"We've last Anbar Province"

[Ziggurat]

Well if I am so ignorant, then perhaps an incredibly smart and well educated person such as yourself would be willing to spend a few days in Iraq seeing the sights while waving the American flag.

That's a non-sequitor if I ever heard one. Did I ever claim it was safe for that sort of behavior yet? No. Does what I HAVE claimed require that? No, it doesn't.

Now, is the number of attacks a good measure of what YOU claimed, namely that "property damage, injuries, and deaths due to insurgent attacks just keeps going up, and up, and up"? It is if the "property damage, injuries, and deaths" from each attack is constant. But what if it's NOT constant? What if they're staging more attacks, but often less successful ones? Then the trend of what you originally claimed could even be the reverse of the number of attacks. What might make the severity of each attack trend downwards? Well, a loss of expertise (Zarqawi, anyone?), a loss of staging areas, a depletion of supplies, adaptation to enemy tactics by coalition forces, lots of things could make the efficiency of the insurgency trend downward. Should we expect some of these factors to be relevant? Yes, we should. Can we conclude, based upon the numbers you presented here, that your origninal claim is correct? No, we cannot.

So thank you for proving a claim other than the one you actually made.

 

[drkitten]

No, it doesn't. It goes up and down periodically, due to a lot of factors (including, for example, the weather). But it most certainly has NOT been a monatonic increase, as you claim. You are ignorant.

That's an -- interesting -- misrepresentation of Crossbow's claims. Certainly, if you look at the trend line for the number of attacks, it does have an overall upward trend.

Similarly, if you look at the casualty count, they are also trending upwards (www.icasualties.org has some stats if you want to look at them).

You suggest that "What if they're staging more attacks, but often less successful ones? ... the trend of what you originally claimed could even be the reverse of the number of attacks." Unfortunately, the numbers don't seem to bear this out, either.

 

[Ziggurat]

That's an -- interesting -- misrepresentation of Crossbow's claims. Certainly, if you look at the trend line for the number of attacks, it does have an overall upward trend.

But Crossbow didn't make any claim about the number of attacks in the post I challenged. He made a claim about the amount of property damage, the number of injuries, and the number of deaths. Those are three DIFFERENT metrics than the number of attacks, and the number of attacks does not tell us any of the other three metrics.

Similarly, if you look at the casualty count, they are also trending upwards (www.icasualties.org has some stats if you want to look at them).

"trending" upwards isn't quite the same thing as "going up, and up, and up", is it? US casualties have NOT been trending upwards, but maybe slightly downwards from a peak in the 2nd half of 2004. Iraqi security force casualties have gone up, certainly, but that's to be expected as they shoulder more and more responsibility. Iraqi civilian casualties have gone up AND down over time. The bloodiest month for them was August '05, and while the average in '06 might be higher than for '05, it's still on a downward trend at the moment from earlier in the year. Which, again, doesn't fit with "going up, and up, and up." And their statistics don't let us compare to '04, which had some of the bloodiest months for US forces, so it's quite possible '04 was bloodier for Iraqi civilians than either '05 or '06.

 

[Ladewig]

I reread my initial post and your subsequent reply. It concerns me that my comments seem “Rovian” to you. I’m going to accept your apology, but must suggest that your knee-jerk assumption is the very thing that politicizes this war, thus making it harder to win. When we demonize each other, or attempt to disparage the character, integrity, intelligence of another’s opinion—not that you did all of that, but to even attempt to marginalize what you perceive to be “the other side”—we prevent useful discourse.

You made a statement that sounded a great deal like a Republican talking point and followed up with a slam on Senator Kerry. I wrongly made an assumption about your position. I'll admit I was incorrect, but I don't think it was a knee-jerk reaction.

As for useful discourse, I agree that it is imperative; but I also maintain that Bush's inner circle has made very little effort to engage in useful discourse about the subject. If I am wrong in holding this position, please provide evidence and I will reconsider my position.

If, as Mycroft suggests, we start from a position of demanding that we “win” (whatever the hell that is) and that we don’t run away, then at the very least Osama Bin Laden doesn’t get to be right that Americans are weak willed and will back down when things get tough.

I believe that Osama Bin Laden is so out of touch with reality that our staying in Iraq until a certified win or our leaving Iraq tomorrow will have no impact at all on his future decisions to attack the U.S.

By starting from the position that we are going to demolish the insurgents, jihadists, terrorists, etc…we can focus on the best way to accomplish that task.

On the other hand, our staying or leaving might have a large impact on some of the more localized terrorists in Iraq. Of course, I may be way off base in believing that because the current activites there (planting bombs that kill children or kill people worshiping in mosques) indicate that they are too crazy to make a rational decisions.

Darth Rotor put the Anbar province condition into a football analogy that I really liked, because it sums up how I see the situation too. Should we argue whether to even play the game when it’s already in the fourth quarter? No. Should we change the coach? Sure, but when his contract expires. Should the team make adjustments? Absolutely. Should they focus on the negative? No. What about the fans? Do we sit on our hands and not boo if we feel that something isn’t going well? Hell no, but we should try to make recommendations that focus on winning.

My take on the football anaology is that Cheney and Rumsfeld brough a baseball team to a football game. I'll admit that it is a very good baseball team, very probably the best in the world in "a stand-up fight" (as Cheney recently put it). The administration's statements about the predicted length of the war, about the predicted cost of the war, about the number of troops needed, and about the status of progress ("the insurgency is in its last throes") indicate to me that they didn't understand what was going to happen in Iraq. The military's decision to beat prisoners to death in a prison that Saddam used to beat people to death is evidence that they did not understand what this war would become. The people at the top didn't know we were going to play football. That's why I think we should have a new secretary of defense.

 

[DJW]

You made a statement that sounded a great deal like a Republican talking point and followed up with a slam on Senator Kerry. I wrongly made an assumption about your position. I'll admit I was incorrect, but I don't think it was a knee-jerk reaction.

FWIW—I’m a centrist, independent voter. I have voted for Democrats, Independents, Republicans and even a couple of Libertarians (I’ll be voting in the Democrat primary today, in fact). However, If you thought my comment about Kerry was a slam, then we need to communicate more so that I can *actually* slam him. The man is a self serving, egotistical, media loving, duplicitous, arrogant, useless and sorry excuse for the gigolo that he is. I would sooner cut my own arm off at the shoulder than ever vote for him.
As far as using the term “knee-jerk reaction”, I think it fits by definition, but I meant no ill will by it.

As for useful discourse, I agree that it is imperative; but I also maintain that Bush's inner circle has made very little effort to engage in useful discourse about the subject. If I am wrong in holding this position, please provide evidence and I will reconsider my position.

Not being a member of the inner circle, I really don’t know what Bush is thinking except from his speeches and his press releases/reports. I’m seeing world events unfold in front of me from a position of ignorance. My biggest concern is that I don’t know what is actually happening because of the fantastic amount of bias that exists within the news “givers”, be they politicians, journalists, news analysts etc…I would agree that Bush hasn’t engaged the USA or the world well. Hopefully the next president will be a better communicator. I just hope he/she also wants to win in Iraq. BTW--Between Kerry and Bush, Yale Univ. should rethink its admissions criteria.

I believe that Osama Bin Laden is so out of touch with reality that our staying in Iraq until a certified win or our leaving Iraq tomorrow will have no impact at all on his future decisions to attack the U.S.

True, but would you then drape the fact that we haven’t yet captured him around Bush’s neck? Some people do, but I don’t see the usefulness of it.

On the other hand, our staying or leaving might have a large impact on some of the more localized terrorists in Iraq. Of course, I may be way off base in believing that because the current activites there (planting bombs that kill children or kill people worshiping in mosques) indicate that they are too crazy to make a rational decisions.

I think leaving would be horrible on so many levels, which have been discussed in detail in this forum. I wonder if more troops and/or a different strategy would help, but no one seems to know.

My take on the football anaology is that Cheney and Rumsfeld brough a baseball team to a football game. I'll admit that it is a very good baseball team, very probably the best in the world in "a stand-up fight" (as Cheney recently put it).

This made me laugh. I also think there’s some truth to your assessment, unfortunately. What do we have to do to get the football team there?

The administration's statements about the predicted length of the war, about the predicted cost of the war, about the number of troops needed, and about the status of progress ("the insurgency is in its last throes") indicate to me that they didn't understand what was going to happen in Iraq.

Yes, but they made adjustments when they realized that they had miscalculated, e.g. more armor, better training (against ieds), different equipment like the personnel carriers that stand up to roadside bombs better, faster training of Iraqis, etc. . We can’t go back, so hopefully we’ve learned a few lessons about this “type” of war. In going forward, what do we need to do?

The military's decision to beat prisoners to death in a prison that Saddam used to beat people to death is evidence that they did not understand what this war would become. The people at the top didn't know we were going to play football. That's why I think we should have a new secretary of defense.

I don’t think the comparison is fair, but that’s my opinion. Although, I’m not sure that I can argue against a valid qualitative comparison. Would you admit that quantitative and institutional differences are pretty evident? As far as Rummy is concerned, I’ll leave that to the military members of this forum to come to a conclusion one way or the other.

 

[Ladewig]

True, but would you then drape the fact that we haven’t yet captured him around Bush’s neck? Some people do, but I don’t see the usefulness of it.

I think I am like you in that I think the most important thing to discuss about Osama is how to capture or kill him.

I don’t think the comparison is fair, but that’s my opinion. Although, I’m not sure that I can argue against a valid qualitative comparison. Would you admit that quantitative and institutional differences are pretty evident? As far as Rummy is concerned, I’ll leave that to the military members of this forum to come to a conclusion one way or the other.

I didn't understand this last question. What institutional differences are you talking about.

 

[Garrette]

Yes, but they made adjustments when they realized that they had miscalculated, e.g. more armor, better training (against ieds), different equipment like the personnel carriers that stand up to roadside bombs better, faster training of Iraqis, etc. . We can’t go back, so hopefully we’ve learned a few lessons about this “type” of war. In going forward, what do we need to do?

It is less a matter of tactics and more a matter of strategy.

It irks me when this is called a new type of war. It is not. It is an insurgency, and insurgencies have been fought--both successfully and unsuccessfully--by more than one nation, even the US.

The only thing arguably new is the extranational nature of the insurgent groups, their multiplicity in a defined area, and the fact that they are more self-supportive than has been historically the case.

There is an institutional resistance in the U.S. military against fighting this type of war, but on local levels and in various offices at the top, there have been successes. The experience of the 101st in Mosul in 2003 was nearly a perfect model of counterinsurgency.

The other thing is a national (as opposed to strictly military) mindset which must be changed to admit that success is a very long-term thing. There will be no defeating of the insurgents this year or next, even if we begin doing all the perfect things tomorrow.

 

[Darth Rotor]

The military's decision to beat prisoners to death in a prison that Saddam used to beat people to death is evidence that they did not understand what this war would become. The people at the top didn't know we were going to play football. That's why I think we should have a new secretary of defense.

What? I am dying to find out how you derived "The Military's decision" in the death of a prisoner.

It is in no field manual that I know of that one beats a prisoner to death. Therefore, the decision to hit or beat the man was not with intent to kill him, and as I understand the case, was not only a regulation violating case of prisoner treatment, but also an unintentional outcome: died, but not due to a decision to put him to death via beating.

Your language is careless and inaccurate, unless you can point to a military decision made by military authority (which in the case of "put the prisoner to death" requires upper echelons of the chain of command) that was "beat this man to death.

I am all ears, and would be grateful for any evidence you have to support your claim.

DR

 

[Ladewig]

I am all ears, and would be grateful for any evidence you have to support your claim.

DR

You are right. I was wrong. I withdraw the claim.

I will replace it with the following.

Cheney's decision to allow abuse of prisoners, the CIA's decision to "ghost" prisoners, the CIA's decision to withhold medical care to prisoners were all made with the intention of gaining critically important information from mid- to high-level terrorists. However, because the techniques were used on people who were not terrorists or even criminals, these policies ended up creating dozens or perhaps even hundreds of terrorists in Iraq.

 

[Crossbow]

That's a non-sequitor if I ever heard one. Did I ever claim it was safe for that sort of behavior yet? No. Does what I HAVE claimed require that? No, it doesn't.

Now, is the number of attacks a good measure of what YOU claimed, namely that "property damage, injuries, and deaths due to insurgent attacks just keeps going up, and up, and up"? It is if the "property damage, injuries, and deaths" from each attack is constant. But what if it's NOT constant? What if they're staging more attacks, but often less successful ones? Then the trend of what you originally claimed could even be the reverse of the number of attacks. What might make the severity of each attack trend downwards? Well, a loss of expertise (Zarqawi, anyone?), a loss of staging areas, a depletion of supplies, adaptation to enemy tactics by coalition forces, lots of things could make the efficiency of the insurgency trend downward. Should we expect some of these factors to be relevant? Yes, we should. Can we conclude, based upon the numbers you presented here, that your origninal claim is correct? No, we cannot.

So thank you for proving a claim other than the one you actually made.

Sorry for the delayed reply, I have been rather busy the last couple of days.

Well since it only took some 16 minutes for you post a reply so I guess you must have missed the bit in your through reading of the GAO report that flatly states how June, 2006 has been the bloodiest time to date (even though Zarqawi was killed in June, 2006). And now that data is available for July, 2006 and August, 2006 it has shown that these months have been even bloodier than was June in spite of your persistent claims that the loss of Zarqawi and staging areas are somehow improving the situation.

The attacks are increasing in terms of frequency and severity as shown on page ten of the recent UN report entitled Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004):

47. Daily civilian casualties remain high. Large-scale kidnappings are now common, as are false checkpoints and summary executions by various Shiite and Sunni armed groups. Despite the Government’s introduction of the Baghdad security plan in June 2006, the levels of violence in the city have actually risen, indicating the worrisome capability of insurgents, armed opposition groups and criminal gangs. Early in August 2006, the Government of Iraq announced a second phase of the Baghdad security plan in which more than 3,700 Multinational Force troops and their armoured fighting vehicles were deployed in the city in another attempt to contain the intensifying violence.

48. However, the security situation in Iraq varies widely. Next to Baghdad, the western province of Al-Anbar is considered the most dangerous area in the country. As a result, the United Nations is unable to conduct operations there. In Baghdad, many districts have been effectively out of bounds for United Nations operations for extended periods. Large numbers of civilians, as well as personnel of Iraqi security forces and troops of the Multinational Force, are killed every week. On 12 July 2006, security responsibilities in the province of Al-Muthana in the south were handed over by the Multinational Force to Iraqi security forces. No significant acts of violence against the Government or other entities in the province have been reported.

 

[Ziggurat]

Sorry for the delayed reply, I have been rather busy the last couple of days.

Not a problem. I do not expect other posters to be at my beck and call, and to be honest, I'd even accept the excuse of boredom with a thread.

And now that data is available for July, 2006 and August, 2006 it has shown that these months have been even bloodier than was June in spite of your persistent claims that the loss of Zarqawi and staging areas are somehow improving the situation.

That wasn't quite my claim. I said that these were blows to the insurgency. That does NOT preclude the possibility that they can make up for these loses in other areas, it means that things would be significantly WORSE had they not lost them. And I don't think you've contested that point.

Another point we haven't really got into is that this is a multi-sided conflict. Shia death squads, for example, contribute to violence and death in Iraq. They are bad, to be sure. But they are also not part of the insurgency. On the plus side, that means this violence does not pose as much of a threat to the government. On the minus side, it's also harder to crack down on, and blows to the insurgency won't necessarily help curb that violence. So I'm well aware that there are serious problems, and I never claimed that everything was rosy.

The attacks are increasing in terms of frequency and severity as shown on page ten of the recent UN report entitled Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004):

You didn't provide a link, so I presume that the part you quoted is the relevant part. But what you quoted does NOT indicate how the overall scale of deaths, injuries, OR property damage, over ANY period of time, has evolved. The closest it comes is "Daily civilian casualties remain high." But that could apply even if civilian casualties are decreasing. The only increase in violence indicated in the report is specific to Baghdad, but we do not know from the quoted section whether this is offset by decreases in violence elsewhere. In fact, we don't even know what metric is used to measure "violence": do they mean number of attacks, numeber of injuries, number of deaths? Some combination? Beats me.

 

[Darth Rotor]

You are right. I was wrong. I withdraw the claim.

I will replace it with the following.

Cheney's decision to allow abuse of prisoners, the CIA's decision to "ghost" prisoners, the CIA's decision to withhold medical care to prisoners were all made with the intention of gaining critically important information from mid- to high-level terrorists. However, because the techniques were used on people who were not terrorists or even criminals, these policies ended up creating dozens or perhaps even hundreds of terrorists in Iraq.

Got it.

The policy decisions you cite are having ripple effects that I suspect the originators never imagined their choices would create.

Myopia for 50, Alex.

DR

 

[Ladewig]

Cheney's decision to allow abuse of prisoners, the CIA's decision to "ghost" prisoners, the CIA's decision to withhold medical care to prisoners were all made with the intention of gaining critically important information from mid- to high-level terrorists. However, because the techniques were used on people who were not terrorists or even criminals, these policies ended up creating dozens or perhaps even hundreds of terrorists in Iraq.

Fairness is an important value for me so I want to withdraw part of my previous criticism. Cheney and the CIA deciding to use agressive introgations is not evidence of poor planning on the administration's part. The people at the top of the intelligence agencies knew that the next al-Queda attack might involve 2, 3, or even 5 times as many victims as the 9/11 attacks. The administration might have actually weighed the possibility of agressively interrogating a wrong person against the possibility of letting a high-ranking al-Queda leader not being thoroghly questioned and decided that violating an innocent person's rights was worth it if enough lives would be saved. Yes, these techniques resulted in some Iraqi nationals taking up arms against U.S. soldiers, but perhaps the administrations policy of fight them there to avoid fighting them here has some reasonable element to it.

To continue with the original claim that these guys had no real plan beyond sending a couple of hundred thousand troops in there, if Brig. Gen. Mark Scheid is accurately quoting Rumsfeld, when he accused the secretary of defense of saying, "he [Rumsfeld] would fire the next person who talked about the need for a post-war plan," then the evidence is clear.

 

[Rob Lister]

Crossbow, where did that chart you posted get it's data? I ask because, according to the chart, there were 4000 insurgent attacks against coalition and iraqi forces/civilians in the month of july alone.

What constitutes an 'attack'?

 

[Jerry_ex_machina]

True.

Well, in the short-run the fundamental thing you want to let them know is that we prefer winning to running.

I actually prefer running, thus my logical contributions to a strategy designed to achieve winning would contain an inherent experimental bias.

 

[Crossbow]

Crossbow, where did that chart you posted get it's data? I ask because, according to the chart, there were 4000 insurgent attacks against coalition and iraqi forces/civilians in the month of july alone.

What constitutes an 'attack'?

The chart comes from page 6 of "GAO-06-1094T" which is entitled STABILIZING IRAQ: An Assessment of the Security Situation. A 'pdf' version of this report can be obtained via the GAO web site at:

www.gao.gov/new.items/d061094t.pdf

As for defining "attack", I do belive that the title of the chart defines the term quite well, to wit:

Enemy-initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners, May 2003 through July 2006.

This report only has statistical data through June, 2006 because when it was written, data for the months of July and August was still classified.

However, if you will review my subsequent post, you will see that the UN has released a report that shows more current data which shows that things are even worse in July and August than they were in June and that Anbar province of Iraq is the worst area of all. A 'pdf' version of this report is available in several different languages at:

http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/2006/706

 

[Crossbow]

Not a problem. I do not expect other posters to be at my beck and call, and to be honest, I'd even accept the excuse of boredom with a thread.

Thanks much! That is most gracious of you.

That wasn't quite my claim. I said that these were blows to the insurgency. That does NOT preclude the possibility that they can make up for these loses in other areas, it means that things would be significantly WORSE had they not lost them. And I don't think you've contested that point.

Another point we haven't really got into is that this is a multi-sided conflict. Shia death squads, for example, contribute to violence and death in Iraq. They are bad, to be sure. But they are also not part of the insurgency. On the plus side, that means this violence does not pose as much of a threat to the government. On the minus side, it's also harder to crack down on, and blows to the insurgency won't necessarily help curb that violence. So I'm well aware that there are serious problems, and I never claimed that everything was rosy.

Well then I do not know what you are claiming!

Originally, you were claiming that Zarqawi getting killed and Fallujah being taken over were "serious blows" to the insurgency, yet all of the object analysis shows that the insurgency just keeps getting more and more sophisticated, larger, better organized, and deadlier, therefore these "serious blows" you crow about do not appear to be all that serious after all.

You didn't provide a link, so I presume that the part you quoted is the relevant part. But what you quoted does NOT indicate how the overall scale of deaths, injuries, OR property damage, over ANY period of time, has evolved. The closest it comes is "Daily civilian casualties remain high." But that could apply even if civilian casualties are decreasing. The only increase in violence indicated in the report is specific to Baghdad, but we do not know from the quoted section whether this is offset by decreases in violence elsewhere. In fact, we don't even know what metric is used to measure "violence": do they mean number of attacks, numeber of injuries, number of deaths? Some combination? Beats me.

Considering how "ignorant" you think I am, I had no idea that finding a document on the UN web site would be so very difficult for you. However, since you are such a sweet guy you can find a 'pdf' rendition of it in several different languages at:

http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/2006/706

The net increase of violence in Iraq has been going up, and up, and up since Baghdad has been taken and the violence has not been offset in any way by decreases in other areas. Now then if you continue to be vexed by not understanding violence in Iraq actually means or how it is determined, then I suggest that you actually study the subject.

 

[Darth Rotor]

New York Times September 18, 2006
Most Tribes In Anbar Agree To Unite Against Insurgents
By Khalid al-Ansary and Ali Adeeb
Check the above article for another angle on the Anbar province deal. I can't get back into it, so no link. My password for NYT doesn't seem to work on a different computer.

Excerpted from the article:

Mr. Rishawi said the 25 tribes counted 30,000 young men armed with assault rifles who were willing to confront and kill the insurgents and criminal gangs that he blamed for damaging tribal life in Anbar, dividing members by religious sect and driving a wave of violent crime in Ramadi.

“We are in battle with the terrorists who kill Sunnis and Shiites, and we do not respect anyone between us who talks in a sectarian sense,” said Mr. Rishawi, the leader of the Rishawi tribe, a subset of the Dulaimi tribe, the largest in Anbar. Half the Rishawi are Shiite Arabs and half are Sunni, he said.

Mr. Rishawi estimated that the insurgents had about 1,300 fighters, many of them foreigners, and are backed by other nations’ intelligence services, though he declined to specify them.

On Sunday, he said the coalition of 25 tribes sent letters to the prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, and other top government officials to seek their support.

DR