Checkmite
Skepticifimisticalationist
Not sure if this this a distinction without a difference. What special implications are there which are different from what I spelled out?
The idea is that we can both recognize a child's future capacity as giving them value and entitlement to protection now and recognize that they're not there yet, so they don't have rights to drive or make contracts and so forth right now. There's no reason it has to be all or nothing.
This view falls squarely in line with the point of view that children are treated in a manner consistent with their mental characteristics at present. I like to call it the "potential people have potential rights" argument. It makes a lot of intuitive sense too: a child might be a potential voter, but has no right to vote right now; they might be potential sex partners, but can't consent at present; they might be potential corpses, but is definitely prudent to treat them as beings who suffer and have a first-person point of view right now; they will eventually become moral agents, but a child lacks culpability required to be charged with arson for playing with matches.
Its a very useful point of view, squares up nicely with how we relate to children in our moral community. They might not be moral agents, but they are moral patients who can suffer, and should be valued for that much alone. Now, the thing about this view is that it rejects potential personhood as being relevant.
That's where you stop describing the point of view I'm exploring here and start adding things I don't necessarily agree with. I've never brought up the capacity to suffer; I've strictly been discussing the capacity for reason as defining a person.
I do not like this "potential person" designation. I think human children in general count as persons because to me their "lack of reasoning" is a strictly transitory condition, much the same way as a sleeping adult human with an otherwise developed mental capacity is still a person even though right this second he is fully unable to reason (by dint of being unconscious).
Its inclusive to the class of humans are not and will never come rational adults. Its hard to rationalize treating infants in a manner consistent with the actual moral characteristics with the view that children only matter because they're potential persons.
It is inclusive; but again it doesn't bother me because humans who by natural processes will never become fully functioning adults are anomalies (for lack of a better term) and as I already said, I think there aren't enough of them to impact the overarching question of whether it's okay to kill and eat humans in general.
I think this point of view needs to be fleshed out. Its very clear that your ethic requires rationality to be included into your sphere of moral consideration, so your view excludes non-rational humans by definition. I think the attempt to equate "potential rational humans" and "actual rational humans" is a false equivalence on the basis that killing them has drastically different moral implications, unless you are comfortable with the view that there's no moral distinction between killing actual rational humans and preventing rational humans from coming into existence in the first place.
As I said, it does not exclude them; where humans being "non-rational" is a transitory and circumstantial condition.
Think of it as the same way in which dog breeds are characterized - by their adult features. A Dalmatian puppy has no spots and absolutely none of the body proportions of an adult Dalmatian; yet for every possible purpose, it is a Dalmatian - that's just what it is. There's no such thing as a "potential Dalmatian".
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