Variation on Determination vs Free Will

[Tricky]

ah, a god-of-the-gaps free will...you forgot to say that we disagree about free will, you and I, because you are wrong about it.

No, not the same at all. As I stated in the definition, free will is not a "thing". It is not a god-of-the-gaps. It is simply a useful concept, sort of like "love". I defy you to show that love actually exists, yet, look at your signature.

Hey, at least you have the courage to present a definition and stand or fall by it. Mostly fall...

Et tu, Mercutio? Then fall, Tricky...

I'm willing to refine my definition. What I'm not willing to do is to throw away a term that many people find useful. I would rather define it.

"Choice" is a very useful word, when properly defined. The behaviorist literature contains quite a bit of research on choice. But choice is often used colloquially as an explanatory fiction--why did you do that? Because I chose to. Ick. In such a case, yes, it is a useless concept too.

Throw out "think" too. You didn't actually "think" anything. It was just brain functions. I really don't see the reason in trying to throw away useful terms. Put them under the surgeons knife, and yes, you may find that the operation was successful, but the patient died.

 

[Mercutio]

Ah, Trixie, you are making a common mistake. "Thinking" is most often not used as an explanatory fiction, but rather as a label for a behavior (or set of behaviors). When "will" and "choice" are used in that manner, they are perfectly fine words, "useful terms" as you put it. It is when they are used circularly to "explain" the very things that we use as evidence of their existence that they are not useful. "Because I wanted to" or "because I chose to" act as reasons, when any 3-yr-old will recognise that the next question is "why did you want to?" and "why did you choose to?". Will and choice, as inner causes, are worse than useless.

A word can be useful when used properly and useless when used improperly. In present company, that really goes without saying...or should.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Um... I was talking about Trickyian free will. This is my definition. It is mine. I wrote it. This is what it is, this definition of mine. I reserve all rights. Perhaps you want to hear my new theory of the brontosaurus?

Ah well then, I certainly can't disagree with your personal definition.

Do you think "choice" is a useless concept too?

I think the idea of libertarian free will (or libertarian free choice, if you like), is incoherent. I think this because I have never heard a coherent definition. Various other uses of "free will" might be useful, but they aren't interesting.

~~ Paul

 

[Beady]

Beady, defining things is crucial to understanding. I think the big problem is asking Iacchus, in particular, to define things. His use of any given word is likely to be unlike any other human's use of that word, but when asked to define it he will not be tied to any definition.

Be that as it may, I see no need to rewrite the dictionary. I am aware of the argument that dictionaries lag behind popular usage, but I don't buy it. If you are free to redefine any word at will, under the guise of some undemonstrable popular usage, then no word has any meanng at all. So, I'll stick to the dictionary and put people like Iacchus and Ian on Ignore.

 

[Tricky]

Ah, Trixie, you are making a common mistake. "Thinking" is most often not used as an explanatory fiction, but rather as a label for a behavior (or set of behaviors). When "will" and "choice" are used in that manner, they are perfectly fine words, "useful terms" as you put it. It is when they are used circularly to "explain" the very things that we use as evidence of their existence that they are not useful.

C'mon Mercutie. You usually read better than this. In my original definition I specifically stated that free will was not a "thing". It is a concept. It doesn't "exist" any more than infinity exists. It doesn't try to employ circularity to explain itself. By my definition, it is simply and expansion of the concept of "choice" into "choice bounded by reality and knowledge."

Yeah, I can immediately see problems with my definition, such as "do you have free will to believe imaginary things". I don't think that free will, as I define it, really applies to that sort of situation, but I can see how it would get garbled.

Tell me if you agree with this though:
The more you know, the more choices of useful action you have. (See, I snuck the word "useful" in there to distingish between them between the choice to do nothing and trust to an imaginary deity. As I say, my definition is subject to discussion.)

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Tricky, you are defining a version of compatibilist free will. No problem. But if someone else is thinking of libertarian free will, the conversation is going to go all postmodern on you.

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

C'mon Mercutie. You usually read better than this. In my original definition I specifically stated that free will was not a "thing". It is a concept. It doesn't "exist" any more than infinity exists. It doesn't try to employ circularity to explain itself. By my definition, it is simply and expansion of the concept of "choice" into "choice bounded by reality and knowledge."

So, a perception of free will rather than an actual causal free will. I can give you that, but it won't do you any good. An illusion that really looks and feels like reality? Sounds like Iacchus's dreams...

Tell me if you agree with this though:
The more you know, the more choices of useful action you have. (See, I snuck the word "useful" in there to distingish between them between the choice to do nothing and trust to an imaginary deity. As I say, my definition is subject to discussion.)

I don't know that I can agree to this. The number of useful choices you have is too often determined by your environment. As is how much you know. Your choice to place the action inside the individual is understandable, but misguided. We can manipulate the environment, but there is no magic switch we can throw to make somebody instantly know more. Even if it feels, experientially, like what you describe is free will, it is not at all a useful illusion. (well...that's not quite true. It is useful in that promoting this view makes people more attuned to the consequences of their actions, and this allows us to control them in that sense.)

 

[Taffer]

For me free will is an illusion. All the factors that go into making it are so complex, so great in number, that for all intents and purposes we have free will. Except we don't really. If you follow.

 

[Tricky]

For me free will is an illusion. All the factors that go into making it are so complex, so great in number, that for all intents and purposes we have free will. Except we don't really. If you follow.

Yes, I follow. Sort of what I am saying. Except we can't really tell if we have it or not. So why not call it "free will" and give a reasonable definition so that everyone will understand what you're talking about? You have to call it something, and it's a bit unweildy to say "the illusion that you are making a choice between alternatives but you really aren't because it's all environmental or it might be something else we don't understand fully."

As I mentioned, love is another such word which requires a context-specific defintion for a very general set of conditions, but nobody seems to be bent out of shape because there is "no such thing as love".

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Tricky, it's already defined. You can't go round postermoderning the definitions.

The only problem is, one of the definitions is incoherent. Perhaps you could replace that one.

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Yes, I follow. Sort of what I am saying. Except we can't really tell if we have it or not. So why not call it "free will" and give a reasonable definition so that everyone will understand what you're talking about? You have to call it something, and it's a bit unweildy to say "the illusion that you are making a choice between alternatives but you really aren't because it's all environmental or it might be something else we don't understand fully."

Why? Because it falsely gives an end-point to the process. Why is this any better than "goddiddit"?

As I mentioned, love is another such word which requires a context-specific defintion for a very general set of conditions, but nobody seems to be bent out of shape because there is "no such thing as love".

Strawman. When the search function is fixed (currently only recent and ancient posts are searched, and all of 2004 is ignored), you can find a behavioral analysis of Love that I posted somewhere...Love can be seen as an explanatory fiction just as easily as Free Will, but is much more satisfactorally seen as an emergent property of a category of behaviors.

Difficulty in defining something is not license to give up.

 

[Tricky]

So, a perception of free will rather than an actual causal free will. I can give you that, but it won't do you any good. An illusion that really looks and feels like reality? Sounds like Iacchus's dreams...

What I'm proposing is a shortcut, not a philosophy.

If you can't determine with a almost flawless degree of certainty that it is perception of free will rather that the actual ability to make choices based on availablity and perception, then how can you differentiate between them? Sure, you might find out that what you thought was a choice had at least an element of environmental control, but so what? Even if you manage to herd all those worms back into the can, you will just open other cans.

I'm not arguing that this isn't worth studying, but just that we need something to describe the effect of what feels like free will. If you insist on calling it "the illusion of free will", then fine. It will make it more difficult to talk about it in a casual way. You'll have to explain yourself every time you use the unweildy phrase.

I don't know that I can agree to this. The number of useful choices you have is too often determined by your environment.

That would be the word "available" in my definition. If your environment is such that certain alternatives are not there, then they are simply not able to be chosen.

As is how much you know. Your choice to place the action inside the individual is understandable, but misguided.

Certainly you admit that choices are often based on the individual's history, biology and preferences. If that's not "inside the individual", then where is it? Even if you are conditioned to hate coconut because you choked on some as a kid, that conditioning is part of you, the individual. The events may be external, but the memory is all yours. You're not choking on coconut when you make the choice to avoid it. You just rememember it.

And what determines which things you will remember and which you will forget? Certainly repetition helps (as Wall Street has discovered), but it is certainly not the only factor.

We can manipulate the environment, but there is no magic switch we can throw to make somebody instantly know more.

Instantly? No. Quickly? yes. That's why many restaurants give samples to assist you in your choice.

Even if it feels, experientially, like what you describe is free will, it is not at all a useful illusion. (well...that's not quite true. It is useful in that promoting this view makes people more attuned to the consequences of their actions, and this allows us to control them in that sense.)

Which sounds to me like it is an extremely useful illusion. Knowing the consequenses of your actions doesn't mean you are being controlled. In fact, the more you know, the more capable you are of making a better choice, not just for yourself, but for others.

The funny thing about (the illusion of) free will is that the more you are aware of it, the less subject you are to control. Those who feel that they "have no other choice", really are setting themselves up to have no other choice, even though others in the same situation might perceive additional, even better choices.

 

[Mercutio]

Strawman. When the search function is fixed (currently only recent and ancient posts are searched, and all of 2004 is ignored), you can find a behavioral analysis of Love that I posted somewhere...Love can be seen as an explanatory fiction just as easily as Free Will, but is much more satisfactorally seen as an emergent property of a category of behaviors.

Difficulty in defining something is not license to give up.

Thanks to an interested stalker, I now have a link to that explanation.
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-13867.html If I was nice, I'd tell you which post, but you will have to read it in context. So there.

 

[Tricky]

Tricky, it's already defined. You can't go round postermoderning the definitions.

Yes I can, dammit! My definition would be in accord with almost any dictionary. I'm only clarifying exactly what I mean when I use the term, and then I use the term consistantly. And if I don't use it consistantly, you can nail me on it.

Now I am sure that there are philosophical definitions that may or may not be part of standard dictionaries, but you're not going to get a lot of people to understand you.

However, if you define free will as "a thing that makes decisions for you" and you use that definition consistantly, then I will agree that there is no free will, by your definition.

The only problem is, one of the definitions is incoherent. Perhaps you could replace that one.

I've read both of them (libertarian and compatabalist), and neither one exactly rolls off the tongue, so to speak. (I agree that the libertarian one is much more silly.) I still prefer my definition. I think most people in casual conversation would.

Forgive me for thinking philosophy is a load of old codswhallop. I have no free will to think otherwise.

 

[Tricky]

Why? Because it falsely gives an end-point to the process. Why is this any better than "goddiddit"?

Under my definition, it does not give an end point. It allows that our choices may be influenced or even determined by external factors. It does not discourage exploration of those factors.

Strawman. When the search function is fixed (currently only recent and ancient posts are searched, and all of 2004 is ignored), you can find a behavioral analysis of Love that I posted somewhere...Love can be seen as an explanatory fiction just as easily as Free Will, but is much more satisfactorally seen as an emergent property of a category of behaviors.

Bushwah!

Prosecutor (to two co-defendents): Why did you kill her?
Defendant 1: I did it because I wanted to.
Defendant 2: I did it for love.

Now why is one of those defenses less of an "end point" than another?

 

[Mercutio]

What I'm proposing is a shortcut, not a philosophy.

Again, so is "goddiddit".

If you can't determine with a almost flawless degree of certainty that it is perception of free will rather that the actual ability to make choices based on availablity and perception, then how can you differentiate between them? Sure, you might find out that what you thought was a choice had at least an element of environmental control, but so what? Even if you manage to herd all those worms back into the can, you will just open other cans.

After enough demonstrations of "vary X in the environment, see Y behavior change, note that the individual is unaware and feels like it is a free choice", I think the burden of proof is on the extraordinary claim of an inner cause.

I'm not arguing that this isn't worth studying, but just that we need something to describe the effect of what feels like free will. If you insist on calling it "the illusion of free will", then fine. It will make it more difficult to talk about it in a casual way. You'll have to explain yourself every time you use the unweildy phrase.

I don't use the unweildy phrase in colloquial speech. I also don't speak of "earth-rotation" instead of "sunrise". But there is also a time and a place for precision. A discussion on whether free will exists at all is not a time for a fuzzy definition of the term.

That would be the word "available" in my definition. If your environment is such that certain alternatives are not there, then they are simply not able to be chosen.

So you agree. Good.

Certainly you admit that choices are often based on the individual's history, biology and preferences. If that's not "inside the individual", then where is it? Even if you are conditioned to hate coconut because you choked on some as a kid, that conditioning is part of you, the individual. The events may be external, but the memory is all yours. You're not choking on coconut when you make the choice to avoid it. You just rememember it.

If that's not inside the individual...it is in the individual's environmental history. The individual's biology is a phylogenetic result of environment, too, and "preferences" is covered between those two.

And what determines which things you will remember and which you will forget? Certainly repetition helps (as Wall Street has discovered), but it is certainly not the only factor.

An excellent question! Note, it is one which is completely dismissed under the assumption of free will.

Instantly? No. Quickly? yes. That's why many restaurants give samples to assist you in your choice.

Thank you for illustrating my point. Yes, there are many ways of manipulating the environment to favor one response or another.

Which sounds to me like it is an extremely useful illusion. Knowing the consequenses of your actions doesn't mean you are being controlled. In fact, the more you know, the more capable you are of making a better choice, not just for yourself, but for others.

Being aware of consequences is good, but it is incomplete. The antecedents of behavior are typically ignored, and we are forced to modify behavior only after the fact, rather than promoting or suppressing various behaviors before they occur. A more complete understanding would result in fewer aversive consequences.

The funny thing about (the illusion of) free will is that the more you are aware of it, the less subject you are to control. Those who feel that they "have no other choice", really are setting themselves up to have no other choice, even though others in the same situation might perceive additional, even better choices.

...he asserted. Conversely, only by recognising that we have no free will are we led to the conclusion that we can bring about change by changing the environment...as an example, look at Behavior Modification and developmentally disabled individuals. By assuming no free will, we are able to design programs that allow much greater freedom (that is, less reliance on medication, less reliance on others, more successful self-management, greater independence).

 

[Mercutio]

Under my definition, it does not give an end point. It allows that our choices may be influenced or even determined by external factors. It does not discourage exploration of those factors.

So why do you call it "free will" again?

Bushwah!

Prosecutor (to two co-defendents): Why did you kill her?
Defendant 1: I did it because I wanted to.
Defendant 2: I did it for love.

Now why is one of those defenses less of an "end point" than another?

Neither is. In both these cases, you are using it as an explanatory fiction, an inferred "cause". Both are useless end points.

 

[Tricky]

Again, so is "goddiddit".

It is more of a "wedunnowhadiddit", just like anything we don't completely understand.

After enough demonstrations of "vary X in the environment, see Y behavior change, note that the individual is unaware and feels like it is a free choice", I think the burden of proof is on the extraordinary claim of an inner cause.

So if you manipulate ever variable you can think of, but the subject still makes the same decision, would you call that an "inner cause", or would you say "something exterior made him have this unalterable preference"? Sounds very much like the sorts of excuses that religious people make for their god.

I don't use the unweildy phrase in colloquial speech. I also don't speak of "earth-rotation" instead of "sunrise". But there is also a time and a place for precision. A discussion on whether free will exists at all is not a time for a fuzzy definition of the term.

Well tough. I'm giving a definition that makes sense and is internally consistant. I won't accept your strawman definition in place of my own.

If that's not inside the individual...it is in the individual's environmental history. The individual's biology is a phylogenetic result of environment, too, and "preferences" is covered between those two.

But their history, their biology all those things are part of the person. They cannot be separated from him. You may argue that all those external factors made the person what he is, but in the end, it is still the person, the accumulated product of his biology and history, that is making the decision.

If you give a blood transfusion to a person, is that blood "internal" to the person, or do you forever regard each cell as something external that was implanted into him? Why should it be any different with memories?

An excellent question! Note, it is one which is completely dismissed under the assumption of free will.

No it is not. It is held open.

Thank you for illustrating my point. Yes, there are many ways of manipulating the environment to favor one response or another.

Offering samples allows the individual to base their response on data, rather than memories or assumptions. I cannot see how that manipulates the environment to favor a certain response.

Being aware of consequences is good, but it is incomplete. The antecedents of behavior are typically ignored, and we are forced to modify behavior only after the fact, rather than promoting or suppressing various behaviors before they occur. A more complete understanding would result in fewer aversive consequences.

By all means, do what you can to reduce the possibility of aversive consequenses. You'll never eliminate selective memory though.

...he asserted. Conversely, only by recognising that we have no free will are we led to the conclusion that we can bring about change by changing the environment...as an example, look at Behavior Modification and developmentally disabled individuals. By assuming no free will, we are able to design programs that allow much greater freedom (that is, less reliance on medication, less reliance on others, more successful self-management, greater independence).

I don't doubt that you are able to achieve behavior modification in people, however, I do not see that the assumption of no free will is necessary to achieve this. Nor do I agree that the people who have had their behavior modified (but not strictly controlled) are bereft of free will for many other choices. In fact, I'd be willing to bet that certain strong-willed (if I may use the term) individuals reject conditioning.

 

[Tricky]

So why do you call it "free will" again?

Because it has the appearance of free will.

Neither is. In both these cases, you are using it as an explanatory fiction, an inferred "cause". Both are useless end points.

How about if I call free will "an emergent property of a catagory of behaviors". Will that make it all right? Certainly that case could be argued.

You argue that my saying "you cannot predict everything" is resorting to god-of-the-gaps, yet you have no problem making a similar assumption that even though we can't explain everything, someday we will. Should we call this "god-of-the-caulk"?

 

[Iacchus]

If God had Free Will ...

So, if God had free will, and He existed on the other side of this "void" you folks keeps referring to, wouldn't His free will also extend into our "little world?" This by the way, would coincide with this spiritual "thingee" that I brought up in the original post. Meaning, the fact that we have free will or, the appearance of it -- similar to the appearance of evolution that is -- constitutes evidence don't you think?