US authorities framed al-Megrahi for the destruction of Pan Am 103

[Hallo Alfie]

So who did it?

 

[Rolfe]

No real idea. The smart money says it was indeed a PFLP-GC operation, but it wasn't done the way it was originally thought to have been done. To add to the coincidences in the case, almost everybody who has been fingered has been called Abu something....

If you strip away the wilder CTs, the suspicion remains that the bombing was inadvertently facilitated by some covert CIA or DIA operation that was going on, probably involving Frankfurt airport (although the most compelling evidence for the place of insertion of the bomb is actually Heathrow), and that this led to a cover-up in which a trail leading to Libya was laid to get the investigators off the real scent. I wonder, even, it it was an operation aimed at preventing a bombing of this nature that spectacularly backfired and ended up facilitating it. The fact that a real live Libyan subsequently turned out to have been in the wrong place at the wrong time to get the crime pinned on him may well have been merely fortuitous.

That's speculation and kite-flying, of course. The only part that's certain is that Megrahi was framed in 1991, principally by the CIA and the Department of Justice blackmailing and bribing Giaka to invent evidence to implicate him in the crime, and that they did this because Megrahi was a plausible suspect and they didn't have another plausible suspect.

The rest - who knows?

Rolfe.

 

[Hallo Alfie]

Interesting.
It would seem to me, that for this to really get legs worldwide (not just JREF), alternative perpetrator(s) would be required to be found and a prima facie case established.

If there really has been a miscarriage of justice, it has - in part - been addressed by his release.
I'm no legist but don't they need additional compelling evidence first, before they re-open a case and spend squillions more of public money?

What will ultimately be achieved even if he is cleared? Has, and/or how, is the public best served?

 

[Rolfe]

I wouldn't say that within hearing distance of any of the victims' family members mentioned above.

Millions were spent on a 4-year investigation of the case by the SCCRC, between 2003 and 2007. In 2007 they reported that there were six separate grounds in which a miscariage of justice may have occurred. (Though they only told us about four of them, all relating to the Gauci identification.) The case was referred back to court for the appeal to go ahead, in mid 2007.

During 2008 the authorities spent a pile more money obstructing the attempts of the defence to have a certain document released in evidence. This, and other delaying tactics, prevented the appeal being heard in 2008 as had been expected. In September 2008, Megrahi was diagnosed with aggressive prostate cancer.

The appeal got to court in April of 2009, and the first hearings occurred. The defence case was going very well indeed, relating to the purchase of the clothes. However, despite the appellant being terminally ill, the case was scheduled to be heard in three sessions - the second beginning November 2009 amd the third, I believe, February this year.

In July/August 2009, during a recess in the appeal hearings, Megrahi was assessed as possibly/probably having only three months or so left to live. Which would just about have taken him up to the start of the appeal hearings being reconvened in November, but nowhere near the conclusion of the proceedings.

This is where it gets murky, but it appears that he was pressurised to drop the appeal as a quid pro quo to get the compassionate release. Which he did, leaving a lot of people who wanted to know the truth extremely upset.

There has been an absolutely stonking amount of money spent on this so far, only for it to be cut short just before we would have got an outcome. However, although the appeal was dropped, the SCCRC report detailing the reasons for their belief that it "may have been" (read, bloody well was!) a miscarriage of justice, still remains.

Rolfe.

 

[Chaos]

Dunno. Is anybody reading? The thread isn't getting many views either. A.A.Alfie says nobody cares.

I think the case that al-Megrahi was framed in a plain vanilla manner because he was a plausible suspect in the wrong place at the wrong time is unanswerable, frankly. And that the subsequent conviction was politically-motivated, and the present cover-up may be interpreted merely as a cover-up of a deeply embarrassing miscarriage of justice.

I therefore find it incomprehensible that "nobody cares" about this, in the light of the constant headlines going on right now, monstering an innocent man because he was granted the privilege of going home to die of cancer.

However, this is going somewhere. The legend of Lockerbie includes a tuppence coloured conspiracy theory, whereby the US authorities sought from the beginning to avoid bringing the probable real culprits to justice, and to lay the blame on Libya instead. Only two years later did this crystallise out into blaming a particular Libyan.

The usual reason given for this (the Gulf War) doesn't wash. Did it happen at all, or has the plain vanilla conspiracy merely been over-interpreted? Was the main intent to blame Libya - or rather, to avoid investigating the real culprits, and Libya was just a handy diversion?

Was the CIA actually culpable in some way for the Lockerbie disaster, a way which would become public if the true culprits were brought to book, and which would be far too embarrassing ever to allow to be discovered? Is this why evidence pointing to Libya in general was planted in the early months of the enquiry, evidence which (perhaps fortuitously) eventually led to the fingering and conviction of an innocent Libyan for the crime?

I actually don't know. But I don't discount it on principle. So let's see whether anyone is interested if and when the progression of the thread gets that far.

Rolfe.

Don´t attribute to malice what can be explained by stupidity, wrongheadedness and the desire to cover one´s ass after making a mistake.

Assuming the CIA et al did contribute to sentencing an innocent man, I see several possibilities, in descending order of likelhood:

1) They were convinced, not beyond reasonable doubt but beyond the doubt of someone predisposed not to like the suspect and the country he is from, that he was indeed the culprit and that, since he had covered his tracks so well, they had to doctor the evidence in order to take a dangerous individual out of circulation. Let´s call this the "stupidity, bias and (sorta) good intentions" version.

2) They really had no clue who did it, thought the al-Megrahi was a bad guy anyway - you know, Lybian, and all that - so why not frame him? Taking an evil Lybian bad guy out of circulation on one hand, and presenting an image of competence and being hard on blowing up airplanes to the public on the other, that´s killing two flies with one stone. Let´s call it the "incompetence, dishonesty and (sorta) good intentions" version.

3) They knew who did it, but for some reason exposing the real culprit would uncover some failure or something on their part which they did not want exposed, so they decided to blame al-Megrahi to deflect investigations from the real culprit, and for the reasons in (2)

4) They had done it themselves and framed al-Megrahi for it, both to deflect the investigation from themselves and for the reasons presented in (2). This is the MIHOP of Lockerbie theories.

5) They knew who did it, and it was someone they didn´t want to see blamed for it in public; since the CIA probably wouldn´t have had a problem seeing the IRA, Palestinians or KGB blamed, this more or less leaves only the Mossad or the British, and either only if they were trying to pull off version (4)

Assuming al-Megrahi was indeed blamed by the CIA (I am covering my own skeptical ass with that caveat, not questioning your arguments, Rolfe), then I think (1) and (2) are the most likely; (1) is somewhat more likely, I think, but I would not want to have to definitely pick one version. (3) is unlikely but possible, in my opinion, and (4) and (5) are pure CT territory - on par with MIHOP and LIHOP for 9/11.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Nice breakdown, Chaos. Myself I'm really no #3, as I think most sceptics are. It deservesmore detailed consideration, but I've got to jet.

ETA: (Post #94) brings us back to the question of what could be done. The best way to clear Megrahi's name would have been in the courts, with the appeal. But for *mysterious reasons of his own* Megrahi surrendered that a week before being released.

The better situated people are Dr. Swire,Mr.Berkley, et al. And they have been looking into reviving that appeal in "the bomber's" name, or having a third appeal ordered, or whatever can be done. I don't know how these things work, and I'm not sure those guys are really much ahead, but they are trying.

I suspect the Scottish justiciary will not fully cooperate with this. Having the verdict overturned for such gross violations of justice might be ... embarrassing. I suspect as an unrelated American citizen, I'd have worse luck yet.

And as far as the real culprits go, it's about as Rolfe says, and the same party suspected by everyone in the early months, before the Libyan clues started appearing out of nowhere. It was pretty obvious, given the scale of grievance the Iranians were pursuing. If this isn't familiar to you, the abundance of alternate perp clues it's actually one of the strong points of this "CT." Here's aprovocative thread I started to discuss the issue of motive re: PFLP-GC vs. Libya. http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=165352
And a blog post: http://lockerbiedivide.blogspot.com/2010/03/iran-air-655-casus-belli-behind.html

And besides the powerful motive and semi-established monry trail from Iran to these guys, their technology (timers that detonate 30-60 minutes after takeoff, depending) matches the detonation on 103 if the bomb went on at Heathrow (38 minutes after takeoff). There are other clues, but those are the biggies.

 

[Rolfe]

Neat summary.

Don´t attribute to malice what can be explained by stupidity, wrongheadedness and the desire to cover one´s ass after making a mistake.

Oh, there's a helluva lot of that going on. So much of it that it's hard to tell if there's anything more.

Assuming the CIA et al did contribute to sentencing an innocent man,

I can't see any way they weren't, looking at what happened with Giaka. The case would never have come to court without the US Department of Justice assuring the Scottish prosecutors that Giaka was a credible witness who would implicate the accused. Except they blatantly blackmailed Giaka into making it up. Without that, the remaining evidence woudn't have supported the indictment. The fact that it subsequently supported a conviction is a whole other ball game, I agree.

1) They were convinced, not beyond reasonable doubt but beyond the doubt of someone predisposed not to like the suspect and the country he is from, that he was indeed the culprit and that, since he had covered his tracks so well, they had to doctor the evidence in order to take a dangerous individual out of circulation. Let´s call this the "stupidity, bias and (sorta) good intentions" version.

I think that actually describes the position of quite a number of people involved in the investigation, probably the majority. Sadly, it's a mind-set found in police forces the world over. It seems very difficult to believe that absolutely nobody sat up and realised that the Malta baggage records actually proved he couldn't have done it, though.

2) They really had no clue who did it, thought the al-Megrahi was a bad guy anyway - you know, Lybian, and all that - so why not frame him? Taking an evil Lybian bad guy out of circulation on one hand, and presenting an image of competence and being hard on blowing up airplanes to the public on the other, that´s killing two flies with one stone. Let´s call it the "incompetence, dishonesty and (sorta) good intentions" version.

That quite possibly accounts for the rest of it - if you add in the fact that not getting anyone for this appalling atrocity would not be a great political or career move. He's in the right place at the right time, he's undercover as well, and he's a Libyan security officer. What's not to like? He'll do nicely.

3) They knew who did it, but for some reason exposing the real culprit would uncover some failure or something on their part which they did not want exposed, so they decided to blame al-Megrahi to deflect investigations from the real culprit, and for the reasons in (2)

I think that's the essence of the main Lockerbie CT. It's actually stated in so many words by Paul Foot, when he's discussing the article Jack Anderson wrote in January 1990 which first reported the alleged Bush/Thatcher telephone call agreeing to back off on getting too close to the PFLP-GC.

But there was something else about Anderson’s speculation which didn’t quite ring true: the notion that George Bush and Margaret Thatcher would agree a “low key” approach solely because they could not do anything to avenge themselves and the Lockerbie relatives on Iran. Just as likely was the fear in both their minds that the Lockerbie bombing had exposed a gaping hole in their intelligence services which would, if the matter was fully aired, be proved to have been incompetent to stop a murderous plot they knew about. At any rate, the Anderson article provided some explanation for the curious official silence of both heads of state after March 1989.

It's interesting to note that this article and others were written before the timer fragment was identified and deemed to point to Libya (June 1990), never mind the first investigations of Megrahi as a suspect (February 1991).

However, you're going right on to a MIHOP, when there is a sodding great LIHOP being promulgated by a lot of people from Tam Dalyell down. It goes like this.

When IA655 was shot down in July 1988, Iran believed it was done on purpose. The Iranian government vowed to take revenge, by downing not just one but many US airliners. I've heard ten mentioned. Somehow, and I've never heard this explained in detail, a bargain was struck. Iran would be allowed to take out one airliner, no hindrance and no retaliation, if it would stop at that. Dalyell calls it a "Faustian bargain".

Just how this story continues depends on which CTist you're listening to. Prominent people were pulled off the flight and people who were "expendable" politically were left on (Charles McKee and Bernt Carlsson are the commonest candidates for that category). There's no real evidence for this, but that's how it goes.

Iran paid the PFLP-GC to do the job. And then, after it happened, the CIA exerted itself to make sure they weren't tracked down. In fact, the CIA actually got Khreesat who made the bomb released from German custody in October 1988 (this appears to be true, actually).

I think it's an appalling idea. I'd have to be dragged there by extraordinarily compelling evidence, which does not appear to exist.

4) They had done it themselves and framed al-Megrahi for it, both to deflect the investigation from themselves and for the reasons presented in (2). This is the MIHOP of Lockerbie theories.

This is just an extension of the LIHOP - it's been suggested by at least one CTer that the CIA was so concerned to save the other hypothetical 9 flights that it actually assisted in the boombing itself. Even more appalling, and completely evidence-free.

5) They knew who did it, and it was someone they didn´t want to see blamed for it in public; since the CIA probably wouldn´t have had a problem seeing the IRA, Palestinians or KGB blamed, this more or less leaves only the Mossad or the British, and either only if they were trying to pull off version (4)

I have seen the occasional, well of course it was Mossad. It seems just to be a knee-jerk reaction by the usual antisemitic suspects.

Assuming al-Megrahi was indeed blamed by the CIA (I am covering my own skeptical ass with that caveat, not questioning your arguments, Rolfe), then I think (1) and (2) are the most likely; (1) is somewhat more likely, I think, but I would not want to have to definitely pick one version. (3) is unlikely but possible, in my opinion, and (4) and (5) are pure CT territory - on par with MIHOP and LIHOP for 9/11.

I think a combination of 1 and 2 are essentially certain, depending on who you're talking to. The interesting question is whether, underneath all that, 3 was happening all along.

Bear in mind that something a bit freaky was going on in Frankfurt. Which was in the US sector of the FRD at the time. The Frankfurt cops busted the local cell of the PFLP-GC in October 1988, catching a number of them red-handed with a device startlingly similar to the one that downed Maid of the Seas. (There are MIHOPers who say it was the same device.) About 17 arrests were made, but all but 2 were released within 48 hours for "lack of evidence".

Marwan Khreesat, the actual bomb-maker, was actually a CIA asset, who was supposed to be making dud bombs, as a double agent. These bombs were not dud however. Khreesat (according to one report) made one phone call to his CIA handlers in Frankfurt and was out of there.

Then when the disaster happened, all the baggage records at Frankfurt airport vanished into a black hole. This was never adequately explained. The details have been gone over already. The Scottish police requested the records several times, but were fobbed off with "the records don't exist any more" and "the records have been destroyed". The only thing more insane than this is how calmly everyone seems to take it. The two police forces were barely on speaking terms though.

Then in April 1989, the PFLP-GC were busted again and (I think) five more devices seized. Caustic Logic is better on the details of this than I am. One device apparently never surfaced, and it's suspected that's the one that blew up over Lockerbie. These were the "dud" devices Khreesat the Jordanian/CIA asset was supposed to be making. One of them exploded and killed a German bomb disposal expert. So the Germans destroyed the rest, on safety grounds. Thus that evidence wasn't available to the Lockerbie investigation.

There have been persistent stories about the US drugs enforcement people allowing controlled consignments of heroin to enter the USA via Frankfurt, in order to track the material at the other end and bust the drug dealers. There seems to be some truth in this, they just say they weren't doing it in December 1988. There are also stories about a "drugs for hostages" deal, similar to the "arms for hostages" deal. Pan Am 103 is supposed to be one of the flights used in these operations.

I have little idea about any of this except that there really does seem to have been weird stuff going on at Frankfurt. Some early investigators proposed the theory that the bomb got on board because the terrorists managed to switch one of the drugs suitcases, which were arranged to circumvent the x-ray, for the bomb. These are the people who claim that reprisals were taken against them by the US authorities (Juval Aviv, Lester Coleman, James Shaughnessy and Allan Francovich). The people propounding the fabricated MST-13 fragment and all that stuff seem to proceed unmolested.

So I think there might have been something going on at Frankfurt, involving the PFLP-GC, that the CIA really, really didn't want to get out, to the point of diverting attention from that aspect. Giving the LIHOPers a moment's credulity, it might even be that some covert negotiations were going on in respect of trading one flight for many, with the intention of getting close enough to the plot to stop the whole thing, and it went spectacularly wrong.

And of course that could all be total fantasy-land. It's possible that the PFLP-GC simply pulled it off by a means that was never discovered (aided by redirecting the investigation to Malta by using these Maltese clothes, and the fact that the investigators really, really didn't want that bomb to have gone on at Heathrow, on British soil). Then, following up the Malta red herring, the investigation noticed Megrahi looking suspicious, got suspicions, and simply decided to fit him up anyway.

But I'd like to know, one way or the other. There are an awful lot of weird things about this case quite separate from the framing of Megrahi. The timer fragment, the radio manual, the Frankfurt baggage records, the Erac printout, and the insider stories going right back to 1989 that there was a very high-up order to back off on the PFLP-GC.

So, I speculate, and I look at the evidence, and I speculate some more.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

And as far as the real culprits go, it's about as Rolfe says, and the same party suspected by everyone in the early months, before the Libyan clues started appearing out of nowhere. It was pretty obvious, given the scale of grievance the Iranians were pursuing. If this isn't familiar to you, the abundance of alternate perp clues it's actually one of the strong points of this "CT." Here's aprovocative thread I started to discuss the issue of motive re: PFLP-GC vs. Libya. http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=165352
And a blog post: http://lockerbiedivide.blogspot.com/2010/03/iran-air-655-casus-belli-behind.html.

I'd forgotten about that thread you just linked to. There is a post there by Ambrosia which is very very interesting.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=5539439

I wish he'd come back - I hope it wasn't something I said. He was a great asset and had so much to contribute. But he hasn't posted since April, and even then he was just playing Battlestar Galactica.

Read the post, anyway.

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

I'd forgotten about that thread you just linked to. There is a post there by Ambrosia which is very very interesting.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=5539439

I wish he'd come back - I hope it wasn't something I said. He was a great asset and had so much to contribute. But he hasn't posted since April, and even then he was just playing Battlestar Galactica.

Read the post, anyway.

Rolfe.

I do recall we had a fairly sharp disagreement there over tone and approach. Re-reading it now, I get the same impression. It's not that I'm wrong, just undisciplined and too right-brained, etc. Yeah,I know that. It would have taken hours to carefully cite and explain the context of each of these things I could also just rattle off with some flair in 1/10 the time. So sue me.

And as far as the Libya and Iran angle, Jibril himself actually in Libya I haven't double-checked, but Ambrosia sounds pretty sure, so ... this makes it seem more plausible, but a whole new CT no one has proposed. It wouldn't do much to explain the "case" against Megrahi I don't think. And I'm not sure how it would fit in with the London clues. Did Gaddafi just facilitate the transfer of Jibril's bomb from Germany, perhaps via Libya, to the Iran Air people at Heathrow? Or did he really have a new bomb built for him, with easily traceable timer inside a similarly stupid radio?

So... sorry that's not the best thread due to my whatever. Point being, Iran was supposed to get that revenge, right about when Libya officially pulled off this bizarre plot of their own. I'm not buying it, not based on the "evidence" that convinced investigators.

ETA: I do feel like a jerk for not explaining things better at first, or not censoring myself better so he wouldn't have to criticize me and make me snappy and apparently chase him off. Ambrosia, sorry! If you're reading, we do miss you and your input!

 

[Caustic Logic]

I uppose I can add something of value now. It's been asked who besides Megrahi/Libya might have been responsible for the bombing, and as I said above, this is not aproblem at all. Rolfe gives a pretty good rundown of the known operation above. That was from the point of view of Tam Dalyell's "Faustian bargain" construct, which just adds an optional twist that I'd rather not get hung up on.

The main thing about this group is its apparent links to Iran revenge plans and the technology they used and its fit with the Lockerbie evidence. The latter I can come back to, but here I'll cover the group and its ops, quickly on the first half and then more detailed. All from my head except where a handy link occurs to me.

We have the USS Vincennes incident that killed 290 Iranians, and whatever one makes of it (here's what ABC/Nightline thought), there's little doubt the Iranian government was furious. There were vows of vengeance, a rain of blood, etc. Western intelligence fully expected at least some attempt to follow up on that.

There's some doubt or uncertainty about the money transactions, and I haven't studies that part closely, but it's said that (IIRC) $1 million was deposited into an account from some Iranian source (Motashemi?) some months before the Lockerbie bombing, and another $10 million just after.

The PFLP-GC is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command - a notoriously brutal splinter group headed by Ahmed Jibril. Based mostly from Syria, they're well known for massacring a schoolbus full of children and also a hospital. In Feb. 1970 they had targeted airplanes from Europe to Israel, using crude altimeter bombs made by a young Jordanian named Marwan Khreesat. Both detonated just minutes after takeoff, one landing safely with no injuries, and the other crashing by a fluke (major smoke) and killed everyone.
(details - All my blog posts on Khreesat and his handiwork)

Khreesat apparently laid low for nearly two decades after that, and became (or already was?) a double agent for Jordanian intel, GID. I'm not sure if he was "CIA," even indirectly, but the GID did later vouch for him as one of theirs.He was requested by Jibril in 1985 to make five altimeter bombs using the newer materials available. He went to Syria, made these, and took them back apart, he says. It was a demo, except one Jibril kept and showed to his nephew, Khaisar Haddad aka "Abu Elias." (this is patched together from several sources and is a little unsure - dedicated thread here - starts a little rough but gets better)

Now... after they had their down payment, Jibril's babykillers set up a new operation in October 1988 in Neuss/Frankfurt West Germany. Jibril's right-hand man Hafez Dalkamouni headed it up. Khreesat was again requested. The GID told him to go, make fake bombs, report back frequently. He arrived in Germany October 13, with his wife actually. They spent a few days shopping with Dalkamouni and others before she flew home and Marwan got to work. He labored over four devices - two inside Ultrasound radios, one in a Sanyo monitor, and one in one of the radios he had used in 1985, a Toshiba BomBeat 453. Their time delays were longer than in 1970 - rather than 15 minutes they were for 30, 45, 60 minutes after the early trigger altitude.

He made them all live and deadly. The reason he gave when the FBI talked to him in Nov. 1989 was "Abu Elias." The bigwig who knew his work had come to Neuss, perhaps to inspect his work and make sure it wasn't a dud. He also apparently brought another radio bomb, already assembled but for two wires needing soldered. For some reason, Khreesat was made to do this while Dalkamouni watched. Then he took it back and "the fifth device" - a different type of Toshiba - disappeared. Abu Elias was also supposed to be an expert in airport security and working around it, for what that's worth.

The German feds BundesKriminalAmt (BKA) had been watching this whole operation. They grew nervous. Either the Jordanian GID or the German BND they liaised with failed to tell the BKA about agent Khreesat and the details he was phoning out - multiple bombs and one missing. So when they sprung on October 26, they hit three spots - two apartments, one with Khreesat's bomb stuff, and the car Dalkamouni and Khreesat were in. They were on their way to meet Abu Elias again to deliver one of the four other bombs, says Khreesat.

The BKA wound up with the BomBeat 453 that was in the car, and what's weird is that their raid of Dalkamouni's place missed the two other radio bombs and the data screen. Khreesat was making hidden IEDs and the BKA apparently left these as inoccuous. Khreesat was released along with most others, after a call to GID. He went right back to Amman. Dalkamouni and the guy responsible for the huge cache of weapons found were held for presence of evidence.

This bust, and a study of the ONE bomb recovered, plus fears of other bombs, led to the important "Toshiba Warning" of November-December 1988. Look out for radios with Semtex and an altimeter inside them. It doesn't seem to have gotten out to the rank-and-file people in time for December 21. None of the relevant people at Heathrow, who seem to have passively witnessed the bomb's introduction, were aware of this warning.

It was only after the bombing that attention turned back to those October busts. The Jordanians informed that Khreesat spoke of four or five bombs, not one. Were they all gotten? Uh... no. The BKA went back to the house in Spring 1989, or the storage unit where the stuff was moved since then anyway. They seized the Ultrasound radios but left the monitor. Somehow, one of these detonated, killing a highly experienced bomb tech and maiming another. They destroyed the other with high-pressure water. Khreesat later affirmed to FBI that he didn't booby-trap the things.

They found the monitor after this, finally taking ALL electronics. The German approach here - as reported to us - seems so strange and sloppy, I really feel like we're missing something that would give it more sense. Especially given that at this same time, December 88 to August 89 they Germans were ignoring, destroying, sitting on, or fabricating the amazing souvenir printout that would "prove" the bomb came from Malta, while publicly denying British claims it came from Frankfurt, by insisting it must have come from London. I really think we're missing a few things here.

I'm sure not all that detail was needed, but I think it's been pretty well illustrated that this workshop was running just weeks prior to the bombing. The weapons made were for killing airliners at altitude. Khreesat's own were irrelevant, except to those two bomb techs. But that fifth device (at least per Khreesat's story, which is all we have) never turned up. Unless it did. And then after "Libya's bombing" the full payment to the PFLP-GC was reportedly plunked down for some job well done, somewhere.


A.A. Alfie, I know that's a lot to absorb at once and to accept at face value, but if this were all true, is that a strong enough possibility to warrant a re-examination of the case against Megrrahi?

 

[Buncrana]

I've often read that the Answer to Lockerbie lies in Germany, most likely in some of the German based articles I browsed over many years ago when looking into the Autumn Leaves operation. While I may not wholly subscibe to this premise, as I believe the answer of how Pan Am 103 came to have a suitcase containing a bomb placed on-board lies at Heathrow, however, the answer as who was behind this and why the investigation was skewed away from the PFLP and towards Libya, may very well lie in Germany. Khreesat, to keep it short.

However, the framing of Megrahi and Libya is a curious aspect. My tuppence worth....

I think the consideration of framing Libya, and possible even Megrahi, was made very early. Whatever Bollier claims of how he came to type out that statement within a fortnight of 103's bomb, someone thought it important enough to visit Mebo during the nascent period of the investigation. The wheels, if already not in full motion, were greased and beginning to turn. Problems however, were being collected all over the hills around Lockerbie, while the publicity that the Autumn leaves operation had attracted, would provide an additional hurdle, if it was to be announced that a bomb had indeed brought down 103.

I think the FBI were quite confident that Tony was so suggestable, perhaps a bit of a simpleton, and he was very clearly unsure, perhaps not initailly in details of size, but certainly in what the buyer looked like, and the photo-fit seemed to confuse poor Tony even more by the time the interviews were in full flow. All the while, Gauci's contradictory and confused statements, even while hinting at Talb, would never be enough to persuade the investigators they had a credible witness to allow an indictment and charge. Over time, and when the time was right, that is after the toshiba, MST and B8849 had been established in their own right, would the appropriate inducement entice a more willing and amenable Gauci. Even then, although Tony was not the most sophisticated of witnesses, compared to Giaka, he must've been pretty much seen as top-notch. Of course, not only was Tony's identification not really assured, but his original recollection of the day of the purchase was even worse. Everything connected to the day of sale, pointed back towards Talb who by late 1989 was also known to have travelled to Malta in the months before Lockerbie. Late '89 was when B8849 had made it's remarkable appearance in the chain of clues, and encouraged the investigators that Malta and Gauci's buyer of the clothes was the prime suspect. The fact that the records from Malta stood up to scrutiny, with no unaccompanied bag coming from KM180, and the manner with which the Germans had seemingly withheld evidence and corporation in the investigation, they decided that the bag most likely did come via KM180. Why, again this wouldn't raise concerns within some of the investigating team, I cannot for the life me imagine. It must have. Undeterred with this unresolved issue, they ploughed on with the KM180 connection, visualizing someone the someone at Luqa that morning, perhaps an Libyan intelligence agent would be spotted boarding a morning flight leaving Luqa around the same time as KM180 left for Frankfurt.

Not immediately however, as the hunt was still on to find where the PI-995 fragment had originated from. The portion of Toshiba circuit board, AG145, had narrowed it down to any of 7 models, originally thought to be white, but now determined to be black, and with the manual recovered by Mrs Horton has provided a positive id on a model. This model is thought to be of a series predominantly ordered by Libya. Quite why the hunt was still on for a match to the red circle photo of the fragment PI995 was proving quite such a challenge after Hayes memo to Williamson is another very strange episode, when during Zeist, is was commented that the Swiss police, and Peter Fluckiger, had been to Mebo in June 1989 to see Bollier in connection with MST timers. However, that wouldn't have done for the Scots police to know about this, when they hadn't known anything about a possible timer id until June 1990 and Thurman's quick take-up, never mind September when the first got Feraday's excitable polaroid of a fragment, or even actually June the year before when the swiss had went to visit Bollier!

And, that photo.

Feraday, in a fit of sudden excitement, apparently rushes up a Polaroid of the fragment, as though no other photographs exist, and sends that to Williamson.

Q- Very well. Is it not the case, Dr. Hayes, that if you had photographed PI 995 and the trapped material in May 1989, Mr. Feraday would have had access to those photographs?
A- I would imagine that he would, yes, most definitely.
Q- And would those simply be Polaroid photographs that you took at that time, Dr .Hayes?
A- It is most unlikely that they would be, no.
Q- I see. Well, you can cast no light on the matter of why Mr. Feraday, in September 1989, would be relying, because of the short time interval, on dubious-quality Polaroid photographs?
A- No, I can't think of any explanation at all, certainly in view of the apparent interval of time, no.


Meanwhile, the trails towards Libya and Megrahi are being laid, it just seems a matter of letting Gauci waffle on, providing confusing and contradictory statements, and essentially while he did quite well on recollecting the clothing, his statements of identification are completely unreliable, which is just fine. When, finally, the MST link is made, reinforcing the Libya link, once again weakening any suggestiion by Gauci that Talb and the Palestinians is not quite right.

It's interesting that when we get right down to the crux of this matter, exactly the suggestions made by 'The Golfer', later dismissed by the SCCRC, are precisely the areas that do heavily suggest improper methods were employed.

The SCCRC decision, in dismissing the possibility of fabrication and/or manipulation, came much to the dismay of Dr. Hans Köchler

Regrettably, the SCCRC has not disclosed all its grounds of referral and, in its news release of 28 June, has basically concentrated on the dubious role of Maltese witness Tony Gauci - while at the same time engaging in a rather strange exercise of "preventive exoneration" of certain people belonging to the British and/or Scottish police and judicial system whose behaviour, as pointed out in the undersigned's reports and confirmed, in the meantime, in several affidavits, has been highly questionable and may have detrimentally affected the fairness of the proceedings.

Dr. Statement by Hans Köchler on SCCRC

The dismissal by the SCCRC of these areas on contention was not something that was going to deter Megrahi's appeal lawyers however.

Al-Megrahi’s lawyers will use his appeal, which could take up to two years to come to court, to express a range of concerns over the circuitboard fragment, including the possibility that it was fabricated or manipulated. They will also raise questions about how forensic scientists concluded that the bomb was in a particular black Toshiba radio – a model and colour linked to a Libyan import company whose chaiman was known to al-Megrahi. The scientists’ initial findings indicated that the radio was white.

Lockerbie bomber’s lawyers reject ruling on fabrication

These were certainly areas of Megrahi's appeal which hadn't yet been brought before the court when Megrahi was persuaded to drop his appeal in August last year, but the questions certainly remain. What were the final two determinations of the SCCRC report, not to mention the remaining 700+ pages that formed their conclusions, and did Megrahi's legal team in pursuing areas that had been rejected by the SCCRC, have further evidence vindicating the assertions, and quite reasonable suspicions around the fragment, toshiba manual and babygro?

 

[Caustic Logic]

Feraday, in a fit of sudden excitement, apparently rushes up a Polaroid of the fragment, as though no other photographs exist, and sends that to Williamson.

Q- Very well. Is it not the case, Dr. Hayes, that if you had photographed PI 995 and the trapped material in May 1989, Mr. Feraday would have had access to those photographs?
A- I would imagine that he would, yes, most definitely.
Q- And would those simply be Polaroid photographs that you took at that time, Dr .Hayes?
A- It is most unlikely that they would be, no.
Q- I see. Well, you can cast no light on the matter of why Mr. Feraday, in September 1989, would be relying, because of the short time interval, on dubious-quality Polaroid photographs?
A- No, I can't think of any explanation at all, certainly in view of the apparent interval of time, no.

I've been a little slow to come around to that point but I see now how the polaroid angle really is important. Thanks. Good summation. I could quibble over the reliability of Bollier's story of the visitor on Dec 30, but I have to confess I've overlooked his Fluckiger story. Do you know if that meeting(s) was ever supported by other evidence? When I hear a specific name, I tend to think so.

ETA:
...the visit of the 'Third Man' with MEBO, on Friday 30th December 1988 approximate at 10 o'clock A.M.
shameless plug

 

[Caustic Logic]

Interesting.
It would seem to me, that for this to really get legs worldwide (not just JREF), alternative perpetrator(s) would be required to be found and a prima facie case established.

If there really has been a miscarriage of justice, it has - in part - been addressed by his release.
I'm no legist but don't they need additional compelling evidence first, before they re-open a case and spend squillions more of public money?

What will ultimately be achieved even if he is cleared? Has, and/or how, is the public best served?

I just wanted to express my appreciation for this thoughtful post. This issue does in fact have legs well beyond this forum already. It's getting wide airing inside the UK, as Rolfe has been showing, and a bit elsewhere. But compared to the mainstream/corporate media, and government sources in the UK and US, its legs are tiny.

So the notion that we've got (or had) the wrong man is somewhere well between Internet chatter and established truth. Just where is harder to say. Since the ossified leadership who've covered for this so far aren't going to lead the way to truth, I'm banking on increased public awareness and a groundsweel from below. I suspect these JREF discussions are being read wider and wider, even in the U.S., as a cutting-edge source to learn more.

It's just that "wider and wider in the U.S." doesn't really mean a whole lot.

BTW, here's an American broadcast of quite good quality (except for the timer "experts") but from a different time - 60 Minutes, 1999
Mebo video
Plane Truth transcript
After the rather unexpected verdict, it seems the lid went on reporting like that.

If Megrahi were ever formally cleared, we'd have a potential can of worms. Someone else didn't and never once got caught, for one thing. The how and why of this "mix-up"would arise, related cascading questions of who knew what and when ... I could offer more specific predictions, but they'd be from my ass. I would recommend calm in that situation, a minimum of vengeance and slower deeper understanding of the kind we tried to avoid first time past.

I do admit I'm a little fuzzy on the big picture of what then. It's pretty hypothetical for the moment, but time do-a-change, so it's something worth some serious thought.

 

[Buncrana]

... I could quibble over the reliability of Bollier's story of the visitor on Dec 30, but I have to confess I've overlooked his Fluckiger story. Do you know if that meeting(s) was ever supported by other evidence? When I hear a specific name, I tend to think so.

ETA:
...the visit of the 'Third Man' with MEBO, on Friday 30th December 1988 approximate at 10 o'clock A.M.
shameless plug

Oh, absolutely the reliability of Bollier is not up for question. It's utterly unreliable and I do try my upmost to avoid taking anything from his site or comments, unless verified by another source, preferably, the court transcripts. It's annoying about Bollier, because, I think there alot he says is probably true, but there's a fair amount of either self-protection and/or misdirection, thereby rendering everything he says as untrustworthy.

I'm going to try and have a trawl over the transcripts to gather the precise context of Fluckiger's testimony at Zeist, and his questioning about visits to Mebo in 1989, but I did pick-up this article outside of Bollier:

It would appear that the Crown was well aware that the June 1989 meeting at MEBO clearly contradicts the official version of the Lockerbie investigation, as the following exchange between Mr. Turnbull and Peter Fluckiger at the trial indicates.
Q: Thank you. Now, these photographs you had with you when you went to visit Mr. Bollier on the 2nd of October of 1990?

A: Yes. This photograph and the one we saw earlier. (NB. The photographs of PT35b and the MST13 board)

Q: Thank you. In your memo, which we looked at a moment ago -- and perhaps we should have it back on the screen, Production 1562, image 4. In your note here you speak, I think, in the first paragraph about a previous meeting; is that so?

A: That is correct. Yes.

Q: What was the date of the previous meeting?

A: I don't remember this by heart, but I can read it here. I wrote down 22nd of June 1989. It would have been on that date.

Q: Thank you. Was that previous meeting in connection with MST-13 timers?

MR. BURNS: Don't answer that question.

http://www.firmmagazine.com/features/546/Lockerbie%3A_J'accuse__-_by_Dr_Ludwig_de_Braeckeleer.html

 

[Rolfe]

I've often read that the Answer to Lockerbie lies in Germany, most likely in some of the German based articles I browsed over many years ago when looking into the Autumn Leaves operation. While I may not wholly subscibe to this premise, as I believe the answer of how Pan Am 103 came to have a suitcase containing a bomb placed on-board lies at Heathrow, however, the answer as who was behind this and why the investigation was skewed away from the PFLP and towards Libya, may very well lie in Germany. Khreesat, to keep it short.

I have a suspicion that the bomb went on at Heathrow, but the reason for the subsequent cover-up and other general shenanigans is something very much to do with Frankfurt.

However, the framing of Megrahi and Libya is a curious aspect. My tuppence worth....

I think the consideration of framing Libya, and possible even Megrahi, was made very early. Whatever Bollier claims of how he came to type out that statement within a fortnight of 103's bomb, someone thought it important enough to visit Mebo during the nascent period of the investigation. The wheels, if already not in full motion, were greased and beginning to turn. Problems however, were being collected all over the hills around Lockerbie, while the publicity that the Autumn leaves operation had attracted, would provide an additional hurdle, if it was to be announced that a bomb had indeed brought down 103.

Would you care to comment on my recent post in the "Timelie of Libyan blame" thread? I have to agree that the concept of framing Libya seems to be remarkably early. Reagan went off on one against Libya on about day 7, despite precisely zero evidence suggesting Libya had anything to do with it. And didn't we come to the conclusion that Cannistraro was leading the CIA arm of the investigation from the beginning? Then of course there was Edwin's weird letter.

There was a change of US president a month after the bombing and I wonder if that had any influence? This is always said to have happened at presidential/prime ministerial level. Bush had been president for less than two months at the time of the legendary phone call.

I'm having great difficulty believing that Megrahi in person was the target as early as that though. This was two years before he was actively investigated as a suspect, and even if someone was playing a long game, it's a stretch.

I think the FBI were quite confident that Tony was so suggestable, perhaps a bit of a simpleton, [....]

I'm not at all clear the FBI was in on this plot. Dick Marquise seems sincere. If he was aware of major shenanigans, would he jump into internet discussions to confront sceptics? I think he's in Chaos's category 1.

The FBI were pushing and pushing at Tony from day 1, including wanting to offer him untold riches for an identification, less than a month after his first statement. More than a year before anybody fingered Megrahi. This could have gone very badly wrong and nearly did. If the CIA knew about Megrahi and wanted him implicated, wouldn't they have found some pretext to introduce him at that stage?

Everything connected to the day of sale, pointed back towards Talb who by late 1989 was also known to have travelled to Malta in the months before Lockerbie.

I'm not convinced Abu Talb was the purchaser either, what age was he at the time? Would he have fitted the description? Also, a bit dangerous to make such a conspicuous purchase in person, if you're a known possible suspect. I suspect it was someone ostensibly unconnected with the plot, maybe even Libyan or pretending to be, who would vanish as mysteriously as he came. A red herring for the police, if the clothes happened to be traced. It's the only explanation I can think of for such a peculiar purchase.

Quite why the hunt was still on for a match to the red circle photo of the fragment PI995 was proving quite such a challenge after Hayes memo to Williamson is another very strange episode, when during Zeist, is was commented that the Swiss police, and Peter Fluckiger, had been to Mebo in June 1989 to see Bollier in connection with MST timers. However, that wouldn't have done for the Scots police to know about this, when they hadn't known anything about a possible timer id until June 1990 and Thurman's quick take-up, never mind September when the first got Feraday's excitable polaroid of a fragment, or even actually June the year before when the swiss had went to visit Bollier!

I forgot about that. Honestly, how can that fragment not be a plant? This visit was, as you say, before Feraday sent his polaroids to Williamson, which is the first date (photo excepting) that the fragment can be definitely seen to be present in the evidence. It was supposed to be lying quietly in store in Kent, unremarked, even though fragments of circuit board were at a total premium, Hayes having unaccountably not thought it worth following up.

My hypothesis was that the decision to pull this trick was taken in April in Maryland, at Cannistraro's instructions, following general presidential directions. The manual page wasn't a problem, thanks to Toshiba in Japan, and that was introduced into the evidence in sequence in May. It was more difficult to fabricate the timer fragment, and the shirt collar with all its contents wasn't ready till September. June could be the acquisition of the necessary material, if the CIA didn't have a spare one to use.

And, that photo.

Feraday, in a fit of sudden excitement, apparently rushes up a Polaroid of the fragment, as though no other photographs exist, and sends that to Williamson.

Q- Very well. Is it not the case, Dr. Hayes, that if you had photographed PI 995 and the trapped material in May 1989, Mr. Feraday would have had access to those photographs?
A- I would imagine that he would, yes, most definitely.
Q- And would those simply be Polaroid photographs that you took at that time, Dr .Hayes?
A- It is most unlikely that they would be, no.
Q- I see. Well, you can cast no light on the matter of why Mr. Feraday, in September 1989, would be relying, because of the short time interval, on dubious-quality Polaroid photographs?
A- No, I can't think of any explanation at all, certainly in view of the apparent interval of time, no.

Uh, yes. That is confusing me. As we can see, there was a photo. Not only is it the most iconic image of the entire bloody trial, so he could hardly have forgotten about it, he wrote the word "photo" in the margin to record that one had been taken.

But when asked, he doesn't mention it. He doesn't even seem sure whether he might have used a Polaroid camera, even. For goodness sake, how stupid is this guy? Any normal scientist at this point would say, no, all these routine photos would have been taken using 35mm film, or whatever. He's just so delightfully vague all the way through. (Of course, he had been out of RARDE and trimming toenails for ten years by then.)

All he had to do at that point, to counter the insinuations from the defence, was to say, yes indeed, that photo with the fragment circled in red was taken at that time, and if you doubt the provenance we can have the negative located at RARDE with the May provenance. He didn't. He even left the door open a crack for the photo to turn out to be a polaroid, if it should ever occur to anyone (as it did to Dan O.) that that photo had to have been taken during the investigation described in the page 51 notes.

Is this just more monumental incompetence on Hayes's behalf, or is this cunning like a fox?

The SCCRC decision, in dismissing the possibility of fabrication and/or manipulation, came much to the dismay of Dr. Hans Köchler

Dr. Statement by Hans Köchler on SCCRC

The dismissal by the SCCRC of these areas on contention was not something that was going to deter Megrahi's appeal lawyers however.

Lockerbie bomber’s lawyers reject ruling on fabrication

These were certainly areas of Megrahi's appeal which hadn't yet been brought before the court when Megrahi was persuaded to drop his appeal in August last year, but the questions certainly remain. What were the final two determinations of the SCCRC report, not to mention the remaining 700+ pages that formed their conclusions, and did Megrahi's legal team in pursuing areas that had been rejected by the SCCRC, have further evidence vindicating the assertions, and quite reasonable suspicions around the fragment, toshiba manual and babygro?

This is an extremely interesting line of thought.

First, I'm confused as to whether Megrahi changed his lawyers. The current firm is Taylor and Kelly, and Taylor was the name of his advocate at Zeist. Who demolished Giaka, so he wasn't exactly not trying. But Kelly is a solicitor (writer), not an advocate, which suggests a firm of solicitors. And the current advocate is a woman.

I find it hard to doubt the Maltese clothes, which tends to exonerate the babygro. But the timer fragment and the manual page - oh yes. I did note that it was reported somewhere that part of what satisfied the SCCRC on such counts was new evidence from RARDE. That negative? Well, they had long enough to fake it, if it's possible to fake such a thing. I don't know. We need an FoI request on that report, but it would be refused.

I don't know what the two further SCCRC grounds of appeal were, but probably to do with the PIIC document? Which everybody is in the dark about. But not about fabricated evidence. They do seem to have been very keen to pre-emptively exonerate the investigating and criminal justice authorities of anything more than over-zealousness in interpreting Tony Gauci's evidence without realising there was a financial consideration.

I wonder if Megrahi's team made a big tactical error here. Shooting down Tony's "identification" would have been enough to get the conviction overturned anyway, expecially if it was combined with another attack on the assumption that B8849 was anything more than a coding anomaly. These seem to have been the points the authorities were prepared to have aired in court and probably to give way on.

Although the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the case back for a new appeal as a possible miscarriage of justice, it made clear that this was because of concerns over the testimony of a single witness rather than anything more sinister.
However, al-Megrahi’s lawyers said yesterday that they intended to make their appeal on a number of grounds and not just those identified by the commission.
Tony Kelly, al-Megrahi’s solicitor, said: “We don’t have to limit our appeal to the grounds the commission has identified. We have carte blanche to make it on as many grounds as we want.”

Hell's teeth, Tony, was that wise? Could it have been his stated intention to raise other matters in court beyond what the SCCRC had indicated were "acceptable" that scuppered the appeal?

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Quite why the hunt was still on for a match to the red circle photo of the fragment PI995 was proving quite such a challenge after Hayes memo to Williamson is another very strange episode, when during Zeist, is was commented that the Swiss police, and Peter Fluckiger, had been to Mebo in June 1989 to see Bollier in connection with MST timers. However, that wouldn't have done for the Scots police to know about this, when they hadn't known anything about a possible timer id until June 1990 and Thurman's quick take-up, never mind September when the first got Feraday's excitable polaroid of a fragment, or even actually June the year before when the swiss had went to visit Bollier!

That's an intriguing point, such an early visit. But it seems you might have some dates mixed up. The LTBU report for 78555 - 19 June 2000 – Day 23

Bollier then gave various different accounts of the date when he had his first interview with Mr Fluckiger. His final evidence was to the effect that this must have taken place in October 1990. It appeared that Mr Bollier was saying that the interview had taken place around March 1990. He said he would contradict Mr Fluckiger if he claimed that the first interview about the MST-13 timers took place on 2nd October 1990.

Day 23 transcript:
No hits.???
Day 24 instead:

Q All right. Let's just -- all I asked

18 you, to begin with, was when, and you are telling me it

19 was the 23rd of March, 1990. I understand that. Do

20 you remember who it was that came to see you?

21 A 23rd of March 1990?

22 Q Yes. And do you remember who it was

23 that came to see you?

24 A Two officials came from the federal

25 police, Mr. Fluckiger and his chief.

3850

1 Q All right. And they had a photograph to

2 show you; we understand that. Did you sign that

3 photograph at that stage, or a little later?

4 A A little later, when the judicial

5 assistance system came into force. And the Scottish

6 police and the FBI and the Swiss police were together

7 in Zurich when we had the first meeting. That is where

8 the photographs were included in the protocol. And I

9 was signing it.

10 Q Look for me at Production 1526, and

11 confirm, please, that the date of it is the 15th of

12 November of 1990. Now, you'll see that that's a record

13 of the hearing on the 15th of November of 1990, isn't

14 it?

15 A Yes.

16 Q Now, if that was in November, are you

17 saying it was in March that the -- Mr. Fluckiger came

18 and showed you the photograph?

19 A That is correct.

20 Q Eight months before the judicial

21 hearing?

22 A That is what bothers me. I said that

23 these people came on the 23rd of March 1990, and the

24 forensic expert of the FBI said that he found out on

25 the 15th of June 1990 that this fragment came from an

3851

1 MST-13.

Looking for Fluckiger's testimony. It's not mentioned in the LTBU summaries.
Looks like he talked on day 29, June 28.
He did a LOT of interviews with Bollier well into the 1990s, and up to trial. The earliest are the haziest.

22 Q I understand that. And what I want to

23 be clear about is this: Although this note is attached

24 to Production 1562, it actually refers to a meeting

25 which took place sometime earlier, on the 2nd of

4534

1 October of 1990; is that so?

2 A The second meeting took place on October

3 2nd, 1990. But looking at the date, I remember June of

4 1989, when I was at MEBO to visit with Mr. Bollier.

5 Q Well, let's take this a step at a time.

6 There appeared to be two lines above a black horizontal

7 line. Do you see it?

8 A Are you referring to the first two lines

9 up on top of the page?

10 Q Yes, I am. Yes.

11 A Yes. Yes. That is the introduction.

12 It's the title of the document.

13 Q Could you read those two lines to us,

14 please, slowly, so we may translate them.

15 A Well, "Note regarding second visit of

16 Commissar F at the MEBO company at Badenerstrasse, at

17 414, 3rd floor, 8004, Zurich, on Tuesday, October 2nd,

18 1990."

19 Q And is the "Commissar F" referring to

20 you?

21 A Yes, that's the abbreviation given to

22 me.


So I stand corrected.

 

[Buncrana]

I have to agree that the concept of framing Libya seems to be remarkably early. Reagan went off on one against Libya on about day 7, despite precisely zero evidence suggesting Libya had anything to do with it. And didn't we come to the conclusion that Cannistraro was leading the CIA arm of the investigation from the beginning? Then of course there was Edwin's weird letter.

There was a change of US president a month after the bombing and I wonder if that had any influence? This is always said to have happened at presidential/prime ministerial level. Bush had been president for less than two months at the time of the legendary phone call.

I'm having great difficulty believing that Megrahi in person was the target as early as that though. This was two years before he was actively investigated as a suspect, and even if someone was playing a long game, it's a stretch.

I agree, and hadn't really given full consideration to the fact there had been a change of government. In March of '89 are the first reports, attributed to Channon, that someone had been pinpointed for the bombing it would be announced any day. Channon departs from his position, and basically the whole investigation comes to a halt until August/September. Throughout this whole period, the Germans are apparently sitting on the Erac printout,which they've had sice February, and Hayes and Feraday have completely missed the biggest chunk of circuit board they've examined and photographed in May.

Eh??

I'm not at all clear the FBI was in on this plot. Dick Marquise seems sincere. If he was aware of major shenanigans, would he jump into internet discussions to confront sceptics? I think he's in Chaos's category 1.

The FBI were pushing and pushing at Tony from day 1, including wanting to offer him untold riches for an identification, less than a month after his first statement. More than a year before anybody fingered Megrahi. This could have gone very badly wrong and nearly did. If the CIA knew about Megrahi and wanted him implicated, wouldn't they have found some pretext to introduce him at that stage?

I'm not convinced Abu Talb was the purchaser either, what age was he at the time? Would he have fitted the description? Also, a bit dangerous to make such a conspicuous purchase in person, if you're a known possible suspect. I suspect it was someone ostensibly unconnected with the plot, maybe even Libyan or pretending to be, who would vanish as mysteriously as he came. A red herring for the police, if the clothes happened to be traced. It's the only explanation I can think of for such a peculiar purchase.

It seems, and must have been even more obvious to the investigators, that not only was Tony aiming for the wrong guy by indicating Talb may well have been the buyer, or at best was utterly unreliable in his recollection of a face (which, clairfying my last post, I don't think it was Talb that bought the clothing, but perhaps an associate of Talb, with or without his knowledge), but he was also choosing a date that would indicate someone other than Megrahi. So, that already looks like its a long game to work on.

Perhaps it would be just a little too bold, as soon as the MST clue surfaced and B8849 was revelaed to everyone, to then immediately look to get the Scot's police to shift Gauci's statement from 23rd and Talb to the 7th and Megrahi. The Scottish police had no control over the evidence that Thurman and the BKA has produced, but it was they who were interviewing Gauci, and perhaps couldn't be relied on to simply skew Gauci's memory without some consternation at the nature of this. Gradually however, as the trail to Megrahi was made more believeable with the identification of MST and Bollier connection, it would prove either too irresistible for the Police to make the connection and encourage the inducement and distorting of Gauci's recollection of the buyer.

I forgot about that. Honestly, how can that fragment not be a plant? This visit was, as you say, before Feraday sent his polaroids to Williamson, which is the first date (photo excepting) that the fragment can be definitely seen to be present in the evidence. It was supposed to be lying quietly in store in Kent, unremarked, even though fragments of circuit board were at a total premium, Hayes having unaccountably not thought it worth following up.

Yeah, that, and the printout. Nobody thought any of them were important for nearly 7 months...

My hypothesis was that the decision to pull this trick was taken in April in Maryland, at Cannistraro's instructions, following general presidential directions. The manual page wasn't a problem, thanks to Toshiba in Japan, and that was introduced into the evidence in sequence in May. It was more difficult to fabricate the timer fragment, and the shirt collar with all its contents wasn't ready till September. June could be the acquisition of the necessary material, if the CIA didn't have a spare one to use.

I think it's certainly fair to say, there far more possibilty of finding important pieces of evidence from an airliner blown up on the ground in Maryland that from 31,000ft and scattered over thousands of square miles of woodland, fields and sea. Similar results would be able to be determined from the tests, helping to determine strength and position of bomb, and quite possibly the kind of evidence that may have escaped from 103 when it broke apart over the Scottish border.

Uh, yes. That is confusing me. As we can see, there was a photo. Not only is it the most iconic image of the entire bloody trial, so he could hardly have forgotten about it, he wrote the word "photo" in the margin to record that one had been taken.

But when asked, he doesn't mention it. He doesn't even seem sure whether he might have used a Polaroid camera, even. For goodness sake, how stupid is this guy? Any normal scientist at this point would say, no, all these routine photos would have been taken using 35mm film, or whatever. He's just so delightfully vague all the way through. (Of course, he had been out of RARDE and trimming toenails for ten years by then.)

All he had to do at that point, to counter the insinuations from the defence, was to say, yes indeed, that photo with the fragment circled in red was taken at that time, and if you doubt the provenance we can have the negative located at RARDE with the May provenance. He didn't. He even left the door open a crack for the photo to turn out to be a polaroid, if it should ever occur to anyone (as it did to Dan O.) that that photo had to have been taken during the investigation described in the page 51 notes.

Is this just more monumental incompetence on Hayes's behalf, or is this cunning like a fox?

You know, that's exactly what I was thinking, and meant to edit my post to include my thinking on Hayes' testimony. It's vague, ambigious and weasley....or cunning I should probably say. And very diliberately so. I don't think he stupid, but he leaving himself a possible backdoor with which to present an excuse if it ever were confirmed that the photograph and the fragment was photographed in May, but inexplicably used a polaroid at this time (therefore negating any precise date), and even although his note page suggests it was (only that the page was entered latterly) examined, and photographed, during the course of his ordinary days work, which should most certainly therefore mean a professional type photograph and negative would be available.

This is an extremely interesting line of thought.

First, I'm confused as to whether Megrahi changed his lawyers. The current firm is Taylor and Kelly, and Taylor was the name of his advocate at Zeist. Who demolished Giaka, so he wasn't exactly not trying. But Kelly is a solicitor (writer), not an advocate, which suggests a firm of solicitors. And the current advocate is a woman.

..I don't know what the two further SCCRC grounds of appeal were, but probably to do with the PIIC document? Which everybody is in the dark about. But not about fabricated evidence. They do seem to have been very keen to pre-emptively exonerate the investigating and criminal justice authorities of anything more than over-zealousness in interpreting Tony Gauci's evidence without realising there was a financial consideration.

I wonder if Megrahi's team made a big tactical error here. Shooting down Tony's "identification" would have been enough to get the conviction overturned anyway, expecially if it was combined with another attack on the assumption that B8849 was anything more than a coding anomaly. These seem to have been the points the authorities were prepared to have aired in court and probably to give way on.

Hell's teeth, Tony, was that wise? Could it have been his stated intention to raise other matters in court beyond what the SCCRC had indicated were "acceptable" that scuppered the appeal?

Rolfe.

I'm really not sure if Megrahi has changed lawyers although I do know that lawyer Eddie McKechnie also represented Megrahi during his submission to his 2nd appeal. Whether these are appointed by Megrahi himself or the Libyan govt., whom I understand were financing his legal representation for much of the period, or some other body I'm really not sure at all.

It's an interesting thought Rolfe, about the possiblity that the fact that Megrahi's defence team, despite being aware that the discrediting of Gauci's evidence would be enough to see their client's conviction quashed, were intent, and had made it very clearly known, on pursuing every further avenue available to them that would expose the charade that Zeist was. It'd be bad enough on sending Megrahi home from the collapse of the Gauci evidence, but perhaps something that would be bearable, claiming Megrahi got off on some sort of technical aspect, and really was the bomber, and in time, would settle down and blow over. However, to expose the whole shebang of Zeist and the deeply flawed, perhaps fabricated evidence, would be simply intolerable for any government, most especially the country who justice system and courts had accepted and convicted on.

 

[Rolfe]

All that was necessary to prove Megrahi innocent was to show he didn't buy the clothes, and break the link between Malta and Frankfurt. I think both had to be done, just in case a court as biassed as we've seen in this case up to now decided that either action was enough to prove guilt.

In fact it was the other way round. Why was Gauci's tentative "resemblance" elevated to identification beyond reasonable doubt? Because the guy with the "resemblance" was the same person as was at the airport when the bomb went on the flight. Why was tray B8849 found to be the bomb bag, and not a coding anomaly or something else innocent? Why was nobody interested in either of the other apparent coding anomalies on the Erac printout? Because the guy who bought the clothes was at the airport when the B8849-pointing flight departed.

Kill one and you kill both, actually, but would anyone have trusted a court to follow this, on past experience?

However, show the date wasn't 7th December and frankly you're motoring. Then point out that the court accepted a totally evidence-free conspiracy theory about suborned Maltese baggage staff as being preferable to a perfectly unremarkable coding anomaly at Frankfurt, and I'd say you're done.

Kelly and his team must have been absolutely seething about the rest of it to want to drag it in. I fear this may have proved the stumbling block for those who had been prepared to let the appeal go ahead if it was only going to cover the clothes purchase.

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

Rolfe, I very much dig that one-two punch proposal. These are the supposedly solid points pointing at Megrahi for the actual bombing, corroborating each other even if both have fallen. It so hapens these are the main points I made in response to American family member Brian Flynn the other day, besides belligerently challenging him to a debate.

"6. Megrahi traveled to Malta on December 7, 1988 and purchased clothing and other items from a shop which ended up at Lockerbie."

How ell have you researched that? What details of Gauci's testimony, to you, are most consistent with a December 7 purchase? And as I posted in the wrong spot earlier:
Tony Gauci did "identify" Abu Talb at a time when he was a suspect, but about 14 months later (Feb 15 1991) he did also "identify" Megrahi from a photo, as the closest fit among 12. All 12 were far too young to be the purchaser he described, but Megrahi, who looked only "ten years" too young (Gauci's words - actually 14 years), was the closest fit among those they picked for him. And then he was paid $2 million by the US DoJ after the verdict, with another $1 million for his brother's help keeping up Tony's "resolve." Good evidence? Only evidence linking Megrahi to the bomb bag.

You mention Megrahi's presence with Fhimah on Malta Dec 20-21 as evidence. Could you explain why that's relevant? What's the evidence connecting Malta to the bombing? (I know what it is, just wondering how well you understand it)

http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-08-06/hed-tk/
No response yet to the debate challenge.

However, "Bunntamas," or "Bunny," who at leastclaims to be an American family member, at the related post's comments section at Robert Black's blog just now showed a keen interest in bringing the discussion to this very forum. I'd like to bump the thread and fluff the nest in case he decides to pop in here.

New members can start threads, just not post links, right? Maybe I can suggest, if he (or she?) reads this, to start a new thread and use broken HTML to circumvent the filter until post 15 or 16. Here's a welcome mat too, in advance. I'm not up to digging for a smilie - if we have it, here it is:

:welcome:

 

[Caustic Logic]

"Bunntamas," or "Bunny," who at leastclaims to be an American family member

Not to doubt him, just ... we're skeptics here. It's habit.