Cont: Trans women are not women (IX)

[theprestige]

I think we all understand pretty well what "valid lived experience" could mean and probably does mean, as a convenient colloquialism or ad hoc jargon.

Pain isn't even really an analogy in this case, just an example of the thing. Several such examples have been presented in this thread. Schizophrenia, delusions of grandeur, and body integrity identity disorder are some of my go-to examples.

What we don't quite understand is exactly what argument LJ is trying to have us accept, without him actually having to argue it, when he uses the term. We want to see his axioms, his reasoning from those axioms, his evidence in support of that reasoning, and his conclusions from that reasoning. Instead, we just get what appears to be both axiom and conclusion, with no real reasoning or evidence presented. The term itself is supposed to stand in for all of that. And it's the "all of that" which we would like him to better explain.

 

[JoeMorgue]

Does this help-

*Cuts you off*

Could you use the same argument for literally any variable that exists in humanity at all and it be equally valid yet never used?

Then no, it doesn't help.

Again we're not telling you that you are wrong, we're telling you that you are meaningless.

Why just sex and not height, weight, skin color, handedness?

Why is there one and only one thing where identity is a third axis along side "What you are" and "What you want to be?"

 

[shuttlt]

Does this help, especially the highlighted sections?

Not really. It just seems like an assertion that they are different. Just swap "Napoleon" for "woman" in any of these statements. If somebody who knows they weren't born Napoleon, but has the lived experience of being Napoleon, how is that a different case to "a male with a lived experience of being a woman need not think they are a woman". The spirit of Napoleon is in the first man, the indefinable essence of woman is in that second man. What is the difference other than that for some reason we take one seriously and one not?

This whole thing is making me think of the plot of Don Juan De Marco, where Johnny Depp get's put away for claiming to be Don Juan. In the end it turns out he knows he isn't Don Juan, he just prefers to act as if he was, but I think his psychologist, played by Brando, decides to believe that in some sense, he is.

 

[Paul2]

I think we all understand pretty well what "valid lived experience" could mean and probably does mean, as a convenient colloquialism or ad hoc jargon.

But

1) What do you mean by "genuine lived condition"? In this context, do you mean that people who "feel like" they're the opposite sex genuinely do feel like they're the opposite sex? In which case, you would be saying that they really do feel what they feel? Or do you mean that people who "feel like" they're the opposite sex actually, for realsies ARE the opposite sex in some fashion? In which case, you would be saying that their feelings override material reality in some meaningful way.

That's what I was responding to.

Pain isn't even really an analogy in this case, just an example of the thing. Several such examples have been presented in this thread. Schizophrenia, delusions of grandeur, and body integrity identity disorder are some of my go-to examples.

I'm happy to have pain be an example, not an analogy.

What we don't quite understand is exactly what argument LJ is trying to have us accept, without him actually having to argue it, when he uses the term. We want to see his axioms, his reasoning from those axioms, his evidence in support of that reasoning, and his conclusions from that reasoning. Instead, we just get what appears to be both axiom and conclusion, with no real reasoning or evidence presented. The term itself is supposed to stand in for all of that. And it's the "all of that" which we would like him to better explain.

I imagine - again, trying to straw man his position - is that, if we sometimes accept some internal experience or feeling of others even though we can't objectively verify it, then we might also accept the internal experience or feeling of trans folk.

 

[Rolfe]

*Cuts you off*

Could you use the same argument for literally any variable that exists in humanity at all and it be equally valid yet never used?

Then no, it doesn't help.

Again we're not telling you that you are wrong, we're telling you that you are meaningless.

Why just sex and not height, weight, skin color, handedness?

Why is there one and only one thing where identity is a third axis along side "What you are" and "What you want to be?"

It's more "what you wish you were". I can wish I was six feet tall, or twenty-five again, or black-skinned, or a man. I have no way of becoming any of these things. Why is it only the last one in which I'd be indulged and lied to that it was possible?

 

[JoeMorgue]

Okay but we don't and we aren't obligated to pretend we do.

Nobody is arguing for their "Height identity" and the "personal experiences of being left handed" or any other version therefore and we don't have to pretend that doesn't matter.

Nobody "identifies" (as the term/concept is used here) as anything ever expect for the biological sex they are objectively not. It's literally the only time this third distinction beyond "What you are" and "What you want to be" ever comes up. We don't have to pretend to just not notice that.

If this concept really was so meaningful it would be used in other situations. The fact that it isn't means something.

 

[Rolfe]

Now it's just getting silly.

The tweet I originally linked to was deleted, after having gone a bit viral. Fortunately, the internet remembers.

https://twitter.com/DrMoragKerr/status/1542610045510340610

[imgw=400]https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FWhzonTXoAIp1tP?format=png&name=small[/imgw]

 

[lionking]

It's just getting silly now.

https://twitter.com/TorontoPolice/status/15424969926261063

Looks like it’s deleted

Hmm...this page doesn’t exist. Try searching for something els

e

 

[Paul2]

*Cuts you off*

Could you use the same argument for literally any variable that exists in humanity at all and it be equally valid yet never used?

Then no, it doesn't help.

Again we're not telling you that you are wrong, we're telling you that you are meaningless.

Why just sex and not height, weight, skin color, handedness?

Why is there one and only one thing where identity is a third axis along side "What you are" and "What you want to be?"

Who knows? Accident of biology?

Doesn't this issue just come down to whether gender dysphoria is - I hesitate to use the word, but for lack of a better one - real, in the same sense that unverifiable pain is real?

 

[shuttlt]

It's more "what you wish you were". I can wish I was six feet tall, or twenty-five again, or black-skinned, or a man. I have no way of becoming any of these things. Why is it only the last one in which I'd be indulged and lied to that it was possible?

I'm sure, if it's popular, Nicola Sturgeon will promise to indulge all of those things after independence. The only thing preventing you being 25 again is the Westminster Parliament. Perfidious Albion strikes again!

 

[Paul2]

Not really. It just seems like an assertion that they are different. Just swap "Napoleon" for "woman" in any of these statements. If somebody who knows they weren't born Napoleon, but has the lived experience of being Napoleon, how is that a different case to "a male with a lived experience of being a woman need not think they are a woman". The spirit of Napoleon is in the first man, the indefinable essence of woman is in that second man. What is the difference other than that for some reason we take one seriously and one not?

It's the difference between merely feeling and being: feeling like a woman - actually having the sensation and perception that you are a woman, but not being deluded to think that you are actually a woman, but you'd still like to live as if you are one.

This, again, is a minimal position, we've seen trans folk go way beyond this, but this is still a trans situation, minimally.

This whole thing is making me think of the plot of Don Juan De Marco, where Johnny Depp get's put away for claiming to be Don Juan. In the end it turns out he knows he isn't Don Juan, he just prefers to act as if he was, but I think his psychologist, played by Brando, decides to believe that in some sense, he is.

Didn't see it, still not sure from your description if it is applicable to what I'm saying.

 

[Rolfe]

If this concept really was so meaningful it would be used in other situations. The fact that it isn't means something.

It means that a bunch of people with an agenda are trying to take the rest of us for mugs.

 

[theprestige]

I imagine - again, trying to straw man his position - is that, if we sometimes accept some internal experience or feeling of others even though we can't objectively verify it, then we might also accept the internal experience or feeling of trans folk.

Well in my view his position is a veritable army of scarecrows already. That aside...

Pain: This is an internal feeling we cannot objectively verify. Instead, we expect medical professionals to apply specialized training and experience to the report. We expect them to carefully consider the available evidence, and compare it to other similar reports by other patients. We expect them to closely study the patient's behavior, the nature of their demands, and their apparent reaction over time to the medication prescribed. They won't get it right every time, but we do not therefore give them license to blindly accept or dismiss the report without properly examining the subjective and objective evidence available to them.

Homosexuality: This is an internal feeling that we can objectively verify. But most of us aren't going to bother. You say you're gay, I'm not going to start showing you photos of studmuffins to see if you get an erection or not. You say it, I believe it, that settles it. Mainly because it's nothing to me, what you get up to in the privacy of your bedroom with a consenting partner.

Fursona: Another internal feeling we can't objectively verify. We also don't care, because again, it's nothing to us if you want to cavort around in a faux-fur blue fox costume. As long as you're not demanding public policy changes, like fursona representation on corporate boards, or special restrooms for fursonas, constructed at public expense or mandated by law for private facilities, your internal experience or feeling and its outward expressions are a non-issue.

Gender dysphoria: See "fursona", above. (This, by the way, is an analogy. I don't expect it to go very well.)

 

[Rolfe]

Looks like it’s deleted

Look at my post again.

 

[Rolfe]

I'm sure, if it's popular, Nicola Sturgeon will promise to indulge all of those things after independence. The only thing preventing you being 25 again is the Westminster Parliament. Perfidious Albion strikes again!

If I were to address this it would be a derail, so I wont't.

 

[Rolfe]

It's the difference between merely feeling and being: feeling like a woman - actually having the sensation and perception that you are a woman, but not being deluded to think that you are actually a woman, but you'd still like to live as if you are one.

This, again, is a minimal position, we've seen trans folk go way beyond this, but this is still a trans situation, minimally.

I think that's even madder, because the idea that someone who is not a woman can have the sensation and perception that he is a woman is either crazy or meaningless.

However, you're still not understanding the point. I haven't seen anyone deny that trans people really really wish they were the sex they aren't, some of them take extraordinary steps to acquire the facsimile of being that sex, and some of them are deluded enough to imagine they really are that sex despite objective reality demonstrating that this is nonsense.

What is being debated is whether this genuine feeling in their heads should entitle them to be treated in law as if they are the sex they wish they were rather than the sex they actually are.

 

[theprestige]

What Rolfe said. It's not about what you believe to be true about yourself. It's what you demand public policy should do with your belief.

If you demand that public policy should give you morphine because you claim to be in pain... Well then. Maybe we need to think very hard about what we can do to be confident you really are in pain, and really do need morphine.

Same with gender dysphoria. If you're a dude who likes to wear dresses because it makes you feel more "womanly", fine, whatever. If you demand to be treated respectfully, and not discriminated against for your transvestism, that's easily-enough arranged. In fact, we've already gotten that far in public policy. If you demand that your feeling should entitle you to transcend sex segregation in sports and prisons... Well then.

 

[Rolfe]

What Rolfe said. It's not about what you believe to be true about yourself. It's what you demand public policy should do with your belief.

If you demand that public policy should give you morphine because you claim to be in pain... Well then. Maybe we need to think very hard about what we can do to be confident you really are in pain, and really do need morphine.

Same with gender dysphoria. If you're a dude who likes to wear dresses because it makes you feel more "womanly", fine, whatever. If you demand to be treated respectfully, and not discriminated against for your transvestism, that's easily-enough arranged. In fact, we've already gotten that far in public policy. If you demand that your feeling should entitle you to transcend sex segregation in sports and prisons... Well then.

Well then, what?

It's entirely possible that you are in pain, and that a prescription for morphine is both justified and kind. It is also unlikely to be an enormous breach of the rights of half the population should a prescription be issued in error.

However, even if you really think you are a woman, it is no more possible that you are a woman, or for you to become a woman, than it is for you to be Napoleon, or for you to become Napoleon.

We should still try to treat you kindly either way, but in the latter case we wouldn't be putting you in charge of the French army, would we?

 

[Paul2]

Well in my view his position is a veritable army of scarecrows already. That aside...

Pain: This is an internal feeling we cannot objectively verify. Instead, we expect medical professionals to apply specialized training and experience to the report. We expect them to carefully consider the available evidence, and compare it to other similar reports by other patients. We expect them to closely study the patient's behavior, the nature of their demands, and their apparent reaction over time to the medication prescribed. They won't get it right every time, but we do not therefore give them license to blindly accept or dismiss the report without properly examining the subjective and objective evidence available to them.

Homosexuality: This is an internal feeling that we can objectively verify. But most of us aren't going to bother. You say you're gay, I'm not going to start showing you photos of studmuffins to see if you get an erection or not. You say it, I believe it, that settles it. Mainly because it's nothing to me, what you get up to in the privacy of your bedroom with a consenting partner.

Fursona: Another internal feeling we can't objectively verify. We also don't care, because again, it's nothing to us if you want to cavort around in a faux-fur blue fox costume. As long as you're not demanding public policy changes, like fursona representation on corporate boards, or special restrooms for fursonas, constructed at public expense or mandated by law for private facilities, your internal experience or feeling and its outward expressions are a non-issue.

Gender dysphoria: See "fursona", above. (This, by the way, is an analogy. I don't expect it to go very well.)

Perhaps the issue is whether gender dysphoria has some organic basis to it, like pain does, and having a fursona doesn't. On what basis do we rule that out, even if we haven't yet ruled it in?

 

[Rolfe]

Perhaps the issue is whether gender dysphoria has some organic basis to it, like pain does, and having a fursona doesn't. On what basis do we rule that out, even if we haven't yet ruled it in?

Because whatever organic basis there may be does not consist of the person actually being the sex they aren't.