Tractor beams and "startrek" type transportation

[DrMatt]

One of the plot requirements for "the transporter" was continuity. In order to not take forever, whatever you were doing at the sending end you'd continue doing at the receiving end without interruption. Without that kind of continuity, transported life would be dead meat. With it, the notion of "died at the sending end" becomes incoherent, as it would imply that when you step out of your front door you die inside your house....

Anyhow, it's just a plot device to eliminate long slow docking procedures so you can get on with the storytelling.

 

[Bronze Dog]

Actually, wasn't it a way to cut the budget?: Not having to use shuttle props and landing sequences.

 

[Correa Neto]

The "teletransporter problem" has already been discussed here. From a materialistic POV (selves are created by brains, a self ceases to exist if the brain is damaged beyond a certain point, the continuity of a self is actually an illusion, etc.), you should not care about being deconstructed and reconstructed by a ST-like teletransporter.

Think about this:
What happens to your counsioussness while you are in coma or sedated? There's a discontinuity in your awareness, consiousness, self, whatever you call it.

 

[aggle-rithm]

One of the plot requirements for "the transporter" was continuity. In order to not take forever, whatever you were doing at the sending end you'd continue doing at the receiving end without interruption. Without that kind of continuity, transported life would be dead meat. With it, the notion of "died at the sending end" becomes incoherent, as it would imply that when you step out of your front door you die inside your house....

Anyhow, it's just a plot device to eliminate long slow docking procedures so you can get on with the storytelling.

It started out as a simple plot device, but became a source for many interesting and thought-provoking stories.

"Repeat to yourself, 'It's just a show, I should really just relax.'"

 

[tsg]

Okay, my thoughts, paraphrasing some of the comments I've seen posted.

"Taking a person apart atom by atom = death." Why? If the atoms are re-assembled exactly the same way they were before they were dissassembled, what changes? The assumption is that the dissassembling process is irreversible in some way. What way?

"It's a different person on the other end." Why? If the person on the other end has all the memories and experiences of the person on the sending end and is atomically identical, how is he different?

 

[LordoftheLeftHand]

What about the 2 Rikers? People can be duplicated so why dont they all just back themselves up before dangerous missions?

This has been my complaint since I first saw the show.

LLH

 

[Ziggurat]

"Taking a person apart atom by atom = death." Why? If the atoms are re-assembled exactly the same way they were before they were dissassembled, what changes?

Because of what happens if you ask what state the person is in halfway through, when all the atoms are disassembled. They are, but most people's understanding, dead. That they can be resurrected at a later time doesn't change this.

The only way around this that I can see is if you take the view that your life isn't dependent upon your physical body, but only the information that your body represents. There is a living version of you if that information exists intact, which it must in order for your body to be subsequently reformed. But of course, this is problematic too, since what does it mean if this information gets copied?

Another possible interpretation is to suppose that such perfect duplication procedures are inherently impossible, because the information contained in the exact quantum state of your body is irreproducible - you might be able to mimic it incredibly closely, to the point of recreating a new person who could fool others (and itself) by any practical measure, but the unavoidable differences would still make it a new and different, though very similar, person.

 

[tsg]

Because of what happens if you ask what state the person is in halfway through, when all the atoms are disassembled. They are, but most people's understanding, dead. That they can be resurrected at a later time doesn't change this.

It does if it changes the implications of being "dead". Death is only important if it's permanent. Would murder be such a big deal if it was fixable? Would it be any more of an inconvenience than being knocked unconscious?

Another possible interpretation is to suppose that such perfect duplication procedures are inherently impossible, because the information contained in the exact quantum state of your body is irreproducible - you might be able to mimic it incredibly closely, to the point of recreating a new person who could fool others (and itself) by any practical measure, but the unavoidable differences would still make it a new and different, though very similar, person.

By that definition, any procedure or occurrence that changes your body in any way makes you a different person. Eating would make you a different person. If that is the case then it ceases to be significant.

This is getting into philosophy, but my belief is that a "person" is simply the sum of his experiences and memories. Providing those survive the process, then the person that comes out is the same as the one that went in.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

I've thought of this many times myself, but I have taken the next step.

Okay, so I resolved that transporting is no different than just being sedated, no problem. What about duplicating a person? Two entities? How do you decide who's real? How does your AWARENESS decide which one to inhabit? Which one is now "you" and which one is the entity that's not "you"?

Further, what if all we ever have are memories of our past selves, and in reality every single moment who were WERE is gone forever and our current self is a whole new entity that just think it was the old one.

In the end, I basically just concluded there's no way to know and we SEEM to have continuous conciousness, so it's best to simply live as though that's the case.

 

[Ziggurat]

It does if it changes the implications of being "dead". Death is only important if it's permanent.

I admit that reversibility would change the significance of death quite a bit, but that's still different from its existence. But while the person in question is atomized, before they are re-assembled, how are they NOT dead? Because there's no reason they need to be re-assembled, and if they never are, aren't they really and truly dead? A classification of current state which depends on future state isn't one I think we want to use, which would therefore mean that they're dead even if we end up resurrecting them or creating an exact copy.

By that definition, any procedure or occurrence that changes your body in any way makes you a different person.

In a sense, yes (and even without this interpretation, it's hard to deny that something fundamental has changed about your identity since you were a baby), but there's a continuity to an ordinary, non-teleported life (meaning that change was continuous and without interuption, providing a single thread we can label and follow despite the changes) that would disappear in our hypothetical imperfect-reproduction scenario. The thread breaks upon reproduction, and never restarts from exactly the same spot it stopped.

This is getting into philosophy, but my belief is that a "person" is simply the sum of his experiences and memories. Providing those survive the process, then the person that comes out is the same as the one that went in.

Yes indeed, these are largely philosophical discussion, and to a certain extent you can just adopt a definition for terms and be done with it. The point of these discussions, as I see it, is more to think about what such different definitions would mean in different situations - they sometimes produce results which are unsatisfying, and hence challenge us to search for new definitions which might be more satisfying.

For example, what happens if we take a scan of you to measure everything about you, store it in a computer, then recreate a copy of you as you were when you were scanned. Who is the person of tsg? What if we scan you again a day later, and create yet another version of you. Is that too tsg? Does it matter if we create more than one copy simultaneously, so they start out identical together? Certainly all three of these bodies are not equivalent anymore, so who is the person? Do they really have anything resembling the constant identity you seemed to object that I was throwing out? What happens if we kill the original body after making the copies - have we killed the person of tsg? I'm not saying your definition is wrong - as a definition alone it can't be - just putting forward some questions to probe the consequences of that definition.

 

[tsg]

I admit that reversibility would change the significance of death quite a bit, but that's still different from its existence. But while the person in question is atomized, before they are re-assembled, how are they NOT dead? Because there's no reason they need to be re-assembled, and if they never are, aren't they really and truly dead? A classification of current state which depends on future state isn't one I think we want to use, which would therefore mean that they're dead even if we end up resurrecting them or creating an exact copy.

But that's exactly my point. If this death is reversible, then it is no longer significant and statements like "If your entire body including your brain is taken apart by the atom or molecule doesn't this mean you're dead?" cease to be as profound. It takes on the same importance as if you had said "doesn't this mean you're asleep?" In other words, what's the big deal?

In a sense, yes (and even without this interpretation, it's hard to deny that something fundamental has changed about your identity since you were a baby), but there's a continuity to an ordinary, non-teleported life (meaning that change was continuous and without interuption, providing a single thread we can label and follow despite the changes) that would disappear in our hypothetical imperfect-reproduction scenario. The thread breaks upon reproduction, and never restarts from exactly the same spot it stopped.

Some would argue that life is not continuous and without interruption. Even sleep interrupts the conscious state. But the point is that if there are changes during our lives which do not make us a different person, then there is some acceptable level of difference which can be tolerated through transport that will yield the same person.

For example, what happens if we take a scan of you to measure everything about you, store it in a computer, then recreate a copy of you as you were when you were scanned. Who is the person of tsg? What if we scan you again a day later, and create yet another version of you. Is that too tsg? Does it matter if we create more than one copy simultaneously, so they start out identical together? Certainly all three of these bodies are not equivalent anymore, so who is the person? Do they really have anything resembling the constant identity you seemed to object that I was throwing out? What happens if we kill the original body after making the copies - have we killed the person of tsg? I'm not saying your definition is wrong - as a definition alone it can't be - just putting forward some questions to probe the consequences of that definition.

The question you appear to be asking (and please correct me if I'm wrong) is which is the real tsg. At the instant the copy is made, both are identical with identical experiences and memories, but they are two separate people and will continue life adding their own unique experiences to the common experience of what was once a single tsg. At that point, what does it matter which one is the "real" one?

 

[Starthinker]

Let me clarify my point of view. First of all we're not even sure how the brain works but let's say I'm stepping into the transporter and I'm thinking about giraffes. That process of thinking is electrical impulses jumping around neurons creating a mental image of a giraffe and stuff about giraffes. Okay, now my brain is taken apart atom by atom and then put back together in virtually an identical configuration miles away. How does the thought of the giraffe get put back? There was nothing tangible about the giraffe to transport. It was impulses dancing around neurons.

On a completely different note: Let's say I walked up to you and explained to you that you were just created that second. All your thoughts and memories were just created atom by atom but you can't tell the difference, for all you know you've been alive for 41 years (my age, insert your age there). No big deal, right? You are in the house you remember, married to the woman you are in love with, etc. so you are likely not to care even though you were JUST created. Now put yourself on the other end of the transporter. I tell you that a copy of you is waiting on the other end and will be activated as soon as you die. He is you. He will have all your memories, etc (see beginning of this paragraph) so as far as he knows he was ALWAYs alive. Would this make you feel better? As far as you are concerned you are about to die, the other guy will get activated, and that's it. That's how I always saw the transporter.

 

[I less than three logic]

I've thought of this many times myself, but I have taken the next step.

Okay, so I resolved that transporting is no different than just being sedated, no problem. What about duplicating a person? Two entities? How do you decide who's real? How does your AWARENESS decide which one to inhabit? Which one is now "you" and which one is the entity that's not "you"?

It's just a clone of yourself, I see no problem here. Identical twins are just clones as well, yet they seem to have their own awareness, and don’t argue over which one developed first to decide who the awareness belongs to. Both of the entities will believe it is you, both will believe the other is not you, and both will be right.

Further, what if all we ever have are memories of our past selves, and in reality every single moment who were WERE is gone forever and our current self is a whole new entity that just think it was the old one.

I see no reason not to conclude we are just memories of our past, but the whole new entity every single moment part doesn’t make any sense. What inhibits the brain from remembering what we’re doing and what we’ve done as part of dynamically changing series of complex processes? Why conclude it has to be a new entity created every moment that just thinks it was the old one.

In the end, I basically just concluded there's no way to know and we SEEM to have continuous conciousness, so it's best to simply live as though that's the case.

I think of consciousness more like the light in your refrigerator. It’s always there every time you look for it. This is what produces the illusion of your continuous consciousness. There is evidence, however, to suggest that our consciousness is not a continuous stream of awareness. Studies into change blindness show that substantial changes can occur directly within our view, but go completely unnoticed. Inattentional blindness shows that we can directly observer something yet not be aware of it. Even more interesting is inattentional amnesia, which demonstrates that the brain can process information yet not present it to our conscious awareness, instead forgetting it almost immediately. Also, studies into the neurology of déjà vu suggest that unattended perception followed by changing to focus your attention on what was perceived can trigger the phenomenon as the two different types of perception overlap within your memory.

http://www.duke.edu/~mitroff/papers/MitroffSimonsLevin_P&P_04.pdf
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~grees/downloads/ReesDriver.pdf
http://gatorlog.com/images/dejavu.pdf

 

[tsg]

Let me clarify my point of view. First of all we're not even sure how the brain works but let's say I'm stepping into the transporter and I'm thinking about giraffes. That process of thinking is electrical impulses jumping around neurons creating a mental image of a giraffe and stuff about giraffes. Okay, now my brain is taken apart atom by atom and then put back together in virtually an identical configuration miles away. How does the thought of the giraffe get put back? There was nothing tangible about the giraffe to transport. It was impulses dancing around neurons.

But the neurons would be there in an identical-enough state and would continue doing what they were doing. They may be a brief, possibly unnoticable, interruption in the thought process but they would likely continue doing what they were doing before they were transported. Imagine an electrical circuit creating a spark between two electrodes being transported and, for the sake of argument, the spark itself cannot be. Once the electrodes are manifested in the new location they would still continue to create a spark. The image of the giraffe is created by the effect the impulse has on the receiving neuron, not the impulse itself.

On a completely different note: Let's say I walked up to you and explained to you that you were just created that second. All your thoughts and memories were just created atom by atom but you can't tell the difference, for all you know you've been alive for 41 years (my age, insert your age there). No big deal, right? You are in the house you remember, married to the woman you are in love with, etc. so you are likely not to care even though you were JUST created. Now put yourself on the other end of the transporter. I tell you that a copy of you is waiting on the other end and will be activated as soon as you die. He is you. He will have all your memories, etc (see beginning of this paragraph) so as far as he knows he was ALWAYs alive. Would this make you feel better? As far as you are concerned you are about to die, the other guy will get activated, and that's it. That's how I always saw the transporter.

You have to distinguish between actually transporting matter and just making a copy. Your example is making a copy and not actually transporting matter. Whatever happens to the copy in the new location will be experienced by the copy and not by you whether or not the original is destroyed. That is a different person. A real transporter would have to actually move the matter from one place to another, not simply create a different one. That is, the actual atoms (or whatever fundamental units we're breaking transported people down into) have to be transmitted and reassembled.

 

[Dilb]

I believe when this came up in the Philosophy section it was pretty thouroghly handled. Naturally, we never agreed on anything, and I still think the other people are wrong, but eh.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=48191&highlight=teleportation

As I recall, it came down to a fundamental disagreement over whether the "self" needs to be continuous in space and time to be the "true self" (which I find absurd, as it adds an immaterial property to a person), or whether you only need the information contained in the "self" to be continuous.

 

[Ziggurat]

The question you appear to be asking (and please correct me if I'm wrong) is which is the real tsg.

Not exactly - more like what does it mean to be tsg.

At the instant the copy is made, both are identical with identical experiences and memories, but they are two separate people and will continue life adding their own unique experiences to the common experience of what was once a single tsg. At that point, what does it matter which one is the "real" one?

It's not really about which one is real, but what does identity mean if you can duplicate a person. Let me try another set of hypotheticals to try to illuminate why I think this isn't a trivial question. Suppose I duplicate your body. Now you've got a double, and per your statements, both are real people. The next day, after having lunch with the original body, I destroy it, and not in some reversible manner. I've done something terrible, haven't I? I've killed a person, right? There's still A tsg walking around, to be sure, but I still killed someone, haven't I? Suppose I don't wait another day, but destroy the original body only an hour after duplication. That's still murder, isn't it? What about a second after duplication? What about as part of the duplication procedure? Is it always murder? Is it less of a murder if I don't wait as long after duplication? If you've been duplicated, is the moral importance of your life reduced because of the redundancy? And can you imagine the lawsuits over property rights?

 

[senorpogo]

In reality if your atoms were broken up you'd be dead. Simple as that. Even if you're put together you're still dead and the new you is a whole different consciousness.

Doesn't that mean there be like a million Captain Kirk's in heaven? Awesome.

 

[Dustin Kesselberg]

It seems to me that compairing sedation to being DEATOMIZED doesn't make any sense. Being sedated just means your brain is resting in particular places of consciousness. However since your brain never stops working you're still alive.
Being deatomized would mean in effect you're dead in any sense of the term. The fact you get put back together at some time in the future isn't relevant. You're still dead. Meaning your consciousness ends.

It seems to me your line of consciousness would be done with the second you're deatomized and the only possible way to have the same "line of consciousness" is if there is some abstract thing that monitors your consciousness apart from your body. Which would be of course supernatural. Which seems unlikely.

 

[wollery]

There was another thread along these lines 2 or 3 years ago, fairly soon after I joined. It developed out of a online "test" about materialism/idealism that Interesting Ian posted a link to. One of the questions was about teleportation, and the test seemed to assert that if you were willing to be transported then you couldn't be a true materialist. I tried to argued that point with Ian, which was when I realized that it was pointless having a discussion with someone who had no respect for anyone's opinion but his own.

Back to the topic at hand;

Teleportation of anything more than a single particle (which can be achieved by quantum entanglement) is surely rendered impossible by Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. Teleporting an individual particle does not require knowledge of it's exact position or momentum, but teleporting a system of connected particles would require such knowledge, which HUP says you can't have.

 

[I less than three logic]

Teleportation of anything more than a single particle (which can be achieved by quantum entanglement) is surely rendered impossible by Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. Teleporting an individual particle does not require knowledge of it's exact position or momentum, but teleporting a system of connected particles would require such knowledge, which HUP says you can't have.

I believe they actually addressed this on the show, saying something about a Heisenberg compensator being used with the teleporters, or something along those lines. I was never really a divoted fan of the series, perhaps I am too young, maybe some others can elaborate on this for me.