There is no "ought"

[Ron_Tomkins]

Ron, I'm going to disagree with you there.
Different answers to that first question definitely affect the answers to the second.

For instance, if your answer to "What is the nature of morality?" is "It's the set of rules handed down by God in the Torah, and he'll punish you if you don't follow them" then your answer as to how to behave morally would be to do what the book says and the finer points would flow from that perspective.

Actually, within the context of moral anti-realism "How should we behave morally within society?" isn't a meaningful question by itself, (even aside from the word "morally") because it contains a "should" without an "if". It needs a modifier to provide that "if" which the answer to the first question provides. In the case above "If we want to avoid punishment by God, how should we behave morally within society".

You're right in that there is a connection provided there actually is an Omnipotent God who punishes people if they don't behave morally. I think that in that case, in there is a God who keeps tabs of a moral code, then it's very obvious that that has a bearing on how we should behave morally. In that scenario, the question of "What is the nature of morality?" is directly linked to "How should we behave morally?". Heck, it couldn't possibly be any ther way, especially since you phrased the answer "It's the set of rules handed down by God in the Torah, and he'll punish you if you don't follow them". In that case there is no way out. The answer to the question "Where does morality come from?" can't possibly escape from having any influence on the question "How should we behave morally?"

However, in our real life scenario in which there is no evidence of an omnipotent God keeping tabs of our moral behavior, the questions still do not follow one from the other: Given the scenario we have in which nature does not obey a moral code, in which there is no God keeping tabs of anything, in which things just are and simply happen without a superior Moral Authority saying what's right nor wrong; such situation has no bearing on how we should behave morally. Why? Because that means that how we should behave morally depends entirely on us. We can't go seeking advice outside ourselves, outside of our own human culture. Nature provides us, if anything, with some of the worse examples of morality. An amoral nature that doesn't know nor care, that doesn't act according to our human preconceptions of what "ought" to be done. Therefore, the issue of the nature of morality and the issue of how we should we behave are entirely separate issues which have no effect within one another.

Again, take my example of chess: The real life situation is that Chess is a game made up by humans, and so, the rules of chess are made up by humans as well. Does that mean that we should cheat on Chess? No. One conclusion doesn't follow from the other. The question of what chess is has no bearing on how chess should be played.
Now if Chess was made up by God and he punished you if you ever cheated, even if you were just playing against yourself in your own privacy, then yeah, obviously the question of whether or not should you ever cheat on chess, even if you were playing against yourself; is directly influenced by the question of What is Chess and who created it? But that is not the real answer. The real answer is that it's a made up game, and it's neither right nor wrong to move a white-square bishop on a black square. It's wrong within the context of playing a game against someone. It's wrong once you're operating under the "agreed contract" of "lets do this little pretend thing we invented by ourselves". We understand that "right" and "wrong" are human concepts, which don't even mean anything, even to other humans of different cultures (A person from another country who doesn't know chess) or humans who haven't been exposed to our moral agreements (A child from our own culture who doesn't know how to play chess). They are subjective. Therefore, the conclusion that they are subjective does not have any bearing on how should they be approached. Such answers are only to be found in the instruction manuals, guides, Bibles, Constitutions, Readmes, and other scriptures we humans also invented so that other humans know how to follow the rules.

 

[Sophronius]

You did well to use the word seem. I did not state or purport to state a fact, let alone a universal fact ( whatever that may be). Stating facts is a different business from issuing moral prescriptions. Our ability to use language allows us to do both of these — and a great deal besides.

Then I'm not entirely sure I understand you correctly. If all you're doing is suggesting a moral prescription, how does it contradict the OP? Moral prescriptions obviously exist, and they are quite important. However, they are still no more than opinions (on what constitutes moral behaviour) and as such carry no 'objective truth'.

Furthermore, when you state that it is right to refrain from killing "whether or not killing people for fun suits my preferences, your preferences or anyone else's preferences", that implies that it is 'right' even if everybody on earth thinks it is not. I do not see how this can be true.

Second: the question of truth-value. As I see it, if moral disagreement is possible, then moral statements have quite enough truth-value to be going on with. As Damon Runyon might have said: if this is not true-or-false, it will do until true-or-false comes along.

What Damon says is quite sensible. But he is speaking purely of practical considerations. Yes, perhaps it "will do" but that does not make it true. If moral disagreement is possible that means that at least some people think it's true, but that again does not make it true. Nobody is denying that moral subscriptions exist, merely that claiming there is something special about them that makes them inherently different from opinions is absurd.

I mean it pretty much as most of us do— until philosophy beckons.

When a fundamentalist says "it is right" they mean that their god dictates it. When the average person states that "it is right" they mean that they think it is so, simply their opinion. When the moral absolutist states "it is right" they mean that they consider it to be a fundamental truth of reality that cannot be disputed.

When you state that it is right to refrain from killing people "whether or not killing people for fun suits my preferences, your preferences or anyone else's preferences", you seem to fall into category 3, the moral absolutist. However it is possible you did not mean it to be interpreted as such, which is what I asked what you meant with "it is right".

 

[Cavemonster]

You're right in that there is a connection provided there actually is an Omnipotent God who punishes people if they don't behave morally.

That was the example that I gave, but I think any answer to the first question is meaningful to the second.

For instance, if the nature of morality is "Those actions which, emergent from human biolology, lead to the most general happiness in a utilitarian sense" then you have another prescription for the second question, even with no higher power. The answer could be "Agreement with the majority moral sentiment" and that prescribes yet a different path. In fact, almost any answer which falls on the spectrum of moral realism has direct implications for that second question.

I can keep going with many answers to that first question, besides god belief, that have specific implications for the second. It is only when you accept certain values for the first question, values which are not widely held, that the second question can be approached the way you do.

So you're really saying that the answer to the first question doesn't affect the answer to the second, as long as you answer the first question correctly, which is a contradiction in definition. It's a bit like saying your height doesn't effect your ability to ride the roller coaster... but you do need to be over 5 feet tall.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

That was the example that I gave, but I think any answer to the first question is meaningful to the second.

For instance, if the nature of morality is "Those actions which, emergent from human biolology, lead to the most general happiness in a utilitarian sense" then you have another prescription for the second question, even with no higher power.

I'm sorry, but no, you don't have a prescription for the second question. The question of "how should we behave morally" is still a subjective one, that pertains us and our memes and our agreements. One that will have many multiple answers, as each individual society builds their own moral. You still don't have a concrete, objective answer as to how we should ALL behave. The number of ways we could behave morally is infinite. And in fact, the Moral Zeitgeist has done nothing but change, and will continue changing over time.

So you're really saying that the answer to the first question doesn't affect the answer to the second, as long as you answer the first question correctly,

No. what I'm saying is that, unless the question of "where does morality come from" involves something that directly affects the question of "how we should behave morally"; then there is no correlation.

The only case where it would, is in the example you gave, in which the answer to "where morality comes from" involved the instructions "A God that will punish you if you don't obey the moral code", thus providing an immediate automatic answer to the question "how should we behave morally"

Again, the example of chess: What the nature of the rules of chess is, has no bearing on how we should play the game. The claim "The rules of chess are an abstraction by human beings" does not imply "You should cheat on every chess game, because what gives? It's all made up".

It's a bit like saying your height doesn't effect your ability to ride the roller coaster... but you do need to be over 5 feet tall.

Sorry but that's just a false analogy and isn't relevant to the examples I've provided.

A correct analogy would be: "What is the nature of the rules for riding roller coasters?" The answer "Human agreement on a specific height number". Does that mean that, because it's a random agreement on a specific height, that one should cheat and try to sneak in smaller people under the argument that "it's just a human agreement"?. No. One doesn't follow from the other.

How one should follow the rules is a separate issue of what the nature of the rules are; unless the nature of the rules itself is one that automatically dictates how one should follow the rules (Duh). But this is not the case.

 

[Cavemonster]

I'm sorry, but no, you don't have a prescription for the second question. The question of "how should we behave morally" is still a subjective one, that pertains us and our memes and our agreements. One that will have many multiple answers, as each individual society builds their own moral. You still don't have a concrete, objective answer as to how we should ALL behave. The number of ways we could behave morally is infinite. And in fact, the Moral Zeitgeist has done nothing but change, and will continue changing over time.

Yes, all that is true if your answer to the first question is that morality "pertains us and our memes and our agreements". But as I've said, there are several answers which posit an objective, or more objective morality. I've listed some and I'm not sure why you're discounting them.

Even on this forum, where god belief is relatively rare, there is a common, if unstated answer to the first question that morality is an invisible objective code that well adjusted individuals access emotionally. Many people claim to know what is objectively right because they feel it, which they'll often phrase as an expression of "common sense". This gives the individual specific moral imperatives without the need for a god figure.

It's incorrect, but that's my point. Your second question is only uneffected by the first if the first is answered correctly, which is a contradiction. You can't say the value X isn't effected by the value of Y as long as Y is a certain value, it's an essential logical contradiction.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Yes, all that is true if your answer to the first question is that morality "pertains us and our memes and our agreements".

I'm not sure if we're on the same page, but you seem to be entertaining the notion that this (the bolded part) is not the case. Otherwise, I don't see the relevance in arguing the "if". Do you disagree that this is the case? Do you disagree that morality pertains our memes and our agreements?

But as I've said, there are several answers which posit an objective, or more objective morality. I've listed some and I'm not sure why you're discounting them.

There may be several answers, but none of them are objective. They may be believed to be objective, but that doesn't make them. People may be convinced that the true objective morality is in the Bible or in their pet religious beliefs, but that does not make it so. There is not a speck of evidence that morality is anything else but a construct of the human mind. So I don't understand why you present these other alternatives as if they were valid.

It's incorrect, but that's my point. Your second question is only uneffected by the first if the first is answered correctly, which is a contradiction. You can't say the value X isn't effected by the value of Y as long as Y is a certain value, it's an essential logical contradiction.

Honestly, when you phrase it like that, I get confused. I'm not sure what you mean by "answered correctly". I mean, what is your position about the issue? Do you believe there actually is such a thing as Objective moral?

What about the example of the Chess Rules? Do you agree or disagree? And if so why?

 

[Cavemonster]

Let me clarify.
There is no such thing as objective moral truth.

But to arrive at the approach to morality you prescribe, and I agree with one must first reject conceptions of morality that hinge on an objective moral truth.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Let me clarify.
There is no such thing as objective moral truth.

But to arrive at the approach to morality you prescribe, and I agree with one must first reject conceptions of morality that hinge on an objective moral truth.

Indeed.

I don't argue that.

The only part I'm arguing is the difference between a) Reaching the conclusion (as you and I have) that morality is subjective; and b) Asking questions about how we should conduct ourselves morally.

I believe you also agree with me that just because there is no such thing as objective moral truth, that that does not mean we should go outside and kill a bunch of people, right?

 

[Sophronius]

If I may, shall I try to clarify cavemonsters position as I understand it?

Caveman essentially argues that we should be rational about morality and as such try and discuss it in practical terms (ought... if...) rather than adhering to outdated ideas such as moral absolutism which don't get us anywhere.

Regarding the issue of whether or not the answer to the question of the nature of reality influences the question of how we should behave morally, it seems obvious to me that one would influence the other. I don't disagree with the answers you gave, but if you were to change the answer to the first question to something else, the answer to the second question would likely change as well. I think this is what cavemonster means when he says that the answer to the first influences the answer to the second.

However, I think we all agree that the answer to the first question doesn't dictate the answer to the second one. It doesn't follow automatically.

As you say, just because there is no such thing as objective moral truth, that does not mean we should go outside and kill a bunch of people. However, our views on what we should do to be moral would surely be different if there WERE such a thing as objective moral truth.

 

[Cavemonster]

Indeed.

I don't argue that.

The only part I'm arguing is the difference between a) Reaching the conclusion (as you and I have) that morality is subjective; and b) Asking questions about how we should conduct ourselves morally.

I believe you also agree with me that just because there is no such thing as objective moral truth, that that does not mean we should go outside and kill a bunch of people, right?

Of course.
We may have slightly different answers to question a.
My view is not that morality is subjective, but that when we talk about morality, we're talking about so many different behavioral drivers, often mutually exclusive systems, that moral terminology becomes meaningless in a practical sense. Not just that morals change with culture, but that in a globalized, culture spanning world, it's far more useful to skip the moral language altogether and get to the practical concerns underneath.

Not moral relativism, but moral anti-realism.

And what I was trying to bring across before, is that many possible (though incorrect in my view) answers to question A have specific consequences for how question B is approached and it is only through answers to A that reject absolute objective morality that the questions are really separated. As Sophronius said above, most answers to A won't absolutely dictate the answer to B (although an answer that includes a written rule book as discussed goes a long way towards that) but many will strongly dictate the direction of exploration. I don't want to get hung up on this because I feel we agree on the essentials and this is a secondary point, most likely just a glitch in communication.

In my view as an anti-realist, the second question is sort of meaningless as phrased and would be more useful for practical discussion if rewritten as "How will I make my behavioral decisions and what behavioral decisions will I advocate in others?"

The "should" in the question doesn't have a meaning without an attached goal, and it's not practical to assume humans have the same life defining goals that can be taken unstated. The "morally" isn't useful because in any broader realm of debate, the participants will bring in those separate and contradictory meanings of moral terminology mentioned above, and from a linguistic standpoint, you can't negate their claim to the term. Much more clear to shuck it than to try to redefine something so widely used.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

Of course.
We may have slightly different answers to question a.
My view is not that morality is subjective, but that when we talk about morality, we're talking about so many different behavioral drivers, often mutually exclusive systems, that moral terminology becomes meaningless in a practical sense. Not just that morals change with culture, but that in a globalized, culture spanning world, it's far more useful to skip the moral language altogether and get to the practical concerns underneath.

Not moral relativism, but moral anti-realism.

And what I was trying to bring across before, is that many possible (though incorrect in my view) answers to question A have specific consequences for how question B is approached and it is only through answers to A that reject absolute objective morality that the questions are really separated. As Sophronius said above, most answers to A won't absolutely dictate the answer to B (although an answer that includes a written rule book as discussed goes a long way towards that) but many will strongly dictate the direction of exploration. I don't want to get hung up on this because I feel we agree on the essentials and this is a secondary point, most likely just a glitch in communication.

In my view as an anti-realist, the second question is sort of meaningless as phrased and would be more useful for practical discussion if rewritten as "How will I make my behavioral decisions and what behavioral decisions will I advocate in others?"

The "should" in the question doesn't have a meaning without an attached goal, and it's not practical to assume humans have the same life defining goals that can be taken unstated. The "morally" isn't useful because in any broader realm of debate, the participants will bring in those separate and contradictory meanings of moral terminology mentioned above, and from a linguistic standpoint, you can't negate their claim to the term. Much more clear to shuck it than to try to redefine something so widely used.

Agreed.

 

[westprog]

Okay, you're ascribing a quality, "right" to refraining from killing for fun.

How do you know that that action exhibits that quality? How do you measure for that quality in a novel situation?

What measurements do you use to determine if a particular action is "right"?

It's very easy for us to determine whether suffering has a different value to happiness. Try slamming your hand in a drawer. The experiment will quickly demonstrate that suffering is worse than not-suffering. (Generating happiness is a bit trickier, and is left as an exercise).

The reason that we say that it is wrong to slam someone else's hand in a drawer is because we think that it will cause suffering to occur. People who think that the suffering someone else experiences matters less than their own are fairly common - but people who think that other people's suffering doesn't matter at all are psychopaths.

People who think that their own suffering doesn't matter are fairly rare.

 

[westprog]

To grasp how morality is merely subjective, one must study the history of mankind and their culture. One must study and understand what Dawkins calls The Shifting Moral Zeitgeist

Dawkins himself has no problem in believing that acts are objectively right or wrong. How he manages this philosophically is another matter.

 

[westprog]

Completely agree, Cavemonster.

And though I do agree that in general it's cumbersome and largely unnecessary to say exactly what your 'if' is in a 'should... if' statement, I also agree that in debate situations like we have here, it's often very useful to go ahead and put the whole thing down in black and white.

Completely amuses me btw that we have people responding to the idea that morals only exist in the minds of intelligent social beings with lines like 'but I have them so they exist, QED, sheesh'

But I honestly don't understand how the OP gets misread as a call for anarchy...

If people took it seriously, it would be a call for anarchy. If there is no objective standard for morality, then anyone can choose their own moral code to suit themselves, and it has to be recognised that we suppress their actions simply in order that our own aims are achievable. If everyone believed this and acted on it, it hardly seems likely that this would have no societal consequences.

However, I don't think that even the people who profess this belief actually believe it.

 

[westprog]

Really?
Cockfighting, bear-baiting, bullfighting, eating shrimp and other animals alive have all been widely enjoyed by various humans in various cultures. They don't think it's evil.

By what basis do you say that it's evil? Please answer this question honestly and directly.

On the basis that it causes - or is thought to cause - suffering.

 

[westprog]

Oh, and Mike.

I have direct experience of my flavor preference for apples. Since it's defined as an experience, that is the strongest evidence there can be.

As for your preference for apples, we have brain imaging technology that can map your pleasure centers. Combined with wider research we can say that either we can tell what flavor you like, or else your brain is drastically different than all other humans.

Aside from that, through behaviorism we can say that it doesn't make any difference to us if you like apples or you just act in every way like you do. From your mom packing you a snack, to an advertising agency trying to sell you a fruit drink, there is no difference between you enjoying apples or just consistently acting as though you do.

For the world outside, the phenomenon of your qualia isn't meaningfully distinct from your actions surrounding your qualia.

So, more broadly, from a functional perspective, we very much can measure your food preference in many ways. Any objective "good" is unfalsifiable more in the way that a god claim is.

That's an excellent example of the limitations of science. The behaviour of someone who enjoys apples may be indistinguishable from someone who just eats them for some other reason. Does this mean that when Cavemonster is sitting in his cave with a box of Cox's Orange Pippins, that his experience is the same as when Lord Muck has his butler peel and quarter a Golden Delicious? We cannot know. We only know our own experiences directly.

The problem of morality is in the extent to which we can know whether other people experience the world as we do. Cavemonster might wish to drag Lord Muck back to his cave to devour him. By his screams and wriggling, he knows that LM is having experiences of fear and pain, which he thinks are wrong. That's the point where he stops being a monster and becomes a human - humane - being.

(P.S. I'm sure that Cavemonster doesn't actually bring people back to his cave to eat them. Thought experiment only).

 

[Complexity]

That's an excellent example of the limitations of current science. The behaviour of someone who enjoys apples may currently be indistinguishable from someone who just eats them for some other reason. Does this mean that when Cavemonster is sitting in his cave with a box of Cox's Orange Pippins, that his experience is the same as when Lord Muck has his butler peel and quarter a Golden Delicious? We cannot know. We only know our own experiences directly.

Fixed it for you.

 

[westprog]

Indeed.

I don't argue that.

The only part I'm arguing is the difference between a) Reaching the conclusion (as you and I have) that morality is subjective; and b) Asking questions about how we should conduct ourselves morally.

I believe you also agree with me that just because there is no such thing as objective moral truth, that that does not mean we should go outside and kill a bunch of people, right?

Assume that I'm Jeffrey Dahmer. How would you convince me, in the absence of an objective moral truth, that I should behave differently?

 

[Sophronius]

It's very easy for us to determine whether suffering has a different value to happiness. Try slamming your hand in a drawer. The experiment will quickly demonstrate that suffering is worse than not-suffering. (Generating happiness is a bit trickier, and is left as an exercise).

Doesn't follow. If you experience suffering that proves that slamming your hand causes you to experience suffering, nothing more.

Dawkins himself has no problem in believing that acts are objectively right or wrong. How he manages this philosophically is another matter.

Really? I remember him specifically stating that he doesn't believe in such arbitrary concepts as good and evil. Could you direct us to where we can find him stating that he believes in objective moral truth?

If people took it seriously, it would be a call for anarchy. If there is no objective standard for morality, then anyone can choose their own moral code to suit themselves, and it has to be recognised that we suppress their actions simply in order that our own aims are achievable. If everyone believed this and acted on it, it hardly seems likely that this would have no societal consequences.

However, I don't think that even the people who profess this belief actually believe it.

Nonsense. This is the kind of stuff that comes straight out of a religious man’s handbook. A call for reason has never, in the history of mankind, resulted in the downfall of society, despite this being predicted every time there is an advancement in the general way of thinking.

Not believing in God doesn't cause people to murder each other. Not believing in some universal moral code doesn't cause people to murder each other. Quite the opposite: Those who are capable of thinking for themselves tend to be far more lawful, simply because they understand the consequences of their actions and are more rational about them.

And the last line there sounds suspiciously like “But in their hearts, I believe that Atheists still know and love God!” Nonsense.

The problem of morality is in the extent to which we can know whether other people experience the world as we do. Cavemonster might wish to drag Lord Muck back to his cave to devour him. By his screams and wriggling, he knows that LM is having experiences of fear and pain, which he thinks are wrong. That's the point where he stops being a monster and becomes a human - humane - being.

If I were given the option, I’d rather not be human, thank you very much. Honestly, I don’t get where this “humans are pure and good and anyone who hurts people is not a real human but a monster!” idea comes from.

How would you convince me, in the absence of an objective moral truth, that I should behave differently?

That's what the law is for. Any rational person will understand that, even in the absence of moral rules, killing random people is not a good idea.

Besides which, just because you don't believe in something as silly as absolute moral truth, that doesn't prevent you from having a sense of empathy, or simply realising that hurting people isn't nice.

 

[Cavemonster]

If people took it seriously, it would be a call for anarchy. If there is no objective standard for morality, then anyone can choose their own moral code to suit themselves, and it has to be recognised that we suppress their actions simply in order that our own aims are achievable. If everyone believed this and acted on it, it hardly seems likely that this would have no societal consequences.

You've hit the nail on the head! It hardly seems like it would have no societal consequences! We don't need a moral code because we can understand practical consequences.

People who say that without god or objective morality, we would act horribly are fundamentally contradicting themselves.

If the society created by acting that way is one that we really want to avoid, one that is markedly less pleasant for most of us to live in, then POOF! We have a rational reason to avoid making the decisions that would create such a society! If the outcome is really so horrible, then we don't need a moral code to decide against it, self interest will do.