There are no material objects

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I happen to disagree, demonic possession is not coherent, it can not be validated. That is why I used the term coherent. It does not have self consistent criteria, explanations that pass double blinding, etc...

It may be self consistent and meet self reference and confirmation bias, but it is not a coherent theory in terms of validation, despite the fact that it is a not uncommon belief.

I'm not saying it is coherent (and this is the key point, which I believe you are not seeing) from the outside. For the believers it is absolutely coherent. For them, inside their world view. True, the very same meaning of the word "coherence" is different from them and for the outsiders.

When it starts to loose coherence... they begin to crack the egg, and some eventually go out, some others, reinforced by fears (probably inserted by an authority figure) remain in the cult.

And this happens, to everyone of us. We all have our own world view, sometimes, it is shared across millions, sometimes by a few thousand. And everyone of us have the model which serves us better, we all try to get it right, and to be correct. I believe this mechanism initiated ages ago, when the cognitive machine needed to be sure, about getting food for instance. If an animal believes or think they won't get the prey, they wouldn't move, a "certainty" mechanism should be in place in order for anyone to move.

 

[dafydd]

Mankind bad

Skydaddy sad

Skydaddy punish punish punish

Only if believe fairy stories.

 

[tsig]

Only if believe fairy stories.

Darn skeptics. You're taking the glow out of the dawn and the wonder out of the world with your pedantic, plodding, pitiful worldview.\new age hat off

 

[punshhh]

Excellently observed. Now let us cultivate our garden.

In which there is a tree of life?

 

[punshhh]

Mankind bad

Skydaddy sad

Skydaddy punish punish punish

You spelt my name wrong its punshhh, not punish.

 

[punshhh]

I'm not saying it is coherent (and this is the key point, which I believe you are not seeing) from the outside. For the believers it is absolutely coherent. For them, inside their world view. True, the very same meaning of the word "coherence" is different from them and for the outsiders.

When it starts to loose coherence... they begin to crack the egg, and some eventually go out, some others, reinforced by fears (probably inserted by an authority figure) remain in the cult.

And this happens, to everyone of us. We all have our own world view, sometimes, it is shared across millions, sometimes by a few thousand. And everyone of us have the model which serves us better, we all try to get it right, and to be correct. I believe this mechanism initiated ages ago, when the cognitive machine needed to be sure, about getting food for instance. If an animal believes or think they won't get the prey, they wouldn't move, a "certainty" mechanism should be in place in order for anyone to move.

Nicely put, maybe some folk will now start to take their blinkers off(some have already of course)

 

[dafydd]

Nicely put, maybe some folk will now start to take their blinkers off(some have already of course)

The people still wearing the blinkers are called mystics.

 

[Dancing David]

And this happens, to everyone of us. We all have our own world view, sometimes, it is shared across millions, sometimes by a few thousand. And everyone of us have the model which serves us better, we all try to get it right, and to be correct. I believe this mechanism initiated ages ago, when the cognitive machine needed to be sure, about getting food for instance. If an animal believes or think they won't get the prey, they wouldn't move, a "certainty" mechanism should be in place in order for anyone to move.

A rather broad over statement, and not really supported by anything. Your understanding of cognitive mechanisms is odd.

No further comment.

 

[Sideroxylon]

I'm not saying it is coherent (and this is the key point, which I believe you are not seeing) from the outside. For the believers it is absolutely coherent. For them, inside their world view. True, the very same meaning of the word "coherence" is different from them and for the outsiders.

When it starts to loose coherence... they begin to crack the egg, and some eventually go out, some others, reinforced by fears (probably inserted by an authority figure) remain in the cult.

And this happens, to everyone of us. We all have our own world view, sometimes, it is shared across millions, sometimes by a few thousand. And everyone of us have the model which serves us better, we all try to get it right, and to be correct. I believe this mechanism initiated ages ago, when the cognitive machine needed to be sure, about getting food for instance. If an animal believes or think they won't get the prey, they wouldn't move, a "certainty" mechanism should be in place in order for anyone to move.

How does your evolutionary epistemology sit with some of the relativist ideas that you have expressed? Isn't that another narrative? How do you justify it?

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

How does your evolutionary epistemology sit with some of the relativist ideas that you have expressed? Isn't that another narrative? How do you justify it?

Can you be more specific?

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

How does your evolutionary epistemology sit with some of the relativist ideas that you have expressed? Isn't that another narrative? How do you justify it?

Relativity has to do with frames of reference, different "FOR" will show you a slightly different world. Reality, from there, seems to be one thing, and from other FOR it will seem to be something else. Evolution means that some FOR are more inclusive than others, because more observables are taken in to account.

 

[Sideroxylon]

Relativity has to do with frames of reference, different "FOR" will show you a slightly different world. Reality, from there, seems to be one thing, and from other FOR it will seem to be something else. Evolution means that some FOR are more inclusive than others, because more observables are taken in to account.

Thanks for that. It wasn't really a well thought out question and having thought about it more I figured you might answer similarly.

The problem with truth relativism is that it does't seem take our ability to measure the truth of a given idea against the external world, with scientific rigor setting aside factors like confirmation bias. The measures of success in many matters seems to go beyond frames of reference in the way some narratives provide utility that keep us well and allow the development of technology.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Thanks for that. It wasn't really a well thought out question and having thought about it more I figured you might answer similarly.

The problem with truth relativism is that it does't seem take our ability to measure the truth of a given idea against the external world, with scientific rigor setting aside factors like confirmation bias. The measures of success in many matters seems to go beyond frames of reference in the way some narratives provide utility that keep us well and allow the development of technology.

Care to be more specific? I believe the key issue here is the concept about what constitutes the "external world". A popular view is that our models are about something, and that the more the model resembles that something, the more accurate (or true) it is. You know, the old maps and territories assumption.

I believe something different, that the universe is a dense fog, and we have managed to put some buoys here and there. Our models reflect such buoys (and more buoys equals better predictions), but around them there is just fog.

 

[Sideroxylon]

Care to be more specific? I believe the key issue here is the concept about what constitutes the "external world". A popular view is that our models are about something, and that the more the model resembles that something, the more accurate (or true) it is. You know, the old maps and territories assumption.

You are not a Berkeleyan idealist, are you. We all take that pragmatic leap of assumption and don't step in front of moving buses. I am talking about that external world. That is what we and this planet's intelligent life, and perhaps some without intelligence, build their models about so they can thrive, avoid danger and reproduce.

How can you hold a truth relativist position if you can talk about some models being more accurate? Do you subscribe to that?

I believe something different, that the universe is a dense fog, and we have managed to put some buoys here and there. Our models reflect such buoys (and more buoys equals better predictions), but around them there is just fog.

I like this idea from Konrad Lorenz:

The central nervous apparatus does not prescribe the laws of nature any more than the hoof of the horse prescribes the form of the ground. Just as the hoof of the horse, this central nervous apparatus stumbles over unforeseen changes in its task. But just as the hoof of the horse is adapted to the ground of the steppe which it copes with, so our central nervous apparatus for organizing the image of the world is adapted to the real world with which man has to cope.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/evo-epis/

 

[Sideroxylon]

You are not a Berkeleyan idealist, are you. We all take that pragmatic leap of assumption and don't step in front of moving buses*. I am talking about that external world. That is what we and this planet's intelligent life, and perhaps some without intelligence, build their models about so they can thrive, avoid danger and reproduce.

How can you hold a truth relativist position if you can talk about some models being more accurate? Do you subscribe to that?



I like this idea from Konrad Lorenz:

http://www.iep.utm.edu/evo-epis/

ETA: * That's a bit Samuel Johnson but you get my point, I hope.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

You are not a Berkeleyan idealist, are you. We all take that pragmatic leap of assumption and don't step in front of moving buses. I am talking about that external world. That is what we and this planet's intelligent life, and perhaps some without intelligence, build their models about so they can thrive, avoid danger and reproduce.

How can you hold a truth relativist position if you can talk about some models being more accurate? Do you subscribe to that?

Not at all. Im more an instrumentalist (from WP)

"instrumentalism is the view that a scientific theory is a useful instrument in understanding the world. A concept or theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains and predicts phenomena, as opposed to how accurately it describes objective reality.
Instrumentalism avoids the realism / anti-realism debate, and may be better characterised as non-realism. Instrumentalism shifts the basis of evaluation away from whether or not phenomena observed actually exist, and towards an analysis of whether the results and evaluation fit with observed phenomena.
Historically, science and scientific theories have advanced, as more detailed observations and results about the world have been made. Instrumentalism provides a framework for the practice of science and scientific method. Instrumentalism is not specifically anti-realist, however it maintains that the role of the scientist is constrained by empirical results, and the theories that can be developed can offer explanations of how the world works, but that these explanations should be seen as best approximations of the world, rather than an ultimate reality."

I would change the last phrase, to this:

but that these explanations should be seen just as (arbitrary) theoretical models that matches the results, rather than a model about an ultimate reality.

 

[Sideroxylon]

Not at all. Im more an instrumentalist (from WP)

"instrumentalism is the view that a scientific theory is a useful instrument in understanding the world. A concept or theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains and predicts phenomena, as opposed to how accurately it describes objective reality.
Instrumentalism avoids the realism / anti-realism debate, and may be better characterised as non-realism. Instrumentalism shifts the basis of evaluation away from whether or not phenomena observed actually exist, and towards an analysis of whether the results and evaluation fit with observed phenomena.
Historically, science and scientific theories have advanced, as more detailed observations and results about the world have been made. Instrumentalism provides a framework for the practice of science and scientific method. Instrumentalism is not specifically anti-realist, however it maintains that the role of the scientist is constrained by empirical results, and the theories that can be developed can offer explanations of how the world works, but that these explanations should be seen as best approximations of the world, rather than an ultimate reality."

I would change the last phrase, to this:

but that these explanations should be seen just as (arbitrary) theoretical models that matches the results, rather than a model about an ultimate reality.

I lean that way myself. Maybe elements of pragmatism but I need to read more on that. These kinds of "soft" epistemologies seem to do away with a lot of problems and refocus some debates that we see around the forums, like evolution.

I read back about what you said on the coherent narratives within frames of reference and see that you are not arguing that they all have equal validity.

 

[Sideroxylon]

but that these explanations should be seen just as (arbitrary) theoretical models that matches the results, rather than a model about an ultimate reality.

When they allow us to explain a wide variety of phenomena, as say a model like atomism or evolution does, aren't we justified in saying they are about the "ultimate reality". I can't help but thinking back to Lorenz on that. Our models are shaped by the "ultimate reality" however limited in aspect or accuracy.

 

[tsig]

Not at all. Im more an instrumentalist (from WP)

"instrumentalism is the view that a scientific theory is a useful instrument in understanding the world. A concept or theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains and predicts phenomena, as opposed to how accurately it describes objective reality.
Instrumentalism avoids the realism / anti-realism debate, and may be better characterised as non-realism. Instrumentalism shifts the basis of evaluation away from whether or not phenomena observed actually exist, and towards an analysis of whether the results and evaluation fit with observed phenomena.
Historically, science and scientific theories have advanced, as more detailed observations and results about the world have been made. Instrumentalism provides a framework for the practice of science and scientific method. Instrumentalism is not specifically anti-realist, however it maintains that the role of the scientist is constrained by empirical results, and the theories that can be developed can offer explanations of how the world works, but that these explanations should be seen as best approximations of the world, rather than an ultimate reality."

I would change the last phrase, to this:

but that these explanations should be seen just as (arbitrary) theoretical models that matches the results, rather than a model about an ultimate reality.

How do we model this ultimate reality and how is it different than our mundane reality?

ETA: If the model matches the results then how is it (arbitrary)?

 

[tsig]

When they allow us to explain a wide variety of phenomena, as say a model like atomism or evolution does, aren't we justified in saying they are about the "ultimate reality". I can't help but thinking back to Lorenz on that. Our models are shaped by the "ultimate reality" however limited in aspect or accuracy.

How is this ultimate reality any different than the reality I see around me?