The Zombie Poll

[Ichneumonwasp]

I want that axe. Especially to have something to grind.....


Ain't google wonderful, it's called the ship of Theseus problem.

 

[jmercer]

A good, but potentially misleading, example! The "misleading" bit is purely the fault of the Art world, though. Within this world, the provenance of the painting seems at times even more important than the painting itself! The Mona Lisa, for example, was stolen in 1911; suppose that the one hanging in the Louvre today is an exact copy? It is entirely possible that, if conlusive proof were produced today to show that it is currently a forgery, the museum would remove it from view, or at least alter the exhibit in some way. It would no longer be considered priceless. And what would have changed, compared to the same painting yesterday? Not a thing. Its value is not in its particular molecules, but in who put those molecules there. (The same can be said for paper money, compared to counterfeits.) There is no such requirement for our brains, except under some fairly strict (probably religious) assumptions.
I agree that the Mona Lisa would be considered to be destroyed by this process. For the reasons outlined above, though, I believe that this particular analogy does not work for the question in the OP.

Interesting point of view, amigo. And of course, I'm going to debate it.

The provenance of a given human being is just as important - in fact, that's a significant part of my position. If human provenance was irrelelvent, a perfect copy of you would be considered the same as you, and entitled to lay claim to everything in your life.

However, if one examined the provenence of the original and the copy, it would be clear that one is Mercutio and the other one is not.

In the same sense, if the brain of one Mercutio is destroyed and replaced with a duplicate, then - just like with the "in-place replacement" of the Mona Lisa - the "new" Mercutio isn't the same person.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Alas, then, Mercutio is not Mercutio.

 

[jmercer]

Alas, then, Mercutio is not Mercutio.

Indeed.

Alas, poor Mercutio... I knew him well.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

If we return tomorrow do you suppose we will find him a grave man?

 

[Apathia]

Yep. It's a purely materialistic viewpoint, and the entire OP is effectively designed to support it's favored conclusion.

Or in other words, it's a straw man argument.

Quick! Somebody get Articulate here. Undercover Elephant has converted!!

 

[jmercer]

If we return tomorrow do you suppose we will find him a grave man?

It's a good question. Perhaps we should hold a skull session concerning it.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yes, yes.

A solemn air and the best comforter
To an unsettled fancy, cure thy brains,
Now useless, boil'd within thy skull!

 

[jmercer]

Quick! Somebody get Articulate here. Undercover Elephant has converted!!

Oh, I dunno about that. I play the 'devil's advocate' at times, myself.

 

[chriswl]

Yep. It's a purely materialistic viewpoint, and the entire OP is effectively designed to support it's favored conclusion.

Or in other words, it's a straw man argument.

Oh please! We really don't need another person round here who thinks that merely describing something in physical terms means you are assuming materialism.

I believe the argument was first proposed in the form it is in here by Chalmers who is a dualist. It makes no assumptions about the relation between mind and matter. It simply invites us to consider a certain physical scenario and then speculate about what (if any) mental activity we can imagine taking place. Believing or not believing in materialism doesn't help you answer the question. I believe we end up concluding that mind must be associated with certain types of artificial brains just as clearly as it must be associated with biological brains. But this says nothing about whether either one of mind or matter can be reduced to the other (or to something else).

 

[chriswl]

The provenance of a given human being is just as important - in fact, that's a significant part of my position. If human provenance was irrelelvent, a perfect copy of you would be considered the same as you, and entitled to lay claim to everything in your life.

But I don't see how this is relevant to the OP.

Do you think it makes any difference whether the replacement process is done very gradually or all in one go? Either the continuity of form provided by the gradual replacement process allows continuity of consciousness. Or even piecemeal replacement alters the essence of what you are. In which case you are clearly not the person you were yesterday. Is there really a third option?

 

[jmercer]

But I don't see how this is relevant to the OP.

Do you think it makes any difference whether the replacement process is done very gradually or all in one go? Either the continuity of form provided by the gradual replacement process allows continuity of consciousness. Or even piecemeal replacement alters the essence of what you are. In which case you are clearly not the person you were yesterday. Is there really a third option?

The natural process occurs at an atomic level, while the OP's process (even if it were possible) would occur at the celluar level - quite a difference in scale, among other things. A replacement at the celluar level would mean that the entire celluar construct of a neuron would be ripped out and an entire new one put in it's place.

In the case of the natural process, there is no discrete replacement of a cell, so provenence (continuance) is literally uninterrupted. If a cell is ripped out and replaced with something else, the original cell dies - and that constitutes an interruption in continuance. If all the cells are killed in this way, you arguably become a different entity than the original at some point during the process. (Don't ask me what point, please! )

I am of the opinion that the natural process is not replacement - but is replenishment. That's a different kind of process altogether. Granted, this may be simply semantics - but I honestly think that there's a fundamental difference.

 

[Mercutio]

Interesting point of view, amigo. And of course, I'm going to debate it.

The provenance of a given human being is just as important - in fact, that's a significant part of my position. If human provenance was irrelelvent, a perfect copy of you would be considered the same as you, and entitled to lay claim to everything in your life.

Well, that is part of what is up for debate in the OP. Under the assumptions of materialism, the exact copy of me would experience the same memories, would have the same habits, would only begin to differ from me as we were now exposed to different environments. In terms of the OP problem, yes, it would be considered the same as me.

Legally, however, it would be another matter. One is me, the other is not, and the provenance *would* matter there. My point is, provenance is of value in only part of what makes me me. There are other parts of what makes me me for which provenance really does not matter. This is why the Louvre sells prints.

However, if one examined the provenence of the original and the copy, it would be clear that one is Mercutio and the other one is not.

In the same sense, if the brain of one Mercutio is destroyed and replaced with a duplicate, then - just like with the "in-place replacement" of the Mona Lisa - the "new" Mercutio isn't the same person.

I am most certainly not the same Mercutio I was years ago. This is biology, chemistry, and physics at work. Whether you call it repair or replacement, the fact is that I am made up of different molecules than I once was.

 

[Mercutio]

The natural process occurs at an atomic level, while the OP's process (even if it were possible) would occur at the celluar level - quite a difference in scale, among other things. A replacement at the celluar level would mean that the entire celluar construct of a neuron would be ripped out and an entire new one put in it's place.

An entire new one that is not merely similar, but functionally equivalent, as per the OP. If the ripping out and replacing damages or in any way impinges on the function of the neuron (or neuron-equivalent), then you are looking at a different thought problem.

In the case of the natural process, there is no discrete replacement of a cell, so provenence (continuance) is literally uninterrupted. If a cell is ripped out and replaced with something else, the original cell dies - and that constitutes an interruption in continuance. If all the cells are killed in this way, you arguably become a different entity than the original at some point during the process. (Don't ask me what point, please! )

You are looking at a different thought problem; your "interruption in continuance" is at odds with the OP's "functionally equivalent".

I am of the opinion that the natural process is not replacement - but is replenishment. That's a different kind of process altogether. Granted, this may be simply semantics - but I honestly think that there's a fundamental difference.

In one, you have the cells that used to be there no longer there, and the cells that were once not there, there. And in the other...

 

[Apathia]

Dr. Frankenstein has silicon chips for you!

http://www.livescience.com/humanbiology/060327_neuro_chips.html

 

[chriswl]

In the case of the natural process, there is no discrete replacement of a cell, so provenence (continuance) is literally uninterrupted. If a cell is ripped out and replaced with something else, the original cell dies - and that constitutes an interruption in continuance. If all the cells are killed in this way, you arguably become a different entity than the original at some point during the process. (Don't ask me what point, please! )

But the OP is asking you at what point, that's what's behind the question. Is there some magic threshold at which you suddenly are no longer the same person, or is it possible to be fractionally the same person? Or does it make more sense to say that there is complete continuity?

I am of the opinion that the natural process is not replacement - but is replenishment. That's a different kind of process altogether. Granted, this may be simply semantics - but I honestly think that there's a fundamental difference.

The only fundamental difference I can see is that "replenishment" is something that the body does to itself, not something that is done to it by an outside agency. It rebuilds itself from the inside. But again, I don't see how this is relevant.

 

[jmercer]

An entire new one that is not merely similar, but functionally equivalent, as per the OP. If the ripping out and replacing damages or in any way impinges on the function of the neuron (or neuron-equivalent), then you are looking at a different thought problem.

Ok... I don't see that, but I'll accept it as a working hypothesis. To me, the death of the original neuron effectively destroys the function of the neuron. Or perhaps a better way of putting it would be "The function of that particular instance of the neuron is destroyed."

You are looking at a different thought problem; your "interruption in continuance" is at odds with the OP's "functionally equivalent".

Hm.. functionally equivalent... one sec, I want to read back over the OP.

Nope. As I read it, the "functionally equivalent" is merely the setup for the central question - which seems to be - what is your opinion on what happens to the 'you' that exists prior to the procedure? -

I mean the whole poll seems to center around that question. My answer is "You die, but no-one can tell."

Not a particularly comfortable answer, I grant you, but that's how I see it. Functionally equivalent is not the same thing as transferring the original consciousness. In fact, I think I said I wish there had been another choice on the poll.

In one, you have the cells that used to be there no longer there, and the cells that were once not there, there. And in the other...

Uh... in the "replenishment" scheme, the cells continue to exist - at least, until they truly die. If I understand you. And I'm not sure that I did. Of course, we've been down that road before.

OTOH, I often gain different perspectives when we debate, so this may simply be another time for that.

 

[jmercer]

But the OP is asking you at what point, that's what's behind the question. Is there some magic threshold at which you suddenly are no longer the same person, or is it possible to be fractionally the same person? Or does it make more sense to say that there is complete continuity?

It's a good question, but it's unanswerable in detail until we can effectively define exactly what consciousness is, and at what level of operation it ceases. Since we (or at least *I*) can't do that, all I can say is that in my opinion, there is a point where you cease to be the same person.

It's probably the point where enough change has been made to the parallel processes that make us up so that fundamental aspects of our personality are taken over by the "new" processes. (Similar to what happens when someone has a massive stroke, a brain injury, or even certain types of brain surgery. They sometimes become completely different personalities.)

The only fundamental difference I can see is that "replenishment" is something that the body does to itself, not something that is done to it by an outside agency. It rebuilds itself from the inside. But again, I don't see how this is relevant.

Nah. In one, the original celluar structure remains intact. In the other, the original celluar structure is removed and - one would assume - destroyed.

 

[Mercutio]

Ok... I don't see that, but I'll accept it as a working hypothesis. To me, the death of the original neuron effectively destroys the function of the neuron. Or perhaps a better way of putting it would be "The function of that particular instance of the neuron is destroyed."



Hm.. functionally equivalent... one sec, I want to read back over the OP.

Nope. As I read it, the "functionally equivalent" is merely the setup for the central question - which seems to be - what is your opinion on what happens to the 'you' that exists prior to the procedure? -

I mean the whole poll seems to center around that question. My answer is "You die, but no-one can tell."

Not a particularly comfortable answer, I grant you, but that's how I see it. Functionally equivalent is not the same thing as transferring the original consciousness. In fact, I think I said I wish there had been another choice on the poll.

What, then, is functional equivalence? How do you see it as "equivalent" if there is a change? What is your definition of functionally equivalent?

If I could expand on your answer, it seems clear to me that it is "you die, but no one--not even you--can tell." Which is a very neat definition of "die".

Uh... in the "replenishment" scheme, the cells continue to exist - at least, until they truly die. If I understand you. And I'm not sure that I did. Of course, we've been down that road before.

In the "replacement" scheme, the function of the cells is continued. In other words, they do everything the cells used to do. Everything. Otherwise, it is a different thought problem.

OTOH, I often gain different perspectives when we debate, so this may simply be another time for that.

 

[Mercutio]

Nah. In one, the original celluar structure remains intact. In the other, the original celluar structure is removed and - one would assume - destroyed.

But--and this is crucial--its functions are maintained. Replaced instantaneously and exactly. Unless it somehow does something above and beyond what it does...(?)...somehow...