2 Terminology and Basic Concepts
In order to set the stage for my discussion, I introduce some definitions and notions I will use in the following. Determinism: First of all, determinism will be taken to refer exclusively to ontic descriptions, and should not be confused with statements concerning our knowledge or beliefs. In particular, according to the definition adopted here, determinism does not to imply predictability. Both, predictability and retrodictability have their proper place only in the framework of epistemic descriptions. Causal relations: A process within which one event is a necessary condition for another event is described by a causal relation. The producing event is known as the cause and the event produced as its effect. A causal relationship is an irreflexive, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation between two events.
That is:
• no event can be the cause of itself;
• if a is the cause of b, then b cannot be the cause of a;
• if a is the cause of b, and b the cause of c, then a is the cause of c.
Causal ordering: A causal nexus requires some universal order. A fundamental
issue is the relation of causality to time. According to David Hume
causal relations have three components: contiguity of time and place, temporal priority of the cause, and constant conjunction.7 For Hume “all inferences from experience . . . are effects of custom, not of reasoning”,8 so that according to Hume’s view the idea of cause and effect is not a matter of fact but a mental habit of association, that is, essentially subjectively fabricated. Hume’s characterization implies that causal and temporal arrows are related by definition. Yet, this merging of the two very different ideas of causal order and temporal order is conceptually not sound. Moreover, it precludes many logical possibilities, like a backward causation, or a time-independent ordering of the causal
nexus.
Arrowless time in physics: If one wants to characterize causal ordering by
temporal ordering, then one has first to introduce temporal direction. Yet, the
generally adopted first principles of physics do not distinguish the future from
the past. First principles are characterized by high symmetries. A corresponding physical law is said to be fundamental if it is as independent as possible of any particular context. For example, we assume that the laws of nature are the same all the time and everywhere.
The assumption that there is neither a favored point of the origin nor a
preferred direction in time and space is a basic symmetry postulate required in
in all fundamental physical theories. Since a fundamental theorem by Emmy
Noether theorem implies a deep connection between symmetries and conservation laws, the idea that fundamental laws should be characterized by high symmetries is not just an aesthetic concept.9 For example, Noether’s theorem requires that the time-translation symmetry implies and is implied by the conservation of energy. In fundamental physical theories the basic dynamical laws are not only taken as a time-translation-invariant but also as time-reversalinvariant. In the mathematical jargon we say that a fundamental dynamics is given by a time-translation-invariant and time-reversal-invariant one-parameter group of automorphisms of the underlying mathematical structure.
If we consider the time-reversal symmetry as primary, then there is no ordering so that we cannot use the concepts of cause and effect. In such a formulation of physics all reality is already pre-existent, and nothing new can come into existence. In order for time and causality to be genuinely active, some degree of freedom is necessary to provide a mechanism by which the events “come into being”. Without breaking the time-reversal symmetry nothing new can ever arise. Within special contexts a spontaneous breaking of this symmetry is possible, so that the direction of time has to be considered as contextual.