Here's a little puzzle suggested by the questions of a poster on another forum.
Did the Nencini appeal court violate Italian procedural laws, CPP Articles 648 and 649, by provisionally convicting Knox and Sollecito on the original Charge D, that is, of the theft of 300 euros, 2 credit cards, and 2 cell phones from Kercher?
Examination of available court records make it clear that the Nencini court did violate those procedural laws.
Charge D alleged the theft, by Knox and Sollecito, of 300 euros, two credit cards, and two cell phones from Kercher.
Massei indeed acquitted Knox and Sollecito of part of Charge D (the theft of 300 euros and two credit cards) on the specification "because the fact [act of the crime] had not occurred" ("perche il fatto non sussiste"), under CPP Article 530 (the paragraph not being referenced, for those interested in that alleged controversy.)
However, Massei convicted them of the "residual" part of Charge D, the theft of two cell phones.
An appeal of the Massei verdict and sentence by the prosecution is available on
www.amandaknoxcase.com. This appeal, by Mignini and Comodi, dated 13 April 2010, is available in Italian and English translation. There is no mention of the Charge D verdict at all in that appeal. The entire appeal is devoted to arguing that there should have been no extenuating circumstances granted to Knox and Sollecito by the Massei court in their sentence, and thus the sentence should have been increased. This suggests that the revision of Charge D to theft of the telephones only was finalized by the time the Hellmann court heard the appeal.
Only the residual part of Charge D appears at the beginning of the Hellmann motivation report, that is, the theft of two cell phones. The theft of the 300 euros and the two credit cards are intentionally omitted (the word "OMISSIS" [= omission, deletion] is substituted for those items). Hellmann acquitted on this revised Charge D with the specification "because the accused had not committed the act". Hellmann did not discuss the theft of the money or credit cards in the motivation report. These are certain indications that there was no prosecution appeal relating to Massei's acquittal for these two elements of Charge D.
Now the Chieffi verdict quashed all the Hellmann acquittals, including the acquittal for Charge D, only maintaining the conviction of Knox on Charge F, "simple" [rather than aggravated] calunnia against Lumumba. As far as I can tell from a brief review of each page of the Chieffi CSC panel motivation report, nowhere in the report are the charges written out. I am unsure whether the Chieffi verdict reinstated Charge D only for the theft of the two cell phones or whether it reinstated it for the full Charge D as it appeared in Massei. The CSC would not have the authority to reinstate the final and definitive acquittals on the two elements of Charge D, because it had become final and definitive due to the failure of the prosecution to timely appeal.
For the Nencini verdict, the motivation report repeats all the charges, including Charge D, as they first appeared in the Massei report, so that Charge D includes the theft of 300 euros, two credit cards, and two cell phones. This inclusion was a violation of Italian procedural law CPP Article 648.
The Nencini verdict goes on to convict Knox and Sollecito of all the original elements of Charge D. This was therefore a violation of Italian procedural law CPP Article 649.
At any rate, the final, definitive verdict of the Marasca CSC panel acquits Knox and Sollecito on all charges including Charge D, except Charge B, carrying a knife, which is dismissed as past the statute of limitations, and thus in effect an acquittal, while reaffirming the conviction of Knox on Charge F, but only for simple calunnia with the Hellmann court's sentence (Nencini had convicted her of aggravated calunnia with an increased sentence). The Marasca motivation report lists Charge D as including the theft of 300 euros, two credit cards, and two cell phones. I am relatively confident that even if there had been a violation of Italian procedural law in listing the full original Charge D in Nencini, Marasca would likewise list it that way to achieve legal certainty. This would be consistent, in part, with the application of CPP Article 649, paragraph 2, which provides that a judge recognizing a case of double jeopardy must immediately dismiss or acquit that case. Marasca, however, does not fulfill the other obligation of CPP Article 649.2, which is to specify the incident of double jeopardy in the motivation report.
