The Stimulus Seems to have failed

Yes, but you are also assuming that these people will place political ideology over profit. For someone in business, that's not bloody likely.
I see no reason to think lack of job growth is because of bizarrely motivated hiring freezes.

In what way would such a hiring freeze cut into profits if productivity didn't suffer simultaneously [which in many instances it hasn't]? It's the same reason job creation lags so far behind other economic indicators [GDP in particular] in the wake of a recession. Many companies don't start hiring until well after "the market" [used in the most abstract sense] recovers to its pre-recession strength. All I'm suggesting is that for some business owners and executives other [political] factors may be taken into consideration.
Do I have proof? No. Am I suggesting I have anything beyond simple anecdotal and very scant statistical evidence to back up my suggestion? Not at all.
But I do think that this is something that should be put under closer scrutiny. And I have a suspicion that when you compare the hiring statistics of large Obama donors v. large McCain donors in during the recession, you'd see a positive correlation.

And I take objection to your characterization of the motivation as 'bizarre'. It's very simple political and economic calculus.
 
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BAC,

As have been pointed out, you seem to be very fond of drowning a point in tangents.

So you've got a Chilean economist talking about completely different recessions. A New Zealand article with no listed author and not attribution of quotes.

All of your information amounts to opinions that other factors are responsible.
That's fine, but I can find just as many opinions that disagree with you, and mine will be named.

But this doesn't address the broader point that those countries which dramatically increased right away spending had a milder and shorter depression after 1929, those that took up austerity and cut spending or had only comparably minor increases had a longer and deeper recession. Those countries that switched tactics midway to increase spendingimproved their economies shortly thereafter. Yes, a whole lot of other factors were involved, that doesn't discount the overwhelming correlation. This same pattern continues for the majority of US recessions. Before 1929, most recessions, including the longest we've experienced, were not met with extreme stimulus spending and typically lasted at least a year and a half. After the great depression, most recessions have occaisioned stimulus spending, and very few have lasted longer than a year, with the exceptions being the early 80s recession, which Regan did not address with an immediate strong stimulus. It took a new democratic congress, yes enacting strongly increased spending, to end it.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_recessions_in_the_United_States


The pattern is clear, and no amount of alternative opinion changes it.
 
But I do think that this is something that should be put under closer scrutiny. And I have a suspicion that when you compare the hiring statistics of large Obama donors v. large McCain donors in during the recession, you'd see a positive correlation.

On this point you may really have something. Large Obama donors have the inside track on large contracts. GE in particular stands to reap huge profits if cap and trade is ever passed.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125832961253649563.html
 
One hand washes the other.

This is why there will never be a "free market" in this country until we have elections funded exclusively by public money.
Sadly, we're most definitely trending away from that.
 
I've actually wondered the same thing. I've reasons for this. I'm not crazy.

If you actually have any evidence that the failure of the stimulus is a deliberate and coordinated effort by business to bring down Obama and the democrats, then by all means present it. I tend to believe actual facts and evidence over sheer speculation, especially when it comes from the sort of liberals gracing this thread. But I don't see any such evidence here.

And besides, were that even true, what would you suggest be done? Seize all the businesses and confirm the socialist nature of Obama and his cronies that I've been warning people about? :D

The free market has mechanisms for correcting problems. More than 200 years of history show that on the whole those mechanisms, which big government democrats and republicans wish to bypass or supplant, work. Refusing to do business with someone … not buying their product … is one such mechanism in the free market. It's why it's called free. Consumers can put companies out of business doing that. Is that a conspiracy? One of the problems with government is that no similar mechanisms exist to reduce inefficiencies, eliminate poor policies, or rid the system of crooks, scoundrels and incompetents. And the election process certainly isn't working to do that. Perhaps what is going on here is nature abhoring a vacuum. Perhaps you are just watching individual businesses who don't wish to risk their capital in such uncertainty reacting cautiously. The policies of the Obama administration itself have made them cautious … have made them decide to take a wait and see attitude. By the way, skeptics of the stimulus approach actually predicted such a response long before the stimulus was passed. Was that a conspiracy? :D

On a different note, you've shown examples, but would you care to explain WHY you think gov stimulus stifles recover?

If you think I haven't already, you haven't bothered to read the thread before joining us.
 
The free market has mechanisms for correcting problems. More than 200 years of history show that on the whole those mechanisms, which big government democrats and republicans wish to bypass or supplant, work. Refusing to do business with someone … not buying their product … is one such mechanism in the free market. It's why it's called free.
...
Are you sure that's what the data shows?
How does "Massive new expenditures [by the government to support a war] on infrastructure and capital plant and concomitant massive reductions in expenditures on consumption - remember, there was substantial rationing during the war" equate into "letting the free market fix the problem"?
 
Has anyone considered that the non-effectiveness of the Stimulus might simply be symptomatic of a political calculation on the part of major players in the private sector [many of whom are to the right of Genghis Khan] to basically freeze hiring until the next election cycle in order to forestall what they perceive as a harmful legislative agenda by a Democratic Administration?

It does sound like you are implying collusion among multiple firms to freeze hiring. I guess it's the way you worded it that has confused people.

I work for GE Healthcare. My office alone has hired at least a dozen new employees in the past quarter. And GE was among Obama's top corporate contributors during the '08 campaign [in the top-5 among non-banks according to OpenSecrets]. They have a vested interest in seeing Obama's agenda succeed. Other large corps... not so much. It's well documented that a lot of employers during this recession have been content with a smaller, more efficient workforce wherein the work of the absent 10-15% is done by the other 85-90%.

Why would GE hire more than they need, or less than they need as a company?

This is what it sounds like you are implying. GE hires more people, because they contributed to Obama's campaign, and the small part that they can do to help Obama look good will somehow offset the (presumably) otherwise less necessary hiring that they did, and make them richer/feel better about themselves (i dunno, i can't figure out your logic) in the long run?

And on the contrary, companies that have contributed to conservatives have a vested interest in seeing the president fail, so much so, that they will reduce hiring below (again, presumably) what is necessary for them as a company, because that will somehow benefit them?

1) Freeze hiring
2) ??
3) $$$$$!

Something like that?
 
In what way would such a hiring freeze cut into profits if productivity didn't suffer simultaneously [which in many instances it hasn't]?
If productivity isn't effected, why would they need to hire more employees?
Companies don't hire people as a favor to them. It's because they need the work done.


IIt's the same reason job creation lags so far behind other economic indicators [GDP in particular] in the wake of a recession. Many companies don't start hiring until well after "the market" [used in the most abstract sense] recovers to its pre-recession strength. All I'm suggesting is that for some business owners and executives other [political] factors may be taken into consideration.
why?


And I take objection to your characterization of the motivation as 'bizarre'. It's very simple political and economic calculus.
I say bizarre, because...
Do I have proof? No. Am I suggesting I have anything beyond simple anecdotal and very scant statistical evidence to back up my suggestion? Not at all
 
It does sound like you are implying collusion among multiple firms to freeze hiring. I guess it's the way you worded it that has confused people.
I don't see why. I really don't.
Why would GE hire more than they need, or less than they need as a company?
They wouldn't hire more than they need. That's the whole point. They're hiring exactly as many as they need under the expectation of growth. My contention is that other companies are hiring fewer people than they need because they believe they can get equal productivity out of a smaller labor pool. Thus the employees who are on staff are more productive for the same pay.

This is what it sounds like you are implying. GE hires more people, because they contributed to Obama's campaign, and the small part that they can do to help Obama look good will somehow offset the (presumably) otherwise less necessary hiring that they did, and make them richer/feel better about themselves (i dunno, i can't figure out your logic) in the long run?
You're oversimplifying. GE, as a major donor to Obama, has made the calculation that they stand to benefit from his policies [as YoPopa pointed out in his post, they have secured a number of contracts from the Recovery Act and stand to gain further from the potential passing of Cap & Trade]. Thus their business can prosper in a bad economy and they can hire the people they need to sustain this expansion.
Other companies - ones who bet against Obama and feel they stand to suffer from his policies - are making the calculation that they can get away with keeping a "leaner, meaner" workforce while maintaining the same profit margins and offsetting whatever they stand to lose in new taxes they expect to come under Obama.

There's no collusion involved here because there doesn't need to be. These are decisions that any company executive can make on his/her own.
And on the contrary, companies that have contributed to conservatives have a vested interest in seeing the president fail, so much so, that they will reduce hiring below (again, presumably) what is necessary for them as a company, because that will somehow benefit them?

1) Freeze hiring
2) ??
3) $$$$$!

Something like that?
Step 2 seems quite obvious. It's "Wait until this administration is hamstrung by a Republican congress and can't enact tax hikes or other policies that work against us."
 
If productivity isn't effected, why would they need to hire more employees?
Companies don't hire people as a favor to them. It's because they need the work done.
Productivity at their current size isn't affected, but they become reluctant to expand [either in size or new ventures] because they expect new taxes and regulations which will undermine their profits. Therefore they postpone any new development, restrict hiring and donate heavily to Republicans.
 
But this doesn't address the broader point that those countries which dramatically increased right away spending had a milder and shorter depression after 1929, those that took up austerity and cut spending or had only comparably minor increases had a longer and deeper recession. Those countries that switched tactics midway to increase spendingimproved their economies shortly thereafter. Yes, a whole lot of other factors were involved, that doesn't discount the overwhelming correlation.

The overwhelming correlation. huh? Can you point me to a regression analysis that backs up your claim, or is this just eyeballing of a handful of anecdotes?

JAMES D. HAMILTON, economist and author of Role Of The International Gold Standard In Propagating The Great Depression, comments here:

http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2005/12/the_gold_standa.html
Under a pure gold standard, the government would stand ready to trade dollars for gold at a fixed rate. Under such a monetary rule, it seems the dollar is "as good as gold."

Except that it really isn't-- the dollar is only as good as the government's credibility to stick with the standard. If a government can go on a gold standard, it can go off, and historically countries have done exactly that all the time. The fact that speculators know this means that any currency adhering to a gold standard (or, in more modern times, a fixed exchange rate) may be subject to a speculative attack.

...

I argued in a paper titled, "The Role of the International Gold Standard in Propagating the Great Depression," published in Contemporary Policy Issues in 1988, that counting on a gold standard to enforce monetary and fiscal discipline in an environment in which speculators had great doubts about governments' ability to adhere to that discipline was a recipe for disaster. International capital flows became more erratic, not less, as doubts were raised about whether first the pound would be devalued and then the dollar. Britain gave in to the speculative attacks and abandoned gold in 1931, whereas the U.S. toughed it out by deliberately raising interest rates in 1931 at a time when the economy was already near free fall. [there's the cause of the deflation]

Because of this uncertainty, there was a big increase in demand for gold, the one safe asset in this setting, which meant the relative price of gold must rise. If everybody is trying to hoard more gold, you're going to have to pay more potatoes to get an ounce of gold. Since the U.S. insisted on holding the dollar price of gold fixed, this meant that the dollar price of potatoes had to fall. The longer a country stayed on the gold standard, the more overall deflation it experienced. Many of us are persuaded that this deflation greatly added to the economic difficulties of those countries that insisted on sticking with a fixed value of their currency in terms of gold.

The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the Great Depression: An International Comparison - Ben Bernanke and Harold James:
NBER Working Paper No. 3488
Issued in October 1990
NBER Program(s): EFG ME


Recent research has provided strong circumstantial evidence for the proposition that sustained deflation -- the result of a mismanaged international gold standard -- was a major cause of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Less clear is the mechanism by which deflation led to depression. In this paper we consider several channels, including effects operating through real wages and through interest rates. Our focus, however, is on the disruptive effect of deflation on the financial system, particularly the banking system. Theory suggests that falling prices, by reducing the net worth of banks and borrowers, can affect flows of credit and thus real activity. Using annual data for twenty-four countries, we confirm that countries which (for historical or institutional reasons) were more vulnerable to severe banking panics also suffered much worse depressions, as did countries which remained on the gold standard. We also find that there may have been a feedback loop through which banking panics, particularly those in the United States, intensified the worldwide deflation.

Continuing on with JD Hamilton's commentary:
Ben Bernanke and Harold James, in a paper called "The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the Great Depression: An International Comparison" published in 1991 (NBER working paper version here), noted that 13 other countries besides the U.K. had decided to abandon their currencies' gold parity in 1931. Bernanke and James' data for the average growth rate of industrial production for these countries (plotted in the top panel above) was positive in every year from 1932 on. Countries that stayed on gold, by contrast, experienced an average output decline of 15% in 1932. The U.S. abandoned gold in 1933, after which its dramatic recovery immediately began. The same happened after Italy dropped the gold standard in 1934, and for Belgium when it went off in 1935. On the other hand, the three countries that stuck with gold through 1936 (France, Netherlands, and Poland) saw a 6% drop in industrial production in 1935, while the rest of the world was experiencing solid growth.

http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2002/20021108/default.htm

This is the Bernanke speech referenced earlier in the thread, given on the occasion of Milton Friedman's 90th birthday in his honor.
I can think of no greater honor than being invited to speak on the occasion of Milton Friedman's ninetieth birthday. Among economic scholars, Friedman has no peer.

...

Today I'd like to honor Milton Friedman by talking about one of his greatest contributions to economics, made in close collaboration with his distinguished coauthor, Anna J. Schwartz. This achievement is nothing less than to provide what has become the leading and most persuasive explanation of the worst economic disaster in American history, the onset of the Great Depression--or, as Friedman and Schwartz dubbed it, the Great Contraction of 1929-33. Remarkably, Friedman and Schwartz did not set out to solve this complex and important problem specifically but rather addressed it as part of a larger project, their magisterial monetary history of the United States (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). As a personal aside, I note that I first read A Monetary History of the United States early in my graduate school years at M.I.T. I was hooked, and I have been a student of monetary economics and economic history ever since.1 I think many others have had that experience, with the result that the direct and indirect influences of the Monetary History on contemporary monetary economics would be difficult to overstate.

As everyone here knows, in their Monetary History Friedman and Schwartz made the case that the economic collapse of 1929-33 was the product of the nation's monetary mechanism gone wrong. Contradicting the received wisdom at the time that they wrote, which held that money was a passive player in the events of the 1930s, Friedman and Schwartz argued that "the contraction is in fact a tragic testimonial to the importance of monetary forces [p. 300; all page references refer to Friedman and Schwartz, 1963]."

...

The Gold Standard and the International Depression

Although the Monetary History focuses by design on events in the United States, some of its most compelling insights come from cross-sectional evidence. Anticipating a large academic literature of the 1980s and 1990s, Friedman and Schwartz recognized in 1963 that a comparison of the economic performances in the 1930s of countries with different monetary regimes could also serve as a test for their monetary hypothesis.

Facilitating the cross-sectional natural experiment was the fact that the international gold standard, which had been suspended during World War I, was laboriously rebuilt during the 1920s (in a somewhat modified form called the gold-exchange standard). Countries that adhered to the international gold standard were essentially required to maintain a fixed exchange rate with other gold-standard countries. Moreover, because the United States was the dominant economy on the gold standard during this period (with some competition from France), countries adhering to the gold standard were forced to match the contractionary monetary policies and price deflation being experienced in the United States.

...

The powerful identification achieved by this categorization of countries by Friedman and Schwartz is worth reemphasizing. If the Depression had been the product primarily of nonmonetary forces, such as changes in autonomous spending or in productivity, then the nominal exchange rate regime chosen by each country would have been largely irrelevant. The close connection among countries' exchange rate regimes, their monetary policies, and the behavior of domestic prices and output, is strong evidence for the proposition that monetary forces played a central role not just in the U.S. depression but in the world as a whole.

...

In a highly influential paper, Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) examined a number of key macro variables for ten major countries over 1929-35, finding that countries that left gold earlier also recovered earlier. Bernanke and James (1991) confirmed the findings of Eichengreen and Sachs for a broader sample of twenty-four (mostly industrialized) countries (see also Bernanke and Carey, 1996), and Campa (1990) did the same for a sample of Latin American countries. Bernanke (1995) showed that not only did adherence to the gold standard predict deeper and more extended depression, as had been noted by earlier authors, but also that the behavior of various key macro variables, such as real wages and real interest rates, differed across gold-standard and non-gold-standard countries in just the way one would expect if the driving shocks were monetary in nature. The most detailed narrative discussion of how the gold standard propagated the Depression around the world is, of course, the influential book by Eichengreen (1992). Eichengreen (2002) reviews the conclusions of his book and concludes largely that they are quite compatible with the Friedman and Schwartz approach.

...

Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You're right, we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again.


This same pattern continues for the majority of US recessions. Before 1929, most recessions, including the longest we've experienced, were not met with extreme stimulus spending and typically lasted at least a year and a half. After the great depression, most recessions have occaisioned stimulus spending, and very few have lasted longer than a year, with the exceptions being the early 80s recession, which Regan did not address with an immediate strong stimulus. It took a new democratic congress, yes enacting strongly increased spending, to end it.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_recessions_in_the_United_States


The pattern is clear, and no amount of alternative opinion changes it.

I'd be delighted to see more than just "look! there's an obvious pattern here".
 
Has anyone considered that the non-effectiveness of the Stimulus might simply be symptomatic of a political calculation on the part of major players in the private sector [many of whom are to the right of Genghis Khan] to basically freeze hiring until the next election cycle in order to forestall what they perceive as a harmful legislative agenda by a Democratic Administration?

I was going to refute this, starting by pointing out that the vast majority of job growth in this country comes from small businesses, but then I realised that it would be pointless since the orderly will likely be by to give you your meds soon.
 
I'd be delighted to see more than just "look! there's an obvious pattern here".
More?

Would you like me to copy paste long chunks of Keynesian economists to match your long chunks of Friedman economists? I addressed that approach with BAC, when he posted the writings of the same people. In the context of this discussion, it's nothing but an appeal to authority.

I made statements about what specifically that pattern was, with numbers. I'm happy you're delighted.
 
If you actually have any evidence that the failure of the stimulus is a deliberate and coordinated effort by business to bring down Obama and the democrats, then by all means present it. I tend to believe actual facts and evidence over sheer speculation, especially when it comes from the sort of liberals gracing this thread. But I don't see any such evidence here.
No worries. I'm a libertarian. I'm only a liberal when it comes to civil rights. You seem to put forth an excellent understanding of the situation below; based on your rant in the above paragraph. Are you in on this? :eek:

And besides, were that even true, what would you suggest be done? Seize all the businesses and confirm the socialist nature of Obama and his cronies that I've been warning people about? :D
Absolutely not. That has already been tried in Atlas Shurgged and failed miserably. I'm not looking to change the world, just slightly/cautiously satisfy some curiosities I have.

The free market has mechanisms for correcting problems. More than 200 years of history show that on the whole those mechanisms, which big government democrats and republicans wish to bypass or supplant, work. Refusing to do business with someone … not buying their product … is one such mechanism in the free market. It's why it's called free. Consumers can put companies out of business doing that. Is that a conspiracy? One of the problems with government is that no similar mechanisms exist to reduce inefficiencies, eliminate poor policies, or rid the system of crooks, scoundrels and incompetents. And the election process certainly isn't working to do that. Perhaps what is going on here is nature abhoring a vacuum. Perhaps you are just watching individual businesses who don't wish to risk their capital in such uncertainty reacting cautiously. The policies of the Obama administration itself have made them cautious … have made them decide to take a wait and see attitude. By the way, skeptics of the stimulus approach actually predicted such a response long before the stimulus was passed. Was that a conspiracy? :D
There are also mechanisms that other types of economic policies have. Look at us learning so much. As you elude to above, protecting capital is one explanation. It's difficult to choose not to do business with a company that has a patent on an item that's used in everyday life. Or to choose not to do business with a company that has such a great market share that they dictate the cost of an item. I've seen ridiculous price increases in the coatings industry. One of the reasons given is their reluctance to reopen a plant that was closed 2 years ago. There are shortages for various raw materials used in common coatings. Am I to believe that ALL business decision makers decided it would be better to raise the prices rather than add a second shift? This would theoretically reduce demand, and inhibit growth. Doesn't exactly sound like a capitalist strategy to me. Do you find it amazing that a lot of the publicly traded companies are recording record profits? There's also a shortage of freight carriers. The kicker is that the national capacity is less than it was 2 years ago. We were hauling more freight 2 years ago than we are now, but there is a shortage. A lot of strange things going one. The world of commerce is running a square wheels right now.

If you think I haven't already, you haven't bothered to read the thread before joining us.
10 pages of bickering. If I missed your prior explanation can you really blame me? I've only seen you use history to explain your position. Keynesian theory attempts to explain why things happen in the economy and suggest a method to alter the outcome. Tell you what, if you tell me what page(s) you had these epiphanies I'll take over from there.
 
So you've got a Chilean economist talking about completely different recessions.

You are wrong. This, http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/SR421.pdf , specifically addresses this recession and the depressions of the 20th century, including the Great Depression. Your clear refusal to even look at it or the other material I offered about Chile is apparent. You can lead a horse to water ...

I can find just as many opinions that disagree with you, and mine will be named.

Go ahead. Let's see your sources.

But this doesn't address the broader point that those countries which dramatically increased right away spending had a milder and shorter depression after 1929, those that took up austerity and cut spending or had only comparably minor increases had a longer and deeper recession.

I have too addressed this. If you are merely going to ignore the details of what I post as you have, then I'm merely going to ignore your regurgitation of what I already showed is logically invalid and clearly not all of the story.

Those countries that switched tactics midway to increase spending improved their economies shortly thereafter.

The sources I've provided clearly prove that the "tactics" that were switched just before recovery began in the countries you named were the gold standard and the ability of the country to export products, not stimulus spending. You appear to be simply hiding from the clear effect of the gold standard being abandoned, the devaluation of the currency that resulted, and changes in export demand as a result of that devaluation and improvements in economies desiring exports elsewhere. The timing of these countries' recovery with changes in these factors has clearly as much to do with their recovery as any stimulus they applied.

In fact, you still haven't proven that the stimulus that they applied sped up the recovery rather than hindered it. If you have graphs or data showing that the rate of growth in GDP or drop in employment increased from what it already was when the stimulus was first applied, then present it. Because as yet you have not proven that the government spending they added into the equation after the other factors I mentioned had already begun to cause a recovery changed the rate of GDP growth or re-employment.

And, one more thing, even if you can find a clear case of only stimulus being the cause of a recovery, you still are fighting against the probabilities. You still won't have addressed the fact that I've offered ten times as many examples where countries with "no massive stimulus" bettered the rate of recovery of countries with a massive stimulus. So even with an example that you haven't yet actually provided, it would still be a case of you betting your money on a horse that loses 9 times out of 10.

Yes, a whole lot of other factors were involved, that doesn't discount the overwhelming correlation.

Wrong. The only clear correlation in those cases you provided is that recovery had already begun before the massive stimulus was added into the mix. Something else cause that and I think that something was one or all of three things: (1) going off the gold standard, (2) improvement in export sale due to rising demand elsewhere, and (3) the normal recovery processes of the market (which have been seen in recovery after recovery for hundreds of years). Those other factors clearly do have a positive effect. In contrast, you haven't shown any data to actually prove that the rate of growth is correlated with the amount of stimulus. Why not? If what you claim is true, isn't it logical to believe that the rate of recovery would be related to the amount of stimulus? Countries that spend three times as much on stimulus should do better. Do they? Where is the data that actually proves that?

The bottom line is how do you know that ordinary non-stimulus market forces and monetary policies aren't behind recoveries, even in cases with stimulus, when those recoveries had (in all the examples you provided) begun before the stimulus was applied? How can we know that those ordinary market forces that would have happened in any case didn't just overwhelm a negative effect caused by government stimulus? Afterall, I've shown example after example where those cases where no or little stimulus was applied are the cases where recovery from recessions and depressions happened faster than in cases where massive government stimulus occurred. Address that, rather than just ignoring it, CM.

This same pattern continues for the majority of US recessions.

You haven't proven this assertion. In fact, your side hasn't even mentioned ANY specific US recessions other than the Great Depression in this debate (which I've already proven didn't happen the way your side claimed). I think you're just throwing out claims that are unsubstantiated in the hopes you can fool some unsuspecting reader. I think you are just trying to move your goal lines now, having failed to convince using the Great Depression case.

But before I let you move those goallines, let's see if you will acknowledge, for the record, that I have adquately shown that your side's descriptions of what happened during the Great Depression was incomplete, distorted and in some cases outright dishonest? Let's see if you will acknowledge, for the record, that the facts and sources I have presented in this thread clearly prove that FDR's Keynesian policies, if anything, increased the depth and length in the Great Depression? And I'll add these two sources to that stack of proof:

http://newsroom.ucla.edu/portal/ucla/FDR-s-Policies-Prolonged-Depression-5409.aspx?RelNum=5409

FDR's Policies Prolonged Depression by 7 Years, UCLA Economists Calculate

http://www.usnews.com/articles/business/economy/2008/04/11/did-the-new-deal-work.html

In 1995, economist Robert Whaples of Wake Forest University published a survey of academic economists that asked them if they agreed with the statement, "Taken as a whole, government policies of the New Deal served to lengthen and deepen the Great Depression." Fifty-one percent disagreed, and 49 percent agreed.

Keep in mind, that was the response he got from people in a discipline that on average are quite liberal in their politics. How liberal?

http://ideas.repec.org/a/ejw/volone/2006148-179.html

AEA Ideology: Campaign Contributions of American Economic Association Members, Committee Members, Officers, Editors, Referees, Authors, and Acknowledgees

... snip ...

Association members were 5 times more likely to give to Democrats than to Republicans.

What if you polled a group that was less politically biased? What percentage of them would say FDR's policies hurt, rather than helped end, the Great Depression? Far more than 51%?

Whaples went on to say that

Yet most economists, including defenders of the New Deal, do agree that Roosevelt's policies were far from perfect. The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, in particular, gets a lot of blame. It created the National Recovery Administration, a federal bureaucracy that limited competition in various industries by setting prices and wages above market levels. The ensuing upward pressure on the price of goods and unemployment may have turned a bad situation worse.

... snip ...

One explanation is that in addition to the harm done by the restrictions imposed by the NRA, the "soak the rich" rhetoric coming from the Roosevelt administration had a chilling effect on economic growth by making people fear for their property rights. Who knows, maybe Uncle Sam would just start wholesale confiscation of the fortunes of America's wealthy or the nationalization of industries—Americans were already observing that going on across the pond with the rise of communism in Russia and fascism in Europe. This uncertainty, along with a jump in the top federal income tax rate from 25 percent in 1931 to 79 percent in 1936, may have deterred investment.

And that's are the same sort of rhethoric and tax policies now coming out of the Obama administration. So tell us CM, why don't the same phenomena as noted in that source about FDR's approach apply now? Could it be they do, and are what has deepened and is now prolonging this recession? Can you really just dismiss that possibility out of hand like you and the other Obama-supporters have been doing here, without looking totally partisan? I don't think so.

Before 1929, most recessions, including the longest we've experienced, were not met with extreme stimulus spending and typically lasted at least a year and a half. After the great depression, most recessions have occaisioned stimulus spending, and very few have lasted longer than a year, with the exceptions being the early 80s recession, which Regan did not address with an immediate strong stimulus. It took a new democratic congress, yes enacting strongly increased spending, to end it.

First of all, it's Reagan, not Regan.

Second, that is loaded with distortions, at best.

Let's just look at the 1974-75 recession as an example (http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/rec1975.htm ). This was a deep recession (5 quarters of falling GDP … over 6% total) with unemployment climbing to 9% (up 4 percent from where it had been). And there was no spending stimulus applied by the government during this recession. The stimulus that was applied came in the form of tax cuts … tax cuts that some democrats ironically argued would have no stimulative effect. But they did, as supply siders had predicted. And the recession came to an abrupt end, as seen in the figures at that link.

And what appened after that recession is equally instructive:

http://www.ibdeditorials.com/IBDArticles.aspx?id=336780728113767

The election of 1976 replaced the discredited Republican president (Gerald Ford) with a charismatic Democrat (Jimmy Carter) who said that the rich were not paying their fair share in taxes. (BAC - sound familiar?) Moreover, the Congress elected that year was the last one till today's with a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, and with Democrats enjoying a similar advantage in the House. (BAC - sound familiar?)

As it happened, in 1976, the year after the recession seemed to have ended, the ranks of the jobless did in fact increase dramatically — by 500,000 in the latter half of the year. So the Democrats, with their supermajorities in Congress and new president, went ahead and put together a post-recession fiscal stimulus bill. (BAC - and this one involved not tax cuts but spending increases)

… snip …

The Republicans, in their apparently hapless tiny position in Congress, responded in an interesting way. They put forward an alternative proposal of an across-the-board cut in income-tax rates, of 5% — the first suggestion of an income-tax cut made in Washington in over a decade.

… snip …

Heller's job-training-and-sewer stimulus became law in 1977, as the minority's alternative got steamrolled.

… snip ...

In the five years following the stimulus spending of 1977, consumer prices rose by 60%, unemployment averaged 7% (two points higher than the 20-year average) and growth collapsed with the double-dip recession of 1980-82, a recession that outdid even the 1974-75 experience in all categories.

What I fear will happen now is the same thing that happened then.

Everyone needs to understand is that at the core, you are defending Keynesian economics (stimulus/deficit spending) and claiming that nothing else has been a major factor in determining the length and depth of recessions … neither before 1929, during it, or after it. So let's examine the validity of those two things with some additional sources (all provided to Obama's supporters on this forum previously but, of course, ignored by them):

http://www.lvrj.com/opinion/40499302.html

"In Keynesian policy, unemployment is never to be corrected by any reduction of money-wage-rates," Mr. Hazlitt summarizes. "Keynes recommends two main remedies. One is deficit spending (sometimes euphemistically called government 'investment'). How good is this remedy? It was tried in the United States (partly because of Keynes' recommendations) for a full decade. What were the results? ... The central and decisive fact is that heavy deficits were accompanied by mass unemployment ..." in the 1930s.

"The other main Keynesian remedy for unemployment is low interest rates, artificially produced by 'the Monetary Authority.' Keynes incidentally admits ... that such artificially low interest rates can only be produced by printing more money, i.e. by deliberate inflation. But we may let this pass for a moment. The question immediately before us is: Did low interest rates prevent mass unemployment? ...

"In sum, over this period of a dozen years low interest rates did not eliminate unemployment. On the contrary, unemployment actually increased as interest rates went down."

Hazlitt proceeds to demonstrate that from 1949 to 1958, when the same policy of artificially pushing down interest rates was tried, "the relationship of unemployment to interest rates is almost the exact opposite of that suggested by Keynesian theory."

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9931

The idea of using fiscal policy to boost the economy during a downturn was championed by John Maynard Keynes in the 1930s. Keynes argued that market economies can get stuck in a deep rut and that only large infusions of government stimulus can revive growth. He posited that high unemployment in the Great Depression was due to "sticky wages" and other market problems that prevented the return of full-employment equilibrium. Interestingly, Keynes did not offer any evidence that sticky wages were a serious problem, and later research indicated that wages actually fell substantially during the 1930s.

... snip ...

Keynesians thought that fiscal stimulus would work by counteracting the problem of sticky wages. Workers would be fooled into accepting lower real wages as price levels rose. Rising nominal wages would spur added work efforts and increased hiring by businesses. However, later analysis revealed that the government can't routinely fool private markets, because people have foresight and they are generally rational. Keynes erred in ignoring the actual microeconomic behaviour of individuals and businesses.

The dominance of Keynesianism ended in the 1970s. Government spending and deficits ballooned, but the result was higher inflation, not lower unemployment. These events, and the rise in monetarism led by Milton Friedman, ended the belief in an unemployment-inflation trade-off. Keynesianism was flawed and its prescription of active fiscal intervention was misguided. Indeed, Friedman's research showed that the Great Depression was caused by a failure of government monetary policy, not a failure of private markets, as Keynes had claimed.

... snip ...

It is difficult to find a macroeconomics textbook these days that discusses Keynesian fiscal stimulus as a policy tool without serious flaws, which is why the current $800-billion proposal has taken many macroeconomists by surprise. John Cochrane of the University of Chicago recently noted that the idea of fiscal stimulus is "taught only for its fallacies" in university courses these days. Thomas Sargent of New York University noted that "the calculations that I have seen supporting the stimulus package are back-of-the-envelope ones that ignore what we have learned in the last 60 years of macroeconomic research."

... snip ...

It is not clear whether Keynesian beliefs or political factors are the main driver for the $800-billion stimulus plan. But as Harvard University's Robert Barro noted in disapproval of the stimulus plan, just because the economy is in crisis, it does "not invalidate everything we have learned about macroeconomics since 1936."

http://www.american.com/archive/2009/would-keynes-have-supported-the-stimulus-bill

In the 1960s, Keynesian economics was fully mainstream, enshrined in textbooks. Macroeconomists of that period believed that they could control macroeconomic fluctuations with great precision, based on mathematical equations that were fit to historical data. The statistical techniques produced what were called macroeconometric models, or macro models for short. The precise policy adjustments were known as “fine tuning.”*

... snip ...

This precise, “engineering” view of macroeconomics was attacked from a number of directions. ... snip ... Milton Friedman argued that the macroeconometric models were not nearly reliable enough to support “fine tuning.” He warned, particularly in his 1967 presidential address to the American Economic Association, that attempts to use inflation to reduce unemployment would prove to be self-defeating as workers began to realize the need to demand wage increases in anticipation of higher prices.

Over the 15 years following his address, economic events played out in a way that vindicated Friedman and discredited the fine tuners. First, inflation accelerated. Second, starting in 1971, President Nixon tried to implement the fine-tuners’ solution for inflation, which was wage and price controls. This failed, leading to dreadful economic performance, with both unemployment and inflation at high levels.

And finally this:

http://spectator.org/archives/2008/10/29/its-best-keynes-remain-forgott .

It not only explains the flaws in Keynesian economics but shows a striking comparison in performance, when it comes to inflation and the frequency of recessions, between the Keynesian approach and the approach that Friedman proposed replace it, Monetarism, wherein controlling monetary growth, controls inflation.

The bottom line, CM, is that Keynesian economics is deeply flawed and was widely recognized as being flawed for decades before it suddenly resurfaced during the Obama administration in order to justify his extreme socialist agenda. Nothing the Obama administration has provided in the way of evidence has changed the earlier proof of its flaws. In fact, what we are witnessing right now is the clear failure of Obama's stimulus to achieve it's goals, and the depth and length of this recession will end up as more confirmation of the inadequacies of Keynesian thinking. The evidence proves it was monetarism and tax cuts, not stimulus spending, that changed the length of recessions after the Great Depression. You are simply WRONG. But democrats apparently will NEVER learn, as democrats on this thread are proving once again.

But what the heck. I'm an optimist. I can still hope that some of you *might* start learning. So here's another source. I know it's a source you probably can't stand but it does an excellent job of taking Keynesian economics apart. I'll quote a few of the notable passages from it:

http://nrd.nationalreview.com/article/?q=YzVhZmI5MDAxMDEyZGIzMWVlZTUzZWU1ZDY2ZjExNTQ=

Democrats and their favorite economists spent the past 25 years bemoaning the “twin deficits” of the 1980s and then claimed that the strong economy of the late 1990s was the result of President Clinton’s fiscal restraint — the precise opposite of “fiscal stimulus.” Also working in the anti-Keynesian mode, former treasury secretary Robert Rubin co-authored a 2004 paper with forecaster Allen Sinai and Peter Orzsag of the Brookings Institution, who now has been tapped by Obama to lead the Office of Management and Budget. They argued that “budget deficits decrease national saving, which reduces domestic investment and increases borrowing abroad.” Big budget deficits, warned Rubin, Orzsag, and Sinai, would “reduce future national income” and risk a “decline in confidence [which] can reduce stock prices.”

... snip ...

Many of the economists who repeatedly prophesied in ominous fashion about the dangers of relatively trivial deficit spending during the Reagan and Bush years have inexplicably become enthusiastic supporters of deficits likely to exceed 10 percent of GDP during the Obama administration.

... snip ...

In 1978, future Nobel laureate Robert Lucas Jr. wrote an obituary for these ideas, “After Keynesian Economics,” along with Thomas Sargent of the University of Minnesota. They showed that “Keynesian . . . predictions were wildly incorrect and that the doctrine on which they were based is fundamentally flawed.” The hubris of expert demand-management through fiscal policy should have suffered a permanent loss of credibility 30 years ago. But memory is short.

… snip …

If Keynesian theorists refuse to accept any evidence as contradicting their theory, they are practicing a secular theology, not science.

So how about it, CM? Are you practicing secular theology or science?

Here's something more that is noteworthy from that source:

a 1999 study by Christina Romer showed that the average length of recessions from 1887 to 1929 was 10.3 months — without any Keynesian spending schemes — while the average recession from 1948 to 2000 lasted 10.7 months.

Isn't that completely contrary to what you claimed, CM … that post 1929 recessions have been shorter? Romer is a democrat who works for Obama and was one of the authors of his stimulus. Was she wrong or is she just further proof that democrats in general simply do not learn, even from their own analyses? :D

Even if Romer is wrong and your Wikipedia article is correct … that the average length of recessions have fallen since 1929, what really is the cause? Is it stimulus spending, or is it the ending the gold standard and the adoption of monetarism? The evidence for the latter reasons is very strong. The evidence for the first reason is tenuous at best (as I've proven). Still others argue (http://seekingalpha.com/article/101575-u-s-recessions-1900-2008 ) that the reason we are seeing shorter recessions over time is that "faster information flow has allowed companies to quickly adjust activity in order to compensate for shocks to the upside or the downside." That doesn't seem unreasonable, does it? And if the government gets involved in ways that keep companies from quickly adjusting (as they did in 1929 and are now doing), then the result will be longer recessions … or even depressions.

Speaking of which, many economists already fear that what we are seeing is the beginning of a depression. But did things have to end up like this? For the first 10-11 months of this recession (till about August of 2008), market and job losses were tracking with those during the 1973 oil crisis and the 1990s tech crash. Then all of a sudden the losses started tracking more closely those of the crash of 1929. So what happened about August/October of 2008? I'll tell you. The government interfered. Bush signed the $700 billion dollar bailout package and everyone in Washington started talking about the need for massive spending to *stimulate* the economy. Heed history or you are destined to repeat it. That's the pattern that is clear, CM. :D
 
Call it a hypothesis, then.

Just so everyone knows, TCE is just regurgitating the nonsense spread by such brilliant people as Ed Schultz of MSNBC and Harry Reid. :rolleyes:

This is based on nothing more than partisan-motivated speculation out of democrat leadership's fear over what's headed their way come November.

The real problem is that these clueless socialists don't understand the free market system … and never have.

They don't understand the very thing that has made this country the most powerful economic engine the world has ever seen and made it's people so prosperous.

It would be laughable … if these jokers weren't now in control of the country.

Instead, they threaten it's future prosperity by trying turning us into a socialist nanny-state where the rich are villified and corporations are evil.

Now if you really want to know why companies aren't hiring and why they are keeping rather then spending their cash reserves, ask yourself these questions:

Has the Obama administration done anything to make business feel secure about their and our country's future economy? No.

Has demand for goods and services increased to justify their expanding business at this time? No.

And why is that? Because individuals are also sitting on the sidelines waiting to see what will happen to the economy as a result of Obama's meddling.

And why is that? Because individuals feel the same as business.

Businesses aren't the problem. We are. Because of the uncertainty that Obama's policies have created about the future in OUR minds.

But is it a conspiracy?

By the way, I don't see my democrat friends (yes, I have some) going out and making any large purchases at this time.

In fact, I've done far more of that, then they have.

So perhaps democrats are the ones really conspiring to bring down Obama. :D
 

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