They review the "Project Alpha" case as a "dramatic demonstration of the need for magicians in the psi lab" (p. 229). Using Terence Hines's (1988) Pseudoscience and the Paranormal as their reference, they claim that the McDonnell Laboratory for Psychical Research in St. Louis was created with a $5,000,000 grant, making it "probably the best funded psychical laboratory in the world". They state that two young magicians, under the direction of James Randi, went to the lab seeking to fool the parapsychologists:
"Shaw and Edwards easily convinced the research staff at the McDonnell Laboratory that they had genuine psychic powers . . . . They rarely failed to achieve "psychic" feats . . . . Randi reports in detail on the simple ways in which these deceptions were carried out . . . . The controls that were placed on Shaw and Edwards were totally inadequate to prevent their use of trickery. Even when videotapes of their feats showed fairly clearly, to anyone watching them carefully, how the trick had been done, the enthusiastic laboratory staff failed to catch on." (p. 229)
I had the opportunity to interview Shaw, Edwards, Randi, and all the researchers at the McDonnell Laboratory while Project Alpha was in progress. How to Think About Weird Things illustrates how scholars depending on secondary sources can go astray. The McDonnell Laboratory was started with a $500,000 grant (not $5,000,000). Lab researchers attempted to capture the performances of Shaw and Edwards on camera and presented their preliminary findings at the Parapsychological Association meetings in 1981 for evaluation and advice. They and the other parapsychologists I interviewed were aware that their controls were not adequate. When they tightened their controls during later experiments, Shaw and Edwards were unable to produce anomalous effects. As a consequence, the researchers ended their experiments with them. The authors' text reflects James Randi's false portrayal of Project Alpha; this case actually illustrates an instance in which skillful magicians caused investigators to waste time and money investigating false leads. For a more complete discussion of Project Alpha, see Truzzi (1987).