The relationship between science and materialism

[UndercoverElephant]

Kevin posted:

What I'm experiencing now is more like a straw man on a straw man, which is purely straw through and through.

 

[Darat]

Correct. I am not a mathematician. My interest is in the philosophy of maths more than maths itself. These aren't the same thing. I live with a person who has a mathematics degree. He neither knows nor cares about philosophy of maths.

Thanks for clarifying that.

Not in words you are familiar with or would be likely to accept, no.

So you can't communicate your metaphysical system?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Kevin,

Here is the evidence which will convict you.

At the start of post #1580 we have:

Geoff-mind : Totality of subjective experiences

Kevin confirms : Those definitions are probably okay

So YOU have accepted the definition that Geoff-mind refers to subjective experiences.

Then, later in the same post:

Well, if in straw-land you are equating "Geoff-mind" and "what we experience",

There can never have been a clearer demonstration that the position Kevin is trying to defend is logically incoherent.

Guilty as charged, Kevin Lowe.

You can continue to pick out terms to deliberately misinterpet so you can yell "Gotcha!" if you like, but I'll just keep pointing out that you are doing it.

Sorry, Kevin, but you just got found out. It's not me who cannot stick to a set of definitions. It's Kevin Lowe.

Let's get back to the point. How do you justify the claim that it is a contradiction in terms to have a mind which is purely physical?

You just showed everyone why.

So far you have not produced an argument for this position which holds up, you've just played dumb or attempted to derail the discussion.

I just demonstrated that you cannot defend your position. You are contradicting yourself.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

In order to defend materialism coherently you must, in the context of this discussion, ACTUALLY STOP using new words to refer to geoff-minds. There aren't any geoff-minds. This is the claim of the eliminative materialism.

Yes, yes, yes, I understand that. So from now on, when I use the word mind, you will know that I am not referring to a Geoff-mind.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's [infinity] a philosophical metaphor, Darat.

That's all? So then:

Being = philosophical Infinity = philosophical Zero = philosophical Nothing

Why didn't you say this in the first place? Now you really do have dualism in a pink halter top.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So you can't communicate your metaphysical system?

Not to the likes of Darat I can't, no.

 

[Mercutio]

So YOU have accepted the definition that Geoff-mind refers to subjective experiences.

Then, later in the same post:



There can never have been a clearer demonstration that the position Kevin is trying to defend is logically incoherent.

Guilty as charged, Kevin Lowe.

You do realize that your quote here was a clause, and not the whole sentence. It sets up a condition which the sentence addresses--it is not, itself, the point of the sentence. You have not demonstrated anything other than that you missed the point of Kevin's post.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The claim you have to deal with is "it is possible that the mind exists, and it is purely physical, and this is not a contradiction unless you have sneaked in the covert assumption that the mind is partially immaterial, as Geoff is constantly trying to do."

I think that Geoff-mind includes the assumption of partial immateriality. If not, that we also need iGeoff-mind.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That's all? So then:

Being = philosophical Infinity = philosophical Zero = philosophical Nothing

Why didn't you say this in the first place? Now you really do have dualism in a pink halter top.

~~ Paul

Paul,

I'm not sure you understand what "dualism" is. "dualism" requires two kinds of stuff. The concept you described above appears in all forms of idealism. They are all monistic. Are you saying you think they are all actually dualistic? Cos that's what it sounds like. Monistic idealism isn't dualistic because it includes "being" and "minds", so why should my system be? "Being" isn't a kind of "stuff".

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You do realize that your quote here was a clause, and not the whole sentence. It sets up a condition which the sentence addresses.....

It is a noun, Mercutio, not a condition. "What we experience" refers to a thing.

Kevin directly contradicted himself in the space of one post. If you think he didn't, then you can't read. He contradicted a definition he had already accepted as valid.

 

[Darat]

Not to the likes of Darat I can't, no.

Can you please explain what you mean by "infinity" in your metaphysical system?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'm not sure you understand what "dualism" is. "dualism" requires two kinds of stuff. The concept you described above appears in all forms of idealism. They are all monistic. Are you saying you think they are all actually dualistic? Cos that's what it sounds like.

No, I'm saying neutral monism is dualistic, because you have two kinds of stuff: noumenal and Being. When I thought we were eventually going to see an astounding mathematical proof that Being = 0, I was willing to suspend my objection pending the revelation that Being really is nothing. But now all the math is metaphorical, so I see no reason to suspend my objection.

A traditional dualist could just perform the same trick by declaring Mind = 0. If it's all metaphorical, on what basis can you reject this trick while maintaining your own?

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

It is a noun, Mercutio, not a condition. "What we experience" refers to a thing.

Kevin directly contradicted himself in the space of one post. If you think he didn't, then you can't read. He contradicted a definition he had already accepted as valid.

Please re-read his and my posts. The condition (as in "this conclusion is conditional, dependent on this assumption--if the term is not the proper philosophical one, sue me; it should still be understandable) is that Geoff-mind is "what we experience". The sentence is saying "if we conditionally accept your definition..." and then goes on to make the point. If you have a problem with the point, that is another thing, but your quoting the conditional clause indicates that your problem is therein. In which case, you are quite simply wrong.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Can you please explain what you mean by "infinity" in your metaphysical system?

In this thread, on this board, to people who haven't accepted a problem with physicalism?

No.

To a bunch of philosophy undergraduates?

Yes, easily - because they have a whole vocabulary which I cannot use here.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

There can never have been a clearer demonstration that the position Kevin is trying to defend is logically incoherent.

Guilty as charged, Kevin Lowe.

Congratulations, you've proved that I provisionally accepted one of your definitions, and then I pointed out that even if I did accept that definition that the argument you made out of it did not go anywhere.

You're really straining to find something to pick on, aren't you?

Sorry, Kevin, but you just got found out. It's not me who cannot stick to a set of definitions. It's Kevin Lowe.

More silliness. Even supposing you had proved that I was inconsistent on that point, and you didn't, where would that get you? It would not prove that you had not been repeatedly sneaky with your own definitions, nor would it prove your claim that physical minds are a contradiction in terms.

You just showed everyone why.

What!? Okay, supposing you had proved that I was inconsistent on that point, and you didn't, how on earth would it follow from that, that physical minds are a contradiction in terms?

What next? I misspelled a word, so that proves God exists?

I just demonstrated that you cannot defend your position. You are contradicting yourself.

One more time. I'm not defending a metaphysical position. You are defending the claim that physical minds cannot exist. You cannot prove that claim by demolishing alternative positions. You cannot prove that claim by discrediting other posters. You need to prove the damn claim, with a proof that stands on its own merits.

What's your proof that physical minds cannot exist? Do you actually have any proof, or will you just continue to beg the question by finding new ways to sneak in the assumption that physical minds cannot exist?

 

[Mercutio]

In this thread, on this board, to people who haven't accepted a problem with physicalism?

No.

To a bunch of philosophy undergraduates?

Yes, easily - because they have a whole vocabulary which I cannot use here.

Having taken more than a handful of undergraduate philosophy courses...

Try me.

A little learning is a dangerous thing;
drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring:
there shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
and drinking largely sobers us again.
--Alex. Pope, An Essay on Criticism, 1709

Perhaps the problem is that you need people who have only learned a little philosophy.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Mercutio,

You are trying to make something very simple seem very complicated. It isn't. It's as simple as this:

In order to defend his position, Kevin first accepted the definition:

Geoff-mind: The totality of experiecnces.

Then, later in the same post he illogically howls:

Well, if in straw-land you are equating "Geoff-mind" and "what we experience"..

No amount of verbosity by you can defend Kevin from the charge of contradicting himself. It's there for all the world to see.

Please re-read his and my posts. The condition (as in "this conclusion is conditional, dependent on this assumption--if the term is not the proper philosophical one, sue me; it should still be understandable) is that Geoff-mind is "what we experience". The sentence is saying "if we conditionally accept your definition..."

Rubbish! You cannot now claim that "Geoff-mind" is a conditional definition provided by me because the definition had already been accepted by Kevin at the start of the same post.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I think you have changed the meaning of "feeling" here. Before, we were refering to qualitative experience. Feelings that are defined by behavior do not refer to these aspects of experience. Indeed, I do not think it is conceivable that they could because behaviour is defined relationally whereas quality is non-relational IMO.

Rather, I have attempted to define feeling in useful terms with which I think we can work. If we leave the definition in its circular form then we are simply left with a circle. That doesn't provide any means of using the word except as a referent within the circle. We can't do anything with it -- it means that you have essentially defined the issue as unresolvable by any means except recourse to itself (you have defined mind as something that simply "is"). That is fine. It's idealism and I certainly cannot prove that it is wrong and have no interest in doing so. But there are other ways of defining the word that provide a means of investigating claims about consciousness. That is where my interest lies. It may be that whole enterprise is doomed to failure. I don't think it is, but there is no way to know based on how the cards are stacked prior to the investigation.

I find this kind of position quite unsatisfactory. Essentially you are saying that:

a) we have a description of brain processes from the "outside" and the ontological brain processes themselves on the "inside", the latter of which equals experiences.

But consider the following:

b)we have a description of brain processes from the outside and the ontological brain processes themselves on the inside, the latter of which do not equal experiences (for example, cerebellum function)


If you accept that b) is possible ( and I think you will, correct me if I'm wrong) then you have posed the "hard problem of conscoiusness" which is how to account for the differing scenarios. In other words, you have to specify how a) and b) are simultaneously possible. Inevitably you have to come up with a definition of experience which gets you into all sorts of circular arguments I reckon.

Actually, yes, I do believe that you are wrong. There is no way that we can effectively speak of "feeling" in cerebellar function because we cannot investigate what happens if only a cerebellum is left intact (no speech possibility), but the question is basically meaningless since the cerebellum is tightly connected with the rest of the brain -- both motor and sensory areas. We know that impairment of the cerebellum certainly feels like something very different from intact cerebellum.

The further question of whether or not we can speak of a motor action being felt as anything in the absence of motivation, emotion, somatosensation, special sensation, etc. is still an open question. I don't think it makes much sense to speak of pure motor action without anything else as an experience or a feeling -- that is essentially a computer the way they are currently constructed. So it isn't just any neural function that "feels"; it depends on what sort of neural function is meant. Some of it provides that sort of "feling" information and some probably does not.


Well yes, but I still think it suffers from my points above.[/QUOTE]

 

[Mercutio]

Mercutio,

You are trying to make something very simple seem very complicated. It isn't. It's as simple as this:

In order to defend his position, Kevin first accepted the definition:

yes

Then, later in the same post he illogically howls:

this is a reiteration of the previous point. Making sure that you remember that he is conditionally accepting your definition for the purposes of this sentence. Geoff, you are quite simply wrong. The quotes in your own post show it.

No amount of verbosity by you can defend Kevin from the charge of contradicting himself. It's there for all the world to see.

By repeating himself? no.

Rubbish. You cannot now claim that "Geoff-mind" is a conditional definition provided by me because the definition had already been accepted by Kevin.

And it is, what, against the law to remind one's reader of the definitions on the table?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

In this thread, on this board, to people who haven't accepted a problem with physicalism?

No.

To a bunch of philosophy undergraduates?

Yes, easily - because they have a whole vocabulary which I cannot use here.

I was a philosophy undergrad at one point. Go for it.