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The relationship between science and materialism

Geoff said:
You think I've gone through the first two years of a philosophy degree and come out the other end thinking there is no chance I've made an incorrect assumption or have some incoherent concepts? Of course I have these things. But I am not scared of correcting them when I find them. I don't suffer from the massive resistance problem that foundationalists suffer from when their foundations are challenged. If something is wrong, and needs correcting, then it gets corrected. If you have no foundations then you have no fear of identifying mistakes, since none of them are likely to be fatal.
Sorta like science, only not empirical. That's good.

~~ Paul
 
I agree it's not incoherent. That's why I asked what good a fictitious coherent belief system is.

~~ Paul

For the third time, It's not incoherent.

Obviously I have to explain why post 1506 is relevant. Coherency doesn't come easily. That's why when you find it, you can be fairly certain that on the large scale of things, it isn't fictitious. The fictions are round the edges. I have found a grand total of one coherent overall position. SEE POST 1506. In contrast, incoherent systems can have fictions as their foundations.
 
Sorta like science, only not empirical. That's good.

~~ Paul


Yes, exactly. It's self-correcting and it's the only way to make progress when empirical science can't help. I might also add that when scientists get too attached to their own theoretical foundations, they can also suffer from the resistance problem - even within empirical science. This is what Kuhn was writing about.
 
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So... what definition of 'eliminative materialist' do you rely upon to make the claim that 'mind' does not exist, regardless of definitions for 'mind'? All I've found (from links you provided) are that 'minds' do not exist as understood by folk psychology. That's hardly the same argument.

That, I can agree with. What we commonly think of as 'minds' - immaterial 'ghosts in the machine' - do not exist (under physicalism). However, minds still exist. They just aren't what commonly are believed to exist, under folk psychology.
 
Zaay said:
That, I can agree with. What we commonly think of as 'minds' - immaterial 'ghosts in the machine' - do not exist (under physicalism). However, minds still exist. They just aren't what commonly are believed to exist, under folk psychology.
I Q-think we're required to call them K-minds or something. In exchange for Geoff using the term 0-Being. I M-realize this causes you P-pain, but you'll just have to put up with your Z-feelings.

~~ Paul
 
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So... what definition of 'eliminative materialist' do you rely upon to make the claim that 'mind' does not exist, regardless of definitions for 'mind'?

All definitions of eliminative materialism. You can define mind in two ways. Mind-Geoff (which really means subjective experiences) and Mind-Kevin (which really means brain processes). If you are going to define "mind" as Mind-Kevin then there is no point in defining it at all - since it refers to brain processes and EM is a hypothesis about a time when everything is known about brain processes (meaning that there is no need for a mind-Kevin). All of the problems start when you want to use it to mean mind-Geoff. We have already split "mind" into mind-Kevin and mind-Geoff. We've already stated that mind-Kevin account for everything we know about physical brains, and if everything which exists is physical than that is everything there is to be said - so there is no room for mind-Geoff to refer to anything at all. The trouble is that we ALL know that there well and truly *IS* something for mind-Geoff to refer to, and that is why eliminative materialism is the most bizarre metaphysical position ever defended. To me, it is even more bizarre than seven-day creationism. At least the creationists don't try to deny their own mind-Geoff exists.

All I've found (from links you provided) are that 'minds' do not exist as understood by folk psychology. That's hardly the same argument.

Those are mind-Geoff minds. "folk psychology" refers to all of our mental terms.

That, I can agree with. What we commonly think of as 'minds' - immaterial 'ghosts in the machine'

No, no, no. We are talking about mind-geoffs **NOT** souls.

- do not exist (under physicalism). However, minds still exist.

You mean mind-geoffs exist. Except EM says they don't.

They just aren't what commonly are believed to exist, under folk psychology.

Then what are they? Mind-Kevins? OOPS!!! :D
 
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JustGeoff, I'm too lazy right now to give your last post to me the response it deserves. Maybe later. But I'll just say this (which might seem silly, but I don't think it is):
Code:
#include <stdio.h>

int main(void) {
   double zero = 0, infinity = 1/zero;

   if (zero == infinity)
      printf("zero equals infinity");
   else
      printf("zero doesn't equal infinity");

   return 0;
}
Try it. See what it says. Maybe there's a good reason why it says what it says.
 
JustGeoff, I'm too lazy right now to give your last post to me the response it deserves. Maybe later. But I'll just say this (which might seem silly, but I don't think it is):
Code:
#include <stdio.h>

int main(void) {
   double zero = 0, infinity = 1/zero;

   if (zero == infinity)
      printf("zero equals infinity");
   else
      printf("zero doesn't equal infinity");

   return 0;
}
Try it. See what it says. Maybe there's a good reason why it says what it says.

You cannot divide by Zero.
 
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Geoff said:
K-minds are brain processes. They are NOT subjective experiences, mental events, qualia or anything remotely like them. You now mean G-mind but are saying K-mind.
They are L-subjective experiences, D-mental events, and S-qualia. You just have to know what those terms mean.

Well, wait a minute. Toss the S-qualia. That's just silly.

~~ Paul
 
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.... mind-kevin is just brain processes,
and nobody is trying to eliminate those except hammegk.
I don't eliminate them, that's silly. What we perceive as physical, which includes brain & body, of course impacts thought with I/O and processing power, and appears to be a necessary requirement for thought to 'live' as we perceive life. I have no trouble with 'thought' being casually efficacious with regards to 'thought we perceive as physical'. :)
 
They are L-subjective experiences, D-mental events, and S-qualia. You just have to know what those terms mean.

Well, wait a minute. Toss the S-qualia. That's just silly.

~~ Paul

In other words, you still have a referent which has no term. Why not S-Qualia? Ah. But that means I can set up another logical trap when you try to define it. ;)
 

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