The relationship between science and materialism

[UndercoverElephant]

ZD has offered up an obvious reformulation of the question:

If minds are identical to brain processes, what possible purpose is served by defining them at all? Why is a definition even needed? What is the difference between defining a mind to be a brain process and defining a fairy-gidget to be a brain process? The only possible answer is that there is something other than a brain process which needs a definition. The problem is that this definition renders the word "mind" useless for refering to what it preivously refered to, since it now refers to something else. So you've included the word in your theory, but you've lost it's referent. The word "mind" then might as well be "fairy gidget". It's just a useless extra word.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

What does your "perfectly good word" mean?

Doesn't matter, because I don't base my life on metaphysics.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I notice that whilst you are happily claiming to have found a new metaphysical position for yourself you haven't actually provided any definitions of :

Geoff, you brickhead. I have not found any new metaphysical position for myself, because I don't care about holding any such position.

~~ Paul

 

[chriswl]

Supervenience is compatible with my own position, it's just my position is clearer.

Not to me, I'm afraid.

Since supervenience is compatible with the argument for the existence of neccesary being as discussed above, it can't be materialism.

But it seems to be the most popular form of materialism that there is! If it isn't really materialism then what is the materialist position that you are arguing against and does anyone out there really subscribe to it?

And, no, Kant didn't kill this version of the cosmological argument (which I repeat proves the existence of something like Brahman (Pure Being) rather than the Chistian God). It was the ontological argument he killed.

A "necessary being" is something that must exist, purely by its definition. But this is nonsense, you can't define things into existence like this. It's just theological sophistry, whether applied the Christian god or any other entity.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I spent all day at work reading every page of this thread and I *still* have no idea what Geoff is playing at.

I have contacted your employer to have you fired.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But it seems to be the most popular form of materialism that there is! If it isn't really materialism then what is the materialist position that you are arguing against and does anyone out there really subscribe to it?

Hey, reductive materialism is eliminative materialism. Supervenience materialism isn't materialism at all. What's your problem, man?

Can we talk about epiphenomenal ectoplasm yet?

~~ Paul

 

[Wheezebucket]

I have contacted your employer to have you fired.

~~ Paul

So there ARE angels out there! These kids will be the death of me. Unless Geoff is right about whatever it is he's proclaiming, then...well, I don't know what would happen to me then. I still don't get it.

And as much as I would like to supply some definitions, Geoff, I would have no idea where to begin; I'm afraid my stupidity will cause a chain reaction, causing an explosion of ten more pages of this stuff that I can't quite figure out.

I'm sticking it out, though! Pretty soon I might even know what epiphenomenal ectoplasm is!

 

[Z]

I didn't define "mind" at all. Neither did I refuse to allow any definitions....

Fine - then use this definition of 'mind': those brain processes as experienced from the first person point of view of the brain having those processes.

I'm not sure this is illogical, since 'faerie-dust-powered gidgets' isn't a word that normally refers to my mental experiences. But in some ways you are correct. It might as well start from "'faerie-dust-powered gidgets" and equate them to brain processes, because if you are going to define something to be no different to brain processes then there is no point in defining it at all.

Except to combat the notion that they are faerie-dust-powered gidgets.

I'm not refering to gidgets at all. I'm refering to my mind (not the fairy-gidget mind of reductionism but my actual mind - which I can still refer to since I'm not an eliminativist).

gidget = mind
faerie-dust-powered = immaterial

Your definition of 'mind' inherently includes the faerie dust.

Then it might as well say that "fairy gidgets" exist and can be reduced to physical terms.

That's your use... it's actually like saying 'faerie gidgets' exist, but there's no faerie involved.

Depends what you mean by "incorrect". I think you are still trying to slip some dualism in. I think you are still using "mind" to refer to what I mean by mind.

Incorrect.

Correct. The line of reasoning starts from assuming materialism is true and ends up concluding that non-physical minds can't possibly exist:

Whereas your line of reasoning starts from assuming dualism and/or immaterialism and ends up concluding non-physical minds must exist.

Materialism is true, therefore materialism is true.

And your claim is 'materialism is false, therefore materialism is false.'

Oh yes it is.

Assertions do not equal truth.

Nope. It's saying it's meaningless to talk about "experiences" at all.

Wrong. Show me where any form of materialism say experiences don't exist at all.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I didn't define "mind" at all.

Really? Seems to me you've spent quite a bit of time both defining it and specifically stating that it is not only non-physical but includes no possibility of being physical. These are just the quickie examples that I recalled from memory. I'm sure there are plenty of others if anyone wants to sift through it all.

Well I told lots of other people.

Mind = mental = subjective = 1st-person

Geoff posted: a subject is a being which has subjective experiences

So there is no referrent for subject experience in physicalism?

~~ Paul


Geoff: That is correct.

If the subject is anything at all it is the viewpoint itself.

You need a subject. That's the only thing my ontological position provides that isn't already provided by the physical description of the brain.

The neccesary components for subjectivity are the subject itself, which can be provided by a theory like mine, and also some specifiable physical/quantum condition of the brain which is yet to be provided by science.

"Mind" is just the name of one part of the human experience of reality - it is the name for the totality of that experience of reality. Therefore it is not a word that can be applied to the neutral world at all.

"Mind" refers to the totality of our experience of a phenomenal world and "Physical objects" are the things which appear before us in physical space, and which persist over time.

Subjectivity is at the core. The Subject is at the core.

The homonculus isn't a thing. It's what I called Being/Zero.

b) What “mind” is.

Whilst the parts of the neutral entity (NE) do not directly correspond to physical reality (they aren't "physical objects"), they do indirectly correspond (they are the causes of experiences of physical objects). There is potential for confusion here. There seem to be two ways we can talk of what "causes" our experience. There is the NE-chairlike-thing, and there is a brain process. The relationship between NE-chairlike-thing and brain process is NOT the same as the relationship between brain process and the mental experience of a chair. We don't "observe" brain processes in the way we observe physical chairs. We can only observe brain processes by cutting a hole in our head and sitting in front of a mirror. So, corresponding to the two physicalist uses of "physical" we have two mixed up uses of "physical brain". But now we can clear up the confusion. The physical brain, according to my system, is the brain in the mirror - NOT the noumenal-brain-like-thing which is the proximal cause of mental experiences. So we have to restate the relationship between brains and minds. Subjective experiences are NOT "brain processes" because brains are phenomenal, life-world, "physical" things. Instead, the content of subjective experiences is being determined by the state of the noumenal-brain-like-thing i.e. that ACTUAL noumenal "brain" that really exists and NOT the brain in the mirror. But the noumenal brain-like-thing isn't sufficient on it's own to produce the mind-and-matter experience of the world. We also need Being. "Being" takes the place of the homunculus. It is the subject. It is YOU. YOU ARE.

b) What “mind” is.

Whilst the parts of the 0-math neutral entity (0MNE) do not directly correspond to physical reality, they do indirectly correspond. In other words, there are parts of the 0MNE which correspond to physical brains and there are parts of the 0MNE which correspond to other parts of physical reality. There are also internal causal relationships between those different parts i.e. the exact state of the part which corresponds to physical brains is partially determined by the state of other parts of the 0MNE via normal empirical causation. What we call “mind” is the result of the relationship between Zero and the part of the 0MNE which corresponds to a brain.

Back to retirement. I couldn't allow such a statement to stand without reproof.

 

[Z]

So what it all seems to boil down to, is that JG is asserting that there are things, we call 'minds', which are absolutely non-physical in some sense; therefore, all forms of materialism are either dualism or patently absurd.

Therefore, I would say the true burden here, is for JG to prove that any of these things are composed entirely - or even partially - of the non-physical: minds, subjective experience, first-person POV, etc.

Otherwise, all he's been doing, for 35 pages, is asserting that materialism is false because he believes it to be so.

 

[Complexity]

Why are we interacting with this idiot (JustGeoff, for those who haven't got a clue)?

Paul, you in particular have been egging him on. Enough is enough.

Not only are Geoff-engagers encouraging a rather nasty troll, but prolonging a discussion that does rather serious damage to the reputation of philosophy for many readers of this forum.

I don't want readers to think that philosophy is merely the ignorant pretentious babble that Geoff and some other members love to indulge in threads throughout this forum.

Philosophy is far too important for that.

 

[hammegk]

Fine - then use this definition of 'mind': those brain processes as experienced from the first person point of view of the brain having those processes.

!
Would you describe an experience? What is having the first-person pov, and what accomplishes the experiencing?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Ad admirable summary, Zaayrdragon.

Geoff starts from the position that if minds exist they are immaterial, and that the idea that minds do not exist at all is crazy. In other words, he covertly assumes all sorts of dumb things.

Thus reductive materialism, which says minds are material, squicks Geoff because it is saying something he assumes is false. Geoff complains that it is dualism in a dress, but only because he assumed from the start that if minds exist then dualism is true. Who knows why he assumed that? I can't account for this level of mendacity. The only dualist in the picture is Geoff, and the only person assuming that "mind" implies dualism is Geoff.

Eliminative materialism, which says there are no immaterial minds at all, also drives Geoff nuts. It's pretty much exactly the same position as reductive materialism if you are not a loony like Geoff, but he hates it because it denies his core covert assumption. So he says it is crazy, and pretends that if you deny the existence of immaterial minds you must be denying the existence of material minds as well.

When challenged, he can never explain why any sane person would agree with this. He just throws a tantrum and starts demanding other people post metaphysical positions, so he can talk about them instead.

I think it may be time to get a Larsen List together. I propose the first two questions be:

1. You have repeatedly claimed that minds must have an immaterial component. Why should we believe this? Isn't this just dualism, which has been completely discredited?

1a. You have repeatedly claimed that if we replace the word "mind" with a term which refers to exactly the same thing, but implies no immaterial component, that we will have denied that we have minds. Why should we believe this? Or alternatively, if you insist on defining minds as necessarily immaterial minds, why should we care if we don't have an immaterial mind?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Data is quantitative. Quality is, well, qualitative.

Sense data? It's a bit of both, isn't it? That's how things like science are possible in the first place.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

Subjective: Existing only in the mind; illusory (Essentially, the opinions of our minds. These are basically just data we are aware of that only refer to that data itself. For example, the ability to "prefer" does not have anything to do with anything other than mental processes.)
Objective: Having actual existence or reality (Note, one can objectively state that subjectiveness exists)
Mental: Executed or performed by the mind; existing in the mind
Physical: Of or relating to matter and energy or the sciences dealing with them, especially physics
1st-person: A state or point of the person to which an experience is occuring
3rd-person: a point of view outside the one who is experiencing a mental state

I pretty much hauled that out of dictionary.com, with my own little additions to make it adapt to this conversation. What's wrong with those definitions? Conciousness, as far as it appears to me, has a simple word. It's a phenomenon that happens when certain mental processes happen. It's the consequence of those actions. Odd that it happens, but it happens. As to WHY it happens, why should gravity be the necessary consequence of matter somewheres? Why does the universe bother existing, and why are the laws of physics as they are? Answer those and then we'll bother with the issue of why conciousness is the necessary consequence of the mental processes.

Basically you tell me this. How would it be possible for a being to be capable of the same mental processes as we are but NOT have that phenomenon of awareness? How could something like that actually occur and still be logically consistant?

And forgive me, but I can't seem to navigate my way through this hedge maze so I am not sure if you answered this or not, but let's say the mind exists in a higher state, some "plane of awareness"? Why is it that this is the one true awareness and it, itself, does not require another layer on top of it? Why does this wavy ethereal rainbow colored light show of the alterverse equate to our awareness? (and yes, I know you didn't give it physical form, but that's the technicolor dreamcoat I envision with what you are describing) What does that actually explain? How does THAT thing explain how we are "aware"? Does it at all, or do you just assign it that quality and be done with it without bothering to do anything at all? How is that any different from assigning mental states the same qualities and being done with it? I'll tell you how. It's the explanation that doesn't posit extra entities where they aren't needed and the evidence leads us to that conclusion.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Not to me, I'm afraid.

But it seems to be the most popular form of materialism that there is!

Supervenience is NOT materialism. It is a claim about the relationship between mental and physical which falls short of an actual claim that physicalism is true. Let me explain. Physicalism makes the claim that the physical Universe self-exists. It claims that "being" is something that arrives in the system for no reason at the point of the Big Bang. It then claims "minds ARE brain processes". So there are two claims about being inherent in physicalism which are not inherent in supervenience. Supervenience theories of mind are compatible with physicalism. In other words if physicalism were true, then mind would supervene on matter. But it doesn't follow that if mind supervenes on matter then physicalism is true. It may be the case that supervenience would rule out any "mind-stuff" such as dualism and idealism claim but provided another metaphysical position restricts its differences to physicalism to other claims about Being then it can also be compatible with supervenience. This is true of at least two claims: one of them is the form of the cosmological argument which posits the existence of neccesary being and another is my neutral monism for the same reason - the only thing it introduces is Being/Nothing and no "mind-stuff". So in the naturalistic version of neutral monism it is true to say that mind supervenes on matter. Not only that, but my position also explains how this could happen rather than just leaving it undefined and mysterious. The upshot of all this is that supervenience is the correct description of the relationship between mind and matter but is no use as a way of specifying and defending physicalism because it is compatible with positions which are themselves incompatible with physicalism.

If it isn't really materialism then what is the materialist position that you are arguing against and does anyone out there really subscribe to it?

I'm arguing against an incoherent position which claims "minds ARE brain processes".

A "necessary being" is something that must exist, purely by its definition. But this is nonsense, you can't define things into existence like this. It's just theological sophistry, whether applied the Christian god or any other entity.

Try to focus on the argument instead. Just because you do not happen to believe that such a being exists, doesn't mean you can reject the first line of an argument which starts "imagine such a being". The point in the argument is to examine the consequences of what would be the consequences IF such a being existed. You can't reject the argument on the grounds of failure of imagination on your part. If supervenience is even just compatible with the existence of such a being, then it is useless as a way of specifying physicalism even if such a being does not actually exist.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Thus reductive materialism, which says minds are material, squicks Geoff because it is saying something he assumes is false.

Okay, that was a word I didn't want to learn.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Fine - then use this definition of 'mind': those brain processes as experienced from the first person point of view of the brain having those processes.

That's the incoherent definition I've been challenging. You can define it that way if you like, but if you go on to give me a definition of the other words, I can prove a contradiction.

Whereas your line of reasoning starts from assuming dualism and/or immaterialism and ends up concluding non-physical minds must exist.

I've no idea why physicalists are so good at convincing themselves that other people are assuming their conclusions when it is in fact the materialists which are nearly always guilty of this crime. You have got exactly backwards ZD. Just like Paul, it is YOU, rather than me, who cannot resist the temptation to assume his conclusion:

And your claim is 'materialism is false, therefore materialism is false.'

Just like you did there. No, ZD. That is absolutely NOT my claim. You first error is to assume your conclusion. Your second error is to assume that anyone-else who doesn't assume your conclusion must be assuming their own conclusion.

Why is that materialists do this? Question-begging and hypocrisy mixed together.

Assertions do not equal truth.

Too f***** right, ZD. So stop making them.

Wrong. Show me where any form of materialism say experiences don't exist at all.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Really? Seems to me you've spent quite a bit of time both defining it and specifically stating that it is not only non-physical but includes no possibility of being physical. These are just the quickie examples that I recalled from memory. I'm sure there are plenty of others if anyone wants to sift through it all.

That is blatant misrepresentation. When I said "I haven't defined mind" what I meant was that I have not imposed a definition of mind for other people to use. Of course I have defined it when I explained MY OWN position, but I am NOT imposing that definition on others. You are free to define it how you like. I never said "this is what a mind is and you have to accept my definition".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So what it all seems to boil down to, is that JG is asserting that there are things, we call 'minds', which are absolutely non-physical in some sense; therefore, all forms of materialism are either dualism or patently absurd.

No, this has got nothing to do with my argument and I haven't made that assertion.

Therefore, I would say the true burden here, is for JG to prove that any of these things are composed entirely - or even partially - of the non-physical: minds, subjective experience, first-person POV, etc.

You are arguing against something, but it isn't me.

Otherwise, all he's been doing, for 35 pages, is asserting that materialism is false because he believes it to be so.

No wonder people like Ian get wound up. This is totally false accusation, not based on anything I actually said.