The relationship between science and materialism

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, we've been here before and I am hoping this time that you will sit long enough before jumping off to all sorts of conclusions.

Much of this has been explained to you, but you won't accept the answers.

That's because the answers don't work.

The answers depend on trying to claim that the brain in the mirror *IS* a physical activity. But we already have a word for the physical activity, so you cannot use the same term for the brain in the mirror. I want a term that EXCLUSIVELY refers to the brain in the mirror. I don't think you can give me one without falsifying physicalism.

There are referents and there are referents. The sentence, "The unicorn ron over the fence to fetch daisies." has no real referent because there is no such thing as a unicorn. But it does have a referent because we do have a concept of unicorns.

Agreed. But my mind isn't just a concept.

There is a referent to the behavior of perceiving in your example above. It is me. I perceive.

So what does "I" refer to?

What we must try to uncover is whether or not I exist. Obviously there is some thing here that we seem to call "me", so I guess I exist. But that doesn't mean that all the things I think about me are actually true in an ontological sense. If we reduce down to the level of what happens in the brain/body we may arrive at the proposition that the referent is my body. My body perceives. There is a referent. The question is whether or not that makes sense. If would please stop jumping the gun and saying that it doesn't perhaps we could make progress?

May we return to the discussion we were having before?

OK. All I am seeing is people trying to use terms for physical activity to refer to the brain in the mirror i.e. "The brain in the mirror IS physical activity in the brain in the vat." If so, we are back to the meaningless "IS" again - unless you are finally going to tell me what "IS" is supposed to mean in such a sentence. If the "IS" means "is identical to" or "is synonymous with" then the new term you have introduced has no referent. If it doesn't mean this, then we need two terms. You are introducing a meaningless "IS". I am introducing "Being" - a meaningfull "IS".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wasp,

Maybe we can sort this out by banning unqualifed use of the word "IS". If you want to say "is identical to" or "is synonymous with" then say that instead of "IS". If you meaning anything else apart from strict identity, then there must be an alternative word to "IS" that you can use. If you cannot find an alternative word, then the sentence you wish to utter is incoherent.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Another reminder:

This proof is not claimed to be effective against eliminative materialism. So if you are trying to find a way to refute the proof, but in doing so you defend eliminativism, the proof still stands. It's a proof against non-eliminativism.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I didn't use the word "is". You did. I used the word perceive.

The answers depend on trying to claim that the brain in the mirror *IS* a physical activity.

Didn't I spend the last several posts explaining the difference between an action and a description of the action? Were you not listening? Brain in mirror is description of action -- from the outside. Perceiving occurs in brain-stuff -- action, first-person, from the inside.

We have yet to determine if there is a subject or if a subject is needed. Further we have yet to determine what we even mean by the word "perceive".

Are you with me?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I didn't use the word "is". You did. I used the word perceive.

Didn't I spend the last several posts explaining the difference between an action and a description of the action? Were you not listening?

Yes, I was listening. But I have no idea why you think this helps in a defence of non-eliminative materialism.

Brain in mirror is description of action -- from the outside. Perceiving occurs in brain-stuff -- action, first-person, from the inside.

I never accepted your account of "internal" and "external". We didn't resolve it, Wasp. I claimed we needed a subject or an experiencer. It is the subject or the experiencer which is key to this, not the fact that there are two different ways of looking at a process. It is the subject which turns the internal view into a mind. The internal view on it's own isn't enough.

We have yet to determine if there is a subject or if a subject is needed.

And your position doesn't work unless you claim a subject isn't needed. But a subject is needed.

Further we have yet to determine what we even mean by the word "perceive".

Yes. The materialist will want to define it in terms of physical behaviour. This will either lead to eliminativism or to a logical contradiction.

Are you with me?

I am certainly following what you are saying, yes. I'm hoping to avoid a repeat of you defending eliminativism and then claiming you aren't defending eliminativism.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Really, really simple explanation of why the only logically coherent defence of materialism is eliminative.

In order to define the term "subjective experience" the materialist wants to define it as "brain processes", where "brain processes" refers to something happening in REALITY - physical reality - the only reality there is. It makes no difference whether he says "brain processes" or "a description of brain processes" because the only thing which is REAL is the brain process. The "description" doesn't refer to anything REAL. It doesn't refer to anything which "IS" (= exists).

So we are left wondering what "ARE" means.

If it means "identical to" then you have introduced a term with no referent. Logically speaking, it is eliminativism. You've just tried to hide this fact by introducing the term "subjective experience" to mean something this term simply doesn't mean.

If it doesn't mean "identical to" then please explain what it does mean without using the word "is".

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It is the subject which turns the internal view into a mind. The internal view on it's own isn't enough.

Well, that is where I was trying to lead the conversation. You agree to the "internal view", however? Can we get past that stage to all the rest? The rest is about the subject. We need to agree on some sort of definition for the subject, or subjectivity. The internal viewpoint is only one part of subjectivity since the viewpoint itself can't do anything. That is why a computer is not conscious. It lacks awareness.

I'm hoping to avoid a repeat of you defending eliminativism and then claiming you aren't defending eliminativism.

Perhaps if you stop labelling me for five minutes and actually read what I am writing we can move along?

I'm sorry to rant about this, but this is what philosphers have done in every conversation to which I have been a party. They spend 2/3 of their time labelling everyone, most of the time jumping to conclusions and then trot out the currently favored counter-argument from the carefully hidden Philosophic Book of Lists, whether or not it is appropriate to the situation. The label is all-important. It is quite irritating, to be blunt.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Geoff,

I'm not trying to cover anything. You keep throwing out those terms, not me. I used the word subject because that is your word. I thought we were trying to have a conversation to determine what we mean by these words. Otherwise, we are all just scampering about with our heads cut off.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, that is where I was trying to lead the conversation. You agree to the "internal view", however?

Provided that is understood to refer to a description - an abstraction - and not anything which is actually real.

Can we get past that stage to all the rest? The rest is about the subject. We need to agree on some sort of definition for the subject, or subjectivity. The internal viewpoint is only one part of subjectivity......

No. It's NO part of subjectivity. (edit: not how you've described it, anyway) No subject = No subjecivity. Not "some subjectivity". There is no such thing as "some subjectivity". I explained this in great detail to Paul. The "physical" things you are talking about (brains) are already abstractions - mind-independent things. If you then talk about an abstraction from a brain process (a description of a brain process) then you are talking about an abstraction of an abstraction. What has that got to do with my actual experiences - the ones I am actually having right now?

That is why a computer is not conscious. It lacks awareness.

But we haven't agreed on a definition of awareness. Do you mean "subjectivity" by any chance?

Perhaps if you stop labelling me for five minutes and actually read what I am writing we can move along?

I am reading everything you write. I respond to each and every sentence.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

This sentence is incoherent. Do you mean "the BIV's perception of a brain in the mirror is not a physical object"?

Yes.

If so, what is it?***

It could be a brain process.

***Beware of introducing new terms to refer to the BIV's perception of a brain in the mirror if those terms already refer to something else which is not the BIV's perception of a brain in the mirror. If you were to do this then I'd need yet another new term to distinguish the brain in the mirror from this other thing. I need a term for the brain in the mirror which is not already a term for something else (like brain processes).

Huh? We have three things:

the brain in the vat: physical
the signals feeding its senses: physical
its internal view of the signals: vat-brain process

Why do we need different terms for the brain in the vat and the signals?

No, this is a misunderstanding of how brains and minds map in to the noumenal. They both map in to the noumenal but they may in to different positions. The only way there can be two different positions for them to map into is if Being is included in the noumenal. That way, minds can be distinguished from brain processes. Your way, they can't.

So the brain is in the noumenal and the mind is Being? I swear you said something different before. So how is this not dualism in a new dress?

But a critically important name change because now you cannot use the term "physical object" for the objects of your perception and you are going to have to call them something else. You want to call them "brain processes".

Sorry, what are "objects of my perception"?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The answers depend on trying to claim that the brain in the mirror *IS* a physical activity. But we already have a word for the physical activity, so you cannot use the same term for the brain in the mirror. I want a term that EXCLUSIVELY refers to the brain in the mirror. I don't think you can give me one without falsifying physicalism.

What brain in the mirror? There is no brain in the mirror. There are only signals fooling the BIV into thinking there is a brain in the mirror.

Agreed. But my mind isn't just a concept.

What is it then, exactly?

OK. All I am seeing is people trying to use terms for physical activity to refer to the brain in the mirror i.e. "The brain in the mirror IS physical activity in the brain in the vat." If so, we are back to the meaningless "IS" again - unless you are finally going to tell me what "IS" is supposed to mean in such a sentence. If the "IS" means "is identical to" or "is synonymous with" then the new term you have introduced has no referent. If it doesn't mean this, then we need two terms. You are introducing a meaningless "IS". I am introducing "Being" - a meaningfull "IS".

There is no brain in the mirror. There is perception by the BIV of signals fed to it, interpreted as a brain in the mirror. That is because the scientists know how to feed signals that will cause the BIV to undergo brain processes that produce the appropriate image.

Here's the question: Why do you insist that those brain processes are special, whereas you would not insist on the specialness of a stimulated process that made the BIV itch its nose? Or would you?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So the brain is in the noumenal and the mind is Being? I swear you said something different before. So how is this not dualism in a new dress?

You are trying to think about the noumenal realm as if it was physical. I haven't explained "noumenal" very well.

Sorry, what are "objects of my perception"?

~~ Paul

The brain in the mirror. It's an object you are percieving. A hallucinated object.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

In order to define the term "subjective experience" the materialist wants to define it as "brain processes", where "brain processes" refers to something happening in REALITY - physical reality - the only reality there is. It makes no difference whether he says "brain processes" or "a description of brain processes" because the only thing which is REAL is the brain process. The "description" doesn't refer to anything REAL. It doesn't refer to anything which "IS" (= exists).

So we are left wondering what "ARE" means.

If it means "identical to" then you have introduced a term with no referent. Logically speaking, it is eliminativism. You've just tried to hide this fact by introducing the term "subjective experience" to mean something this term simply doesn't mean.

This is fine and may suffice for philosophical discussions. It does not suffice for neuroscience, because "brain process" currently leaves something out that "subjective experience" or "consciousness" captures. Even Churchland admitted this. As time goes by, the terms should become closer and closer in meaning. However, at that point, neuroscience will have redefined the folk psychology terms to mean something crisp. Philosophers may moan and groan, but that is neither here nor there.

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Provided that is understood to refer to a description - an abstraction - and not anything which is actually real.

What do you mean by that? There is a real distinction between an action and a description of an action. It isn't a thing, but the distinction is real. There really is a viewpoint difference between inside and outside. There is no subject inside a computer, but that contrasts with the difference in viewpoint. Viewpoint alone, again, is not sufficient to account for a subject. But the distinction between these viewpoints is certainly not fabricated or concocted. So it depends a bit on what you mean by abstraction.

It's NO part of subjectivity.

But we haven't agreed on a definition of awareness. Do you mean "subjectivity" by any chance?

OK, this is getting extremely frustrating since you keep changing your stance. First you told me that subjectivity was the viewpoint, now you tell me that it is no part of the viewpoint.

One more time. The way I thought we had agreed on what subjectivity was this: it is awareness from that internal viewpoint. The viewpoint is not subjectivity. Awareness is not subjectivity (if it is not from a particular viewpoint). Subjectivity as you seem to be using it is awareness from that internal viewpoint. Can we agree on that or is there something else that we left out?

First we deal with subjectivity, then we deal with awareness. If awareness is part of subjectivity (subjectivity from a viewpoint -- so two components, the awareness and the viewpoint), then we need to nail down subjectivity first. If subjectivity is something else, then we need to move onto whatever else that "thing" is and figure out that definition.

So we need to agree on terms first. Can we agree that there is a viewpoint from the inside (for a computer this is action-in-itself, differing from external description) and one from the outside (description)? And can we agree that subjectivity is not simply the internal viewpoint, but is awareness from that internal viewpoint?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The brain in the mirror. It's an object you are percieving. A hallucinated object.

It's not a physical object, so I can reserve "physical object" to refer to the BIV and the signals. The brain in the mirror is an "hallucination" caused by the BIV's brain processes being fooled into recalling the image of a brain in a mirror.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

What do you mean by that? There is a real distinction between an action and a description of an action. It isn't a thing, but the distinction is real. There really is a viewpoint difference between inside and outside. There is no subject inside a computer, but that contrasts with the difference in viewpoint. Viewpoint alone, again, is not sufficient to account for a subject. But the distinction between these viewpoints is certainly not fabricated or concocted. So it depends a bit on what you mean by abstraction.

This is why we should distinguish between subjective, subjective experience, and subject. The question is: Can the brain produce subjective experience without a subject?

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'm trying to get there, man.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Sorry, yes, continue on.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wasp and Paul

Can we try a new approach?

We seem to have a situation where the pair of you think that you have a solution to the problem, but that I can't see why it's a solution. So perhaps I shall explain exactly what the problem is and you can tell me why you think your solution works. I need you to try to understand the problem from my viewpoint and that means temporarily suspending any belief in materialism in order for me to explain the problem:

As explained to Paul before, everything we ever experience is subjective. We are trapped in our own mental realm. For all we know, solipsism may be true. Please don't complain that I am using "dualistic talk". I need some sort of way of specifying the problem and "We are trapped in our own mental world" is the only way of specifying it. Now, I don't care at this point if you want to think to yourselves that this "realm of subjective experiences" is a shorthand notation for something mind-independent like a brain proces, but you can't insist (at this point) that I also use it as a shorthand notation for something else. I need it to refer to my own subjective realm - all my experiences - because this is this very thing that needs to be explained.

There are experiences. My experiences. At this point the word "experiences" has only one referent. I am the solipsist. Nothing exists but my experiences. "experiences" doesn't refer to anything independent of my mind, because there are no things which are independent of my mind.

Where do we go from here?

Well, let's now assume that there is a world external to my experiences - I'm not a solipsist after all. Let's call this external world "physical". What I want to know is how this external physical world relates to my solipsistic world of experiences. Of crucial important is the following:

I know nothing of this external physical world. I have merely posited it's existence. I have no direct, incontravertible evidence that exists at all. From my perspective (stuck in a subjective world where solipsism could be true) it is merely an informed fairy-tale. It is in fact an abstraction from my experiences - something I have proposed/concluded exists via a line of reasoning. It's not something I'm sure exists, however powerfully I might believe it exists.

Now comes along Wasp and Paul and they say they want to defend the view that the only reality is physical reality. They have claimed that the only thing which actually exists is something which from my subjective point of view is a mere abstraction. This is already quite difficult to swallow, because it is a claim that the only thing which exists is independent of my subjective experiences, and my subjective experiences are the only thing I am sure exists. But let's press on and look at the explanations that Wasp and Paul are offering for their claim. They ask me to recognise the difference between a physical process and description (abstraction) of a physical process. Now, if we remember that this external world, from my point of view, is already a mere abstraction, then the difference between the two things wasp has called "internal" and "external" - the difference between the process and the description of the process - is that one is a first-level abstraction and the other is a second-level abstraction. The final part of the claim made by Wasp and Paul is that this second-level abstraction IS IDENTICAL to what I am calling "subjective experiences" or my solipsistic world.

Is that agreed?

The problem with this view is this: The abstraction from my experiences which we are calling an external physical world has been defined as being external to my subjective experiences. This means that physical processes which involve information-processing are also external to my subjective experiences - they are also mere abstractions because they are just abstractions of abstractions. They are a model within a model. And if you were to add another level of description to this all you would be left with is an abstraction of an abstraction of an abstraction - a model within a model within a model. Each time you add a layer of abstraction to the already abstract external world you just get further away from my solipsistic subjective world. Please can you explain how your solution overcomes this problem, because I don't understand.

The reason I think my solution works and your doesn't is because mine provides an anchor for the subjective world of experience. That anchor is the thing I call "Being" from the neutral perspective and "the subject" from the subjective perspective. Now the accounts of abstractions of abstractions can work. Now your 2nd-order descriptions of processes in the external world can become all the things apart from Being that is needed to create my subjective experience. Now the claim "brain processes are minds" can be correctly stated as "minds are brain processes + Being" and all of the problems evaporate. The noumenal has been replaced with physical and mind is explained by the addition of the subject/Being. But you don't want to allow me to add Being. Please explain to me how you can remove Being from this picture and still provide an "anchor" for the solipsistic world of subjective experiences. Please explain why those subjective experiences don't just remain models within models, all happening in some mind-independent world.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

This is why we should distinguish between subjective, subjective experience, and subject. The question is: Can the brain produce subjective experience without a subject?

~~ Paul

Yes, yes and yes. That is indeed the question. How can the brain produce subjective experience without a subject. Remember the only way I get around this is to introduce what is a subject from our point of view, but in the greater scheme of things is Nothing/Being - instead of a "thing" or "mental stuff". If you introduce a subject and it's anything other than Nothing/Being then you've got something like an individuated soul to contend with and nobody wants one of those. But if you try to avoid introducing a subject at all then what is it that prevents "brain processes" from being nothing more than abstract descriptions of something happening in a mind-independent world which is itself a mere abstract description? How come my experiences are REAL?