The relationship between science and materialism

[chriswl]

Rolly-eyes don't substitute for an argument, Chris.

I went to the trouble of locating the post in question and your replies. Roll eyes is my reaction to the idea that you offered any kind of "proof" that my position was wrong.

You haven't shown me what's wrong with my position.

I don't understand your position. No one on here does.

You started this thread trying to convince us that physicalism was incoherent as a prelude to describing your own system. You failed to convince us that physicalism was wrong, but we implicitly agreed to put that disagreement to one side while we discussed your alternative.

So where are we now? It's your thread. If you want to just discuss your system please avoid sarcastic asides about how stupid physicalism is or claims that you have disproved it, because we will respond and things will get derailed. Or do you actually want to have another go at convincing us why physicalism is wrong?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Okay, I don't know what my position is. I've never even thought about the matter. Now what?

Now nothing. If you don't know what your position is you'd best stick to asking questions instead making pronouncements about how I don't have a position. I do have a position. You don't understand it.

Geoff

 

[davidsmith73]

Why do we need the noumenal? Why not just say there are a bunch of subjective physical experiences floating about? I guess that would be idealism, right?

~~ Paul

That makes more sense to me. From there we can work out all the physical aspects of reality from observation.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Why do we need the noumenal? Why not just say there are a bunch of subjective physical experiences floating about? I guess that would be idealism, right?

~~ Paul

That is correct. If there are mental things which are independent of human minds then you are an idealist.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And I want to be a neutralist instead of an idealist or materialist ... why?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Ah, I think this helps me understand.

Your answers seem to be making more sense, so yes it looks that way.

When I am fearful, my heart races. I have a private internal experience of my heart racing. Someone else measures my heartbeat and sees that it is racing; I presume you'll call this objective.

Yes to all of this. It's objective in the sense that it is information that has been filtered through a system which turns it into an objective piece of information. But you don't experience the measurement of your heartbeat. It's an abstraction.

You insist on a clean separation between these two aspects of my fear. You will not allow me to say that fear is both subjective and objective, but what you actually mean is that my private experience of fear is subjective and the physiological correlates are objective and that there is no overlap between those two aspects of fear.

Absolutely spot on.

In fact, you seem to be saying that even if we had a complete understanding of what gives rise to my internal experience of my heart racing, there would still be something unexplained.

Also correct. That is what Husserl means when he says that some parts of the lifeworld cannot be mathematised. You cannot objectify your experience of seeing red. The "objective" version is a wavelength, which is no different to the measurement of your heart rate. You see red, not a wavelength.

Geoff.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Chris,

Are you following what Paul is writing? Do you understand it?

Geoff

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Now nothing. If you don't know what your position is you'd best stick to asking questions instead making pronouncements about how I don't have a position.

How does that follow? An argument stands or falls on its own merits. It doesn't matter whether or not the person articulating the argument happens to have a coherent metaphysical position up their sleeve, surely?

If it matters that much to you we can do it the other way. We'll pretend that I do have a position up my sleeve, instead of pretending that I don't, and then you can respond to the post you asked me to make.

I do have a position. You don't understand it.

So defend it, instead of hunting about for excuses not to.

 

[chriswl]

Want to try answering the MCQ?

Computer is to computation what brain is to....

A) brain process
B) minds/experiences
C) I'm confused
D) I'd better go back and check my definitions

Oh, I nearly forgot, B.

The computer equivalent of "brain processes" would be "computer processes", i.e. the moving around of data between registers and memory and the precise sequences of events. A particular computation can be implemented by many different realisations of physical "computer processes". It supervenes on them in the same way that a mind supervenes on brain processes.

 

[davidsmith73]

David

He doesn't prove it, no. It's like eliminative materialism. I don't think you can prove it's logically incoherent, but there's something wrong with it anyway.

What's that?

Not neccesarily, but it does mean it is a reaction to physicalism. Sometimes when a position is a reaction to another position it can swing too far in the opposite direction.

I'd say an understandable reaction. But I have to continue along the this line, I can't see how a reactionary position implies incoherence. Filip Radovic writes:

"The problem as I see it is that "friends of qualia" more than any other fraction in philosophy of mind strengthen the dualistic position. In general it is very easy to sympathise with the phenomenally oriented philosophers since an over-emphasis on the subjective aspect of experience seems very plausible if one argues against a hard-core reductionism. Who wants to deny the existence of plain experience? Simultaneously, however, an exaggerated emphasis on the subjective character of experience will predispose us to a strong form of dualism."

I don't see where he explains how the dualistic position is strengthened by an "exagerated emphasis" on qualia. What he needs to show is how this emphasis cannot conceivably account for the other half, ie, physical reality. Perhaps it can't but I don't see an attempt. Do you know of any literature that does?

If phemonenalism can account for its reducible counterpart within its framework then is there any need for Radovic's proper monism?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And I want to be a neutralist instead of an idealist or materialist ... why?

~~ Paul

I can only tell you geoff wants to be a neutral monist instead of a materialist or an idealist.

The only way to defend materialism is to defend eliminative materialism. But doing so leaves "subjective experience" and every other mental term with no referent. This is insane, because what "subjective experience" is supposed to refer to is absolutely everything you ever experience, and what is left if you deny that? Nothing at all. So why not be an idealist? The answer to that is being discussed between myself, davidsmith and hammegk. Idealism/phenomenalism is just a reaction to the problems with materialism and because it is a reaction it makes the mistake of wobbling too far in the other direction. Instead, we need to wipe clean the metaphysical slate and start again, this time fully aware of the pitfalls, and try to figure out a way of specifying a coherent position. The result is neutral monism.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

David

I'd say an understandable reaction. But I have to continue along the this line, I can't see how a reactionary position implies incoherence.

Eliminative materialism isn't incoherent either. It's just insane.

I don't see where he explains how the dualistic position is strengthened by an "exagerated emphasis" on qualia. What he needs to show is how this emphasis cannot conceivably account for the other half, ie, physical reality. Perhaps it can't but I don't see an attempt. Do you know of any literature that does?

No.

If phemonenalism can account for its reducible counterpart within its framework then is there any need for Radovic's proper monism?

I think his agenda is similar to mine. He's not proposing this as the only logical solution. He is trying to reach out to both sides in the debate rather than just doing battle for the phenomenalists against the reductionists. I think he knows that most people who end up with a position like yours ended up there because of a reaction to hard-nosed eliminativism.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Oh, I nearly forgot, B.

The computer equivalent of "brain processes" would be "computer processes", i.e. the moving around of data between registers and memory and the precise sequences of events. A particular computation can be implemented by many different realisations of physical "computer processes". It supervenes on them in the same way that a mind supervenes on brain processes.

Chris, there is no difference between a computation and computer process. These terms are synonyms. Unless one of them is a purely abstract logical description of the process, in which case it's irrelevant - unless you think minds are purely abstract logical descriptions.

 

[Piggy]

The subjective things are what your entire experience of reality consists of.

My experience is an emergent phenomenon produced by the activity of my brain. Yes, I know that assumes a ton of stuff. So I'll back up from that conclusion and start fresh.

But you should do the same, then. These "subjective things", these alleged components that my experience "consists of" are an invention. If we stop positing them, it will be easier to move on to a coherent model of conscious experience.

Whenever you are aware or conscious then there are subjective experiences taking place.

Seeing as how "awareness", "consciousness", and "subjective experience" are merely different terms referring to the same phenomenon, then of course. How could I disagree with that? Onward we go.

Hammegk explains this very clearly when he says "there is only one objective thing I am aware of : I am conscious". In other words, absolutely everything he ever experiences is completely subjective. EVERYTHING. There is one fact only about which he can be objectively certain : he is experiencing something, there are experiences.

It is an error to claim that being aware of the fact of one's own state of being aware is an awareness of an "objective thing" (more below regarding objective things). When you follow this up with the claim that "absolutely everything he ever experiences is completely subjective. EVERYTHING", then we have a clear contradiction.

But let's pass over these errors and move on to the last sentence. You seem to be claiming something I agree with -- that cogito ergo sum is the only 100% logically unassailable claim.

So what does "objective" mean? What we call objective are things we have arrived at via reasoning - like the content of scientific theories. They have been objectified via that process of reasoning.

Whoa, Hoss. I don't know what sort of "objective... things" "the content of scientific theories" might be. That string of words doesn't make sense to me.

But in any case, if you're saying here that a "process of reasoning" has in fact done something to something, namely "objectified" "the content of scientific theories", then we have a second phenomenon now in our box besides consciousness... the process of reasoning.

What is the relationship between the two? Is the process of reasoning (PoR) an activity of the conscious experience (CE)? Is the PoR something that the CE is merely aware of? How can these questions be answered?

But wait.... Before we jump into that tar baby, let's back up and look at this statement about what's meant by "objective": "What we call objective are things we have arrived at via reasoning."

Ok, so according to your definition, the conclusions reached by the mind through reasoning are to be called "objective".

That's not a definition I'm aware of -- maybe it's used in philosophy departments, I don't know -- and it's not one I'm prepared to accept, especially since the conclusions reached by the mind are still "in" the mind, so to speak.

There is a more common definition of "objective", which is neatly summed up by these excerpts from the Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary: "dealing with things external to the mind", "belonging to the object of thought rather than to the thinking subject".

Properly used, to my way of thinking, "objective things" are things that exist whether or not anyone perceives them or is aware of them.

CAUTION: I am not claiming, at this point, that any objective things actually exist, nor that our conscious experience can in any way have direct access to them if they do. All I am saying is that, where I'm from, that's what the word refers to, and that's how I'm going to use it.

But none of them are ever a direct part of our subjective experiences - they are nothing but abstractions.

The term "direct part" is too fuzzy for me to make any statement about. I have already said why I believe it's an error to say that objective things "are" abstractions. That's not what they "are". What we seem to have in our box at this point is CE, PoR, and "abstractions" which are somehow part and parcel with CE.

Outside the box, by my definition of the term, we have objective things (OTs) which haven't yet been posited to actually exist. Until now....

They are like the external world that causes our experiences - we cannot know they exist apart from through a process of reasoning.

Ok, so now we have the claim of an "external world that causes our experiences", which I will grant. But OTs aren't "like the external world", they are the external world.

I somewhat agree with the second half of the statement, depending on what's meant by "know" and PoR.

I don't think any reasoning process is necessary for successful conscious interaction with the external world (EW). If by "know" you mean logical certainty, then we've moved beyond the cogito.

But if you simply mean that OTs don't somehow become part of CE, then we're in agreement.

Now to the heart of the matter....

So it turns out that it is indeed implicit in the definition of subjective that there is no "objective component".

The troublemaker here is that nasty little word "component". So now, back to our differing models of mind referenced above, neither of which has been proved or disproved by what we've seen thus far.

Your model of "subjective things" excludes such a component. My model of "emergent phenomenon" does not.

A component is a thing that goes to make up something else. So if subjective experience is somehow composed of subjective things, and only subjective things, then there's no room for an objective component. But if subjective experience is an emergent phenomenon arising purely from the activity of objective things (namely, the physical matter and energy which is the brain) then the objective component is inextricable from the subjective experience, just as the water is inextricable from the wave, just as the dancer is inextricable from the dancing.

So you see, the subjective experience does not per se exclude any objective component. It only does so when you tack your assumptions onto it. There are workable models of subjective experience which do not have to exclude objective components.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

How does that follow? An argument stands or falls on its own merits. It doesn't matter whether or not the person articulating the argument happens to have a coherent metaphysical position up their sleeve, surely?

If it matters that much to you we can do it the other way. We'll pretend that I do have a position up my sleeve, instead of pretending that I don't, and then you can respond to the post you asked me to make.


So defend it, instead of hunting about for excuses not to.

Kevin,

I will not be able to get you to understand my position unless I first get you to work out what your own position is. Only by the process of finding out what is wrong with the way you currently think about will you be able to see what I am saying.

Geoff

 

[Jeremy]

If brain processes are to brains what computations are to computers, are minds to brain processes what programs are to computations?

 

[chriswl]

Chris, there is no difference between a computation and computer process. These terms are synonyms. Unless one of them is a purely abstract logical description of the process, in which case it's irrelevant - unless you think minds are purely abstract logical descriptions.

Brain processes are the firing of the neurons, computer processes are the switching of the logic gates. A computation would be, say, the execution of an algorithm find the first 1000 prime numbers. Quite a different sort of thing.

I'm not saying minds are abstract logical descriptions. Just that they are not the same sort of thing as brains even though in a sense, they are nothing more than brains, the same sense that a computation is nothing more than lots of logic gates switching but still manages to be a different type of thing.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Piggy

But you should do the same, then. These "subjective things", these alleged components that my experience "consists of" are an invention. If we stop positing them, it will be easier to move on to a coherent model of conscious experience.

How can one invent ones experiences?

It is an error to claim that being aware of the fact of one's own state of being aware is an awareness of an "objective thing" (more below regarding objective things). When you follow this up with the claim that "absolutely everything he ever experiences is completely subjective. EVERYTHING", then we have a clear contradiction.

We would have, if you didn’t happen to agree with the claim that “cogito ergo sum” is logically unassailable – but since you do there isn’t a problem.

Originally Posted by JustGeoff :

So what does "objective" mean? What we call objective are things we have arrived at via reasoning - like the content of scientific theories. They have been objectified via that process of reasoning.

Piggy replies:

Whoa, Hoss. I don't know what sort of "objective... things" "the content of scientific theories" might be. That string of words doesn't make sense to me.

But in any case, if you're saying here that a "process of reasoning" has in fact done something to something, namely "objectified" "the content of scientific theories", then we have a second phenomenon now in our box besides consciousness... the process of reasoning.

What is the relationship between the two? Is the process of reasoning (PoR) an activity of the conscious experience (CE)? Is the PoR something that the CE is merely aware of? How can these questions be answered?

The process of reasoning is something that happens in your subjective world. You experience the process. But what comes out the other end are ideas about a world independent of experience. Those things – those abstract ideas – like the wavelength of red light – those things are objective. But their referents remain forever beyond the veil of perception. We can’t reach them.

Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary: "dealing with things external to the mind"

Properly used, to my way of thinking, "objective things" are things that exist whether or not anyone perceives them or is aware of them.

Your definition contradicts websters. Websters, like me, define objective things to be things external to mind. That exactly co-incides my definition but contradicts yours. You want to claim that there is a class of objective things which exists whether or not anyone perceives them. That mixes up P1 and P2. You’ve already defined objective things as being mind-independent so you cannot then say it doesn’t matter whether or not they are being perceived. It does matter. If they are in your mind (being perceived) then they cannot also be mind-independent. I’ve lost count of the number of times I have explained this particular point during the course of this thread.

CAUTION: I am not claiming, at this point, that any objective things actually exist, nor that our conscious experience can in any way have direct access to them….

Yes you did : “Properly used, to my way of thinking, "objective things" are things that exist whether or not anyone perceives them or is aware of them.”

All I am saying is that, where I'm from, that's what the word refers to,

Then it refers to two things at the same time. Two things which are not the same. That’s what led to the contradiction above.

Ok, so now we have the claim of an "external world that causes our experiences", which I will grant. But OTs aren't "like the external world", they are the external world.

So not in minds?

Your model of "subjective things" excludes such a component. My model of "emergent phenomenon" does not.

Emergentism is a non-eliminative form of materialism. As I am happy to demonstrate to anybody who wishes to define their terms and try to defend it, non-eliminative materialism is logically incoherent.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Brain processes are the firing of the neurons, computer processes are the switching of the logic gates. A computation would be, say, the execution of an algorithm find the first 1000 prime numbers. Quite a different sort of thing.

No, they are exactly the same sort of thing. One is X and the other is a collection of X's. This is not the same as the relationship between brain processes and minds. You've now introduced a new false analogy.

You are trying to say:

Computer process is to computation what mind is to the process in a single neuron.

It's still wrong. Here's the logically coherent version:

Computer process is to computation what your whole brain state is to the process in a single neuron.

No mention of minds. You've mixed up a one-many relationship with a subjective-objective relationship.

I'm not saying minds are abstract logical descriptions.

No you are saying they are collections of neutral processes as opposed to single processes. It's not going to help you define what a mind is. All you've done is describe a collection of processes instead of a single process. But once more you seem to believe you have explained what a mind is. You haven't.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If brain processes are to brains what computations are to computers, are minds to brain processes what programs are to computations?

No. There is no computational equivalent of a mind, no matter how hard chris tries to find one.

We are left with:

Programs are to computations what XXX are to brain processes.

What is XXX? In this case XXX is whatever governs the course of our thought processes - just as the program governs the course of the computer process. This is partly the result of evolutionarily-defined brain structures and partly a set of learned ways of thinking. Our belief system is part of our program. Christians are running a different program to atheists.

It's an interesting analogy, because sometimes there are bugs in the brain's programs. This whole thread is an attempt by me to fix a common brain-bug which results in people believing physicalism is true. Unfortunately I cannot reprogram Chris's brain quite so easily as I can program a computer. Only Chris can actually fix the bug.

Geoff