The relationship between science and materialism

[UndercoverElephant]

It may indeed be the case that an 8-year-old could understand your argument. But that is because an 8-year-old would have a simplistic definition of minds/experience.

~~ Paul

And in this particular case, he'd be one step ahead of yourself, because the "simplistic" definition of "mind" is the only one that is logically coherent.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

OK, I'm getting nowhere in my attempts to pin down some basic definitions and there is simply too much activity for me to keep up with today. You guys carry on without me.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

All of it, Paul. All of your experiences are subjective and experiences are all you have. It's ALL subjective. "objective" is an abstraction.

So you're calling fear an entirely subjective experience, even though there are measurable objective aspects to it? Then absolutely everything is subjective. What does objective refer to?

I haven't assumed it, Paul. ALL of your experiences are subjective. Some of them contain experiences of objects - subjective experiences of objects. The reason there is a "crisp division" is that none of the things you want to call "objective" come to you directly. They are all abstractions. There is your crisp division. Now what is wrong with that?

But one of the definitions of objective is:

b : of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind *objective reality*

So aren't some aspects of fear objective?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

OK, let's examine this. I looked back at your uses of P1 and P2 earlier and you defined P1 as subjective experience of something. I'm not speaking of any subjective experience (we don't have a subject in a computer the way that you are using the word), so I'm not sure what you are saying.

We do have two different senses of computer. There is indeed a subjective experience of a computer - and I do not mean the subjective experiences being had by a computer. I am mean your subjective experiences of seeing a computer in front of you. That computer I am calling P1-computer. This differs from the external-to-mind "real world" computer that is the cause of your experience of seeing a computer. That computer I am calling a P2-computer.

I want you to explain your question again in terms of these two different uses of "computer" so I know which one you mean, remembering that the P2-computer is already an abstraction - something you never experience but can only describe - something which is already a description.

Are you trying to say that the description of an event and the actual performance of the event are one and the same thing? I always thought they were different -- one an action and the other a description.

No. I'm trying to establish the difference between P1-events and P2-events. The difference between a calculation and the description of a calculation is one level of abstraction. The difference between a process in a P1-computer and a process in a P2-computer is also one level of abstraction. So it's important I know which one you are talking about, otherwise we will lose track of how many levels of abstraction we are talking about.

My point is going to be this: The difference between phenomenal reality and the first level of abstraction is of critical importance. The difference between the first level of abstraction and the second level of abstraction is totally irrelevant. But which of these cases you are talking about is dependent on whether you mean P1 or P2 when you say "computer". It is therefore of critical importance which of these two you mean.

Geoff

 

[davidsmith73]

I have to leave for a bit, but have argued quite extensively in an Ian thread that the equating of thinking with "qualia" is assuming quite a bit.

That's alright, I don't get much time to visit this forum either which is a shame as I find these discussions very interesting. Perhaps a bit more clarification is needed on my part before we go further. I am not equating thinking with qualia. I recognise that thinking is a term that requires a physical definition. I was just assuming that hammegk was using the word in a more old fashioned sense and I used your reply to him as a starting point to express my own opinion on all of this. Suffice to say, I am making a distinction between the behaviour of thinking and phenomenal character.

If you are meaning "qualia" when you say "thought exists", I would argue you cannot possibly be 100% certain of that.

I don't mean to say that "qualia" refers to an independent "property" of reality that is separate from the ontological existence that the word refers to, in an analogous sense that "mass" refers to a property of the physical world. I mean to say that any phenomenal character is undeniable.

The abstraction of a quality from your experience learning about that quality is a fairly high-order thing to do.

Well, I hope you can go into this in as much detail as you gave hammegk or others, because I can't possibly see how this can be. Can you start by defining abstraction and quality in the context of that statement?

I am not proposing "quality" as a property of experience. It is experience.

It is not at all a base assumption like "thought exists", but must be the result of quite a bit of learning. You are going farther from "thought exists" all the time here.

You are essentially proposing a solution to the hard problem of consciousness here. If a phenomenal character is the result of learning then there must be a point where you can define your phenomenal character in terms of a specific process. Learning is, after all, defined in terms of physical relationships. I can see you making the same dualistic assumptions you have been accusing everyone else of making and then denying the existence of the thing you are supposed to be explaining.

Furthermore, would a definition of physical be possible without qualitative experiences? I think not

Consider the opposite scenario - would the existence of qualitative experiences be possible without a definition of the physical? I think so.

But "phenomenal character" is not at all unassumed basis of reality. You are already loading it up with baggage from your history of language use.

What assumption is being made when redness exists?

what language baggage?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

So it turns out that it is indeed implicit in the definition of subjective that there is no "objective component". The one and only "objective component" of our subjective experiences is the bald fact that there are subjective experiences. But this fact boils down this : something exists. That fact would be the one and only entry on Paul's list of "things which are both sujective and objective."

Now I'm thoroughly confused. If all we have is subjective experience, then why do we need the noumenal and the physical? There is no reason to postulate the noumenal at all. Just have my subjective physical experience be all there is.

~~ Paul

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Wrong. It matters if the things you are conflating are real things and abstractions of things. And that is what this is. So your example of apples and oranges isn't relevant to the discussion.

No it doesn't. To a physicalist an "abstraction of a thing" too is, fundamentally, just a particular kind of pattern of molecules inside someone's head. Since for this purpose the physicalist gets to define things as they see fit, as long as the definitions are not internally contradictory, that is an end to the matter.

And this leads to a logical problem.

No it doesn't. It might lead to a terminological problem if you try to stick labels on brains and the things they do, especially if the labels don't quite fit because they are implicitly based on Cartesian dualism.

A physicalist would claim that "subjective experience" is a term that points only to certain kinds of purely physical events in purely physical brains, and say that you can stick any damned label you like on any aspect of those physical structures and events, but it won't change the nature of the object you are labelling.

Nor does it matter one whit if you select a set of labels beforehand and can't find a satisfactory way of making them sit on the brain. All it would mean if that happened was that you chose a poor set of labels for the job.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So you're calling fear an entirely subjective experience....

Absolutely. In fact fear is one of the best examples of an entirely subjective experience. Nothing about your fear is objective. There may be some physical correlate of fear which can be said to be objective, but you never experience that correlate. It's just words in a theory.

, even though there are measurable objective aspects to it? Then absolutely everything is subjective. What does objective refer to?

Abstractions. Things you never experience but use your powers of reasoning (and empathy) to conclude exist. You believe there is a mind-independent world. This is perfectly reasonable, but it doesn't mean that mind-independent world ever appears in your experiences.

But one of the definitions of objective is:

b : of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers

: having reality independent of the mind *objective reality*

Those two definitions conflict. They are different uses of the word "objective". The second usage is the same as mine. The first one means something slightly different - it means to do with objects of experiences. I already said that there are subjective experience of objects. That's not the same as "an objective experience". See the difference?

That first usage of object co-incides with MY use of "physical". Even the brain in the vat experiences objects like these - but they aren't real objects.

So aren't some aspects of fear objective?

No. Fear is totally subjective. You could concievably say you have some "objective reason" to be fearful (maybe you are going to be shot at dawn), but that's as close as you'll get.

Geoff

 

[chriswl]

You've got that backwards. P2 isn't the object of our experience. P1 is the object of our experience.

OK, now I see what you are doing. You are creating an extra level - there are three things: the conscious subject, the things that it is conscious of and the things-in-themselves. But of course physicalists don't believe there are unknowable things-in-themselves out there. We just don't accept your premises.

Yep, and it's incoherent. If you don't believe me, give me some definitions and I'll construct a proof that they're illogical. I've already done this once with you, when you tried to explain computationalism to me.

You proved it. Yeah, right .

They are making precisely the error you are making. They think the relationship between brains and minds is like the relationship between computers and calculations.

Just declaring it over and over again to be an error doesn't make it so. Do you think you have actually convinced anyone on here that you are right on this? Do you care? Your arguments, as I remember it, are:

1) The P1/P2 thing which is completely rigged from the start.

2) Some laughable stuff about "necessary beings", that you seem to have abandoned.

3) Your belief that subjective experience is just not the kind of thing that could "emerge" from or "supervene" on the physical world. I've yet to see a justfication for this, just lots of bold assertions that indicate you strongly believe it and think anyone who doesn't must be crazy.

Besides, you have defined "subjective experience" as "the sum total of your mind, your entire mental life. Everything that you have ever experienced." Which is, of course, completely circular. Now define experience....

Even if you were right we are just back at dualism, which can't be right either, idealism which has the same problems as physicalism or your system which sweeps all the problems up into an unknowable noumenon.

As I said, you're not convincing anybody and that's why this issue won't go away.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Kevin

You accused me of not having a coherent position. Now is your chance to prove that wasn't just hot air and that you can actually defend your own position.

What is that position?

Are you an eliminitavist?

Or do you think you can provide a logical defence of non-eliminative materialism which I cannot refute in ten minutes?

Put up or shut up.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You proved it. Yeah, right .

Rolly-eyes don't substitute for an argument, Chris.

Just declaring it over and over again to be an error doesn't make it so. Do you think you have actually convinced anyone on here that you are right on this? Do you care?

You haven't shown me what's wrong with my position.

Your arguments, as I remember it, are:

1) The P1/P2 thing which is completely rigged from the start.

2) Some laughable stuff about "necessary beings", that you seem to have abandoned.

3) Your belief that subjective experience is just not the kind of thing that could "emerge" from or "supervene" on the physical world. I've yet to see a justfication for this, just lots of bold assertions that indicate you strongly believe it and think anyone who doesn't must be crazy.

No argument in that quote. Just rhetoric.

Besides, you have defined "subjective experience" as "the sum total of your mind, your entire mental life. Everything that you have ever experienced." Which is, of course, completely circular. Now define experience....

More rhetoric.

Even if you were right we are just back at dualism, which can't be right either, idealism which has the same problems as physicalism or your system which sweeps all the problems up into an unknowable noumenon.

As I said, you're not convincing anybody and that's why this issue won't go away.

And more rhetoric.

Want to try answering the MCQ?

Computer is to computation what brain is to....

A) brain process
B) minds/experiences
C) I'm confused
D) I'd better go back and check my definitions

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Now I'm thoroughly confused. If all we have is subjective experience, then why do we need the noumenal and the physical?

Because the alternative would be solipsism. We have to postulate the existence of something external to our experiences or we turn into a solipsist and live in a world where everybody else is a p-zombie - nothing but part of our own experiences. This conclusion is intolerable. Therefore we reason that there is an external world and other people having subjective experiences.

There is no reason to postulate the noumenal at all. Just have my subjective physical experience be all there is.

~~ Paul

That leaves everybody else without minds.

Geoff

 

[davidsmith73]

David

Since you will have missed the link to this earlier, here is why I think phenomenalism won't work either:

http://www.phil.gu.se/posters/prop.html

Geoff

BTW, my metaphysics professor is coincidentally called David Smith.

I've had a read through the paper, thanks for that.

I can't see where the author shows how phenomalism must be a false monism.

I can see how it is opposed to materialism in the dualistic divide. But that doesn't mean that phenomenalism is inadequate does it?

I have a particular problem with this part on phenomenal experience as a contrast term:

"The emphasis on non-reducibility (or "phenomenal character" or "qualia") indicates that we have to do with a modern contrast-element. However, the contrast-element in modern discussions is harder to detect than in Descartes’ case."

So a definition of qualia has to settle with "non-reducible" thus refering or contrasting with that which is reducible thus creating the dualistic divide.

Could this contrast term be a necessary consequence of attempting to define a phenomenal reality which is not definable?

For example, we have to settle for a description of redness as being "non-reducable". But we don't have to define redness for it to exist.

Its only when we try to use relational definitions for phenomenal existence that the dualism between reducable and non-reducable arises. I think.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Kevin

You accused me of not having a coherent position. Now is your chance to prove that wasn't just hot air and that you can actually defend your own position.

What is that position?

Are you an eliminitavist?

Or do you think you can provide a logical defence of non-eliminative materialism which I cannot refute in ten minutes?

Put up or shut up.

As an alternative proposal, why don't you address my post instead? You asked me to respond to post #836, and I did. So now you snip it all and demand that we start an entirely new conversation where I set up an alternative position for you to try to knock down.

I'm tired of you changing the subject entirely every time you come under pressure. Let's just stick with this one until it's resolved one way or the other, okay?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

As an alternative proposal, why don't you address my post instead?

I'm tired of you changing the subject entirely every time you come under pressure. Let's just stick with this one until it's resolved one way or the other, okay?

All BARK, Kevin Lowe, no bite.

You do not know what your own position is and you haven't got the guts to specify one because you're not sure you can defend it.

Pick up the gun, Kevin. Let's have those definitions.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Because the alternative would be solipsism. We have to postulate the existence of something external to our experiences or we turn into a solipsist and live in a world where everybody else is a p-zombie - nothing but part of our own experiences. This conclusion is intolerable. Therefore we reason that there is an external world and other people having subjective experiences.

Why do we need the noumenal? Why not just say there are a bunch of subjective physical experiences floating about? I guess that would be idealism, right?

~~ Paul

 

[davidsmith73]

Because the alternative would be solipsism. We have to postulate the existence of something external to our experiences or we turn into a solipsist and live in a world where everybody else is a p-zombie - nothing but part of our own experiences.

I'd like to suggest a certain take on solipsism (probably not very well). Solipsism is a funny one. "There's nothing but our own experiences" mmmmm.

Solipsism may be defendable with the addition of two illusions - self and time.

Could it be conceivable that any particular illusiary "self" is simply a certain cohort of experiences that manifest in the illusiary "now"?

In this sense, there may be no need to postulate anything "external to our experiences"

Think about it. There's no need to postulate that "our own" experiences of "tomorrow" are "external to our experiences"

Hope some of that made sense

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

All BARK, Kevin Lowe, no bite.

You do not know what your own position is and you haven't got the guts to specify one because you're not sure you can defend it.

I'll take a leaf out of Paul's book here and just go with it.

Okay, I don't know what my position is. I've never even thought about the matter. Now what?

How does this get your position off the hook?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Absolutely. In fact fear is one of the best examples of an entirely subjective experience. Nothing about your fear is objective. There may be some physical correlate of fear which can be said to be objective, but you never experience that correlate. It's just words in a theory.

Ah, I think this helps me understand. When I am fearful, my heart races. I have a private internal experience of my heart racing. Someone else measures my heartbeat and sees that it is racing; I presume you'll call this objective. You insist on a clean separation between these two aspects of my fear. You will not allow me to say that fear is both subjective and objective, but what you actually mean is that my private experience of fear is subjective and the physiological correlates are objective and that there is no overlap between those two aspects of fear. In fact, you seem to be saying that even if we had a complete understanding of what gives rise to my internal experience of my heart racing, there would still be something unexplained.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

David

I can't see where the author shows how phenomalism must be a false monism.

He doesn't prove it, no. It's like eliminative materialism. I don't think you can prove it's logically incoherent, but there's something wrong with it anyway.

I can see how it is opposed to materialism in the dualistic divide. But that doesn't mean that phenomenalism is inadequate does it?

Not neccesarily, but it does mean it is a reaction to physicalism. Sometimes when a position is a reaction to another position it can swing too far in the opposite direction.

I have a particular problem with this part on phenomenal experience as a contrast term:

"The emphasis on non-reducibility (or "phenomenal character" or "qualia") indicates that we have to do with a modern contrast-element. However, the contrast-element in modern discussions is harder to detect than in Descartes’ case."

So a definition of qualia has to settle with "non-reducible" thus refering or contrasting with that which is reducible thus creating the dualistic divide.

Yes. Qualia is defined as oppositional to physical - it has to be non-reducable. The problem is that the invention of the word "qualia" is a reaction to a physicalist mistake. But that just makes "qualia" an attempt to fix a screwed-up foundation by plastering something on top of it. It doesn't fiex the problem. Instead it just makes fixing the problem even harder.

Could this contrast term be a necessary consequence of attempting to define a phenomenal reality which is not definable?

I think it is the consequence of defining physical to mean two different things, one of which isn't appropriate.

I may have misunderstood some of your comments.

Geoff