The relationship between science and materialism

[UndercoverElephant]

Each "description" must leave out certain information about X. It is impossible for you or any known thing thing to describe every single property of X, thus the description is not X, but only a partial representation of X.

Don't eat the menu.

OK, point accepted. They are almost synonymous but not quite. We are drifting off course here though. I'll wait for Wasps response.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

When you refer to computer, are you refering to the phenomenal computer - the one you actually percieve - "the P1-computer" - or are you refering to real-world external computer - "the P2-computer"?

Oh, OK, I see what you mean.

I am referring to an actual computer. Actual computers actually do stuff.

 

[davidsmith73]

The extent to which that assumption is warranted is also the extent to which you understand my argument.
You did not understand my use of the word "illusion".

I wasn't aware I was addressing any use of "illusion" in my post. I thought you were questioning hammegk's statement that he is 100% sure thought exists and stating that an assumption must be made here. Is that correct? For arguments sake, I am regarding "thought" as "qualia".

Your "experience of redness" may well be a purely material process. If (and here is where we start getting into what the assumptions of "thought" include) you think that you see, instead of a red ball, the image of a red ball, or the redness of the ball, then you are mistaking an illusion for an actual phenomenal experience. When we say "thought exists", and from that conclude that this "existence" has some sort of implications for a possible "mental realm", we have built a castle out of air.

Just to clarify, I do not think I see the redness of the ball, but just simply "redness". It doesn't really need any particular label since it is quality. The phenomenal character of this (or any) experience is impervious to doubt. That is what I think hammegk meant. I can't see how this can be denied except by averting your eyes!

I agree that it is an assumption. But if you make this assumption, you can get to an illusion of "mental". Given that, "mental" cannot be assumed, since it depends on the assumption of material.

You must be using the term "mental" differently than I. How about we use the term "phenomenal character" instead? Does that change the focus of your reply? For I can't see how you can "get to" phenomenal character from assuming the existence of objective reality. It seems much more plausible the other way round. Phenomenal character is the unassumed basis of reality and from that point you get to the illusion of the physical (Blackmore's use of the term).

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Yes. In this case the P1/P2 confusion about physical doesn't matter. The reason it doesn't matter is because there is no subjective/objective dichotomy in between "weather" and "molecular interaction".
...
Because all instances of "weather" are on the same side of the subjective/objective divide. You aren't trying to sneak in a "subjective is objective" clause. There's no subjectivity to be had. Unless you want to start talking about "lightning", in which case we will have to make a distinction between the experience of seeing lightning and lightning-as-it-is-in-itself - at which point our problems will start all over again.

I don't think this addresses my question. Why do you assume that we cannot understand subjective experience in terms of brain function?

Right now what is preventing it is that you either can't or won't acknowledged that your definitions are all wonky. You've got to stop blaming me for "begging the question" and "rigging the definition" when it is Paul C. Anagnostopoulos who keeps doing those things. Until you can see why it is you and not me who is guilty of this, we are going to go round in circles. Please go back to post 836. All the answers are there. I need you to give me a much more detailed response to that post.

Okay.

You have one word ("physical") which has two referents (physical-1 and physical-2), and there is much potential for confusion if you subsequently conflate them without noticing you've done it. Therefore you need a new term for one (or both) of these referents to avoid the risk of serious confusion.

I agree there is potential for confusion.

You also have another word/term ("subjective experiences") which has no referent at all, even though you really want it to have one.

Correct, there is no thing that subjective experience refers to. It is a collective term.

So I am hoping you can see what has gone wrong here. The fact that "subjective experiences" has no referent is a symptom of the double definition of "physical". It is a symptom of the mistake of confusing P1 and P2 by calling both of them physical. Why did you want to call them both physical? It wasn't because that was a sensible term to use - it was because you were trying to defend physicalism by assuming it was true ("begging the question") in the the following way:

If physicalism is true then everything must be physical so P1 is physical and P2 is also physical, even though they are different. They are just "different sorts of physical".

Why is there a problem if subjective experience has no thing as its referent? Well, apparently there isn't a problem as long as I submit to the label "eliminative materialist." So I will.

I'm sorry Geoff, but I still don't see any problem but a linguistic one.

~~ Paul

 

[Piggy]

We are drifting off course here though.

Whaddya mean "here"?

Kurtz: Are my methods unsound?
Willard: I don't see any... method, at all, sir.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Can you tell me what is non-synonymous about these things? Do you think that every time you describe the description you are adding any new information to the description?

No, but I'm adding the fact that I've "redescribed" the description. A description of a description is not synonymous with a description. It is, however, functionally equivalent.

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

No. I've no idea what "private behaviour" is supposed to mean.

I thought you said you understood my view.

I didn't define "private behaviour" at all.

Behavior is what organisms do. Note, it does not matter whether you define organisms as material, ideal, or noumenal in "reality", what they do is termed "behavior". Some of this behavior is publicly observable--that is, any number of people could, if they were in the right place, observe it. Some of this behavior is private--it cannot be observed by an outside observer, but it is nonetheless something that the organism does; it is behavior. Walking is something public; it is accomplished mainly by the legs, but also of course by the rest of the body, including the brain. Thinking is something private; it is accomplished mainly by the brain, but also of course the rest of the body, from the adrenal glands to the sensory organs which provide the material for thinking. Both walking and thinking are things that an organism does. They are natural events, not necessarily "material" or "ideal" events; we do not need to specify a monism in order to say that organisms do things.

Err. You can have "private experience", or a "private realm" or a "mental realm". All of this would be the same as "mind", yes. There's nothing to distinguish private from subjective in this sense. But I'm not going to let the word "behaviour" sneak under my radar unnoticed.

It is not a terribly difficult concept. But thank you; you cannot distinguish "private" from "mental". The former does not require even the appearance of dualism (again I must note, it also does not specify a monism; the question is wholly irrelevant); the second contains dualism in its very language.

Please elaborate. I don't see what you mean.

Geoff

You have been defining "subjective" as "mental", with all the baggage both words carry. Indeed, you are more than reluctant to change the dictionary definition, as if there were something magic about being in a dictionary that makes something real. (Remember, at the time the dualistic view of "mental" was being defined, our view of "element" was limited to earth, air, fire, and water. That definition changed; why not "mind"?) My example of "private behavior" simply points out that your choice of "subjective", "mental", etc., is not the only way to look at the phenomenon at hand, and that by choosing those words you are necessarily limiting what you could conclude. It is as if you defined flight as requiring feathers, just because a centuries-old dictionary said so. If you do, you will reach particular conclusions, by ignoring insects and bats, and say that only birds and Dumbo (when he has the magic feather) can fly.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I simply disagree. There is nothing about the definition of subjective experience that implies that there is no objective component at all. If there was, the definition would be wrong.

Chr*st!

Are you trying to say that the definition would be wrong because you can't then use it to defend physicalism?

Are you then going to claim that you aren't "begging the question?"

WHY does there have to be something objective about subjective experiences?

WHY, Paul?

Because you are begging the bleeding question, Paul, that is why.

Why you cannot see this is beyond me.

Now, if you'd like to take subjective experience and divide it into the "purely subjective experiences" and the "sorta subjective experiences," be my guest. I'd like to see the two lists, though.

There's only one list. All subjective experiences are subjective, Paul. When is the penny going to drop? There's no difference between "purely subjective experiences" and "sorta subjective experiences." NONE. Why do you think there is? Could it be something to do with your compulsive unacknowledged question begging?

If you divide subjective and objective experience into two disjoint sets, you are assuming a clear dualistic difference. Can we see the two lists?

All experiences are subjective, Paul. We cannot see two lists. You try to give me two lists. You'll find there's only one. That'll be because all experiences are subjective.

Many of my subjective experiences have no remnants whatsoever in my mind.

You mean past experiences. They've gone now. They are irrelevant. They were subjective when they were present.

Are you sure you don't mean "everything you remember you have experienced"?

No.

Yeah, I'm sure. Would you care to define "the sum total of your mind"?

Everything you experience.

I was never saying they are linguistic synonyms, was I?

Are you going to try to invent something which is a non-linguistic synonym?

I don't know what it means to be a dualist if insisting that subjective experience is by definition different from brain function isn't it.

That's because you still haven't understood post #836.

Geoff.

 

[Mercutio]

I wasn't aware I was addressing any use of "illusion" in my post. I thought you were questioning hammegk's statement that he is 100% sure thought exists and stating that an assumption must be made here. Is that correct? For arguments sake, I am regarding "thought" as "qualia".

I have to leave for a bit, but have argued quite extensively in an Ian thread that the equating of thinking with "qualia" is assuming quite a bit. If you are meaning "qualia" when you say "thought exists", I would argue you cannot possibly be 100% certain of that.

Just to clarify, I do not think I see the redness of the ball, but just simply "redness". It doesn't really need any particular label since it is quality. The phenomenal character of this (or any) experience is impervious to doubt. That is what I think hammegk meant. I can't see how this can be denied except by averting your eyes!

The abstraction of a quality from your experience learning about that quality is a fairly high-order thing to do. It is not at all a base assumption like "thought exists", but must be the result of quite a bit of learning. You are going farther from "thought exists" all the time here.

You must be using the term "mental" differently than I. How about we use the term "phenomenal character" instead? Does that change the focus of your reply? For I can't see how you can "get to" phenomenal character from assuming the existence of objective reality. It seems much more plausible the other way round. Phenomenal character is the unassumed basis of reality and from that point you get to the illusion of the physical (Blackmore's use of the term).

But "phenomenal character" is not at all unassumed basis of reality. You are already loading it up with baggage from your history of language use.

I will return later; I apologize for not being able to stay now and get into this in more depth.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Computer is to computation what brain is to....

A) brain process
B) minds/experiences
C) I'm confused
D) I'd better go back and check my definitions

I can't answer this question until you define "minds/experiences." Let's check out the possible definitions:

the sum total of your mind: too vague to understand

your entire mental life: sounds a lot like brain processes

everything you have ever experienced: this either refers to the things I have experienced, in which case it has nothing to do with mind, or it refers to my memories, in which case it's not clear whether we would call this a brain process.

So you need to clarify the definition of minds/experiences, and/or add another answer:

E) Either A or B

~~ Paul

 

[Piggy]

I simply disagree. There is nothing about the definition of subjective experience that implies that there is no objective component at all. If there was, the definition would be wrong.

Chr*st!

Are you trying to say that the definition would be wrong because you can't then use it to defend physicalism?

Are you then going to claim that you aren't "begging the question?"

WHY does there have to be something objective about subjective experiences?

WHY, Paul?

Because you are begging the bleeding question, Paul, that is why.

Why you cannot see this is beyond me.

JustGoeff, you are reading more into Paul's statement than is there, at least from what I can see.

All he has said here is that a total absence of any objective component is not implicit in the definition. In other words, the definition does not require it, which is not the same as claiming that it disallows it.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Kevin,

If you think you understand this discussion, please respond to post #836.

Okay.

Previously I pointed out where you had pulled a fast one in your "proof" that physicalism could not possibly be true. In post #836 you appear to be trying to salvage your "proof" by backtracking and creating some purely terminological confusion about the P1 and P2 we established earlier.

One of your two claims is that physicalists want to use "physical" to refer to two different things. Well done, Sherlock. If you're a physicalist, physical refers to an astronomically large number of differentiable things. That is not a problem, nor is it a problem if someone conflates brains, apples and oranges as all being physical if they are a physicalist.

Your other claim is that "subjective experience" is undefined (or undefinable) in physicalism, which is just false. You can define it as the physical processes that are going on when a being has experiences.

You might try to claim at this point that I am being circular, but nothing of the sort is going on. To pop your "proof" all we need are consistent ways of interpreting P1 and P2 in physicalist terms, to falsify the claim that there are no such consistent ways of interpreting them. We don't even need to show that these interpretations might be true, since all we are doing at the moment is showing that they are not internally contradictory.

None of this matters at all outside the context of refuting your proof, of course. This is just mental exercise. You can fiddle with the labels all day and it does not make any difference to the underlying reality, if any.

This terminological obfuscation is indeed a symptom of a problem. The problem is that you are trying to defend an indefensible position, neutral monism. To be a neutral monist you first have to believe that there is reason to be an immaterialist or dualist (ideas long since put in the trash can), and then take a further leap into the land of nonsense by postulating an unnecessary entity you have no evidence for as the "underlying reality" which "explains" both material and immaterial phenomena.

This being a skeptical forum, every time you try to make your leap into the land of nonsense somebody grabs your shirt tails and says "Hang on there son, where is this evidence for immaterial stuff?". Your only response is to just keep asserting that any explanation of mental experiences which doesn't covertly assume an immaterial component to them is "begging the question", which is nonsense. Nobody is assuming a priori that there is no immaterial component to consciousness, we just want to see some evidence before we give the idea the time of day.

Fiddling furiously with the labels we put on our mental experiences, or on physical objects, is simply never going to give rise to such evidence. They are just labels.

If I were you I would retreat back into mysticism at this point, and just declare that your arguments make perfect sense to illuminated adepts who have communed sufficiently with Husserl. At least that claim is unfalsifiable, unlike your other ones.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Chr*st!

Are you trying to say that the definition would be wrong because you can't then use it to defend physicalism?

No. I'm saying that there isn't a crisp division between subjective and objective. If there is, you can enumerate exactly which part of our life is subjective. For example, is fear subjective?

Are you then going to claim that you aren't "begging the question?"

No, I'm going to claim that you are begging the question by assuming a crisp division.

WHY does there have to be something objective about subjective experiences?

WHY, Paul?

There doesn't have to be something objective, but I'm certainly not going to accept the idea without some evidence in the form of two lists, or a statement of how we tell the difference, or something like that. Otherwise it is simply defined this way. Right? I mean, without some evidence for a definition, it's just a definition.

There's only one list. All subjective experiences are subjective, Paul. When is the penny going to drop? There's no difference between "purely subjective experiences" and "sorta subjective experiences." NONE. Why do you think there is? Could it be something to do with your compulsive unacknowledged question begging?

I suppose it could be, but what I'm seeing is capitals, bold, smilies, and rude words. I don't seem to see any evidence. I don't even see a coherent definition of subjective experience that might make me say "Aha!"

Are you going to try to invent something which is a non-linguistic synonym?

Well, I was foolishly assuming that people understood that "subjective experience is a synonym for brain processes" did not mean a linguistic synonym, but I shall no longer make that mistake.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

Geoff's question:

Computer is to computation what brain is to....

A) brain process
B) minds/experiences
C) I'm confused
D) I'd better go back and check my definitions

Paul's answer :

So you need to clarify the definition of minds/experiences, and/or add another answer:

E) Either A or B

Good. So you can presumably see that there is a problem here. You want to answer (A and B). But as we all know, A and B are not even remotely synonymous so you can't give that answer. The reason you cannot answer this question is right at the root of your logical problems.

There is your problem in a nutshell. The multiple choice question is actually so easy that a moderately intelligent 8-year-old would get the answer right.

But there is no point in ME providing a definition of mind/experience because my definition will lead to the CORRECT answer : A.

Computer is to computation what brain is to....brain process.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

No. I'm saying that there isn't a crisp division between subjective and objective. If there is, you can enumerate exactly which part of our life is subjective. For example, is fear subjective?

All of it, Paul. All of your experiences are subjective and experiences are all you have. It's ALL subjective. "objective" is an abstraction.

No, I'm going to claim that you are begging the question by assuming a crisp division.

I haven't assumed it, Paul. ALL of your experiences are subjective. Some of them contain experiences of objects - subjective experiences of objects. The reason there is a "crisp division" is that none of the things you want to call "objective" come to you directly. They are all abstractions. There is your crisp division. Now what is wrong with that?

There doesn't have to be something objective, but I'm certainly not going to accept the idea without some evidence in the form of two lists, or a statement of how we tell the difference, or something like that. Otherwise it is simply defined this way. Right? I mean, without some evidence for a definition, it's just a definition.

One of the lists would have nothing on it, Paul. All of your experiences are subjective. All the things on the "objective" list are P2 things. Things you've never experienced. All of the things you've actually experienced were experienced subjectively. Everything. From the sound of the first beat of your mothers heart to the sound of the bullet which ends your life. ALL subjective. Every moment.

Well, I was foolishly assuming that people understood that "subjective experience is a synonym for brain processes" did not mean a linguistic synonym, but I shall no longer make that mistake.

There is no such thing as a non-linguistic synonym.

Geoff

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Computer is to computation as car is to:

A) Engine running
B) Broom-broom noises
C) I'm confused
D) Oh my god, if it's not A, B or C then my definition of "car" is flawed and it is a philosophical crisis!

I want to answer both A, and B, but they are not synonymous! How can this terrible dilemma be?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Hello Kevin,

One of your two claims is that physicalists want to use "physical" to refer to two different things. Well done, Sherlock. If you're a physicalist, physical refers to an astronomically large number of differentiable things. That is not a problem, nor is it a problem if someone conflates brains, apples and oranges as all being physical if they are a physicalist.

Wrong. It matters if the things you are conflating are real things and abstractions of things. And that is what this is. So your example of apples and oranges isn't relevant to the discussion.

Your other claim is that "subjective experience" is undefined (or undefinable) in physicalism, which is just false. You can define it as the physical processes that are going on when a being has experiences.

And this leads to a logical problem.

Define:

Subjective
Objective
Mental
Physical

....and I will prove your definitions are illogical. Go on Kevin. Make my day. Pick up the gun.

You might try to claim at this point that I am being circular, but nothing of the sort is going on. To pop your "proof" all we need are consistent ways of interpreting P1 and P2 in physicalist terms, to falsify the claim that there are no such consistent ways of interpreting them. We don't even need to show that these interpretations might be true, since all we are doing at the moment is showing that they are not internally contradictory.

Provide the definitions then. Show us you can do what Paul can't do.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Computer is to computation as car is to:

A) Engine running
B) Broom-broom noises
C) I'm confused
D) Oh my god, if it's not A, B or C then my definition of "car" is flawed and it is a philosophical crisis!

I want to answer both A, and B, but they are not synonymous! How can this terrible dilemma be?

If you want to answer A and B to that question then I think you'd fail the IQ test, Kevin.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Good. So you can presumably see that there is a problem here. You want to answer (A and B). But as we all know, A and B are not even remotely synonymous so you can't give that answer. The reason you cannot answer this question is right at the root of your logical problems.

Well, if you leave out the part where I said the definition of minds/experiences is either confused, synonymous, or irrelevant, then sure.

There is your problem in a nutshell. The multiple choice question is actually so easy that a moderately intelligent 8-year-old would get the answer right.

It may indeed be the case that an 8-year-old could understand your argument. But that is because an 8-year-old would have a simplistic definition of minds/experience.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Piggy

Paul wrote:

There is nothing about the definition of subjective experience that implies that there is no objective component at all. If there was, the definition would be wrong.

Geoff replied:

WHY does there have to be something objective about subjective experiences? Because you are the question.....

Piggy posted:

JustGoeff, you are reading more into Paul's statement than is there, at least from what I can see. All he has said here is that a total absence of any objective component is not implicit in the definition. In other words, the definition does not require it, which is not the same as claiming that it disallows it.

A total abscence of any objective component is indeed implicit in the definition of subjective. It doesn't have to be explicit. There is a very simple reason for this. The subjective things are what your entire experience of reality consists of. Whenever you are aware or conscious then there are subjective experiences taking place. Hammegk explains this very clearly when he says "there is only one objective thing I am aware of : I am conscious". In other words, absolutely everything he ever experiences is completely subjective. EVERYTHING. There is one fact only about which he can be objectively certain : he is experiencing something, there are experiences. So what does "objective" mean? What we call objective are things we have arrived at via reasoning - like the content of scientific theories. They have been objectified via that process of reasoning. But none of them are ever a direct part of our subjective experiences - they are nothing but abstractions. They are like the external world that causes our experiences - we cannot know they exist apart from through a process of reasoning.

So it turns out that it is indeed implicit in the definition of subjective that there is no "objective component". The one and only "objective component" of our subjective experiences is the bald fact that there are subjective experiences. But this fact boils down this : something exists. That fact would be the one and only entry on Paul's list of "things which are both sujective and objective."

Do you see?

Geoff