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The relationship between science and materialism

Here is your chance to explain to me why subjective experience can't be synonymous with a set of brain processes. Please include a clear definition of subjective experience in the explanation.

~~ Paul

What's my definition of "subjective experience" going to be?

Previously when we have had this debate, you would have placed a further condition on my "clear definition of subjective experience". You would have insisted that my definition did not exclude the possibility that subjective experiences were just brain processes. You claimed that this was justified, because otherwise I would be "begging the question". I can provide you with a clear definition of subjective experience, but I cannot satisfy your further condition. What you are asking me to do is to commit the logical error of physicalism for you! You want me to define subjective experience, but you have limited my scope for defining it to being "something which is reducable to the physical". So it isn't me who is begging the question at this point - it is you - and very obviously, which is why I got annoyed at the continual accusation it was me who was doing it.

So I have to ask you : are you going to allow me to define "subjective experience" in such a way that it is not guaranteed to be reducable to something physical?

If I can define it how I like, I have no problem. But if I have to satisfy your extra condition, the one that avoids you accusing me of "begging the question", then I simply cannot define it all - it's undefinable.

Geoff
 
Geoff said:
So I have to ask you : are you going to allow me to define "subjective experience" in such a way that it is not guaranteed to be reducable to something physical?
I didn't ask that it be guaranteed reducible to the physical, did I? I asked that it not be guaranteed irreducible. But anyway, define it however you like.

Why can't subjective experience be synonymous with a set of brain processes?

~~ Paul
 
Paul said:
Why can't subjective experience be synonymous with a set of brain processes?
You can have 100% faith it is (and as an eliminative materialist logically defend your position). What you can't have is 100% certainty.
 
Hammegk said:
You can have 100% faith it is (and as an eliminative materialist logically defend your position). What you can't have is 100% certainty.
Not if I'm to trust this:
.... the denial of irreducible qualia is one of the greatest absurdities imaginable... Titus Rivas

~~ Paul
 
It makes no difference who or what you trust. But here I am 100% certain thought exists.
 
It makes no difference who or what you trust. But here I am 100% certain thought exists.
See, here is where I have a problem. I understand your view, I am fairly certain, and yet I would say you can no more be 100% certain than can the eliminative materialist. Just as the EM must take the axiomatic assumption on faith, so must you. Why? Well, because the exception to the 100% certainty of the EM is (more or less) your view. But the exception to your view would be the EM. If (note, assumption) the EM is right, then you can still 100% convinced that thought exists...but be fooled by an illusion (following Blackmore, "illusion" does not mean something that is not there, but something that is not what it appears at first glance).

If you assume OI, you can fool people into thinking materialism is true. If you assume EM, you can fool people into thinking idealism is true. Both are based on assumptions, of course, but your 100% certainty is every bit as much a 100% faith as the materialist's.

Both positions suffer from the handicap that their monisms are labeled by terms popularly associated with dualism, and the confusion that results from that. Thus we see all sorts of "but why can't X view account for Y?", a question assuming dualism, applied to each monism. Blech.
 
The most well-known defence of neutral monism is called "What is the Soul?" by Bertrand Russell.
JustGeoff, if this three-quarter century old "classical argument for neutral monism" is the best example you can trot out for your position, then you're my best supporter and your own worst enemy.

Let's take a look at what Mr. Bertrand Russell has to say in his essay "What Is the Soul?"....

Mr. Russell opens with an appeal to nostalgia in his first paragraph:
Bertrand Russell said:
When I was young we all knew, or thought we knew, tha a man consists of a soul and a body....

He then launches his argument with this falsehood in his second paragraph:
Bertrand Russell said:
Nowadays these fine old simplicities are lost: physicists assure us that there is no such thing as matter, and psychologists assure us that there is no such thing as mind.... Who ever heard of a cobbler saying that there was no such thing as boots, or a tailor maintaining that all men are really naked? Yet that would have been no odder than what physicists and certain psychologists have been doing....

Mr. Russell is either misinformed or lying. No reputable physicist denies the existence of matter, and none did in 1929, either. No reputable psychologist denies the phenomenon of mind, and none did in 1929, either, although many certainly disagreed with Mr. Russel regarding its fundamental constituents.

One may justifiably stop reading right there. But let's not.

Mr. Russell continues:
Bertrand Russell said:
What we can say, on the basis of physics itself, is that what we have hitherto called our body is really an elaborate scientific construction not corresponding to any physical reality.

Claptrap. No reputable physicist was making this argument. Mr. Russell is engaging the age-old rhetorical device of factum ex anus.

From this point, Russell leaps into a fantasy of his own making, disconnected from any reference to reality, however tangential:
Bertrand Russell said:
The modern would-be materialist thus finds himself in a curious position, for... he cannot explain away the fact that the body itself is merely a convenient concept invented by the mind. We find ourselves thus going round and round in a circle: mind is an emanation of the body, and body is an invention of the mind. Evidently this cannot be quite right, and we have to look for something that is neither mind nor body, out of which both can spring.

Evidently, this indeed cannot be quite right. But the solution is not what Mr. Russell proposes. The solution is to recognize that his assertion that "the body itself is merely a convenient concept invented by the mind" is a load of unsupported and unsupportable humbuggery which, if not believed on faith, ceases to create the alleged problem Mr. Russell conjures up from thin air.

We now know that our author (1) has no clear understanding of science, and (2) indulges in incoherent leaps of illogic. But let's indulge him one step further nonetheless. After providing a reasonably accurate description of why atomic theory stipulates that, in the process of running one's hand along a stone wall, there is no actual touching of flesh and stone on a subatomic level, he makes this observation:
Bertrand Russell said:
Modern science gives no indication whatever of the existence of the soul or mind as an entity; indeed the reasons for disbelieving in it are very much of the same kind as the reasons for disbelieving in matter.

I don't see any reason to continue following a chain of thought that begins with such falsehoods.

If you have something better to offer, pony up. If not, then you're talking out of your hat badge, to put it mildly.
 
Mr. Russell is either misinformed or lying. No reputable physicist denies the existence of matter, and none did in 1929, either. No reputable psychologist denies the phenomenon of mind, and none did in 1929, either, although many certainly disagreed with Mr. Russel regarding its fundamental constituents.
Actually, at that point, Watson's Methodological version of Behaviorism was quite popular, and he very much denied the phenomenon of mind.

Problem is, too many people think that behaviorism hasn't changed since then.
 
Actually, at that point, Watson's Methodological version of Behaviorism was quite popular, and he very much denied the phenomenon of mind.
I'll take the hit. I didn't know that Watson went that far. It's been a while since my psych classes.

Nevertheless, my critique still stands. Even if Watson was one popular theory at the time, if Russell's essay is the best thing JustGeoff has to pony up, he's still talking out his hat badge.
 
I'll take the hit. I didn't know that Watson went that far. It's been a while since my psych classes.

Nevertheless, my critique still stands. Even if Watson was one popular theory at the time, if Russell's essay is the best thing JustGeoff has to pony up, he's still talking out his hat badge.

As I said earlier, Geoff is just rooting around in the trash can of the history of philosophy, looking for anything he can cannibalise to support the preconceived woowoo beliefs he started the exercise with.

If he ended up with a position that made any sense it would be a fluke, but we have repeatedly demonstrated that doesn't have one. Just a complicated system of sophistry that allows him to maintain a constant stream of noise that sounds like it might have something interesting going on underneath it all.
 
I didn't ask that it be guaranteed reducible to the physical, did I? I asked that it not be guaranteed irreducible.

There's no difference. You want to define subjective and objective as "not really opposites" but that is because of your own definitional problems. If you wish to define them properly then they must be defined as the opposites they really are. But if that is the case then anything "not guaranteed irreducible" will also be guaranteed reducible. It's the same thing.

But anyway, define it however you like.

Subjective experiences : The sum total of your mind, your entire mental life. Everything that you have ever experienced.

This is the correct referent for "subjective experiences". It is what that phrase was invented to refer to. Denying it has a referent is therefore tantamount to declaring yourself to be a p-zombie.

Why can't subjective experience be synonymous with a set of brain processes?

"Synonyms" means "two labels for the same referent." In order for this to be true, the referents of the two labels must be indistinguishable - they must be indentical in every way. If there is a way of telling their referents apart, then they aren't synonyms. The reason why subjective experiences cannot be synonymous with brain processes is therefore that this critieria is nowhere near being met. The proper referent for "subjective experiences" (which I've defined above) is not only distinguishable from the referent for "brain processes" - the two referents have almost nothing in common at all. They are arguably "functionally equivalent" - but that's not enough to be synonyms - not even close.

Geoff
 
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OK, I just want to nail down this perspective issue so that we are sure that we are on the same page. A computer, for instance carries out steps in a program. I can look from the outside and see what it does.

Agreed.

From the inside, there is computation, which I really can't see from the outside. That is a "first-person" type perspective for the computer (and I use the words "first-person" extraordinarily loosely). There is no person in there, there is no awareness, no insight or understanding so there is no subject.

Agreed.

But there is a different perspective -- one from the outside and one from the inside.

Eh? Where has this "inside" come from. If there is no awareness and no subject then there is no "inside." It is the subject which allows there to be an "inside".

In the case of the computer, the "inside perspective" doesn't really mean much though.

It doesn't mean anything. It is another term with no referent. There is no like "what it is like to be a computer".

In the absence of awareness you can't do anything with computation except spit out some calculated numbers on a sheet of paper or a cathode ray tube. It happens, but that is all. That is basically why I say that I can't see the viewpoint as being all that critical an issue. It is the awareness that matters.

OK, then use "awareness" instead of "viewpoint". There is no "awareness" in a speeding camera, agreed?
 
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You can have 100% faith it is (and as an eliminative materialist logically defend your position). What you can't have is 100% certainty.

I disagree. Having faith that "brain process" is synonymous with "subjective experience" isn't the same as having faith in something indeterminable like the existence of God. It is like having faith that there is no dark side of the moon - it is having faith in something that is definately WRONG. You can be 100% sure that "brain processes" are not synonymous with "subjective experiences".
 
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I'll take the hit. I didn't know that Watson went that far. It's been a while since my psych classes.

Nevertheless, my critique still stands. Even if Watson was one popular theory at the time, if Russell's essay is the best thing JustGeoff has to pony up, he's still talking out his hat badge.

Piggy, this is 21 pages into the thread and the first time I wheeled out old Bertie. I did it as an "interesting aside" and no more. My version of neutral monism isn't the same as his. I'm not depending on his particular arguments which were influenced by his own times.
 
Paul

I need to explain to you exactly how you physicalism ends up with no referent for "subjective experience". This is not the primary problem - it is the symptom of another problem. Just as "subjective experiences" has no referent, you also have another term which has two different referents. This other term is "physical" and it is the definition of "physical" which has caused the problem. Why?

These two terms normally (when we aren't having this debate) have the following referents:

Subjective experience -----> The sum total of all your conscious experiences, everything that's ever appear in your mind.
Physical brain processes -----> A computation in grey matter in your head.

In this standard terminology "physical" is clearly refering to what we called P1 before. If you are sitting in front of a mirror with a hole in your forehead then "physical brain process" would be something you could see in the mirror. When you say "physical" you are using this as one of your referents - you are refering to the whole physical world as you experience it, from your own hands to the most distant star you can see. This is referent 1 for "physical".

But physicalism doesn't stop there. Even though you already agreed that experiences of a physical universe shouldn't be confused with the external causes of those experiences, you (and physicalism) also declare that P2 (the mind-external reality which causes those experiences) is also physical. When you are sitting in front of the mirror, you see a physical-1 brain (in the mirror), but the physical-1 brain isn't the proximal cause of your subjective experiences. By contrast, the physical-2 brain isn't in the mirror, but is the proximal cause your subjective experiences. So they aren't the same thing. Your physical-1 brain is not a synonym for your physical-2 brain. So you now have a referent 2 for "physical".

So you now have two terminological problems, not one:

You have one word ("physical") which has two referents (physical-1 and physical-2), and there is much potential for confusion if you subsequently conflate them without noticing you've done it. Therefore you need a new term for one (or both) of these referents to avoid the risk of serious confusion.

You also have another word/term ("subjective experiences") which has no referent at all, even though you really want it to have one.

So I am hoping you can see what has gone wrong here. The fact that "subjective experiences" has no referent is a symptom of the double definition of "physical". It is a symptom of the mistake of confusing P1 and P2 by calling both of them physical. Why did you want to call them both physical? It wasn't because that was a sensible term to use - it was because you were trying to defend physicalism by assuming it was true ("begging the question") in the the following way:

If physicalism is true then everything must be physical so P1 is physical and P2 is also physical, even though they are different. They are just "different sorts of physical".

So you have ended up with two different referents for the single word "physical" and no referent at all for "subjective experience". At this point, somebody like me comes along and tries to claim your definitions are all messed up. But when I try to fix them you will say "but you are using all that dualistic-influenced talk to define your terms" or falsely accuse me of "begging the question." All I am actually trying to do is get to a point where each term has one referent and nobody is confused about meanings. But every time I try to do that I get falsely accused of being a dualist and the existing physicalist terminological mess is defended to the hilt instead of being corrected. Because I am aware of exactly what has gone wrong with the terminology and you aren't aware of it at all (and wouldn't permit me to correct it - until now), I can play logical games with you. As soon as you give me a definition of "subjective experience", I can use your definitional confusion to construct a logical proof that your definitions are incoherent. But I do not want to play logical games with you as if I was a stage magician pulling proofs against materialism out of a top hat. I'm trying to explain to you how the trick works. No actual magic is involved. :)

Geoff

edit NB: If you followed all that then it should now be clear how the term "qualia" got invented. If you define physical as P2 then you've got this extra referent (the brain in the mirror - what a physical brain actually looks like to you). The person who wishes to define qualia is doing no more than inventing a new term for one of your usages of "physical" - and it is a term that is now definately needed if we are to distinguish P1 from P2. If you want to prohibit them from doing this then you are still left with a referent which has no term, forcing me to invent yet another new term to add to the collection of supposedly referentless terms you can't define : Mind, mental, subjective, 1st-person, qualia, experiences, P1, ....

You've got a referentless term ("subjective experiences") and you've got a termless referent (the thing qualia refers to). But even though the referentless term quite obviously refers to the termless referent (qualia really are subjective experiences) the physicalists refuse to allow the definition of this term! :D
 
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As I said earlier, Geoff is just rooting around in the trash can of the history of philosophy, looking for anything he can cannibalise to support the preconceived woowoo beliefs he started the exercise with.

If he ended up with a position that made any sense it would be a fluke, but we have repeatedly demonstrated that doesn't have one. Just a complicated system of sophistry that allows him to maintain a constant stream of noise that sounds like it might have something interesting going on underneath it all.

Kevin,

If you think you understand this discussion, please respond to post #836.

Geoff
 
hammegk said:
It makes no difference who or what you trust. But here I am 100% certain thought exists.


See, here is where I have a problem. I understand your view, I am fairly certain, and yet I would say you can no more be 100% certain than can the eliminative materialist.

This is me entering the debate massively late. It's far too big to for me to read all the way through but I thought I would just comment on this.

First, I'll assume that hammegk is refering to the phenomenal character of experience when he says "thought". Hopefully, that definition is also included in Mercutio's use of the term in his reply.

Mercutio,

How can you say that the existence of experience is an assumption? That seems ludicrous. It's meaningless to say that I assume my experience of redness.

On the other hand, one can easily state that the existence of objective reality is an assumption since it is defined as something that is not dependent on phenomenal charater for its existence.
 
Both positions suffer from the handicap that their monisms are labeled by terms popularly associated with dualism, and the confusion that results from that. Thus we see all sorts of "but why can't X view account for Y?", a question assuming dualism, applied to each monism. Blech.

Just because dualism doesn't work, doesn't mean that the insights originally made by Descates weren't correct. There are certain aspects of existence that cannot be assumed to exist. We have various names for it but we've debated this thing "qualia" here many times before. That is what I think Descartes really meant when he said that the existence of his thoughts were impervious to doubt. In contrast, it was actually possible to doubt the existence of "physical" things. Thus the distinction was made. Just because that distinction was made doesn't mean that we have to go along the route of Cartesian theory of the mind does it? If we can formulate a theory of physical reality that recognises it as an aspect of a "greater" reality that is entirely phenomenal then we don't have a dualism. Or is that doomed to failure?
 
If we can formulate a theory of physical reality that recognises it as an aspect of a "greater" reality that is entirely phenomenal then we don't have a dualism. Or is that doomed to failure?

I think if you want to propose that this "greater reality" is phenomenal it may well be doomed to failure. There's an assumption in there that because it doesn't make sense to think of "greater reality" is physical, it must make more sense to think of it as phenomenal. But why should "things as they are in themselves" be anything like "things as humans experience them"?

For me, the main problem with thinking "greater reality" is phenomenal is to do with time. I don't think we can be sure that time applies in the same way in "greater reality" as it does to us humans who are restricted to phenomenal reality. But if we say that "greater reality" is phenomenal then we are implying that time looks the same from the greater perspective as it does to us. So I call it neutral or noumenal instead.
 

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