The relationship between science and materialism

[Mercutio]

So, what you are really saying is that your brain experiences, your brain feels, your brain loves. In few words, YOU are your brain.

Well, my body, technically. Which happens to include my brain. So far, no brain has made it without a body, and no brain has been uninfluenced by that body. My body experiences, my body feels, my body loves. Yes. Absolutely.

Yes, Paul. Say it loud and believe it! There is nothing unique about YOU, nothing special. Just a bunch of grey matter and electrical impulses. A p-zombie.

Does not follow. By virtue of the fact (not supposition, but fact) that I and only I see through this particular set of eyes, feel through this particular skin, hear through these particular ears, etc., I am absolutely assured that my own experience within the environment is unique. Because I am shaped as a result of experience with my environment (and vice versa, I might add), the person I am is, and must necessarily be, unique. Yes, there are ways in which I am the same as everyone else. There are both biological and shared environmental reasons for that. There are ways in which I am like some, but not all, other people. Again, there are both biological and environmental reasons for that. But there are, of course, ways in which I am absolutely unique. My unique biology, my unique learning history. Because I am just a bunch of grey matter and electrochemical impulses, and the supporting flesh, bone, and gooey stuff, with my own unique experience in the world.

And I prefer the term M-Zombie. (tried once before to make it a meme here, you can search for it.) That is, the same thing as a P-Zombie, except for the explicit (rather than implicit but sometimes denied) inclusion of private behavior in the definition, as well as public behavior. But yes, I am an M-Zombie. Or P-Zombie, if properly defined. And I am fine with that.

 

[Q-Source]

You appear still to be suffering under the impression that I ever thought anything else.

Well, it was not clear. Pages ago, you said that P1 and P2 were different.

I am glad that you finally admit that you are your brain. At least, you start being more consistent with your beliefs.

I was griping at philosophers for always assuming some dualistic notion when people say the word mind. Are you a philosopher? If not, then I shall have to extend the domain of my statement.

The problem is not about philosophers assuming dualistic notions when they hear the word mind, the problem is people using the word mind when they´re really talking about brain processes (i.e. you).

No, I am not a philosopher. I just find it weird the difficulty of many people to be consistent. People like Daniel Dennett is someone who is consistent, not only with his philosophy but also with his language. He quines qualia and ends with the problem of using dualitic language. There are no minds, no subjective experiences, only brains and processes. I am a p-zombie.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Dang, Mercutio beat me to it.

With one little proviso. There is no "me".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Who thinks like that?

Nearly all physicalists think like that. They don't understand that there is any important difference between their two usages of the word/concept "physical". It is the failure to recognise this difference which allows me to concoct proofs that their position is logically incoherent.

Obviously the objects as I am subjectively aware of them aren't made of matter, because they are not noumenal objects.

Eh? Noumenal objects aren't material. There aren't any "noumenal objects". Objects are things in our world.

However, my analysis of my subjective experience of objects has led me to believe that the noumenal objects are made of matter, where "made of matter" is a convenient shorthand for the complex physical models we have developed. That use of "made of matter" is not an ontological claim.

Yes it is. If you want say "obeys definable mathematical laws" then say "obeys definable mathematical laws". That's not ontological. But your claim was.

The only question is: Do we need "something else" in order to develop a complete model for how my subjective awareness works and how it comes to have representations of noumenal objects? In other words, will subjective awareness yield to a physical model? If it does, great, and we don't need all this metaphysical baggage. If it does not, then surely we will discover something quite fascinating that we have missed so far, whose essential essence, I daresay, will be unlike anything we dream of in our metaphysics.

Maybe we need to go back to the point where you try to define your terms and I prove there is another logical contradiction.....?

Now, if some people insist on "no matter what neuroscience discovers, it will, by definition, be missing the core of subjective awareness," then they will have the burden to explain carefully why this is so. An explanation such as "we just don't think you've got it all" will not suffice.

No. But logical proofs that people have specified an internally incoherent position will be wheeled out until those people stop trying to bury ontological problems with use of illogical language which they then justify as "short-hand" or "sloppy", thus failing to recognise that it is also illogical.

Geoff

 

[Darat]

Well, it was not clear. Pages ago, you said that P1 and P2 were different.

I am glad that you finally admit that you ar

...snip...

P1 and P2 are different, it is just how they are different that causes confusion to some people.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I do not understand why Being is needed to account for subjective experience.


Some other way, because I don't understand this at all.


I asked why we need a subject. You removed the answer "there is no subject." I'm confused.

"Why do we need a subject?" is no different from "Why do we need anything subjective?". That's all well and good provided you recognise the existence of p-zombies because p-zombies have no subject and nothing subjective. You've declared it incomprehensible for there to be a humanlike thing with no subject and no subjectivity, but you still want to be able to ask me "What do we need the subject for?" The answer is "We need the subject or we are going to have to acknowledge the possible existence of P-zombies?"

Less confused?

I defined mind to be a term that circumscribes certain brain processes." Does the verb circumscribe have the same problem as is?

It does in this example, yes. It is a meaningless "circumscribe".

Geoff
~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Dang, Mercutio beat me to it.

With one little proviso. There is no "me".

Ah, very good, Grasshopper...erm, Wasp.

You'd have had fun with Iacchus.

 

[Piggy]

I am a p-zombie.

Oh! Sorry I misunderstood you.

Should we all get a little 12-step thing going?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Then you cannot say that the physical is any sort of simple image of the noumenal.

There is potential for confusion to creep in here, but this is basically correct. What we call "physical" is a human-biased, spatio-temporal version of something noumenal.

And furthermore, you have to admit that Being is the source of this cause/effect swap. It's now stretching things a bit to say that Being is nothingness.

Why? I didn't say it had no properties. I didn't defined it's properties but did say that a naturalist could conclude it had no active properties. But even the naturalist has to admit it some passive properties. As the very least, it's some sort of observer. Some people, like supernaturalist theists, would like to bestow all manner of other properties upon it, but they wouldn't be able to provide any empirical or logical evidence to support this.

 

[Darat]

Oh! Sorry I misunderstood you.

Should we all get a little 12-step thing going?

I'll join - I've been saying I'm a p-zombie on these boards for years - I used to think that I thought I felt very lonely....

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I feel your pain.

We have had this "forced ontology" problem for years. Is it de rigueur in philosophy of mind? Since philosophers ignore neuroscience, they seem to have no room for mind to make reference to brain function.

Some problems are empirical and scientific. Some problems are down to sloppy and illogical use of language which goes unrecognised. The philosophers of mind you are refering to are not "ignoring neuroscience". It is simply the case that they have identified an illogical use of language and are insisting that you cannot invoke "future neuroscience" to fix it. Instead, you have to fix the linguistic mistake. I provided an essay quote which takes Paul Churchland to pieces for making this mistake. His wife comes along and fixes the problem by claiming we need to eliminate "folk psychology.

Again, I reviewed definitions of eliminative materialism on the Web. Some of them make reference only to the innapropriateness of folk terminology. A couple mention the "radical" abandonment of mind and mental states, but when examined carefully simply say that there is no referrent for some of the folk psychology terms we use.

That is correct. There is no referent for any subjective/mental/1st-person/"folk-pyschological" term. There is no such thing as mind. It's a myth. Mind's don't exist. Period.

I'm happy to go on record as saying that we will find neurological explanations for all the folks psychology terms we use.....

Then you're not defending eliminative materialism and your position will be incoherent if you want to claim that fundamental reality is physical.

* Can I say "like" anymore?

Not if you mean "is", and don't know what the "is" means.

Geoff

 

[Q-Source]

Well, my body, technically. Which happens to include my brain. So far, no brain has made it without a body, and no brain has been uninfluenced by that body. My body experiences, my body feels, my body loves. Yes. Absolutely.

Oh, yes. You are mindless, there is no YOU. Only a brain.

Does not follow. By virtue of the fact (not supposition, but fact) that I and only I see through this particular set of eyes, feel through this particular skin, hear through these particular ears, etc., I am absolutely assured that my own experience within the environment is unique. Because I am shaped as a result of experience with my environment (and vice versa, I might add), the person I am is, and must necessarily be, unique. Yes, there are ways in which I am the same as everyone else. There are both biological and shared environmental reasons for that. There are ways in which I am like some, but not all, other people. Again, there are both biological and environmental reasons for that. But there are, of course, ways in which I am absolutely unique. My unique biology, my unique learning history. Because I am just a bunch of grey matter and electrochemical impulses, and the supporting flesh, bone, and gooey stuff, with my own unique experience in the world.

Well, let´s say that you are physically and biologically unique. Just like an Ostrich in the ocean is also unique.
What I mean is that assuming that materialism is true, what you thought were subjective and unique experiences are really objective decipherable processes, therefore anyone can have direct access to them. Even what it feels to be Mercutio can be objectively explained. Do you agree?

But yes, I am an M-Zombie. Or P-Zombie, if properly defined. And I am fine with that.

If you are a p or m-zombie then there is nothing else to say. There is no problem.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

But Paul, don't you want to be special? I mean com'on!

I am special, but the reason is a secret.

~~ Paul

 

[Piggy]

Some problems are down to sloppy and illogical use of language which goes unrecognised.

You should have provided a cite.

Counter-thread update: The claims are formulated, but I haven't yet devised an adequate guard against DoS attacks. Perhaps there isn't one. But sooner or later I'm gonna have to post anyway.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Well, it was not clear. Pages ago, you said that P1 and P2 were different.

They are. Surely you're not suggesting that the chair and my experience of it are the very same thing?

The problem is not about philosophers assuming dualistic notions when they hear the word mind, the problem is people using the word mind when they´re really talking about brain processes (i.e. you).

I refuse to accept the responsibility to use "brain process" all the time. In particular, a statement like "I pictured that in my mind" is entirely reasonable, since it does not involve an actual picture in my brain, and the process by which I do it is not entirely understood. If anyone wants to think I mean some dualistic free-floating mind picturing it, well, they can just be confused.

No, I am not a philosopher. I just find it weird the difficulty of many people to be consistent. People like Daniel Dennett is someone who is consistent, not only with his philosophy but also with his language. He quines qualia and ends with the problem of using dualitic language. There are no minds, no subjective experiences, only brains and processes. I am a p-zombie.

Join the club.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I thought I made that clear. "Minds are brain processes" is a sloppy way of trying to say that what we call "mind" is not a thing but a verb.

It's worse than that. It's not just "sloppy". It's illogical. Defining "mind" to be a verb doesn't avoid the problem. Even if it is a verb, it still has no referent. You've already got a physical term for that verb - "to process". To use "mind" in that way you will have made the mistake that chriswl made when he was trying to explain computationalism. He tried to explain the relationship between brain process and subjectivity but what he actually ended up saying was :

computers aren't the same as computations.
brains aren't the same as minds.

It's a false analogy. The correct version is:

computers aren't the same as computations.
brains aren't the same as brain processes.

So, he didn't actually explain anything. All he did was confuse a physical process with a mental process. But he THOUGHT he'd explained subjectivity. That is the consequence of this "sloppy use of language". It makes people think their position is logically coherent when it isn't.

We don't really have language for it. That is why I have been saying that brains "mind".

But that's not true, wasp. This paragraph is important:

We *DO* have the language for what brains do. They process/compute. You are claiming that we don't have a word for thing you are using "mind" for, but we do. Your purpose wasn't to find a word for something (a referent) that didn't have one - that would suggest that your usage of "mind" has a referent. Your real (but unacknowledged) purpose was to find a referent for a word which, in your system, has no referent. You didn't need to use a new word at this point. What you needed to do was find a referent for "mind". But the referent you found was the wrong one. It was wrong because minds are subjective and physical processes are not.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The trouble with not using mind anymore is that I can't say "I'm of a mind ...," "I've changed my mind," "time out of mind," "the public mind," "he's lost his mind," and so forth. I'll be so sad.

~~ Paul

You can throw plenty more words than "mind" into the bin, Paul. It's half the dictionary, not just one word.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Of course you can, just as we still say "what a beautiful sunrise". The only time you must be out of your mind, so to speak, is when you are speaking in a strict manner.

Like when you are involved in a debate about ontology.....?

I don't mind people saying "minds are brain processes" if they aren't using it a key logical plank in a metaphysical argument. I only care about it when the logical mistake is of critical importance. Like now.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Nearly all physicalists think like that. They don't understand that there is any important difference between their two usages of the word/concept "physical". It is the failure to recognise this difference which allows me to concoct proofs that their position is logically incoherent.

I think you exaggerate. They may sound like that when using sloppy speech, but I very much doubt too many people have trouble with the difference between a chair and my experience of it.

Eh? Noumenal objects aren't material. There aren't any "noumenal objects". Objects are things in our world.

The word object does not imply material. There are objects in the noumenal, or it would all be one amorphous glop.

Yes it is. If you want say "obeys definable mathematical laws" then say "obeys definable mathematical laws". That's not ontological. But your claim was.

No, it is not. When I say matter I am not making an ontological claim. I have no idea what things are actually made of.

Maybe we need to go back to the point where you try to define your terms and I prove there is another logical contradiction.....?

Feel free to present a proof that subjective experience cannot be a result of brain process.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That depends on what qualifies as a "conceptual philosophical problem".

For example, questions regarding the nature of the soul can be "solved" by being voided as non-questions.....

The most well-known defence of neutral monism is called "What is the Soul?" by Bertrand Russell. He claims it is a non-question. But whilst doing so, he defends neutral monism and claims that matter is nothing but "a heraldic device."

http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/neutralmonism.html