The relationship between science and materialism

Paul

Sorry, I don't get it. I can sort of picture noumenal things as neutral things, but I don't understand where physical things come from.

Think back back to the example of the brain in the vat. Since we are now using the word "physical" to refer to the objects of experience, the BIV, even though it is being fed data from a computer, still sees physical objects. They aren't like normal physical objects because if the BIV hallucinates a chair there is nothing chair-like in the noumenon as their distal cause. Instead, their distal cause is computer-like thing in the noumenon. So in the BIV case, where did the physical things come from? The answer is that they are parts of your mind. Both the hallucinated chair (technical term: a merely intentional object) and the chair you are sitting on can be decribed as physical. Neither of them "came from" anywhere. It's one of those questions like "what happened before the universe exists". Objects in minds don't come from anywhere. The question you need to ask is "where do minds come from?", and the answer is that minds are the combination of two things: the content is determined by the noumenal equivalent of a neural process and the fact that it actually exists is because it is a manifestation of Being/Nothing.

Objects in the lifeworld. Parts of human experience. The things that are right in front of you now. You are typing on a physical keyboard. Somewhere in the noumenon there is a noumenal Paul noumenally typing on a noumenal keyboard, but those things aren't physical. They are noumenal.

Doesn't help. What is the distinction and why is there a distinction?

You are asking me what the distinction is between physical and noumenal? Why are you asking that again? I've answered that exact same question several times now. What didn't you understand about the answer?

The noumenon is the external-to-mind cause of your experiences, including this distal cause (the noumenal chair) and the proximal cause (the noumenal brain).
Physical objects are internal-to-mind component parts of your experiences.

When I had finished describing the neutral part of the system I declared it to be complete. The physical things are already contained within it, but from the neutral viewpoint they become the relationship between being and a noumenal brain state. Only in the world of experience does the relationship turn into "Physical things". You can think of physical things as mental representations of noumenal things.



It isn't. There is only one Being. It has no individuated identity, if you remember. Your identity as Paul is beestowed upon you by the fact that Paul's mind is a reflection of Paul's noumenal brain. Those things have an identity.

Yes, but as experienced by Being, which is undifferentiated. Why aren't all our experiences one big Borg-like superconsciousness?

Because they are neccesarily tightly-bound to noumenal brains. And noumenal brains are differentiated. Your independent identity is ensured by the fact that your brain and my brain are differentiated.

Nothingness is the most neutral concept in existence.

Then the Neutral should also experience, allowing the noumenal to have mind.

"Mind" is just the name of one part of the human experience of reality - it is the name for the totality of that experience of reality. Therefore it is not a word that can be applied to the neutral world at all. It is laced with dualism. ALL dualism belongs on the phenomenal side - the world as we experience it. As soon as you start talk about the neutral things having minds you are making the mistake of taking concepts from the phenomenal world and trying to apply them to the noumenal world. "Minds" have a correlate in the noumenal world - but it would be just as wrong to call that correlate "mind" as it is to call it "matter".

If the things-in-themselves are mental then you are an idealist.
 
Last edited:
Uh oh. I have Being at the bottom and Neutral off to the side. I have a noumenal brain and chair coming out of the Neutral. I have a physical brain and chair floating above the Being. I don't know how to connect anything. Even when I squint, it doesn't look like a pyramid.

~~ Paul

Drawing a diagram is probably not going to help. I think it is likely to lead to some horrible sort of system where you've got three types of "stuff" instead of one. That's the wrong way to think about it.
 
So...nothing is physical or mental until it is perceived by us. It is neutral, noumenal--we can't say what it actually is, merely that it [/i]is[/i], separate from our perception of it. Our perceptions, molded as they are by dualistic language, are of two fundamentally different sorts, physical and mental. Neither physical nor mental are real, they are a constuction of our perception of what is actually real, which is neutral or noumenal.

Is that about it? Or do you want to tweak something, before I poke it with a pointy stick to see if it deflates?
 
Chris

1) "things-as-they-really-are" (Kant),

aka...Noumenal world (Kant), or neutral entity (Geoff)

2) the lifeworld (Husserl)

aka...or Phenomenal world (Kant), or "things as we experience them (Kant), or "the world of mind and matter (Geoff).

3) the abstract, mathematised world of science (Husserl),

aka...the SECOND usage of the term "physical" made by physicalists. This "mathematised world" is a chimera, because it is the result of the mistake. It is a name for "noumenon mixed up with physical".

Is that better?

I know the terms can be confusing, especially when we are dealing with interchangeable terms like these.
 
Geoff said:
You are asking me what the distinction is between physical and noumenal? Why are you asking that again? I've answered that exact same question several times now. What didn't you understand about the answer?
I don't understand the relationship between the noumenal, physical, and Being. Is the physical the result of Being experiencing the noumenal?

Because they are neccesarily tightly-bound to noumenal brains. And noumenal brains are differentiated. Your independent identity is ensured by the fact that your brain and my brain are differentiated.
Why? There is only one undifferentiated Being experiencing the noumenal. There is no independent identity unless it is the noumenal brains that are doing the experiencing.

"Mind" is just the name of one part of the human experience of reality - it is the name for the totality of that experience of reality. Therefore it is not a word that can be applied to the neutral world at all. It is laced with dualism. ALL dualism belongs on the phenomenal side - the world as we experience it. As soon as you start talk about the neutral things having minds you are making the mistake of taking concepts from the phenomenal world and trying to apply them to the noumenal world. "Minds" have a correlate in the noumenal world - but it would be just as wrong to call that correlate "mind" as it is to call it "matter".
Why does a noumenal brain trigger Being to experience the physical, and not a noumenal chair?

~~ Paul
 
So...nothing is physical or mental until it is perceived by us.

That is correct. "Physical" and "Mental" are categories of concepts we use to talk about the phenomenal world. "Mind" refers to the totality of our experience of a phenomenal world and "Physical objects" are the things which appear before us in physical space, and which persist over time. But there is no point in using these categories of concepts to refer to the noumenal world because the noumenal world is not dualistic like the phenomenal world is.

It is neutral, noumenal--we can't say what it actually is, merely that it [/i]is[/i], separate from our perception of it.

Seperate from our experiences of it, yes.

Our perceptions, molded as they are by dualistic language, are of two fundamentally different sorts, physical and mental.

Not quite. Mental actually refers to the totality of our experiences. Everything in the phenomenal world comes to us via mind. Physical refers to individual objects with spatial extension - the very things which the word "physical" was always supposed to refer to.

Neither physical nor mental are real, they are a constuction of our perception of what is actually real, which is neutral or noumenal.

You could possibly say that there is some part of the neutral system which correlates to what we call "mind" and what we call "matter", so in that sense they are real. But they are not real in the sense that they have any existence independent of the neutral, noumenal system.

Is that about it? Or do you want to tweak something, before I poke it with a pointy stick to see if it deflates?

Poke away. All poking is welcome.

Geoff.
 
Last edited:
I don't understand the relationship between the noumenal, physical, and Being. Is the physical the result of Being experiencing the noumenal?

Almost, but not quite. When you say "result", I am thinking of you trying to draw a diagram. I don't want you to think of physical as "emerging" from the noumenal in the same sort of way that people claim that minds "emerge" from matter". It's not like that. Physical is the name we give to the relationship between Being and one very specific part of the noumenal world - the part which corresponds to a brain. What exactly it is about noumenal brains which allows this relationship is currently unclear. I could give you some suggestions, but I am worried they may cause more confusion, not less.

Why does a noumenal brain trigger Being to experience the physical, and not a noumenal chair?

It is not possible to experience a noumenal chair. You mustn't think of noumenal things as being like objects. That is why I keep saying "chair-like-noumenal-thing". I'd use that terminology all the time but it takes too long. There aren't really "noumenal objects". That would be falling back into the mistake of associating noumenal things with physical things. This must be avoided at all costs. It's the mistake we are trying to fix.

Try not to think too hard about what the noumenal world is like. If that comes at all, it comes later. Kant was quite happy to leave it largely undefined.

Geoff
 
Paul

This may help:

Objects always appear to us in space and time. But space is a property of the phenomenal world (time is more complicated). Since objects can only appear in space, and noumenal things are not spatio-temporal, it isn't possible to directly experience noumenal things like we can experience physical things.

Geoff
 
Geoff said:
It is not possible to experience a noumenal chair. You mustn't think of noumenal things as being like objects. That is why I keep saying "chair-like-noumenal-thing". I'd use that terminology all the time but it takes too long. There aren't really "noumenal objects". That would be falling back into the mistake of associating noumenal things with physical things. This must be avoided at all costs. It's the mistake we are trying to fix.
Sorry, I wasn't clear. Why does a noumenal brain have a special relationship with Being, whereas a noumenal chair does not have that relationship?

I think you need to give more detail about the special relationship. I still do not understand why my experience is differentiated from yours, given that the experiencing is going on in the undifferentiated Being.

~~ Paul
 
Geoff said:
Objects always appear to us in space and time. But space is a property of the phenomenal world (time is more complicated). Since objects can only appear in space, and noumenal things are not spatio-temporal, it isn't possible to directly experience noumenal things like we can experience physical things.
How can my noumenal brain state change, if the Neutral has no spatio-temporal aspects?

~~ Paul
 
Sorry, I wasn't clear. Why does a noumenal brain have a special relationship with Being, whereas a noumenal chair does not have that relationship?

I think you need to give more detail about the special relationship.

That is the question Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff are trying to answer. I don't know whether their answer will turn out to be the correct one, but it is the first attempt that takes account the ontological problems we have been discussing in this thread. It is possible that science may eventually provide at least parts of the answer to this question, but it would help if the scientific world didn't react to Penrose in the same negative way that many people have been reacting to me in this thread - as if he was an enemy of science. Unfortunately, they do react in this way. This maybe because they think Penrose and Hameroff are trying to solve a problem which doesn't exist. Once you understand the ontological problem, it is easier to see what motivates Penrose to say the things he does.

My guess is that there is something very special about brains (or their noumenal equivalent) which allows this relationship. This is part of why functionalist computationalism doesn't work. It's not just the calculation itself which is important. There has to also be some sort of fundamental property of brain tissue (very likely something to do with quantum mechanics, but this is not certain) that makes it possible. Our understanding of brains, combined with our ontological problems, has made progress on answering this question painfully slow.

So I do not know the definitive answer to this question, but there is no shortage of answers which are possible, and some people trying to answer it right now.

I still do not understand why my experience is differentiated from yours, given that the experiencing is going on in the undifferentiated Being.

~~ Paul

You understand that my brain isn't your brain though.

The entire content of your experiences are determined the state of your (noumenal) brain. That's all you ever experience. The reason you can't experience my experiences is that your brain isn't my brain.

I don't really understand the problem here. For there to be such a thing as "Paul's mind" there has to be two things : Paul's (noumenal) brain and Being. The entire content of everything you have ever experienced was determined by Paul's noumenal brain. So what you are asking is why can't I (Paul) experience being you (Geoff). The answer is simple: If you were experiencing being Geoff then you would be Geoff, not Paul. I sort of understand why this is a cause of concern, but I don't think it's a real problem. Human minds are individuated because human brains are individuated. The obvious answer is still correct.
 
How can my noumenal brain state change, if the Neutral has no spatio-temporal aspects?

~~ Paul

This is a good question. Both Kant and Heidegger spent a lot of words talking about time. First: is there any reason why all change need be spatio-temporal? I think Kant would say that our tendency to think like this is the result of our cognitive limitations. The noumenal world is not like the phenomenal world. Our language and our normal cognitive functions are designed for the phenomenal world, not the noumenal world. I am loathe to continue too far down this line because "time" has been such an important concept for so many of the philosophers dealing with these problems, not to mention the problems it causes in physics. So there's no quick and easy answer to this one either, although I may say a bit more later.
 
Paul,

Probably the single most important person (after Kant) to write about this is Heidegger. His most important work on the subject is called "Being and Time", and is directly concerned with the sort of question you just asked me. But this is not a book I would be willing to try summarise in a post on this forum. Answering it requires answering a whole load of other things first. Ask sir-drinks-a-lot. He's just started a thread on this book.

Geoff
 
So far, to sum up, I've seen arguments from authority, arguments from ignorance, arguments from false dichotomy and arguments from definition.

Geoff, since you are the only one who thinks there is a problem (here), and since this problem, as far as I can tell, is equally strawman and semantic argument, I see no reason to continue this debate. You have yet to even show that there is a problem, let alone construct an argument free of semantic sillyness that supports your claim.
 
Geoff said:
I don't really understand the problem here. For there to be such a thing as "Paul's mind" there has to be two things : Paul's (noumenal) brain and Being. The entire content of everything you have ever experienced was determined by Paul's noumenal brain. So what you are asking is why can't I (Paul) experience being you (Geoff). The answer is simple: If you were experiencing being Geoff then you would be Geoff, not Paul. I sort of understand why this is a cause of concern, but I don't think it's a real problem. Human minds are individuated because human brains are individuated. The obvious answer is still correct.
Nope, I'm not asking why I don't experience your mind. I'm asking why there is any differentiated experience at all, since the experience is going on in the Being. To be differentiated, the experiences must be going on in the noumenal brains, at least to some degree. Are they? If so, why do we need Being at all?

This is a good question. Both Kant and Heidegger spent a lot of words talking about time. First: is there any reason why all change need be spatio-temporal? I think Kant would say that our tendency to think like this is the result of our cognitive limitations. The noumenal world is not like the phenomenal world. Our language and our normal cognitive functions are designed for the phenomenal world, not the noumenal world. I am loathe to continue too far down this line because "time" has been such an important concept for so many of the philosophers dealing with these problems, not to mention the problems it causes in physics. So there's no quick and easy answer to this one either, although I may say a bit more later.
How can there be any spatio-temporal experience at all, if it is not grounded in the noumenal? Does the noumental/Being experience engine just make it up out of whole cloth? If so, then clearly my experience of the physical does not map in any straightforward way to the noumenal.

~~ Paul
 
So why do you keep coming back and posting in this thread? :oldroll:

Becuase I'm always willing to debate metaphysics with people. However, to have a debate, there needs to be a coherant argument. I'm willing wait, if you're willing to provide one.


No. It's such a shame you can't make me, isn't it? If only wishing made it so.
 
Yes, but as experienced by Being, which is undifferentiated. Why aren't all our experiences one big Borg-like superconsciousness?
Different inputs and processing specific to each individual processor we perceive as brain/body/IO.

Then .... (should) ... the noumenal ... have mind.

~~ Paul
Why wouldn't it, although better said the noumen -everything--"what-is" -- is "mind" as opposed to "body" (If you're an objective idealist).


So...nothing is physical or mental until it is perceived by us. It is neutral, noumenal--we can't say what it actually is, merely that it [/i]is[/i], separate from our perception of it. Our perceptions, molded as they are by dualistic language, are of two fundamentally different sorts, physical and mental. Neither physical nor mental are real, they are a constuction of our perception of what is actually real, which is neutral or noumenal.

Is that about it? Or do you want to tweak something, before I poke it with a pointy stick to see if it deflates?
At least I'm getting happier with my objective idealism & the epriphenomena of matter. :)


Yes, but I believe neutral monism is both easier to naturalise and technically more accurate. "Idealism" still carries a hangover of the ontological problem originally made by physicalism. Without physicalism, there would have been no idealism. The noumenon isn't mental.
I don't care for "mental" either. Try "with intent & purpose" rather than body=lacking intent & purpose.


And what is your mind, if not the same 'stuff' as 'things in themselves'?
My mind, and yours, are "what-is" constrained and/or amplified by our perceived brains, bodies, and the photons (also "what-is") that interact with "us" is imo a better way to say it.
 
That is correct. "Physical" and "Mental" are categories of concepts we use to talk about the phenomenal world. "Mind" refers to the totality of our experience of a phenomenal world and "Physical objects" are the things which appear before us in physical space, and which persist over time. But there is no point in using these categories of concepts to refer to the noumenal world because the noumenal world is not dualistic like the phenomenal world is.
Is this asserted, or concluded? Is there any way at all that we can know of this noumenal world? You have said that we "naturally" split our phenomenal world into physical and mental; in what way are you able to describe that which is not phenomenal?
Seperate from our experiences of it, yes.
But our experience of "it" is not of noumenal, but of phenomenal, which is experienced as mental and physical, no? (your "experienced as mental and physical", not mine. I do not hold this view.)
Not quite. Mental actually refers to the totality of our experiences. Everything in the phenomenal world comes to us via mind. Physical refers to individual objects with spatial extension - the very things which the word "physical" was always supposed to refer to.
Which simply takes the dualism problem and pushes it here. You still, at this level, have people claiming that the things you call physical here could not even be called, were it not for the fact that they are perceived, and others saying that they could not be perceived were it not for the fact that they physically exist. Your view does nothing to solve this problem, it merely asserts that the dualism is real at the level of the phenomenal, even though the dualism is not real at the level of what truly exists. This does not help. Indeed, it adds a layer of verbiage for which there is (nor can be, if you are right) no evidence.
You could possibly say that there is some part of the neutral system which correlates to what we call "mind" and what we call "matter", so in that sense they are real. But they are not real in the sense that they have any existence independent of the neutral, noumenal system.
See? This is exactly what you are doing--saying that, at the level of the phenomenal, you accept dualism. This does nothing to help. You are inventing a "real" reason to continue using an illusory dualism, and pretending that this makes the inherent problems of dualism go away. The problems are still there, and your supporting system must be assumed, cannot be concluded.
Poke away. All poking is welcome.

Geoff.
You have not avoided the problems of dualism. You have added, without any ability to support it, a layer of asserted reality. I do not think it helps; it certainly does not solve any practical problem.
 
My mind, and yours, are "what-is" constrained and/or amplified by our perceived brains, bodies, and the photons (also "what-is") that interact with "us" is imo a better way to say it.

Yes, but then I have no clue what you're on about. :D
 

Back
Top Bottom