The relationship between science and materialism

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Do as Darat suggests; try to support your position, not to merely assume that if you knock materialism down, yours is all that remains standing.

In particular, you need extra cases in your proof to allow for dualism. The chair and my experience of the chair might be two fundamentally different existents. Heck, if my brain is in a vat, then the chair, my brain, and my experience might be three different existents. Why, there is no end to the fun!

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

I might very well agree with this if I new what eliminativism was.

Eliminativist materialism is a combination of the claim of materialism (everything which exists is physical) along with the claim that the very words which are used to refer to things which are inherently subjective (including the whole of “folk psychology and four of the terms I asked you to define) can, in principle, be eliminated from our vocabulary. Then, they say, the problems will go away.

Are you sure this is not just a caricature of eliminativism? Why can't I used a term to refer to something subjective, as long as the definition of the term is clear?

As soon as you try to do that, I will take your definitions and construct a proof that they lead to a contradiction. The only way you will have of escaping that proof will be to do exactly what you did to escape the last one : to claim that in fact subjective experiences are synonymous (completely identical in every way) with brain processes. But if you do that, then you might just as well have never defined the subjective terms in the first place. They are not needed. They can be eliminated. At this point the logical problems disappear but the eliminativists open themselves up to the accusation of having lost the plot, since they have now arrived at possibly the most counter-intuitive and incomprehensible metaphysical position ever invented. They have denied the existence of their own minds.

It's quite different to say they have no referents or to say that they refer to things explained from another viewpoint.

You are going to have to explain very carefully what you mean by this before I can deconstruct it.

Even so, how does this deny subjective experience?

Let me explain this again…..

The non-eliminativist materialists want to have their cake and eat it, and it is logically impossible to do so. They want to simultaneously claim that:

E1) they are not denying the existence of minds
E2) that minds can be COMPLETELY defined in terms of behaviour and physical processes

The problem is that if minds can be completely defined/explained in terms of behaviour and/or physical processes then there is in fact no point whatsoever in using any of the vocabulary that currently refers to minds and mental things.

They want to have their cake (“minds really do exist”) and eat it (“minds are nothing more than brain processes”). They then claim that they aren’t eliminativists but that mental things are physical. This is incoherent. It is logically impossible for the non-eliminativists to make both of these claims at the same time. So the eliminativists come along and say “hold on, your position is illogical! What you need to do is eliminate all that mentalistic vocabulary! Then your position won’t be illogical any more!” And they are right. People like Wasp really believe that their position is materialistic, non-eliminativist and coherent all at the same time. Those people have an incoherent belief system. The eliminativists do not.

So you are saying that the question of the relation between brain and subjective experience is one that science cannot tackle?

Yep, that’s what I am saying. The only means “science” has of tackling this problem is to invoke materialism. But materialism isn’t science. This doesn’t stop people from claiming that the invoking of materialism is somehow “scientific”. They are wrong. There is nothing scientific about it. It is the straightforward assertion of physicalism – a philosophical claim – but claimed to be scientific.

Instead, the answer will be found by philosophers debating whether the single existent is physical, mental, neutral, or otherwise? But some philosophers don't want to play the game, so they have simply declared the problem eliminated?

Some philosophers, representing the scientistic community, have realised that the game is going to be lost by the physicalists unless they are eliminativists. So they are still “playing the game”, it’s just they have figured out how the game works whereas the people trying to defend non-eliminativist versions of physicalism have not yet figured out how the game works. So I am here to make them wiggle and dance until the penny finally drops and they realise their position is fundamentally incoherent.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

And Geoff, no, you do not understand me. I am not trying to defend physicalism at all.

I understand you perfectly. You obviously didn't read my post. Try reading some of my replies to Paul. Maybe that will help. You have agreed with me. Sorry if you can't figure that out. Come on, Merc, your IQ is considerably higher than Darat's. Have another look at what I am claiming. It is you that has not understood me. I am not claiming that all forms of physicalism are false. I am claiming the only way to defend it is to eliminate the "dualistic vocabulary". And that, my friend, is exactly what you are saying too.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

As soon as you try to do that, I will take your definitions and construct a proof that they lead to a contradiction. The only way you will have of escaping that proof will be to do exactly what you did to escape the last one : to claim that in fact subjective experiences are synonymous (completely identical in every way) with brain processes. But if you do that, then you might just as well have never defined the subjective terms in the first place. They are not needed. They can be eliminated.

Agreed. I was merely pointing out that there is no harm in using them, as long as they are well-defined.

At this point the logical problems disappear but the eliminativists open themselves up to the accusation of having lost the plot, since they have now arrived at possibly the most counter-intuitive and incomprehensible metaphysical position ever invented. They have denied the existence of their own minds.

See, this is the sort of accusation that doesn't follow. Nothing allows you to go from "mind is a poorly-defined term" to "there is no such thing as mind." There certainly is such thing as mind, as long as it is defined correctly. Scientists may choose not to use the term at all, but that is neither here nor there.

Yep, that’s what I am saying. The only means "science" has of tackling this problem is to invoke materialism. But materialism isn’t science. This doesn’t stop people from claiming that the invoking of materialism is somehow "scientific." They are wrong. There is nothing scientific about it. It is the straightforward assertion of physicalism --- a philosophical claim --- but claimed to be scientific.

Why does science need to invoke materialism? Why can't it just invoke scientific epistemology, as it always does? If I take your claim to its logical conclusion, science can't tackle anything.

Some philosophers, representing the scientistic community, have realised that the game is going to be lost by the physicalists unless they are eliminativists. So they are still "playing the game". it’s just they have figured out how the game works whereas the people trying to defend non-eliminativist versions of physicalism have not yet figured out how the game works. So I am here to make them wiggle and dance until the penny finally drops and they realise their position is fundamentally incoherent.

So who is an example of a noneliminative materialist scientist?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

--------------------------
eliminative materialism: the claim that our mentalistic talk is so deeply flawed that must be abandoned, and there is no hope of correlating our talk about beliefs and desires with our talk about brain states. Includes the claims that mental events are not identical to brain events because minds and mental events do not exist.
-----------------------------------------

Paul writes: Perhaps this is what you mean by denying subjective experience. It doesn't, of course, but merely denies that "mental events" are a different sort of thing from "brain events." If mental events are not different, then those terms should be abandoned to avoid dualistic confusion.

Go back and read it again.

From the definition : "mental events are not identical to brain events because minds and mental events do not exist"

Paul's mis-reading of the definition: "It doesn't deny that subjective experiences exist."

It does make this denial, Paul. It does not claim that "mental events are a different sort of thing from brain events". That would not be eliminativism. It makes the quite specific claim that mental things DO NOT EXIST. What part of "DO NOT EXIST" are you having trouble understanding?

 

[Mercutio]

I understand you perfectly. You obviously didn't read my post. Try reading some of my replies to Paul. Maybe that will help. You have agreed with me. Sorry if you can't figure that out. Come on, Merc, your IQ is considerably higher than Darat's. Have another look at what I am claiming. It is you that has not understood me. I am not claiming that [all forms of] physicalism is false. I am claiming the only way to defend it is to eliminate the "dualistic vocabulary". And that. my friend, is exactly what you are saying.

I am saying that the very claim you are making is incoherent. The issue is a non-issue. If you agreed with me, you would never have written the OP in the first place, nor would you be asking for coherent definitions of those terms.

I can see why you superficially think I agree with you. Perhaps this is why you have misunderstood Darat; he has shown in this and other threads that he knows what I am talking about. But unless you, fairly soon, do as he suggests and support your view on its own, I am afraid I must continue to conclude that you do not understand what I have said (although Darat has).

My view could be expressed fairly simply (and, I believe, has been on some other threads). I am off to teach right now--see if you can demonstrate that we agree by the time I get back.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Agreed. I was merely pointing out that there is no harm in using them, as long as they are well-defined.

But, crucially, the position entails that there is no point in using them.

See, this is the sort of accusation that doesn't follow. Nothing allows you to go from "mind is a poorly-defined term" to "there is no such thing as mind." There certainly is such thing as mind, as long as it is defined correctly.

If your definition of "mind" has everything in common with what are currently defined as "brain processes" then there should be no reason why these words cannot be used interchangeably to refer to the exact same thing. The trouble starts as soon as you actually try to do this. But this is irrelevant. All you have done is redefine "mind" to mean "brain process". It is dishonest to then go on using mentalistic vocabulary to refer to things that other people do not accept are "brain processes". So long as you continue to use the mentalistic vocabulary, non-eliminativists will think you are using those words to mean what all of the non-eliminativists mean by those words - and in truth, so are you. To avoid this dishonesty and confusion I am insisting that people defending eliminativism face up to the consequences of what they are defending instead of trying to "soften" it by continuing to use the very same mentalistic talk which they need to eliminate in order to be able to defend their position. I am not going to let people resort to eliminativist arguments to defend physicalism and then immediately go back to using mentalistic vocabulary to defend other things they believe. You've got to be consistent.

Why does science need to invoke materialism?

Because no empirical science can tackle the question, in principle.

Why can't it just invoke scientific epistemology, as it always does?

Ah, but it doesn't. It claims it is invoking epistemology and then uses this to make claims which are implicitly ontological.

If I take your claim to its logical conclusion, science can't tackle anything.

Nonsense. Science can tackle every empirical question it can ask.

So who is an example of a noneliminative materialist scientist?

A public figure? Can't think of any off the top of my head. There's plenty of people here who fit that description though.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Go back and read it again.

From the definition : "mental events are not identical to brain events because minds and mental events do not exist"

Paul's mis-reading of the definition: "It doesn't deny that subjective experiences exist."

Don't you take it as meaning "... because minds and mental events do not exist on their own"?

It does make this denial, Paul. It does not claim that "mental events are a different sort of thing from brain events". That would not be eliminativism. It makes the quite specific claim that mental things DO NOT EXIST. What part of "DO NOT EXIST" are you having trouble understanding?

The part where anyone has the right to eliminate concepts, as opposed to things. I think all it is saying is that minds do not exist as separate things from brains.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

If you agreed with me, you would never have written the OP in the first place, nor would you be asking for coherent definitions of those terms.

That's a misunderstanding on your part. I agree with you that if you define those terms and then try to defend physicalism you can prove this leads to a contradiction. My reason for OP is somewhat different to this, and you have not explained what this has got to do with your position.

Merc, this would be a lot easier if you BACKED OFF telling me I don't understand you and started reading what I post instead. I can just as easily tell you that you do not understand where I am coming from. Then it turns into a p*ss*ng contest.

But unless you, fairly soon, do as he suggests and support your view on its own, I am afraid I must continue to conclude that you do not understand what I have said (although Darat has).

I have no idea why people keep asking me to do this. I started a thread for precisely this purpose. Nobody engaged with it.

ARE YOU BLIND?

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=54825

Title of thread : "Geoff's neutral monism clarified."

Funny, I made the silly mistake of thinking that the point of this thread was to support my own view.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If your definition of "mind" has everything in common with what are currently defined as "brain processes" then there should be no reason why these words cannot be used interchangeably to refer to the exact same thing. The trouble starts as soon as you actually try to do this. But this is irrelevant. All you have done is redefine "mind" to mean "brain process". It is dishonest to then go on using mentalistic vocabulary to refer to things that other people do not accept are "brain processes".

Agreed, which is why I do not use the term mind in practical discussions of neurophysiology.

So long as you continue to use the mentalistic vocabulary, non-eliminativists will think you are using those words to mean what all of the non-eliminativists mean by those words - and in truth, so are you. To avoid this dishonesty and confusion I am insisting that people defending eliminativism face up to the consequences of what they are defending instead of trying to "soften" it by continuing to use the very same mentalistic talk which they need to eliminate in order to be able to defend their position.

Fair enough.

Because no empirical science can tackle the question, in principle.

In principle? You mean you're saying that, in principle, what we call subjective experience cannot be brain function? How do you know this?

Ah, but it doesn't. It claims it is invoking epistemology and then uses this to make claims which are implicitly ontological.

Such as?

Nonsense. Science can tackle every empirical question it can ask.

And why is this one not empirical?

A public figure? Can't think of any off the top of my head. There's plenty of people here who fit that description though.

So far, a noneliminative materialist is a person who is using naive folk psychology terms in a loose manner. Not the highest of crimes, really.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Geoff, I think you're making a mountain of angst out of a molehill. Abandoning sloppy vocabularly does not eliminate subjective experience as a field of empirical study. However, you appear to think that subjective experience is not a candidate for study anyway.

So that leaves you with just the philosophical approach to subjective experience. In this confined space, eliminative materialism does indeed eliminate subjective experience, because in philosophy the elimination of terms truly eliminates paths of thought. If I felt as you do about subjective experience as a field of study, I too would reject eliminative materialism if for no other reason than to save subjective experience for further consideration.

Are you sure you want to camp in such a confined space?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Don't you take it as meaning "... because minds and mental events do not exist on their own"?

No, Paul. I take the words to mean exactly what they mean. If it meant what you seem to think it means, it wouldn't be a description of eliminativism. The words matter. Especially in this case. Your "interpretation" leads to it being emergentism or epiphenomenalism or some other non-eliminativist version of physicalism, which defeats the entire point of specifying eliminativism in the first place.

Eliminativism = There is no such as a "mind" so stop using the word.

I think all it is saying is that minds do not exist as separate things from brains.

Then you are simply imposing your own meaning on something, a meaning which is fundamentally wrong.

Eliminativism : It does exactly what is says on the tin.

And I think you have forgotten something. In response to my proof you ended up having to make the following claim:

"The experience of seeing the chair is precisely the brain process."

In which case you are equating the phrase "experience of seeing the chair" and "brain process". If so, then one of them can be eliminated. It is excess to requirements. If your claim is true, then there is no need to claim that minds exists AT ALL. All I am asking is that you are consistent. If these two phrases refer to precisely the same thing, then there is no more need to refer to "minds". Hence "minds", in any sense of the word as it is used in common usage, DO NOT EXIST. Instead, what exists are brain processes. You cannot equate the word "mind" to "brain process" in order to defend physicalism and then subsequently go back to using that word to mean what everybody else takes it to mean. It's dishonest. You are wobbling between two different meanings for the word "mind". One of them supports physicalism and the other refers to what normal people actually mean by "mind".



Mercutio

No. You are seeing what you want to see, and not what I am saying.

Nope - that's what you are doing. I will try once more. This time, don't assume you are talking to Ian or Lifegazer. You are talking to Geoff now.

It is, once again, understandable--you are unable to see past your assumptions because you are constrained by the language you have chosen

OK...in small sentences this time....

1) I didn't define any of those terms!!!
2) I gave people the option whether or not they wanted to define them!!!

How can I be constrained by my assumptions and my language if I haven't assumed anything and I am allowing people to provide THEIR OWN definitions?

And I gave them the option of not defining them at all!!!!

Understand yet?

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

In principle? You mean you're saying that, in principle, what we call subjective experience cannot be brain function? How do you know this?

No. I am saying that, in principle, scientific materialism has one way and one way only to explain the relationship between subjective experience and brain function. That way is to define them to be the same thing. But this isn't anything to do with science. Science itself never gets a look-in. Instead, all that has happened is that materialism has been defined to be true. That isn't empirical science.

Geoff: It claims it is invoking epistemology and then uses this to make claims which are implicitly ontological.

Paul: Such as?

"subjective experiences are brain processes".

Geoff: Nonsense. Science can tackle every empirical question it can ask.

Paul: And why is this one not empirical?

Because it is an ontological assertion. No empirical research needed to be done to arrive at the conclusion. It is a theoretical claim based entirely on ontology. Ontology is a non-empirical discipline.

So far, a noneliminative materialist is a person who is using naive folk psychology terms in a loose manner. Not the highest of crimes, really.

No. A non-eliminative materialist is someone who tries to make two contradictory claims:

1) Minds really exist.
2) Minds don't really exist.

Non-materialists deny (2), eliminativists deny (1). Non-eliminativists try to deny neither but this leads to a contradiction.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff, I think you're making a mountain of angst out of a molehill. Abandoning sloppy vocabularly does not eliminate subjective experience as a field of empirical study.

We are talking about the defence of theoretical positions.

However, you appear to think that subjective experience is not a candidate for study anyway.

Not the same sort of study that is applicable to the physical world, no.

So that leaves you with just the philosophical approach to subjective experience. In this confined space, eliminative materialism does indeed eliminate subjective experience, because in philosophy the elimination of terms truly eliminates paths of thought. If I felt as you do about subjective experience as a field of study, I too would reject eliminative materialism if for no other reason than to save subjective experience for further consideration.

One step at a time. I do reject eliminative materialism, but I need people to understand my reasons for rejecting it, and my reasons for claiming that is at least logical, unlike non-eliminative materialism.

Are you sure you want to camp in such a confined space?

~~ Paul

It's not me who is confined. I'm not the one who thinks phenomenology is pointless.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No. I am saying that, in principle, scientific materialism has one way and one way only to explain the relationship between subjective experience and brain function. That way is to define them to be the same thing. But this isn't anything to do with science. Science itself never gets a look-in. Instead, all that has happened is that materialism has been defined to be true. That isn't empirical science.

Yes, that is absolutely what is going on in the philosophy of mind. Science itself never gets a look-in. Yet one more reason to reject metaphysics.

Because it is an ontological assertion. No empirical research needed to be done to arrive at the conclusion. It is a theoretical claim based entirely on ontology. Ontology is a non-empirical discipline.

I hereby stipulate to whatever you say about the nonsense going on in the philosophy of mind departments vis a vis subjective experience and eliminativism.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

One step at a time. I do reject eliminative materialism, but I need people to understand my reasons for rejecting it, and my reasons for claiming that is at least logical, unlike non-eliminative materialism.

In the context of philosophy of mind, I also agree that eliminative materialism is logical, but I reject it out of hand because it closes doors that should be left open.

Fortunately, I don't think philosophy of mind is worth much, so these ill-thought-out decisions on my part don't matter.

Say, do philosophy of mind departments consider the deja vu problem?

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Yep, especially anyone thinking of trying to defend non-eliminativist physicalism (like wasp, for example).[/QUOTE

Now wait a second here. When did I accrue this label? I used emergentism as a simple example to show you why your "proof" was wrong, and I expressly mentioned that it was only one reason why. I did this because you seem to ignore completely the other answer, which is what I actually believe. That "emergentism" answer was designed to show that your "proof" erred in its limited view of causation. It does not follow that emergentism is the precisely correct answer to life, the universe, and everything; and I never meant it to be taken that way. The second answer to your challenge attacks one of the premises, but not necessarily in the way you expect.

From the way that you use the terms I am an eliminativist. But I think that is a misuse of terms because it implies that there was something there to eliminate in the first place rather than a linguistic smear that confuses the picture.

There is no mind. There never has been a mind. The problem with your P1 is that it is a "thing", a noun, an experience. There are no experiences. There is experiencing. There is no mind. There is "minding". Even when we try to explain it by talking about the "process of neuron firing" we end up using noun clauses. We don't have the vocabulary to discuss this meaningfully unless you make a shift in thinking to everything "mental" being a verb rather than a noun. We don't need to speak about them being separate entities, or separate substances, or different aspects of the same thing because all of that language is fruitlessly lost in some form of dualism and quite frankly does not capture what happens in the brain. Mind isn't a different thing because it isn't a thing at all. It is action.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

1) Minds really exist.
2) Minds don't really exist.

Non-materialists deny (2), eliminativists deny (1). Non-eliminativists try to deny neither but this leads to a contradiction.

1) Unicorns really exist.
2) Unicorns don't really exist.

(1) and (2) can both be true for certain meanings of "exist", the two statements are not necessarily contradictory.

I would suggest if you go down this route you will need to explain quite clearly (e.g. give it at lesat an internally coherent definition) what you mean by "exist".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

1) Unicorns really exist.
2) Unicorns don't really exist.

(1) and (2) can both be true for certain meanings of "exist", the two statements are not necessarily contradictory.

That is correct. Fictional things can be said to exist. However, I do not believe my mind is fictional. If is the material world which deserves the tag "fictional", not mind. Here's a logical explanation of why:

"The Physical Word is a Fiction":

http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~ursa/philos/phinow3.htm

I would suggest if you go down this route you will need to explain quite clearly (e.g. give it at lesat an internally coherent definition) what you mean by "exist".

To me?

The problem here is that nobody understands my system so when I try to define things for them they end up imposing their own meanings on words that I am using to mean what *I* mean. I can explain quite clearly what I mean in terms of neutral monism, but you woudn't be able to understand it

As for the rest of you....

I am glad to see you have abandoned all those silly non-eliminativist physicalist positions and have admitted the bald truth of coherent materialism: minds don't exist.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

When have I ever claimed otherwise? I told you my position at the very beginning and you blithely ignored it and went off on a tangent.