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The Monty Hall problem

Since we have no new information, we must assume the odds remain the same as before, and switch.

I don't think you can justify even that much of a statement (that we "must" make a certain assumption). Depending on which of the possible strategies we assume Monty has, our odds of winning by sticking with our first choice can be somewhere between 0% and 100%. Without any kind of reason for assigning probabilities to his possible strategies, it's simply unsolvable.
 
I don't think you can justify even that much of a statement (that we "must" make a certain assumption). Depending on which of the possible strategies we assume Monty has, our odds of winning by sticking with our first choice can be somewhere between 0% and 100%. Without any kind of reason for assigning probabilities to his possible strategies, it's simply unsolvable.
I get your point, but if the question of all possible strategies is essentially unanswerable, then I would think those factors are added to all the unanswerable and unimaginable possibilities, everything from a door opening strategy to cheating and no car at all to the door swinging open accidentally, etc., and does that not leave us with the original odds? Chances that we made the wrong choice initially are 2 in 3. Absent the possibility of further information, what would reasonably change our assessment of that probability?
 
Monty opening either of the doors you didn't pick, at random, irrespective of whether or not he reveals the car.

If that's his game, switching won't make any difference.

Rolfe.
 
Monty opening either of the doors you didn't pick, at random, irrespective of whether or not he reveals the car.

If that's his game, switching won't make any difference.

Rolfe.
Why? We only get to play the game once, and in the game we play, he opens a goat door.

Situation one: We choose a door. Monty, who knows what is behind the doors, opens a goat door. Our original choice had a 2/3 chance of being wrong when we made it, and we already knew that at least one remaining door must have a goat. What is changed by confirmation that this was true?

Situation two: We choose a door. Monty, who randomly chooses a door without knowledge, opens a goat door. Our original choice had a 2/3 chance of being wrong when we made it, and we already knew that at least one remaining door must have a goat. What more do we know than before?
 
As always: Play the game and look at the actual numbers!

Why? We only get to play the game once, and in the game we play, he opens a goat door.

True.

Situation one: We choose a door. Monty, who knows what is behind the doors, opens a goat door. Our original choice had a 2/3 chance of being wrong when we made it, and we already knew that at least one remaining door must have a goat. What is changed by confirmation that this was true?

We don't learn anything new. But knowing that it is Monty's intention to show us a got no matter what allows us to understand what is going on. Changing is the right strategy. We don't have to wait for Monty to open one of the two doors to know this.

Situation two: We choose a door. Monty, who randomly chooses a door without knowledge, opens a goat door. Our original choice had a 2/3 chance of being wrong when we made it, and we already knew that at least one remaining door must have a goat. What more do we know than before?

Again, what Monty actually ends up doing is not important to us. It is only important how he acts, i.e. what constraints he has placed upon his actions. The rest follows from that.

Here, we learn that we are not in the situation where the car is behind the door opened by Monty - so we know we're not playing one of three possible games/situations.
 
Situation two: We choose a door. Monty, who randomly chooses a door without knowledge, opens a goat door. Our original choice had a 2/3 chance of being wrong when we made it, and we already knew that at least one remaining door must have a goat. What more do we know than before?

Suppose we choose door 1 and Monty opens door 2 to reveal a goat.

You could just as easily say, originally door 1 and door 3 had equal chances of hiding the car, so they still do have equal chances of hiding the car, because "what more do we know than before?"

But, of course, we do know something that we didn't know before, namely that there is a goat behind door 2. For all we knew beforehand, there could have been a car there.

Why should that knowledge change door 3's chances of hiding the car, but not change door 1's chances?
 
Suppose we choose door 1 and Monty opens door 2 to reveal a goat.

You could just as easily say, originally door 1 and door 3 had equal chances of hiding the car, so they still do have equal chances of hiding the car, because "what more do we know than before?"

But, of course, we do know something that we didn't know before, namely that there is a goat behind door 2. For all we knew beforehand, there could have been a car there.

Why should that knowledge change door 3's chances of hiding the car, but not change door 1's chances?
I think that's true only if we have reason to believe that there's a system in the selection of which door monty opens, or if we otherwise assign some significance to the difference between numbered doors. Otherwise we only know "one of the remaining doors had a goat." We always knew that. Maybe I'm being dense, but I can't see that knowing the number of the door is relevant, or that it changes the basic odds that our original choice had a 2/3 chance of being wrong.

Imagine a similar test in which, rather than doors, we are choosing un-ordered boxes from an unordered pile. We cannot distinguish the difference between the boxes. Perhaps we're blindfolded. One of the three has a prize in it and the others are empty. We pick up one box. We know we have a 2/3 chance of being wrong, but that right or wrong, one of the remaining boxes must be empty. The host, who is not blindfolded or otherwise has a way of knowing what's in the boxes that we are not privy to, picks up one empty box and opens it, and offers us the same old "stay or switch" option. We always knew that at least one remaining box was empty. How does this version differ from the doors and goats version in any substantive way?

Grabbing a last minute edit, I think what I'm getting at here is that, as I perceive it, you choose one door out of several. At a later date, you are allowed the option which amounts to "do you prefer to stick with the one you chose, or switch for all the others." When Monty opens a door, he narrows down which member of the set "all the others" is which, but this is relevant only within the set. It does not change the relation of the set "all the others" to "the one you chose."
 
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Imagine a similar test in which, rather than doors, we are choosing un-ordered boxes from an unordered pile. We cannot distinguish the difference between the boxes. Perhaps we're blindfolded. One of the three has a prize in it and the others are empty. We pick up one box. We know we have a 2/3 chance of being wrong, but that right or wrong, one of the remaining boxes must be empty. The host, who is not blindfolded or otherwise has a way of knowing what's in the boxes that we are not privy to, picks up one empty box and opens it, and offers us the same old "stay or switch" option. We always knew that at least one remaining box was empty. How does this version differ from the doors and goats version in any substantive way?

I don't believe it differs from the usual Monty Hall problem. But I though we were talking now about a version where Monty doesn't know which door is which, and only happens to show a goat, rather than one where he intentionally shows a goat.

Grabbing a last minute edit, I think what I'm getting at here is that, as I perceive it, you choose one door out of several. At a later date, you are allowed the option which amounts to "do you prefer to stick with the one you chose, or switch for all the others." When Monty opens a door, he narrows down which member of the set "all the others" is which, but this is relevant only within the set. It does not change the relation of the set "all the others" to "the one you chose."

If Monty doesn't know which door is which, the option you're given is not actually switching to both remaining doors; it's switching to both remaining doors provided Monty shows a goat, which he might not do. That changes things.

1/3 of the time, your initial door is right. But, of the 2/3 of the time that it's wrong, Monty accidentally shows the car 1/2 the time. (He has two doors to choose from, and the car is behind one of them.) This means that, overall, Monty shows the car 1/3 of the time, because 1/2 of 2/3 is 1/3. He didn't show the car now, though, so we can exclude that possibility. We're still left undecided as to whether the situation in front of us is the 1/3 of the time that your initial door is right, or whether it's the 1/3 of the time that both your initial door is wrong and Monty shows a goat. And these two possibilities occur equally often. So, it doesn't matter whether you stay or switch.
 
I don't believe it differs from the usual Monty Hall problem. But I though we were talking now about a version where Monty doesn't know which door is which, and only happens to show a goat, rather than one where he intentionally shows a goat.



If Monty doesn't know which door is which, the option you're given is not actually switching to both remaining doors; it's switching to both remaining doors provided Monty shows a goat, which he might not do. That changes things.

1/3 of the time, your initial door is right. But, of the 2/3 of the time that it's wrong, Monty accidentally shows the car 1/2 the time. (He has two doors to choose from, and the car is behind one of them.) This means that, overall, Monty shows the car 1/3 of the time, because 1/2 of 2/3 is 1/3. He didn't show the car now, though, so we can exclude that possibility. We're still left undecided as to whether the situation in front of us is the 1/3 of the time that your initial door is right, or whether it's the 1/3 of the time that both your initial door is wrong and Monty shows a goat. And these two possibilities occur equally often. So, it doesn't matter whether you stay or switch.

OK, I can see ( I think) how if if we know monty has a 50/50 chance of ending the game, then this clearly influences the likely number of remaining games, and thus the odds. What if we don't know whether or not his choice is random? If we don't see other examples of the game than our own, and are not told how he chooses, and if he chooses a goat, are the odds calculable at all? I was inclined to think we should stick to the original odds and switch, but I'm about ready to concede that it's a shot in the dark.
 
What if we don't know whether or not his choice is random? If we don't see other examples of the game than our own, and are not told how he chooses, and if he chooses a goat, are the odds calculable at all?

I would tend to say no.

One could calculate the odds by assigning a probability to each possibility. For example, we could say that, with probability 1/2, Monty will choose randomly, and, with probability 1/2, he will deliberately avoid the car. Then, we could calculate a specific answer. But that seems somewhat arbitrary.
 
Monty opening either of the doors you didn't pick, at random, irrespective of whether or not he reveals the car.

If that's his game, switching won't make any difference.

Rolfe.

? I think that depends on what is seen as the outcome.

I'm going to regret this. Disagree. Your point would be valid if Monty was choosing his door entirely at random. It is not valid if Monty is barred from choosing the same door you chose.
Rolfe.

The problem as set out by Vos Savant, does prevent Monty from opening the contestant’s door. Variants can make a difference, but are a side-track. I am referring only to the "original" puzzle as expressed by Vos Savant, and the nonsense about knowing, avoiding and probability.
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"Suppose you're on a game show, and you're given the choice of three doors: Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick a door, say No. 1, and the host, who knows what's behind the doors, opens another door, say No. 3, which has a goat. He then says to you, "Do you want to pick door No. 2?" Is it to your advantage to switch your choice?"
—Whitaker/vos Savant 1990

And these explanations:
“Here is the way Monty explains it. When the contestant made his first choice his probability of being right was 1/3. When Monty opened the second door the contestant would think his chance of being right had gone up to 1/2. It hadn't, though, it was still 1/3; and since the only other place the auto could be was behind the third door, the probability of it's being there was 2/3."

“This is the way Marilyn first explained it: "Suppose there were 100 doors and Monty opened 98 of them. You'd switch pretty fast then, wouldn't you?"
“You are on a game show with three doors. A car is behind one; goats are behind the others. You pick door No. 1. Suddenly, a worried look flashes across the host’s usually smiling face. He forgot which door hides the car! So he says a little prayer and opens No. 3. Much to his relief, a goat is revealed. He asks, “Do you want door No. 2?” Is it to your advantage to switch?”
—W.R. Neuman, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Nope. If the host is clueless, it makes no difference whether you stay or switch. If he knows, switch."
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The puzzle is a rather bad joke. If there is any probability, it is imputed, or inferred by the reader. All the other stuff: Monty, game, winning, swapping is narration, and obfuscation by dint of word.

1) If probability is invoked, then it never changes from the initial state.
2) If there is any probability, it is not conditional.
3) It’s a game if you want it to be.
4) The contestant can never learn to advantage by watching previous iterations, unless the advantage to any given door is huge.
5) My idea of the garages and recruiting Jeeves is narration.
6) The 100 door example is irrelevant.
7) The statement “if Monty knows, swap, but if he doesn’t know, don’t” is
narrative Voodoo.

I have re-written this post few times, because the more I think about it, the more trivial the puzzle becomes. I started with the earlier garages idea, where Dave wants to find the car in the most efficient manner, and where Monty/Jeeves is replaced by a deterministic Boolean logic device operating the doors. A sort of game, where Dave and Monty are co-operative. That “works”, but is still over-egged.

I started with the idea that Dave knows nothing at all, so what could he do?
Start simple and just look.
1) Opening just one door is not going to find the car, so that’s out.
2) Opening all 3 doors will work, but is the worst case, so that’s out.
3) That leaves two doors or steps, as the only possibility for improvement. (So “swapping”)

Dave knows nothing, so perhaps there are 3 cars, and therefore 2^3=8 possible states. My next line of thought was to say that the puzzle limited
that set ( perhaps by Karnaugh mapping or Veitch diagram http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karnaugh_map), to the point where Monty’s simple Boolean engine could do the rest.

Like this:

attachment.php


But, the third table tells all. It’s a “walking one”, which may be applied to a range of puzzles built upon it. For example:

Dave is given the task of writing down the colour of a car he finds behind one of three doors. He knows nothing other than that.
He approaches Door A and opens it, and finds a black car is there, so writes that down, and then leaves. The next day, he tries what worked the last time, but this time the car is not there, but for some unknown reason, Door C has opened. He looks, but the car isn’t there, so he tries Door B, and the black car is there. He notes that, and leaves.
On the third day, he again tries Door A, but this time, Door B opens, but the car is not there, but he finds it behind C.
On the fourth day, it’s back at Door A.

That is because the car is on a train which advances one door at a time, and then loops back to Door A. The doors are closed when he is not there, and they are not independent, but related. As the train moves, it sets a mechanical device that opens the relevant door, should it be triggered by Dave opening any door.

Winning = knowing the color of the car
Swapping = walking a bit further to the relevant door on each occasion
Even distribution = the train’s motion.
Door logic = Monty.
Contestant = trigger on the door.

Of course, Dave can learn the pattern, and cut down on the amount of walking, if the rule can’t be inferred from the question.
Monty is just the interconnection of the doors, and his stage crew, the train, and where they just happen to put the car.

The logic of Monty’s doors means that the contestant is faced with one door, where the car may be there in 1/3 of the trials, but two other doors that are effectively one, and were the car is 2/3 of the trials.

Instead of you choosing, and then being asked to swap, what would you say if Monty first asked “would you like to choose the door were I put the car 1/3 of the time, or the door where I put it 2/3 of the time?”

It’s not “I have 1/3 of chance with a door, and if I swap, then 2/3 with the remaining door” but “with that system of 3 doors, I have 2/3 of a chance”.

If Dave were to watch the show, he could learn nothing of value. If the car were evenly distributed, and he swaps, he is guaranteed a 2/3 success rate. To beat that, a car would have to be behind any one door more than 2/3 of the time. One way or the other, some process has to be there, if the probability is to be other than 1/3.

The 100 door claim is superfluous because 3 doors is the only number that allows one input state to be mapped to two output states. More or fewer doors do not allow for that.

It’s so dumb. If there is no Monty, and you “choose” a door, and then tell yourself that there is “2/3 chance with the other two”, that is a truism of no value, because you still have two doors to select from, so the chance remains at 1/3.

If Monty is there, and he shows an open door, then you may say that the chance with the other two is`1/2. Many say that, and it’s correct, but Monty does not open the door you have chosen, so the car will certainly be behind the other door. (if it's not behind your first choice)
Variants play around that inanity.
 

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