The Hard Problem of Gravity

[AkuManiMani]

I will give an extended response;

I appreciate you taking the time to write detailed responses to my rather unpopular positions

here is the short form, if consciousness is encoded in the EM then there are some situations that are possible
1. The EM field represents the patterns of neural firing, carried through the biological organic processes of neural transmission and nurotransmission, one in cells and co-joined cells the other between cells. I think with both agree upon this
I have an important caveat however:
1.a. the organic transmission in cells and between cells has a conditioned response. this is not represented in the EM field patterns but is crucial to the 'gating' or fuzzy Boolean logic of brain patterns.

Your caveat is consistent w/ my earlier comments in which I stated that intelligence and computation are not necessarily identical to conscious experience. My rationale for stating such is that neural processing of some kind or another continues to go on even in absence of one having a conscious experience. In other words, one must account for why computational processes continue to go on in the nervous system, and the rest of the body, even in absence of consciousness. If conscious activity is restricted to a certain range of brainwave activity [which studies have shown] then it would strongly imply that such activity is relevant to consciousness -- if not identical to it.

So that brings us to

2. The EM field generated by the generated by the brain also interacts with the brain and off the top of my head I think that you stated McFadden thinks it changes the depolarization potential.

3. The EM field of the brain is a byproduct of the brain and does not interact with the neural transmission in any form other than as a spurious byproduct of depolarization.

Now here is the deal:

There appears to be no evidence for 2, in fact you seem to agree to this in your post. And I do not see how frequency of pulses in EM fields is going to have any difference at all whatsoever, if EM fields cause changes in the depolarization potential, the massive and moderate EM fields will do the same thing.

So why is the 'consciousness' interacts with the EM field of the brain is it not overwhelmed by magnetic fields that are billions of times stronger than the EM field of the brain?

that is why I say, if the EM field has an effect on neural transmission, then it should be swamped by the fields generated by a transformer station, where they will be 6 -8 orders of magnitude stronger than those in the brain.

To clarify; Yes, I do agree that McFadden's assertion that the EEM of the brain has an affect on the initiation of action potentials is the most conjectural portion of the hypothesis. Though I believe it can be argued that there is currently some unknown signaling mechanism that could selectively allow only the EEM to affect potentials, there isn't any non-circumstantial evidence for it that I'm aware of.

As to the question of ambient fields overwhelming the EEM I would like to again point out that there mere presence of denser fields would not be sufficient to disrupt weaker EM signals. Shining a bright light thru a weaker beam of light doesn't block passage of the weaker beam. Just as the presence of power lines in the vicinity of a radio transmitter does not necessarily block reception, so it can be argue that mere field density would not negate or disrupt the weak endogenous field of the brain. If anything, such field would just make it harder to pick out the endogenous signal from the noise -- which is why subjects are put into a shielded room when undergoing a MEG scan.

I've said before that the brain is analogous to biological computer hardware and mental patterns [like thoughts and memes] are like biological computer software. If such is the case, then is means that thoughts are encoded in some way by the hardware of the brain and that, in principle, there must be some way of decoding and reading such patterns of activity. Simply cracking open someone's skull and picking at neurons won't do; you'd be more likely do damage the person that get any useful information. The next best thing would be to utilize relatively non-invasive methods to read the encoded information from the brain's EEM. Of course, even assuming that one had sensitive enough equipment, they would presumably need some computer software to sort thru all the activity to even begin the process of decoding specific thought patterns across the brain.

Are my proposals mostly tentative speculation and conjecture? Of course. I'm well aware of the difficulties in substantiating such claims and the even greater challenges of putting them to use if they are actually valid. But, as you may have guessed, I think there is enough data and circumstantial evidence to justify serious speculation in this area. I just so happen to specialize in wild speculation

 

[Dancing David]

Oki. I'll try to keep my sarcasm in check as well



I agree with that comment except on one point. I don't think is appropriate to say that we 'learn' perceptions like red. Either our brains can readily generate them or not. Its the labels and associations of perceptions that we learn and not the perceptions themselves.

Well, I was using a broad definition of 'learn', as short hand at the time.

Our brains develop neural patterns of firing in association with exposure to stimuli. No stimuli, no development of those structures of the brain along those lines.

Which is why I say that Poor Mary (raised in the black and white room) will never ever see the color red. If she is exposed to blue, green and yellow, but not purple or any red tones, then she may see the color red when exposed to it as some sort of gray (or something) but since her long wave photo receptors were not ever exposed to red, she will not see red. Just as you can not acquire language beyond a certain age, I o not think she will see the color red, ever. (I could be wrong).

So to see colors requires exposure to colors during development, that is what I meant by 'learned' as well as the neural association developed through use.

I understand your usage as well, and agree with it.

That is true. Its also true that the presence of large electromagnetic fields does not necessarily negate or disrupt radio transmissions either.

That was not the point, if the EM field modifies the neurons at the micro gauss level, I think that it will at the mega gauss level.

You do know about shielding and RF interferences right?

If you say the EM field you can mean either
1. Radiation
2. Magnetism
3. Both.

What part of the EM field effects neural transmission.

My experiment with the extension cord will be a both situation.

It would mess with an AM radio transmission for sure, but not FM as much.

Its important to keep in mind that the quanta of such fields are photon [i.e. light] of varying pattens and frequencies.

Sorry neuron tuning is getting out there, your mechanisms are still left for us to wonder what they are.

Take another example. Suppose one were to try to communicate data optically in some fashion. Simply sending another transmission thru the encoded beam would not disrupt it or the information it carries.

That is different you are talking about EM radiation there and yes you will not get exactly interference but you will get interference. Not like radio but more like waves on a pond.

So are you saying that the brain uses photons?

As Ichneumonwasp pointed out earlier, TMS does not work by directly manipulating the endogenous field of the brain but indirecly, by inducing a current in living brain tissue. This induced current, in turn, contributes to a change in the endogenous field of the brain and hence the conscious experience of the subject.

I will have to reread his post I though he said that it caused depolarization.

Even then, the inducing field of the TMS must be of an extremely high density [15 orders of magnitude higher than the endogenous field, as Pixy has pointed out] to directly affect brain activity.

there are many ways to do that and so how is something that is fifteen OOM going to have a similar effect?

Which brings me to my response to your thought experiments [1 & 2]. If one were to carry out such experiments they most likely would not create any discernible effect on the consciousness of a subject. The reason for this is that, as you pointed out before, the cell membranes of neurons do not have the same physical properties of something like a conductive copper wire and does not transmit or react to electromagnetic fields or signals in the same way. The lipid bilayer that makes up most of the cell membrane is an insulator- meaning that it is not itself electrically conductive. However, while the bilayer itself is not conducive to electrical charge there are receptors embedded thru-out it that actively pump ions on either side of the membrane creating a voltage. When an appropriate signal [e.g. a neurotransmitter or other biological signal] triggers the relevant receptors embedded in the membrane and ions are temporarily allowed to pass across the voltage gradient, locally depolarizing the membrane. This sets off the coordinated propagation of the electrical signals we call action potentials. All this means is that, functionally, the cell membrane acts as a semiconductor.

Sort of, I will read your link, not like doped silicon at all.

The membranes of living cells differ from other conductive materials [such as metals] in that initiation and propitiation of electrical current along it's surface is biologically controlled. In order to even set an action potential in motion there must be either a highly specified biological signal,

yes.

direct application of a current, or brute force EM induction as in the case of TMS.

then how does the finesse approach work?

In regards to thought experiment 3 I would have to say that, due to reasons already mentioned, the experiment probably would not work. However, the basic premise that what actually carries the qualitative experience of consciousness is [or is encoded within] the endogenous field of the brain is not invalidated by the objections raised so far.

. really, how so, if it does not interact with the neurons, then it does what?

As far as whether or not the endogenous field of the brain has some direct causal role in cognitive function I'm not sure. There could possibly be some relevant interaction with specialized receptors embedded in neural membranes but, of course, that would just be conjecture at this point.

that is what I said, it is speculation and high level magnetic fields would certainly mess with it.

I will close this response by pointing out that when it comes to biology, it seems that nature always harbors some hidden surprises. Just a little over decade or so ago it was thought that photosynthesis operated by purely classical mechanisms [tho, the high efficiency and exact details of the process were a mystery]. Now there is mounting evidence that plants utilize QM effects to achieve the extremely high energy efficiency of photosynthesis. There is still much about the biological processes of cells [including neurons] that is not yet fully understood or known. IMO, it would be wise to leave open the possibility of functions in cells not before considered.

Sure when the hypothesis meets the criteria of observation. You bet.

 

[Nick227]

Your caveat is consistent w/ my earlier comments in which I stated that intelligence and computation are not necessarily identical to conscious experience. My rationale for stating such is that neural processing of some kind or another continues to go on even in absence of one having a conscious experience. In other words, one must account for why computational processes continue to go on in the nervous system, and the rest of the body, even in absence of consciousness.

A Strong AI response to this would be to point out that consciousness (conscious access) is not the sum total of information processing going on in the body. It's just the bits that are joined together!

I ("I") can see, hear, touch, taste, smell, feel and think because the outputs from those modules are joined together neuronally. I put "I" like this because it is not that there is some "I" observing or receiving all of this processing that's going on. It is rather that thinking (inner speech) is in this global workspace also and this thinking is constructing the other outputs into a subject-object relationships - little stories of "what's going on" revolving around a central character, "I."

According to a Strong AI interpretation of GWT, the brain and body consist of a multitude of discrete processing modules, some of which feed into and out of each other via a network called the global workspace. What separates conscious from unconscious processing is not anything particularly mystical. It's just the way things are connected up. For example, I can give a verbal report of what I see because these modules are wired together.

Nick

 

[Dancing David]

I appreciate you taking the time to write detailed responses to my rather unpopular positions



Your caveat is consistent w/ my earlier comments in which I stated that intelligence and computation are not necessarily identical to conscious experience. My rationale for stating such is that neural processing of some kind or another continues to go on even in absence of one having a conscious experience.

No doubt, one of the reasons I think we should avoid the word consciousness in general.

In other words, one must account for why computational processes continue to go on in the nervous system, and the rest of the body, even in absence of consciousness.

No need to account for it any more than why digestion occurs when we are not conscious.

If conscious activity is restricted to a certain range of brainwave activity [which studies have shown] then it would strongly imply that such activity is relevant to consciousness -- if not identical to it.

That is where I would say you have a mistaken impression, The presence of the wave patterns could be a byproduct of synchronization, not the actual process you label as conscious.

Just as a fan motor may increase speed to cope with a higher heat load. Or you may increase frequency to increase information capacity in bits.

To clarify; Yes, I do agree that McFadden's assertion that the EEM of the brain has an affect on the initiation of action potentials is the most conjectural portion of the hypothesis. Though I believe it can be argued that there is currently some unknown signaling mechanism that could selectively allow only the EEM to affect potentials, there isn't any non-circumstantial evidence for it that I'm aware of.

Sorry, I think that is convoluted.

As to the question of ambient fields overwhelming the EEM I would like to again point out that there mere presence of denser fields would not be sufficient to disrupt weaker EM signals. Shining a bright light thru a weaker beam of light doesn't block passage of the weaker beam. Just as the presence of power lines in the vicinity of a radio transmitter does not necessarily block reception,

Really, I get a buzz in my radio near high power transmission lines, do you want to check up on that. My refrigerator will give a spurious signal when the compressor kicks on as well.

Now not in FM, but man that is a whole other beast.

so it can be argue that mere field density would not negate or disrupt the weak endogenous field of the brain.

yes, but for it to matter there must be a ‘receiver’ of some sort, the extension cord will create both RF and magnetic forces that would swamp ‘receivers’.

If anything, such field would just make it harder to pick out the endogenous signal from the noise -- which is why subjects are put into a shielded room when undergoing a MEG scan.

I've said before that the brain is analogous to biological computer hardware and mental patterns [like thoughts and memes] are like biological computer software.

In some ways yes and others no, the software is part of grown architecture and conditioning (you know the potentiation/attenuation).

If such is the case, then is means that thoughts are encoded in some way by the hardware of the brain and that, in principle, there must be some way of decoding and reading such patterns of activity.

yes, but I believe that they are idiomatic and that each person would require a separate translator.

Simply cracking open someone's skull and picking at neurons won't do; you'd be more likely do damage the person that get any useful information. The next best thing would be to utilize relatively non-invasive methods to read the encoded information from the brain's EEM. Of course, even assuming that one had sensitive enough equipment, they would presumably need some computer software to sort thru all the activity to even begin the process of decoding specific thought patterns across the brain.

they did this with signals in the optic nerve recently.

Are my proposals mostly tentative speculation and conjecture? Of course. I'm well aware of the difficulties in substantiating such claims and the even greater challenges of putting them to use if they are actually valid. But, as you may have guessed, I think there is enough data and circumstantial evidence to justify serious speculation in this area. I just so happen to specialize in wild speculation

What is the evidence, synchronous signals are not enough, there are some confounding factors there are well. Like the networks that run throughout the brain.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Well, I was using a broad definition of 'learn', as short hand at the time.

Our brains develop neural patterns of firing in association with exposure to stimuli. No stimuli, no development of those structures of the brain along those lines.

Which is why I say that Poor Mary (raised in the black and white room) will never ever see the color red. If she is exposed to blue, green and yellow, but not purple or any red tones, then she may see the color red when exposed to it as some sort of gray (or something) but since her long wave photo receptors were not ever exposed to red, she will not see red. Just as you can not acquire language beyond a certain age, I o not think she will see the color red, ever. (I could be wrong).

So to see colors requires exposure to colors during development, that is what I meant by 'learned' as well as the neural association developed through use.

I understand your usage as well, and agree with it.

Oki-Doh, I can go w/ that. I've always found the Mary thought experiment to be a bit silly. "Knowing" all there is to know about the color red is not the same as experiencing the color. The experience of some sense impression (like the color red), as such, has a reality prior to any other learned associations to it. The mystery is exactly how brains give rise to specific impression like 'red' and what they would look like if they were being read off the brain by an outside observer.

[By the way, keep it up. Your responses are really getting my thoughts in motion and helping me develop my ideas further -- I'm going to have to start writing this stuff down and compiling it *_*]

That was not the point, if the EM field modifies the neurons at the micro gauss level, I think that it will at the mega gauss level.

You do know about shielding and RF interferences right?

If you say the EM field you can mean either
1. Radiation
2. Magnetism
3. Both.

What part of the EM field effects neural transmission?

My experiment with the extension cord will be a both situation.

It would mess with an AM radio transmission for sure, but not FM as much

I think you may have hit the nail on the head. I hadn't given any consideration to the possibility that the brain encodes information via amp. modulation. Now that I think more on your thought experiment, it seems much more likely that if conscious impressions are coded in the EEM then it must be according to some form of frequency modulation [this brings to mind the Fourier transforms invoked in the holonomic brain model].

[As a side note, I just realized that, here I am, defending the hypotheses of people with whom I've had no communication using arguments off the top of my head ]

Sorry neuron tuning is getting out there, your mechanisms are still left for us to wonder what they are.

[...]

That is different you are talking about EM radiation there and yes you will not get exactly interference but you will get interference. Not like radio but more like waves on a pond.

[...]

So are you saying that the brain uses photons?

Well, the 'messenger' particle of the electromagnetic force is the photon which is why visible light is part of the electromagnetic spectrum. So technically, yes. If the brain utilizes the EM force for any of is functions (which it undeniably does) then it uses photons -- specifically, virtual photons

Since we're on the topic of the use of photons in biology I would like to note that I've just recently read The Rainbow and the Worm by biophysicist Mae-Wan Ho. In it she details, among other things, experimental findings on the use of photons in cellular communication. She also goes into detail discussing other signaling mechanisms in organisms.

The book was a bit of a tough read since I haven't had all the relevant training in some of the subject areas covered in the book. What I was able to pick up on was quite interesting and seems to corroborate a lot of ideas I have been speculating on for some time now. I've since lent the book to a friend of mine whose currently majoring in the field and, so far, hes also found it an interesting read.

Even then, the inducing field of the TMS must be of an extremely high density [15 orders of magnitude higher than the endogenous field, as Pixy has pointed out] to directly affect brain activity.

there are many ways to do that and so how is something that is fifteen OOM going to have a similar effect?

As we've already covered, electrical signal propagation along neural membranes is very different from the electrical currents carried by metallic conductors like wires. Keep in mind that the energy conveyed by neurotransmitter molecules is orders of magnitude smaller than the energy unleashed by the resulting action potential. In the case of biological systems information is the deciding factor in biological action. The initial energy input, in the case of action potentials, is less significant than information input. To set off an action potential a signal trigger doesn't need to add the energy; it is already produced and stored by active ion transport across the membrane. All that is needed is the proper signaling elements and the information is amplified and relayed by the action potential.

Now, depending on exactly how information is encoded and received by membrane receptors, one should, in principle, be able to trigger the receptors in the same way as specific neurotransmitters. If [as your thought experiment seems to establish] alleged EM signaling in the brain is encoded via frequency modulation then field density or amplitude should not play a significant role. In such a scheme, the encoded information of the signal is more significant than its energy density in setting off an action potential.

Which brings me to my response to your thought experiments [1 & 2]. If one were to carry out such experiments they most likely would not create any discernible effect on the consciousness of a subject. The reason for this is that, as you pointed out before, the cell membranes of neurons do not have the same physical properties of something like a conductive copper wire and does not transmit or react to electromagnetic fields or signals in the same way. The lipid bilayer that makes up most of the cell membrane is an insulator- meaning that it is not itself electrically conductive. However, while the bilayer itself is not conducive to electrical charge there are receptors embedded thru-out it that actively pump ions on either side of the membrane creating a voltage. When an appropriate signal [e.g. a neurotransmitter or other biological signal] triggers the relevant receptors embedded in the membrane and ions are temporarily allowed to pass across the voltage gradient, locally depolarizing the membrane. This sets off the coordinated propagation of the electrical signals we call action potentials. All this means is that, functionally, the cell membrane acts as a semiconductor.

Sort of, I will read your link, not like doped silicon at all.

You're right. The membrane is semiconductive but there are significant differences between it and synthetic silicon chips.

The membranes of living cells differ from other conductive materials [such as metals] in that initiation and propitiation of electrical current along it's surface is biologically controlled. In order to even set an action potential in motion there must be either a highly specified biological signal, direct application of a current, or brute force EM induction as in the case of TMS.

Then how does the finesse approach work?

If, like other biological functions, the initiation operate via the 'finesse' approach then it must operate according to some frequency code carried by the valence shells of transmitter molecules and possibly in the endogenous field.

In regards to thought experiment 3 I would have to say that, due to reasons already mentioned, the experiment probably would not work. However, the basic premise that what actually carries the qualitative experience of consciousness is [or is encoded within] the endogenous field of the brain is not invalidated by the objections raised so far.

really, how so, if it does not interact with the neurons, then it does what?

Its funny. When I first started this discussion with you I had my doubts about how the EEM could have an effect on the initiation of action potentials. Even if the EEM somehow carried consciousness, if it did not affect neural functioning then consciousness would truly be just and epiphenomenon. But, after further thought and discussion with you, it seems that the most likely mechanism [if it does exist, mind you] would have to be thru frequency modulated signaling. Such a mechanism would help account for apparently spontaneous neural firing in the brain.

It is conceivable that the various neural transmitters are each one of many possible neural signaling mechanisms. The molecules themselves would be molecular packets encoding information in their valence shells which trigger the membrane receptors to initiate action potentials with the corresponding information. If the endogenous field works by signal triggering receptors in the same way as signaling molecules -- well -- it would be quite interesting indeed :0

that is what I said, it is speculation..

[...]

Sure when the hypothesis meets the criteria of observation. You bet.

What better place to discuss protoscience than in the philosophy forum?

 

[AkuManiMani]

A Strong AI response to this would be to point out that consciousness (conscious access) is not the sum total of information processing going on in the body. It's just the bits that are joined together!

I ("I") can see, hear, touch, taste, smell, feel and think because the outputs from those modules are joined together neuronally. I put "I" like this because it is not that there is some "I" observing or receiving all of this processing that's going on. It is rather that thinking (inner speech) is in this global workspace also and this thinking is constructing the other outputs into a subject-object relationships - little stories of "what's going on" revolving around a central character, "I."

According to a Strong AI interpretation of GWT, the brain and body consist of a multitude of discrete processing modules, some of which feed into and out of each other via a network called the global workspace. What separates conscious from unconscious processing is not anything particularly mystical. It's just the way things are connected up. For example, I can give a verbal report of what I see because these modules are wired together.

Nick

The Strong AI response would be reasonable, but I would have to rebut portions of it. For starters, simply stating that consciousness is the joined up information processing of the body isn't sufficient, in and of itself. All the information processes of the body are functionally tied into each other. As you said, only a very small portion of it makes it into our consciousness. There has to be not only an explanation for what brings the relevant information together to form what we experience as consciousness, but why this particular mechanism(s) is the only one that creates consciousness. Our consciousness is an output of the brain that comes together as a singular experience -- the mental theater upon which our sense impressions and thoughts play out. The question is: what media is the output being dumped onto?

 

[Dancing David]

They don't need to use the Global Workspace, they have direct contact with each other.

 

[PixyMisa]

I think you may have hit the nail on the head. I hadn't given any consideration to the possibility that the brain encodes information via amp. modulation. Now that I think more on your thought experiment, it seems much more likely that if conscious impressions are coded in the EEM then it must be according to some form of frequency modulation [this brings to mind the Fourier transforms invoked in the holonomic brain model].

You have got to be kidding.

You have shown no mechanism by which this can possibly happen, no evidence at all that it is happening, and we know that there's a difference of fifteen orders of magnitude between the EM field of the brain and what it actually takes to have any effect at all.

First show us that this even happens, then you can starting building hypotheses about the modulation method.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Alright, I actually have stuff to contribute again.

I agree with that comment except on one point. I don't think is appropriate to say that we 'learn' perceptions like red. Either our brains can readily generate them or not. Its the labels and associations of perceptions that we learn and not the perceptions themselves.

A few posts down you mention words. Words are, indeed, abstract entities, but here I'd like to refer to something interesting that's a bit more concrete--the "written" word. We recognize shapes "naturally", and even spoken phonemes, but written words are odd entities in themselves. When I read sentences, while reflecting on what I'm doing, I have the percept of "grabbing" individual words. In some really odd sense, I see the entire word. I glance at it and know the word... there's no conscious "reading step", just an instant percept of the entire entity.

This is obviously learned, and is a strange sort of entity in itself. It's visually manifest. It's glued to complex representations of entire sets of shapes (how many ways to write lower case "g" do you simply "see" as g?) It's pseudo-phonemic, yet the spelling does not imitate the phonemic pronunciation of the words... and, furthermore, I don't "see" another set of pronunciations (if there's an association, it's to how I normally say the word)... so there are all sorts of extremely complicated recognitions, analyses, etc going on when I read. And it's all presented to me, nice and wrapped up--so automated I cannot look at a word and not read it--as "atomic" pieces... written words are "quale" (though I can also easily see the letters... and the shapes on each letter... I don't, however, "assemble" them consciously--in fact, I see the words before I go and figure out what shape exactly the g is in whatever font it is, for example).

Now I've mentioned this before... I sort of have no problems with qualia (as a mass noun), but I have reservations about quale (as a singular entity--a sort of "atom" of perception). This is one of the reasons why. Now, I also find it extremely hard to imagine that we evolved the ability to read words, so the fact that we can get so good at it that our brains can invent atomic "quale" for words, and push almost the entire set of actions so far down that reading actually becomes involuntary, suggests that we can learn how to see completely different sorts of things.

And if we can do that to words, then when you return to the primitives like color... how do you know we're not doing it for those things?

...and now it's time to dance while leaning towards the other side of the fence...

Which is why I say that Poor Mary (raised in the black and white room) will never ever see the color red. If she is exposed to blue, green and yellow, but not purple or any red tones, then she may see the color red when exposed to it as some sort of gray (or something) but since her long wave photo receptors were not ever exposed to red, she will not see red. Just as you can not acquire language beyond a certain age, I o not think she will see the color red, ever. (I could be wrong).

I'm not entirely sure about this very specific scenario. In the more optically oriented sections of brain development and recognition of color, as I understand it, your particular Mary would probably be able to see red. I say that because I think this could very well be sufficient:

• Your particular Mary sees gray
• Your particular Mary sees green

That's enough to pump creation of the red-green opponent process ganglia, and to start developing recognition circuits along this direction. Red, in this sense, would be a suspiciously strong "non-green" stimulus that is so much stronger than the normal "level" grays that it may be subjectively detectable. This may even provide the ability to see "purples". In particular, there's probable precedent for seeing colors more saturated than you've been exposed to naturally (pure frequency light, for example), and also probable precedent for seeing and recognizing as distinct different sorts of colors than you could have been exposed to (the "reddish-green"/"bluish-yellow" percepts that can be produced in certain subjects using forced stimuli tied to eye tracking software).

It'd be an interesting experiment, though it probably would be difficult to set up ethically speaking for humans.

Anyone who knows better about this, especially with references, I'd be fascinated to hear about it.

 

[Nick227]

The Strong AI response would be reasonable, but I would have to rebut portions of it. For starters, simply stating that consciousness is the joined up information processing of the body isn't sufficient, in and of itself. All the information processes of the body are functionally tied into each other. As you said, only a very small portion of it makes it into our consciousness. There has to be not only an explanation for what brings the relevant information together to form what we experience as consciousness, but why this particular mechanism(s) is the only one that creates consciousness.

As I understand it, a Strong AI perspective would be that it is not. The brain is riddled with consciousness. Individual processors (modules) are all individually conscious but for the most part only the outputs from these modules make it to the global workspace.

The thing I'm avoiding saying is that "the brain is wholly conscious but we are only aware of a small part of it", because this is what it seems like, but is not how it is. Self is just a product of inner speech - intermodular processing, some of which also takes place in the workspace.

Thus, as I understand it, there is nothing extra to do to make what is present in the global neuronal workspace conscious. It is consciousness, as in conscious access. Other bits of the brain and body are equally self-conscious, but there are degrees of functional separation such that what makes it into the workspace is just certain outputs.

This is what I understand from Dennett's interpretation of GWT.

Our consciousness is an output of the brain that comes together as a singular experience -- the mental theater upon which our sense impressions and thoughts play out. The question is: what media is the output being dumped onto?

It appears to come together as a singular experience, but this perspective is now being thoroughly challenged from all quarters. Blackmore in particular does a good job, I think. For me, I can direct attention towards a single object but generally if I'm honest what's present is a bit of a scattered mess. In GWT, cortico-thalamic looping amplifies what it arbitrates as relevant to be processed in the global workspace.

Don't know if this helps any!

Nick

eta: the usual issues people have with GWT are (i) where's the self? where's me? or (ii) ok, but then what happens to make the information in the workspace conscious?

Are these your issues?

 

[dlorde]

Off the bat, I would like to say that I find your thoughtful responses and critiques to be refreshing -- especially after all the pages combative rebuttal by some other posters

Thank you for those kind words. To refute an argument you must understand it, and to refute it to the proposer's satisfaction (or otherwise), you must understand it from their POV. This is why it's so pointless to interpret another's words to your own preference and then argue against that interpretation, it's a straw man. True, people could express themselves more clearly and precisely - but of course, they're only human.

Thoughts, qualia, and other mental phenomena could be thought of as metaphysical abstractions of brain processes. I don't think that such a designation could be construed as being necessarily incorrect.

I'll take that as a 'yes'

... The general idea that has been coming together in my mind is that all observable entities [even atoms and 'fundamental' particles] are all just emergent processes of more fundamental constituents.

I don't understand exactly what you mean by 'observable entity'. can you clarify? It sounds like 'objectively verifiable entity', but this would surely exclude qualia.

I can see that we can describe physical objects as being composed of other physical objects, which are likewise compositional (is it turtles all the way down, or is Planck the limit?), and that these parts are interact dynamically, and their interactions over time can be called processes, and emergent, because the behaviour of the composition is not related to the individual behaviours of its constituents in a simple way...? is that what you meant? if so, what was your point?

Technically, one could consider our labeling of them as objects, per se, to be just metaphysical abstractions of more basic phenomena.

Yes, that's what a label is - and if an object is composed of more basic elements, then a label for it is an abbreviated metaphysical abstraction for the properties and behaviour of that composition. No surprise there.

On the other hand, I think it would be also justified to consider such entities to be as ontologically real, in their own right, as the basic process(es) that give rise to them.

OK, but for what values of 'real' ? They are conceptual entities, not physical entities. At a conceptual, metaphysical level, they may both be abstractions with common properties, but at the physical level (that is our context in this discussion) I think you're making a category error if you attempt to equate the two - they are qualitatively different.

One example that I like to use is that of words. Words are symbols that are used to convey concepts and meanings which are, by they nature, abstract entities of a sort. Words are words regardless of the nature of the media upon which they are conveyed [for instance, as a pattern of sound waves, a hand written text, engravings, electronic displays, etc..]. They have an objective reality that has causal relevance to actual physical events yet they themselves are not physical objects, per se, in the conventional sense.

I don't see the utility of this analogy here. You seem to be comparing different levels of abstraction of qualitatively different concepts and trying to draw a conclusion that has meaning at a physical level...

Granted. Its not absolutely necessary but, in the interest of advancing scientific understanding, it would be a good idea to do so.

It's not necessary because it's not a scientific concept, so there's no scientific understanding to be advanced.

As I mentioned earlier terms like 'qualia' and 'memes' hold the same epistemic status that genes did during the time of Darwin and Mendel. Their existence can be inferred even if their exact mechanisms and composition have yet to be scientifically established.

Memes are abstractions for modelling the spread of imitative behaviours, so arguably part of social & behavioural science, but qualia is a philosophical abstraction, not scientific...

My charges of him lying are in direct reference to his repeated claims that I have never defined what I mean by terms like 'qualia' and 'consciousnesses', despite the fact that I have repeatedly done so. I've even gone as far as to link earlier posts where I provided the definitions -- on multiple occasions. There is no way he could have been unaware of them so the only logical conclusion I can come up with is that there is deliberate dishonesty on his part.

I expect he is waiting for a clear, unambiguous, formal definition of what you mean by them, rather than a dictionary definition or vague description. It seems to me that many of Pixie's responses are intended to get the other party to think through their concept enough to provide a formal (scientific) definition of it, and in doing so, discover that it has little or no (scientific) meaning or value.

However, I maintain that I have accurately represented his position as he has presented it.

You have a habit of dropping his qualifiers and/or adding your own qualifiers when you paraphrase his statements, e.g. his use of 'such a field' (where 'such' referred to an EM field that could carry consciousness and influence neurons) became any EM field when you accused him of contradicting himself ("you assert that there is no way for the brain to generate EM fields"), and where his description of the measurable brain wave activity as simply 'noise' became 'all just incoherent noise' when you wanted to scoff - and many other instances. That's not accurate representation, it's misrepresentation, it's annoying and a waste of time.

When I proposed that the medium for what we consciousness may be a kind of EMF phenomena he chose to represent my position as being a "magical-faerie-field". Whether or not the hypothesis is valid, his persistent caricaturing of this, and other positions I've taken, is blatant straw-manning.

No, it's mocking. A straw man argument is an informal fallacy based on misrepresentation of an opponent's position, which is what you've been doing.

However, based on reasons mentioned above, I still maintain that I find the EM model of consciousness to still hold some plausibility.

Despite there being no evidence whatsoever for it, no requirement for it, no plausible mechanism for it, and what little evidence there is for EM influences on the brain suggesting that it is many orders of magnitude away from feasibility? That's not a very scientific approach - as the saying goes, 'Keep an open mind, but not so open your brains fall out'

 

[Nick227]

The Strong AI response would be reasonable, but I would have to rebut portions of it. For starters, simply stating that consciousness is the joined up information processing of the body isn't sufficient, in and of itself. All the information processes of the body are functionally tied into each other. As you said, only a very small portion of it makes it into our consciousness.

I wanted to have another go at this, so this is the second reply to this post.

When you say "only a very small portion of it makes it into our consciousness" you are, I submit, falling into the pit of the grand assumption!

For, in GWT, what is in the global workspace is in consciousness. There is no separation. That's it. No extra stages. No Ned Block-type protestations that there must be more to it. There must be access consciousness leading to phenomenal consciousness - no! It's over. That's it. Finito. End of story.

The assumption of the mind is that the notion "our consciousness" must be authentic even at a sub-brain level. It isn't. Consciousness has no possessor at this level. What is in the workspace is consciousness. It is not the only consciousness in the brain or body. There's consciousness all over the place. But the only bit that can speak and that can hear and that can see and that can understand and do all these things together is the global workspace, because that's how it's wired up neuronally.

In Strong AI there is absolutely nothing special about consciousness. It's everywhere. Other bits of your brain and body could inter-communicate on their own if they had a channel to do so.

This is just one global workspace talking to another!

Nick

 

[Dancing David]

Oki-Doh, I can go w/ that. I've always found the Mary thought experiment to be a bit silly. "Knowing" all there is to know about the color red is not the same as experiencing the color. The experience of some sense impression (like the color red), as such, has a reality prior to any other learned associations to it. The mystery is exactly how brains give rise to specific impression like 'red' and what they would look like if they were being read off the brain by an outside observer.

[By the way, keep it up. Your responses are really getting my thoughts in motion and helping me develop my ideas further -- I'm going to have to start writing this stuff down and compiling it *_*]



I think you may have hit the nail on the head. I hadn't given any consideration to the possibility that the brain encodes information via amp. modulation. Now that I think more on your thought experiment, it seems much more likely that if conscious impressions are coded in the EEM then it must be according to some form of frequency modulation [this brings to mind the Fourier transforms invoked in the holonomic brain model].

[As a side note, I just realized that, here I am, defending the hypotheses of people with whom I've had no communication using arguments off the top of my head ]



Well, the 'messenger' particle of the electromagnetic force is the photon which is why visible light is part of the electromagnetic spectrum. So technically, yes. If the brain utilizes the EM force for any of is functions (which it undeniably does) then it uses photons -- specifically, virtual photons

Hmmm, if you mean the brain uses phons because of chemical interactions okay, other wise:
What? Huh?

Since we're on the topic of the use of photons in biology I would like to note that I've just recently read The Rainbow and the Worm by biophysicist Mae-Wan Ho. In it she details, among other things, experimental findings on the use of photons in cellular communication. She also goes into detail discussing other signaling mechanisms in organisms.


The book was a bit of a tough read since I haven't had all the relevant training in some of the subject areas covered in the book. What I was able to pick up on was quite interesting and seems to corroborate a lot of ideas I have been speculating on for some time now. I've since lent the book to a friend of mine whose currently majoring in the field and, so far, hes also found it an interesting read.

Okay, this is rather vague... there is this book... and it says something...

As we've already covered, electrical signal propagation along neural membranes is very different from the electrical currents carried by metallic conductors like wires. Keep in mind that the energy conveyed by neurotransmitter molecules is orders of magnitude smaller than the energy unleashed by the resulting action potential.

Um that is because the signal is chemical, if you use E=MC² then the nuerotansmitter would blow your head off. What is your point?

In the case of biological systems information is the deciding factor in biological action. The initial energy input, in the case of action potentials, is less significant than information input.

Uh huh, which is where the connections and the conditioned history is imporatnt. (Potentiation/attenuation)

To set off an action potential a signal trigger doesn't need to add the energy; it is already produced and stored by active ion transport across the membrane.

that is only the single or cojoined cell signal.

All that is needed is the proper signaling elements and the information is amplified and relayed by the action potential.

Again the conditioned history is crucial.

Now, depending on exactly how information is encoded and received by membrane receptors, one should, in principle, be able to trigger the receptors in the same way as specific neurotransmitters.
If [as your thought experiment seems to establish] alleged EM signaling in the brain is encoded via frequency modulation then field density or amplitude should not play a significant role. In such a scheme, the encoded information of the signal is more significant than its energy density in setting off an action potential.



You're right. The membrane is semiconductive but there are significant differences between it and synthetic silicon chips.



If, like other biological functions, the initiation operate via the 'finesse' approach then it must operate according to some frequency code carried by the valence shells of transmitter molecules and possibly in the endogenous field.

More epicycles. Okay.

Its funny. When I first started this discussion with you I had my doubts about how the EEM could have an effect on the initiation of action potentials. Even if the EEM somehow carried consciousness, if it did not affect neural functioning then consciousness would truly be just and epiphenomenon. But, after further thought and discussion with you, it seems that the most likely mechanism [if it does exist, mind you] would have to be thru frequency modulated signaling. Such a mechanism would help account for apparently spontaneous neural firing in the brain.

Must not ...must not... I was recently suspended...must not.

Really how interesting...monsters are such interesting people. (modified Bugs Bunny)

Sorry just add some wheels and the brain would be a car.

It is conceivable that the various neural transmitters are each one of many possible neural signaling mechanisms. The molecules themselves would be molecular packets encoding information in their valence shells which trigger the membrane receptors to initiate action potentials with the corresponding information. If the endogenous field works by signal triggering receptors in the same way as signaling molecules -- well -- it would be quite interesting indeed :0

Sure would and if I had wings I would fly.

What better place to discuss protoscience than in the philosophy forum?

You mean science fiction.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Alright, I actually have stuff to contribute again.

W00t! Hes back!

A few posts down you mention words. Words are, indeed, abstract entities, but here I'd like to refer to something interesting that's a bit more concrete--the "written" word. We recognize shapes "naturally", and even spoken phonemes, but written words are odd entities in themselves. When I read sentences, while reflecting on what I'm doing, I have the percept of "grabbing" individual words. In some really odd sense, I see the entire word. I glance at it and know the word... there's no conscious "reading step", just an instant percept of the entire entity.

This is obviously learned, and is a strange sort of entity in itself. It's visually manifest. It's glued to complex representations of entire sets of shapes (how many ways to write lower case "g" do you simply "see" as g?) It's pseudo-phonemic, yet the spelling does not imitate the phonemic pronunciation of the words... and, furthermore, I don't "see" another set of pronunciations (if there's an association, it's to how I normally say the word)... so there are all sorts of extremely complicated recognitions, analyses, etc going on when I read. And it's all presented to me, nice and wrapped up--so automated I cannot look at a word and not read it--as "atomic" pieces... written words are "quale" (though I can also easily see the letters... and the shapes on each letter... I don't, however, "assemble" them consciously--in fact, I see the words before I go and figure out what shape exactly the g is in whatever font it is, for example).

Now I've mentioned this before... I sort of have no problems with qualia (as a mass noun), but I have reservations about quale (as a singular entity--a sort of "atom" of perception). This is one of the reasons why. Now, I also find it extremely hard to imagine that we evolved the ability to read words, so the fact that we can get so good at it that our brains can invent atomic "quale" for words, and push almost the entire set of actions so far down that reading actually becomes involuntary, suggests that we can learn how to see completely different sorts of things.

And if we can do that to words, then when you return to the primitives like color... how do you know we're not doing it for those things?

When I propose that qualia are fundamental elements of perception I do not mean that they cannot be reduced further. Even an atom is made of more fundamental components. By 'fundamental element' of perception I mean that there must be a basic level of reduction, beyond which, the emergent property no longer exists. For instance, tangible matter no longer exists as such below the level of the atom, liquids no longer exist as such below a certain level of reduction, genes no longer exists as such -- and so on.

Now, as far as words go, I do not think that they are 'atomic' perceptive elements. To continue with the chemistry analogy, they would probably be comparable macro-molecules of perceptive elements. A word is a conglomeration of numerous sign associations and meanings. There are the phonetic components to compose the mental representation of the word, visual elements that come together to form the mental image of the script version -- and then there are the web of associative meaning linked to the word. Simply put, words are unitary components but they are not fundamental.

The ability to create so many higher level mental constructs, to such a degree, and with such fidelity is probably the main factor that distinguishes human cognition from that of other animals.

 

[dlorde]

I put "I" like this because it is not that there is some "I" observing or receiving all of this processing that's going on. It is rather that thinking (inner speech) is in this global workspace also and this thinking is constructing the other outputs into a subject-object relationships - little stories of "what's going on" revolving around a central character, "I."

Quite - there is a 'confabulator' in the brain concerned with generating plausible scenarios (i.e. stories that fit our prior experiences and expectations) for our perceptions. These appear to be based on simple logic (common sense) and past experience. These stories are clearly useful when we need to explain and predict the behaviour of others, but there are a number of experiments that show that they are also applied to our perception of our own behaviour. I suspect that when our focus of attention is not introspective or directed towards explicitly conscious decision making (and perhaps even when it is), our sense of 'self' as an active agent is partly based on these post-hoc confabulations. The limited information the 'self' receives about subconscious decision-making, and the perceptions of the resulting behaviours are used to generate an on-going story that is the internal narrative. That this narrative is a convenient and plausible fiction has been demonstrated by a number of experiments, involving superficially plausible but unlikely or impossible explanations for decisions and behaviours under test conditions.

 

[PixyMisa]

I expect he is waiting for a clear, unambiguous, formal definition of what you mean by them, rather than a dictionary definition or vague description. It seems to me that many of Pixie's responses are intended to get the other party to think through their concept enough to provide a formal (scientific) definition of it, and in doing so, discover that it has little or no (scientific) meaning or value.

Yes, exactly. Though I gave up reading all of AkuManiMani's posts a while back, because they are generally unresponsive and uninteresting, so it's also quite possible that he said something I missed. Which is why I asked him to repeat it - which he wouldn't do.

You have a habit of dropping his qualifiers and/or adding your own qualifiers when you paraphrase his statements, e.g. his use of 'such a field' (where 'such' referred to an EM field that could carry consciousness and influence neurons) became any EM field when you accused him of contradicting himself ("you assert that there is no way for the brain to generate EM fields"), and where his description of the measurable brain wave activity as simply 'noise' became 'all just incoherent noise' when you wanted to scoff - and many other instances. That's not accurate representation, it's misrepresentation, it's annoying and a waste of time.

Bingo.

Indeed, he continued to do this even after I explained exactly what I meant.

No, it's mocking. A straw man argument is an informal fallacy based on misrepresentation of an opponent's position, which is what you've been doing.

Precisely.

Presenting an absurd version of someone's argument may be a strawman, or it may just be an attempt to highlight the existing absurdity. If I asserted that AkuManiMani was arguing that consciousness is propagated by magic fairies, that would be a strawman. But when I point out that he may as well be arguing that consciousness is propagated by magic fairies, that's just mockery.

Indeed, it's a specific kind of mockery, because AkuManiMani is performing a specific kind of logically invalid argument - the retreat to unfalsifiability. Whenever a fault is pointed out with his hypothesis, instead of reassessing his ideas, he adjusts them so that the fault no longer applies.

It's the invisible dragon argument:

There's a dragon in my garage.
No there isn't. I was just in your garage, and there's no dragon in there.
It's an invisible dragon.

Despite there being no evidence whatsoever for it, no requirement for it, no plausible mechanism for it, and what little evidence there is for EM influences on the brain suggesting that it is many orders of magnitude away from feasibility? That's not a very scientific approach - as the saying goes, 'Keep an open mind, but not so open your brains fall out'

He didn't seem to respond well to that the last couple of dozen times I pointed it out to him, and I finally got tired of it and put him on ignore.

If he says anything interesting I'll just have to read it in the quotes of the other posters.

 

[PixyMisa]

Must not ...must not... I was recently suspended...must not.

Heh.

I understand how you feel. You've seen my defence mechanism at work. It helps enormously if you make the other guy scream in frustration.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Aku,

Just a few quick questions...............since the EM field surrounding the brain is so very weak, how does this theory account for it affecting nervous tissue at all? How could it account for specificity of action -- it is a gross conglomeration depending on mass action, so how does it affect that neural network over there to raise my hand? How do you avoid the inevitable feed-forward loop -- nerves fire, they contribute to the EM field, which causes them to fire apparently, which causes them to contribute to the EM field, which causes them to fire more?

Frequency coding is what neurons in the brain do. There is no need to guess about frequency coding having an effect on synaptic potentials.

I'm afraid to say that so far what I have heard of this model bears no relationship to what I know of how neurons work, especially how they work in the cortex (but more on that later).

The analogies to light beams and radio waves do not apply to this scenario. We are not discussing photons, which have no charge, but ions that produce the EM field in the brain. Anything that can cause a an electrical current (which depends on charge) will affect the EM of the brain. So, if I rub a magnet on my head, it will create a current that will cause some change in the EM field of the brain. There is no way to avoid that issue.

I don't know how much everyone knows about neuron function, but in the central nervous system it is not one cell firing and that makes the next one fire. Neurotransmitter locking with receptor creates a synaptic potential which travels from the dendrite (or cell body if we are talking about inhibitory inputs) to the axon hillock. Voltage gated sodium channels are localized to the axon hillock (that's why there is a hillock) where summation of all the inputs results in an action potential or no action potential depending on whether or not the incoming inputs reach threshold. If the inputs are over threshold an action potential occurs.

In the brain, on average, a minimum of twenty or so inputs are necessary to result in an action potential for any given cell. This means that, in contrast to the peripheral nervous system, one cell cannot cause the next cell in the network to fire an action potential. Instead, action potentials only occur from the concerted action of several different inputs; and the information that is encoded depends critically on the spatial distribution and timing of those inputs. If the surrounding EM field could affect neurons (there are situations when this is possible, see below), at most it could not provide anything more than a single type input of any particular synaptic potential, and that is not sufficient in and of itself to produce an action potential. In other words, EM fields could not decide that a cell or group of cells would fire by themselves.

And there is no mechanism to provide the specificity necessary for what brains actually do. EM fields, at best, could affect neurons only randomly or through some gross action. If you want to argue for any sort of specificity with this stuff, then you've got a homunculus in there somewhere, and the whole scenario depends on dualism.

The role of glial cells is to dampen the field created by depolarization of neurons. Glia act as sinks for potassium ions, which are extruded by neurons during depolarization, and without them neurons could not fire at the rates they do in life. There are probably as many, if not more, glia than neurons, so we expend enormous resources to keep ionic fields from affecting neurons. The only evidence we have is that ionic fields interfere with neuron function, not the reverse. And they do so in a general, mass fashion -- no specificity involved. In other words, when a local field is sufficient to affect neuron function, it mucks up the works rather than performing some sort of work.

Lastly, just in case others don't know (and I've mentioned this in passing before) EEGs do not measure action potentials. For most cells the orientation is wrong and action potentials pass too quickly to summate for that sort of measurement. EEGs actually measure the much slower post-synaptic potentials, but to even see anything on an EEG requires a fairly large area of brain over which this summation occurs. There is no chance at specificity when discussing the fields measured by EEG. In clinical practice EEGs provide only approximate localizing information.

 

[Nick227]

Quite - there is a 'confabulator' in the brain concerned with generating plausible scenarios (i.e. stories that fit our prior experiences and expectations) for our perceptions.

Yes.

Personally, I would go a little further and state that the whole story is a confabulation. There is no self, aside of the body, and this lump of flesh and bone can barely be meaningfully construed as having the vast number of attributes and associations commonly ascribed to the self...owning a car, having a girlfriend, being shy, wanting a better job, etc etc... It's all construction around an empty centre, created by inner speech, and only arguably of meaning or value.

These appear to be based on simple logic (common sense) and past experience. These stories are clearly useful when we need to explain and predict the behaviour of others, but there are a number of experiments that show that they are also applied to our perception of our own behaviour. I suspect that when our focus of attention is not introspective or directed towards explicitly conscious decision making (and perhaps even when it is), our sense of 'self' as an active agent is partly based on these post-hoc confabulations.

For sure. I guess the brain stores a bunch of "dispositional representations" (or whatever) of self and these are made active as inner speech interprets sensory information, translating it into subject-object relationships.

The limited information the 'self' receives about subconscious decision-making, and the perceptions of the resulting behaviours are used to generate an on-going story that is the internal narrative.

Yes, only awareness can save us! The serpent tempted Eve, to use the gnostic allegory, a symbol of the subconscious mind, and the body came to regard itself as a limited self. Identification with thought is typically an unconscious process and can thus only reliably be broken through increased self-awareness.

Nick

 

[AkuManiMani]

Thank you for those kind words. To refute an argument you must understand it, and to refute it to the proposer's satisfaction (or otherwise), you must understand it from their POV. This is why it's so pointless to interpret another's words to your own preference and then argue against that interpretation, it's a straw man. True, people could express themselves more clearly and precisely - but of course, they're only human.

*nods*

I'll take that as a 'yes'

*nods*

I don't understand exactly what you mean by 'observable entity'. can you clarify? It sounds like 'objectively verifiable entity', but this would surely exclude qualia.

Hehe. You're on to me.

Yes. If you recall, earlier I stated:

The distinctions are not arbitrary but logically, and necessarily, follow from the reality. I stated much earlier in this thread that qualia and quanta [subjective experience and objective existence, respectively] are complementary aspects of reality. Objective reality is veridical which means that, by definition, it can be observed. Observations themselves are, by definition, subjective and are necessarily qualitative; however, the act of observation itself has objective reality as well.

Qualia aren't just observable; they are the fundamental basis for observation. Without observation -- without perception -- there is no knowledge, there is no science.

... The general idea that has been coming together in my mind is that all observable entities [even atoms and 'fundamental' particles] are all just emergent processes of more fundamental constituents.

I can see that we can describe physical objects as being composed of other physical objects, which are likewise compositional (is it turtles all the way down, or is Planck the limit?), and that these parts are interact dynamically, and their interactions over time can be called processes, and emergent, because the behaviour of the composition is not related to the individual behaviours of its constituents in a simple way...? is that what you meant? if so, what was your point?

While I was pointing out emergent properties my actual point is a good deal more radical than that. I'm saying that even what we think of as physical objects are just as virtual as any metaphysical abstraction.

Of course, there's a bit more to it than that. For the past couple of semesters I've been piecing together my own little ontological framework, as I find most of the conventional ontologies a bit lacking >_>

On the other hand, I think it would be also justified to consider such entities to be as ontologically real, in their own right, as the basic process(es) that give rise to them.

OK, but for what values of 'real' ? They are conceptual entities, not physical entities. At a conceptual, metaphysical level, they may both be abstractions with common properties, but at the physical level (that is our context in this discussion) I think you're making a category error if you attempt to equate the two - they are qualitatively different.

I'm saying that there is no absolute division between what we consider physical and metaphysical. I'm saying they exist on the same continuum. Mental objects are as objectively real as 'concrete' objects.

One example that I like to use is that of words. Words are symbols that are used to convey concepts and meanings which are, by they nature, abstract entities of a sort. Words are words regardless of the nature of the media upon which they are conveyed [for instance, as a pattern of sound waves, a hand written text, engravings, electronic displays, etc..]. They have an objective reality that has causal relevance to actual physical events yet they themselves are not physical objects, per se, in the conventional sense.

I don't see the utility of this analogy here. You seem to be comparing different levels of abstraction of qualitatively different concepts and trying to draw a conclusion that has meaning at a physical level...

Oh ho...I'm not just using it as an analogy... >:}

It's not necessary because [quale is] not a scientific concept, so there's no scientific understanding to be advanced.

I pointed out to Dancing David earlier that modern science [i.e. the modern scientific method] is a technology developed by Enlightenment era philosophers. In other words, science is a philosophical tool for systematic knowledge acquisition. In other words, science is an applied philosophy.

The purpose of science is the cumulative advance of knowledge within an ever evolving conceptual framework. 'Matter', and the domain we call 'physical', are just the starting frame of reference upon which natural science began compiling the human knowledge base. 'Matter' and 'physical' are just words used to describe a particular category of extant entities -- not the absolute measure and basis of reality.

As mentioned earlier, anything that has objective reality is, in principle, observable in some fashion. If it is observable it falls within the domain of scientific inquiry. Thoughts, and other mental objects, have objective reality. We base our physical action off of the perception mental objects -- meaning they have veridical consequence upon the physical world and, by extension, physics. They are well within the domain of scientific inquiry.

Memes are abstractions for modeling the spread of imitative behaviors, so arguably part of social & behavioral science, but qualia is a philosophical abstraction, not scientific...

The same argument could have been put forward for the concept of 'hereditary elements' about a century ago. Memes are a protoscientific concept, atm, just as genes were. 'Hereditary elements' [aka genes] were, and are, necessarily inferable entities because of the observable replication of traits from one generation to the next.

Memes are also necessarily inferable because of the observable replication of behaviors and beliefs between individuals. These, in turn, have physical consequences upon the world -- they are, in principle, veridical objects. The thing is that mental constructs like memes cannot replicate or exist without the conscious perception of living subjects. People mentally perceive and incorporate physical behaviors into their repertoire. They perceive and accept beliefs and propositions which, in turn, shape their behaviors. Memes are mental [i.e. subjective] entities but they have objective consequence upon the world. Subjective perceptions are necessarily qualitative and, presumably, they can be broken down into more basic elements. These elements are what some call 'qualia'.

I expect he is waiting for a clear, unambiguous, formal definition of what you mean by them, rather than a dictionary definition or vague description. It seems to me that many of Pixie's responses are intended to get the other party to think through their concept enough to provide a formal (scientific) definition of it, and in doing so, discover that it has little or no (scientific) meaning or value.

Dude, if a dictionary definition is not formal then the term 'formal' is meaningless. I every single post I've used the term in a manner consistent with the definition -- THIS definition:

qua⋅le: a quality, as bitterness, regarded as an independent object; a sense-datum or feeling having a distinctive quality.

As I've already said, qualia aren't just empirical phenomena; they are the very basis of empirical observation. The statement that they have no scientific meaning or value is probably the most absurd claim I have ever heard. Without qualia the IS no science. Period.

You have a habit of dropping his qualifiers and/or adding your own qualifiers when you paraphrase his statements, e.g. his use of 'such a field' (where 'such' referred to an EM field that could carry consciousness and influence neurons) became any EM field when you accused him of contradicting himself ("you assert that there is no way for the brain to generate EM fields"), and where his description of the measurable brain wave activity as simply 'noise' became 'all just incoherent noise' when you wanted to scoff - and many other instances. That's not accurate representation, it's misrepresentation, it's annoying and a waste of time.

If that is the case all he had to do was state "It is not possible for the EMF of the brain to be the carrier of consciousness". My argument was, and is, that consciousness may be carried by the EM field generated by the brain. For him to simply state "no such field exists" when he meant "It is not possible for the EMF of the brain to be the carrier of consciousness" is not only lousy communication - but factually incorrect.

Perhaps is Pixy actually bothered to articulate himself instead of spewing out one liners and single word reposes we wouldn't have the problem right now.

And another thing. Pixy defined information processing as 'awareness' and self-referential processing as 'consciousness'. These are the same definitions he used a year ago, and hes still using them now. At no point did I misrepresent his position. If you believe I did feel free to provide the exact post in which I did so.

No, it's mocking. A straw man argument is an informal fallacy based on misrepresentation of an opponent's position, which is what you've been doing.

I stated that the endogenous field of the brain is possible the carrier of consciousness. For him to claim that I'm arguing for a 'magical-faerie-field' is not only mocking but a direct misrepresentation of my argument -- i.e. a strawman.

Regardless of what you want to call it, it was still inappropriate; if he wanted to have a civil discussion with me he should have been civil. Why should I be singled out for retaliating? If Pixy, or anyone else, doesn't want a caustic barrage of insults then they shouldn't pick a verbal fight with me. I suspect that the only reason why you're focusing on me is that I'm more adept at wielding words as weapons than Pixy is.

However, based on reasons mentioned above, I still maintain that I find the EM model of consciousness to still hold some plausibility.

Despite there being no evidence whatsoever for it, no requirement for it, no plausible mechanism for it, and what little evidence there is for EM influences on the brain suggesting that it is many orders of magnitude away from feasibility? That's not a very scientific approach - as the saying goes, 'Keep an open mind, but not so open your brains fall out'

LOL!

No, no, no. I need you to keep your brains in. How else are you going to be able to provide the criticism I need to strengthen my postulations?

Anyway, I've already admitted that I'm basing my position off of logical inferences and circumstantial evidence. Is it possible I'm wrong? Of course. Am I going to concede just because there are a bunch of people who really, really, really disagree? Not a chance.