The Hard Problem of Gravity

[westprog]

No, I don't really care. I just wanted you to finally admit that there are indeed differences.



Right. But there are differences -- you just admitted it.

So guess what, genius? Whatever you want to call those differences between a drop of water and a snowflake, and it doesn't matter what you call them because they exist nonetheless, those are the same types of differences that people refer to with the term computation.



Wrong.

There are clearly differences between the two systems. Just like there are between a drop of water and a snowflake.

Educated people call some of those differences computation.

For you to assert that such a thing does not exist in a "physical" sense is utter stupidity, especially in light of the fact that you just admitted such physical differences exist.

Oh, now I see. Computation is something that occurs in one system but not the other when two systems are different. That's a really good definition.

Since by definition any two systems are different in some way, it might be helpful to have some more precise way to determine when computation is taking place. Since the assertion is that computation is taking place only in one system, and not at all in the other, it's necessary to show what process is taking place in only one.

But hey, wave your hands and say "But they're different", if it makes you happy. You can even say "Look! Westprog thinks a drop of water is the same thing as a snowflake!".

 

[westprog]

Wait, wait. There are NO differences between computer components and a working computer ?

Of course there are. But there are no processes taking place in the working computer that aren't taking place in the components.

Dammit. Why did I even bother assembling it, then ?

To produce changes in your qualia. Same reason you do anything.

 

[rocketdodger]

Oh, now I see. Computation is something that occurs in one system but not the other when two systems are different. That's a really good definition.

Can you provide an example of any physical theory that doesn't reduce to the difference between two systems?

Since by definition any two systems are different in some way, it might be helpful to have some more precise way to determine when computation is taking place. Since the assertion is that computation is taking place only in one system, and not at all in the other, it's necessary to show what process is taking place in only one.

Why?

Are the processes in a drop of water different than those in a snowflake?

Why does every physical scientist on Earth agree that a snowflake is crystalline while a drop of water is not?

What is the physical definition of "crystalllization?" Is there a physical theory that includes crystallization?

Why is "crystallization" acceptable when "computation" is not? Both terms refer to real behaviors of real physical systems. Behaviors that do not occur in all other physical systems.

Why is it acceptable to label a snowflake as crystalline and a water droplet as not, but unacceptable to label a working computer as computing and a pile of transistors as not?

Do you have serious answers to any of these questions? Or are you going to continue playing the ignorance game?

You can even say "Look! Westprog thinks a drop of water is the same thing as a snowflake!".

I don't think even you are that stupid.

I think you just refuse to take this line of questioning seriously because you realize it invalidates all of your arguments.

 

[rocketdodger]

Of course there are. But there are no processes taking place in the working computer that aren't taking place in the components.

So crystallization takes place in a warm drop of liquid water?

Or are you going to contend that crystallization takes place in all substances, and only occurs to a "much greater extent" in what scientists label crystals?

If so, why can't one just say that computation takes place in all substances, and only occurs to a "much greater extent" in what scientists label computers?

If so, why can't one just say that consciousness takes place in all substances, and only occurs to a "much greater extent" in what scientists label conscious entities?

Either way, your argument goes nowhere.

 

[Belz...]

Of course there are. But there are no processes taking place in the working computer that aren't taking place in the components.

Reeaaallly ? So a working computer DOESN'T have electricity going through and DOESN'T actually compute ? Or are you instead arguing that a unconnected hard drive actually does stuff ?

To produce changes in your qualia. Same reason you do anything.

That sounds like philosophy. Philosophy is useless. I'm now asking you what scientific reason we have for assuming qualia exist.

 

[AkuManiMani]

The brain makes up quite a large portion of the nervous system and is directly involved in not only neural signaling to ectodermal and mesodermal tissue, but also endorcrine signaling to various organs and organ systems.

... And?

What do you mean "And"? Lemme recap the exchange because apparently you've either lost track or are deliberately playing obtuse again. I stated that the brain is directly tied to many other body systems and you replied that this was not the case. I then asked you what mediates the link if it's not direct and you replied "the nervous system" which is a nonsensical counter assertion being that the brain is the main hub of the nervous system. Tho its a bit of a digression from the main discussion I'm just a bit taken aback that you wouldn't even concede on such a minor point.

Yes, that's a quote. Every point I made is correct, and you are talking complete nonsense.

You stated that you never claimed that brain doesn't generate an EM field [i.e. the field I've been referring to]. Yet, when presented with direct quotes of you actually saying such all you do is assert that you were correct -- completely disregarding the blatant contradiction. You appear to be psychologically incapable of even entertaining the remotest possibility of wrong doing, short comings, or fallacies on you part. I'd have a lot more respect for you if you actually showed some integrity and atleast admit to fault when its shown to you clear as day.

Which reminds me... You've yet to provide any of the quotes I requested to backup your claim that I've been misrepresenting your arguments. I'm becoming more and more convinced that you've little or no intellectual integrity thus making any fruitful discussion between us impossible. So, before we continue this discussion [potentially wasting our time] I've two proposals that you must meet to my satisfaction before I continue conversing with you. I want a reasoned detailed response to each of them and not a snippet-by-snippet counter assertion to each and every sentence segment -- as you are so wont to do. In other words, I want you to extend the same courtesy that I've extended to you thru-out this and other discussions we've had. Once you have done so we will continue where we left off and I will even address your argument of "OMG, the orders of magnitude are fifteen -- wut now, son?!?!"

[1] I find your charge that I've misrepresented your position on consciousness without any attempt to substantiate it to be very dishonest. This is especially offensive in light of the fact that you've consistently lied about what has and has not been said during this discussion despite the fact that I've repeatedly gone back and provided direct quotes showing such comments to be inaccurate. I'm once again proposing that you go back and provide direct quotes and/or links to posts where you exposit your position on what constitutes 'consciousness'/'awareness' [As I've gone out of my way to do with my own comments numerous times] and substantiate your claim that I've misrepresented it.

[2] Lets assume that CEMI, and related hypotheses, are incorrect and have no explanatory merit [which, I'm guessing, you already do]. You have still yet to explain how your model of 'consciousness' explains or accounts for qualitative sense impressions such as colors, tastes, sounds, emotions and other sensations [what I've been calling 'qualia']. About a year or so ago, when I asked you this same question you replied that those are all simply "factory added extras" that need no accounting for, even tho it was pointed out to you that such features are central to the standard definition of consciousness. Now, about a year after, you're claiming that not only are these "factory added extras" irrelevant, they are "logically incoherent". To erase any potential for confusion [or further evasion on your part] these "factory added extras" and the realized capacity to generate them are what I've been calling been qualia and consciousness, respectively. As of yet, I haven't seen any sufficient accounting for them in your model and I would like you to do so -- assuming you can.

If you're interested in this subject, I very highly recommend the MIT Introduction to Psychology lecture series presented by Jeremy Wolfe. Prof. Wolfe is a visual perception researcher, so he devotes a fair bit of attention to all the stuff that goes on in the brain to trick you into thinking that vision is a continuous process when it is nothing of the sort. But every part of the brain plays tricks like that.

I'd listened to a couple of the lectures the last time you provided the URL [they were quite interesting]. Since then I'd lost the bookmark to it O_<


Thank you for reposing that link.

 

[AkuManiMani]

That is an interesting point. Even so, it seems relevant that an external EM source would have to be of a specific range of frequencies to have a direct effect on biological functioning, let alone mental states. There is a SciAM article that goes into more detail about that here.

Transcranial magnetic stimulation does not work by affecting a field around neurons. It works by setting up an electrical field that causes depolarization of neurons in a localized area. It is the depolarization of neurons that is important for neuronal funcitoning. We can affect the field created by EPSPs and IPSPs without causing neuronal depolarization by using smaller magnetic pulses. Those pulses have no effect on people. You have to give a pretty strong magnetic pulse to have any effect.

Let me clarify. The hypothesis is that the actual carrier of conscious experience is the weak endogenous field generated by the collective activity of neurons. The idea is that information coded in the neural firing pattern may also be encoded in the field. The theory is an attempt to account for how the firing patterns of neurons, scattered thru-out the brain, comes together for form a single conscious experience. There are, however, different versions of the hypothesis. In one [McFadden's version] proposes that the endogenous field affects the charges across neural membranes, thus affecting the probability that an action potential will be triggered. In other versions [such as those being proposed by Susan Pockett, et al.] the field has no causal role at all in neural functioning. As has been pointed out, the theory is mostly speculative right now and is, therefore, not fully developed. Some version of the hypothesis is still seems plausible and the above example doesn't actually falsify it.

You're that TMS does not operate by directly affecting the endogenous field of the brain; it utilizes electromagnetic induction to induce electric currents in neural tissue directly and there by affecting brain function. This in no way invalidates the EM model of consciousness since, as you said, it only directly affects the activity of neural tissue, not the endogenous field they generate.

If a surrounding field was responsible for thought or consciousness or whatever, then we should be able to disrupt consciousness with simple pulses (completely irregardless of frequency -- why in the world would the frequency matter when discussing disruption of a field?) and people near power lines should be blithering idiots.

As you've already pointed out, even with the relatively powerful fields generated by TMS machines they do no directly affect the endogenous field generate by the brain. They work by inducing activity in the tissue itself -- which requires a very high density field to have any noticeable effect. The same should hold true for background radiation generated by powerlines, and the like. By way of example, it isn't sufficient to merely have an EM field to interfere with a radio transmission; the field must have the correct frequency to interfere with said transmission.

We should also be reading people's thoughts with an EEG or MEG. Berger was not happy when he learned that EEG could not do this since that is what he initially thought he was doing when he invented EEG.

In principle, there is no reason why it should not be possible to develop technology that would allow us to 'read' a person's thoughts. The problem is we currently have no idea how specific thoughts are encoded by the brain. So, as of now, its more than a little futile to attempt to read them even if they are somehow encoded in the endogenous field of the brain.

I'm sorry, but this idea is totally bankrupt. I would advise giving it up now. It can only arise from lack of knowledge.

Not really. If anything, the examples you've brought up are easily accounted for by the theory.

[ETA:
I should also add that this totally neglects the simply elegant demonstration that stimulation of particular areas of the brain produce reliable effects on cognition, movement, etc. Knock out a particular brain area and you see loss of these functions. The very idea that consciousness is some mass action field is just wrong. The contents of consciousness are clearly the result of neuronal action. And I can knock out your consciousness by putting a needle into your upper brainstem while still leaving your EEG showing at least THETA range (and put it in the right place, ALPHA range) activity.

You misunderstand. The hypothesis isn't asserting neural function is irrelevant to cognition, locomotion etc; it is quite clear that brain is where the action is taking place. It's core proposal of the theory is that the endogenous field of the brain is what actually carries the experience of consciousness, not that the neural processing of the brain is irrelevant. IMO, this is a perfectly plausible idea. As to whether or not the endogenous field has any causal role in neural function is still an open question in my book. Of course, as with all hypotheses, the postulate is tentative.

However, if the basic premise of the the hypothesis turns out to be valid then it would provide an solid means of conclusively determining whether or not consciousness is epiphenomenal.

 

[PixyMisa]

What do you mean "And"? Lemme recap the exchange because apparently you've either lost track or are deliberately playing obtuse again. I stated that the brain is directly tied to many other body systems and you replied that this was not the case. I then asked you what mediates the link if it's not direct and you replied "the nervous system" which is a nonsensical counter assertion being that the brain is the main hub of the nervous system. Tho its a bit of a digression from the main discussion I'm just a bit taken aback that you wouldn't even concede on such a minor point.

It's directly tied to the nervous system - as you say, it's part of the nervous system. It's tied to the other systems via the nervous system. In other words, the connection is not direct. That's all I'm saying, and you seem to agree. It's a minor point, and all we are doing is disagreeing on how one or the other of us phrased some sentence, so let's drop it.

You stated that you never claimed that brain doesn't generate an EM field [i.e. the field I've been referring to].

Right. I never said that.

Yet, when presented with direct quotes of you actually saying such all you do is assert that you were correct -- completely disregarding the blatant contradiction.

There is no contradiction. You are misinterpreting what I said.

You appear to be psychologically incapable of even entertaining the remotest possibility of wrong doing, short comings, or fallacies on you part.

Sorry, no. Other people have corrected me, and I have accepted it with grace.

This is simply an ad-hominem attack.

I'd have a lot more respect for you if you actually showed some integrity and atleast admit to fault when its shown to you clear as day.

Nope. You're wrong. Those quotes do not say what you claim they say. I never once said that the brain does not generate an EM field. I said that it does not generate your invisible-magic-fairy-field.

You initially referred to it simply as a "field". No field with the characteristics you describe exists.

You later referred to it specifically as an electromagnetic field. As I, and Ichneumonwasp, and Dancing David have all explained in detail, this is completely impossible.

Either way, all my points stand. I do not say, and have never said, that the brain does not generate an electromagnetic field. I have said, said at the beginning, and still say that the brain does not generate a field with the properties you claim.

Which reminds me... You've yet to provide any of the quotes I requested to backup your claim that I've been misrepresenting your arguments.

I didn't say that. I said that you are wrong. And you've just demonstrated this again.

I'm becoming more and more convinced that you've little or no intellectual integrity thus making any fruitful discussion between us impossible.

Ad hominem.

So, before we continue this discussion [potentially wasting our time] I've two proposals that you must meet to my satisfaction before I continue conversing with you.

AkuManiMani, I don't care what terms you want to issue. You can address the subject, or not. I don't care. I will continue to point out when you make incorrect claims regardless.

You can put me on ignore. Whatever. I don't care. I'll still be here.

I want a reasoned detailed response to each of them and not a snippet-by-snippet counter assertion to each and every sentence segment -- as you are so wont to do.

Don't care.

In other words, I want you to extend the same courtesy that I've extended to you thru-out this and other discussions we've had.

You want an unending stream of ad hominem attacks, insults, and random logical fallacies?

Okay, sure. But why?

Once you have done so we will continue where we left off and I will even address your argument of "OMG, the orders of magnitude are fifteen -- wut now, son?!?!"

Why strive to make your case even more ridiculous than it already is?

You do not get to handwave away fifteen orders of magnitude. You don't get to special plead your way out of it just because you have misunderstood what I have said. It just doesn't work like that.

A fifteen-order-of-magnitude error means you are wrong, as wrong as someone who thinks that the image of North America on a pocket map is the same size as the real thing.

[1] I find your charge that I've misrepresented your position on consciousness without any attempt to substantiate it to be very dishonest.

You what?

This is especially offensive in light of the fact that you've consistently lied about what has and has not been said during this discussion despite the fact that I've repeatedly gone back and provided direct quotes showing such comments to be inaccurate.

As those quotes demonstrate, you're wrong about that, just as you are wrong about the claims that elicited those quotes in the first place.

I'm once again proposing that you go back and provide direct quotes and/or links to posts where you exposit your position on what constitutes 'consciousness'/'awareness' [As I've gone out of my way to do with my own comments numerous times] and substantiate your claim that I've misrepresented it.

I don't even know what you're talking about.

[2] Lets assume that CEMI, and related hypotheses, are incorrect and have no explanatory merit [which, I'm guessing, you already do].

Right. Fifteen orders of magnitude. You don't get to ignore fifteen orders of magnitude. I don't care if you're offended by some imagined slight. You can either address the flaws in your argument - the same flaws I pointed out the moment you introduced it - or not.

Your choice.

You have still yet to explain how your model of 'consciousness' explains or accounts for qualitative sense impressions such as colors, tastes, sounds, emotions and other sensations [what I've been calling 'qualia'].

There's this thing. It's called the brain. It does that.

This in no way involves invisible-magic-fairy-fields.

About a year or so ago, when I asked you this same question you replied that those are all simply "factory added extras" that need no accounting for, even tho it was pointed out to you that such features are central to the standard definition of consciousness.

Sorry, again, no.

If I'm colour blind, I can't see colours, but I'm still conscious.
If I have no sense of tast, I cant taste, but I'm still conscious.
If I am deaf, I can't hear, but I'm still conscious.

These features cannot be central to the definition of consciousness, because the definition does not change when these features are entirely absent.

Consciousness is the awareness of self, of one's own thought processes. That includes what sensory data is available, but sensory data is not central to the question. It's just that we invariably have sensory data if we are conscious, so it must be included in a full explanation.

Now, about a year after, you're claiming that not only are these "factory added extras" irrelevant, they are "logically incoherent".

No.

The concept of qualia is logically incoherent. See the Wikipedia article, which has an excellent summary of how the word is used and the arguments for and against the concept.

You're talking about something that's apparently not qualia, but still using the word. Why, I don't know, but please don't.

To erase any potential for confusion [or further evasion on your part] these "factory added extras" and the realized capacity to generate them are what I've been calling been qualia and consciousness, respectively.

Could you please call them something other than qualia then? Unless you really mean to use an inherently incoherent dualistic concept. I misunderstood you at least once because that word does not mean what you are using it to mean.

As of yet, I haven't seen any sufficient accounting for them in your model and I would like you to do so -- assuming you can.

Consciousness is self-referential information processing. Perception is information processing.

I'd listened to a couple of the lectures the last time you provided the URL [they were quite interesting]. Since then I'd lost the bookmark to it O_<

Thank you for reposing that link.

No problem. Those lectures are wonderfully engaging and extremely informative.

 

[PixyMisa]

Let me clarify. The hypothesis is that the actual carrier of conscious experience is the weak endogenous field generated by the collective activity of neurons.

We know that. It's a very straightforward hypothesis.

The problem is not that we don't understand it, it's that it is completely impossible.

The idea is that information coded in the neural firing pattern may also be encoded in the field.

No.

What's the point? You already have neural firing. You already have a vast interconnected network of amplifying switches. The EM field generated by this activity is (a) effectively random noise, and (b) far far far too weak to have any effect on the activity itself.

The theory is an attempt to account for how the firing patterns of neurons, scattered thru-out the brain, comes together for form a single conscious experience.

It doesn't. That's not what happens.

There are, however, different versions of the hypothesis. In one [McFadden's version] proposes that the endogenous field affects the charges across neural membranes, thus affecting the probability that an action potential will be triggered.

Which is impossible. The field is too weak to do that.

In other versions [such as those being proposed by Susan Pockett, et al.] the field has no causal role at all in neural functioning.

Uh, what? I mean sure, that's exactly what I said, but why do you bring it up?

As has been pointed out, the theory is mostly speculative right now and is, therefore, not fully developed. Some version of the hypothesis is still seems plausible and the above example doesn't actually falsify it.

The theory is not plausible in any way.

You're that TMS does not operate by directly affecting the endogenous field of the brain; it utilizes electromagnetic induction to induce electric currents in neural tissue directly and there by affecting brain function. This in no way invalidates the EM model of consciousness since, as you said, it only directly affects the activity of neural tissue, not the endogenous field they generate.

Any and all external EM activity will distort the brain's own EM field. As we have seen, this has no effect at all until the external field reaches extremely high levels of intensity.

As you've already pointed out, even with the relatively powerful fields generated by TMS machines they do no directly affect the endogenous field generate by the brain. They work by inducing activity in the tissue itself -- which requires a very high density field to have any noticeable effect. The same should hold true for background radiation generated by powerlines, and the like. By way of example, it isn't sufficient to merely have an EM field to interfere with a radio transmission; the field must have the correct frequency to interfere with said transmission.

Nope.

To interfere with a signal encoded on a carrier wave, the simplest way is to use another signal on the same carrier frequency. But that's not the only way. A high-bandwidth signal on a nearby frequency will do the same job. The further apart the carrier frequencies, the higher the bandwidth you need. And a blast of broad-spectrum noise will do the job regardless.

You need more energy in the latter situation, but that doesn't matter. And as has been pointed out, household electricity is within the range of normal brainwave frequencies, and has no effect whatsoever.

In principle, there is no reason why it should not be possible to develop technology that would allow us to 'read' a person's thoughts.

Second law.

Not really. If anything, the examples you've brought up are easily accounted for by the theory.

So account for them already.

And also for the missing fifteen orders of magnitude. You know, the ones that say that the Sun is a dust speck about a micron wide.

You misunderstand. The hypothesis isn't asserting neural function is irrelevant to cognition, locomotion etc; it is quite clear that brain is where the action is taking place. It's core proposal of the theory is that the endogenous field of the brain is what actually carries the experience of consciousness, not that the neural processing of the brain is irrelevant.

I see. So the brain does the work, and the field does? What? Exactly.

IMO, this is a perfectly plausible idea.

Except for the six fatal flaws.

As to whether or not the endogenous field has any causal role in neural function is still an open question in my book.

Fifteen orders of magnitude. You know, like the claim that our entire galaxy consists of one brown dwarf star.

Of course, as with all hypotheses, the postulate is tentative.

Not tentative, just wrong.

However, if the basic premise of the the hypothesis turns out to be valid then it would provide an solid means of conclusively determining whether or not consciousness is epiphenomenal.

And since it isn't, it provides nothing.

 

[AkuManiMani]

That does not follow. The point of fundamental components is that they can be arranged in more complex ways.

Aku, if you can experience an experience, then you can have qualia about qualia. So clearly qualia are either ill-defined or they're not basic, because there could be MORE basic turtles qualia composing them.

As I said already; that reasoning simply does not follow. I suppose the point of confusion lies in how I've phrased the argument so I'll attempt to clarify by rephrasing it thus:

[P1] There are fundamental elements of conscious experience which I'm dubbing 'qualia'.

[P2] Qualia, by their very nature, are subjective impressions -of- sensations or other neural information -as- a qualitative experience.

[P3] Given the self-reflective nature of much of human cognitive processing [such may also be the case in other animals], the mind necessarily generates higher order impressions of base level sensations.

[P4]These 'higher order' impressions are also necessarily qualitative; hence they can be considered 'meta-qualia'.

[C] Given that conscious thoughts are necessarily qualitative, and many conscious thoughts are about [or in reference to] other thoughts and sense impressions it follows that qualia can be in reference to other qualia.

One that would specifically define what they are physically and predict how they could be reproduced.

Here's that special pleading, again. You have simply no idea how experiences are produced, and you're trying to claim that there needs to be a new physical LAW to explain it.

Belz, that's exactly the point. Nothing in any current physical theories explains what they are physically, or exactly how they are produced. If there is an actual process or phenomenon that is not accounted for in a physical theory, it must either be revised in such a way that it accounts for said processes or a new theory must be formulated that is more comprehensive. There is no 'new physical law' created in formulating a new theory, merely the incorporation of already existing principles into our explanatory framework. This is a basic epistemological fact.

Are experiences that special to you ?

The entire point of philosophy and scientific inquiry is to help us gain a better understanding and knowledge of the world. If there is a gap in human knowledge or understanding it is the business of philosophical & scientific inquiry to work toward filling it in. If you're so incurious that you don't consider such pursuits worth while that's your own affair, but don't sit back and disparage it merely because you don't understand.

Whats the actual point of contention here? I get the impression that you're simply being contrary for contray's sake and arguing for the sake of arguing.

Of course texts are basic.

Really ? I thought texts were composed of words composed of phonemes or letters. So much for basic.

I think you get the idea. Phonemes form the fundamental basis spoken and written language. Yet, here I am using language to refer to the fundamental components of language.

No, you're not. You talked about TEXT. Text is, by definition, composed of phonemes but phonemes are not composed of other phonemes. So texts are not analogous to qualia.

Look Belz, lets put it this way. Qualia are analogous to phonemes. Conscious thoughts are analogous to sentences, paragraphs, etc. By composition, conscious thoughts are qualia and, by definition, they may be in reference to a quale, ensemble of qualia, or qualia in general.

Could you atleast bother trying to understand what is being proposed before you try to critique it? You're far from dimwitted and such is well within your capabilities. So far, almost all of your responses have been knee jerk rebuttals. Are you looking to have a reasoned discussion or are you just out to beat your chest?

An entity without qualia cannot be said to be conscious.

That only follows from YOUR definition of qualia, which is circular. Obviously, if qualia are the basic elements of consciousness then without them one cannot be conscious or, more precisely, if one is conscious he necessarily has them.

Just to highlight the absurdity of your rebuttal:

[Belzebub]: That only follows from YOUR definition of [codon], which is circular. Obviously, if [codons] are the basic elements of [genes] then without them one cannot [have a genome] or, more precisely, if one [contains genes] he necessarily has them.

But that's not what the definition you quoted says.

Lets go back to the definition again shall we? The dictionary definition of quale I posted is:

qua⋅le: a quality, as bitterness, regarded as an independent object; a sense-datum or feeling having a distinctive quality.

Now could you please explain how my usage of the term contradicts this definition, Belz?

The definition is quite simple and clear. I don't understand why after over 70 pages of discussion you're still harping over this.

Quite simple, actually. Qualia don't exist. Under any definition. Experiences are not independent objects with their own laws of physics. They are actions.

I didn't say that they are objects independent of the laws of physics. I said that they are not predicted or accounted for in our current physical models. Period. If we had such knowledge we would not only be able to have an accurate objective criteria for determining what entities are conscious, but we would know how to reproduce subjective experiences synthetically in artificial constructs. As of now, humans do not have such knowledge.

Are you trying to have a genuine discussion or do you have some ulterior agenda? Can we move on or are you going to just keep picking at this issue because the term sounds too 'mystical' for you?

It doesn't "sound" mystical. It IS mystical. Your claim that it requires physics that aren't yet known makes it a supernatural claim until such laws are developped.

By that reasoning gravity and electricity were 'mystical' before humans gained a scientific understanding of them; atoms were 'mystical' until Boltzmann; the problem of black body radiation was 'mystical' until it was finally solved by early formulations of quantum mechanics. Etc, etc... Need I go on?

- By 'objective experience' I'm referring to general exposure or interaction of an object -- as in:
"system1 experiences [x] change in temperature; system2 experiences [y] change in viscosity..." etc. Things like temperature and viscosity are quantitative properties. Both conscious and unconscious entities can be said to 'experience' events in this sense.

Actually, by that definition subjective and objective are impossible to distinguish. I prefer Mercutio's "private" and "public" behaviour.

- By 'subjective experience' I'm referring to what you've earlier called 'internal behaviors' of a subject -- as in:
"critter1 experiences change in temperature as [x] sensation; critter2 experiences change in viscosity as [y] sensation" etc. Sensations of a particular experience are qualitative correlates of quantitative data originating from within/without the organism.

But that's completely uncalled for. Not only have you provided what seems to be completely arbitrary distinctions between the two, but now you're going to have to define "critter".

The distinctions are not arbitrary but logically, and necessarily, follow from the reality. I stated much earlier in this thread that qualia and quanta [subjective experience and objective existence, respectively] are complementary aspects of reality. Objective reality is veridical which means that, by definition, it can be observed. Observations themselves are, by definition, subjective and are necessarily qualitative; however, the act of observation itself has objective reality as well.

And FYI, by 'critter' I meant 'conscious agent' but I wanted to keep things concise so I just used the shorter term

P.S. Just as a side note:

As of now, its abundantly clear that you're simply reacting, knee-jerk, to how how I'm using terminology and that you have no rational objection to the concepts themselves. If I had come along using the words 'private behaviors' instead of 'qualia', and stated that we need 'a more comprehensive model in order to reproduce them artificially' rather than pointing out that they are not accounted for in current physics you wouldn't be nearly so combative.

I shouldn't have to dress up concepts in a such a way as to flatter your sensibilities just to get you to accept them for the sake of argument or, at least, consider them rationally. I don't like communicating in such a fashion. I find it disingenuous, demeaning to all parties involved and only befitting lawyers and politicians. I suppose the irony is that its a big part of the reason why I come off as being so tactless. I prefer to be frank and direct even at the risk of offending and putting people off.

I suspect that the reason why you are so chronically combative of almost everything I say is that you're reacting more to presentation than to substance. I've no problem with you disagreeing with me, per se, [in fact I prefer it -- otherwise we wouldn't have anything to talk about ] but I've little patience for belligerence and knee-jerk responses. I suggest that if you actually want a reasonable discussion with me [w/o my trademark sarcasm] then you should lay off the combativeness and take the time to thoughtfully consider what I'm saying before you try to critique it.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Don't care.

[...]

You can put me on ignore. Whatever. I don't care. I'll still be here.

Then you don't care to have a meaningful exchange with me. I've laid down my terms and you've rejected them; so be it. We've nothing to discuss.

P.S. Putting people on ignore ain't my thing. I don't like censorship -- even if its by me or ostensibly for me.

 

[AkuManiMani]

AMM,

I know I was het up, but I do know what I am talking about and here are two experiments and a thought experiment that are relevant

Hey, Dave. I haven't forgotten about you. I was hopping I would have a chance to give a longer reply to you posts this evening but my other replies have taken longer than I anticipated and its about time to call it a night. As soon as I'm able I'll get back to address your points and I have some questions of my own for you

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Let me clarify. The hypothesis is that the actual carrier of conscious experience is the weak endogenous field generated by the collective activity of neurons. The idea is that information coded in the neural firing pattern may also be encoded in the field. The theory is an attempt to account for how the firing patterns of neurons, scattered thru-out the brain, comes together for form a single conscious experience. There are, however, different versions of the hypothesis. In one [McFadden's version] proposes that the endogenous field affects the charges across neural membranes, thus affecting the probability that an action potential will be triggered. In other versions [such as those being proposed by Susan Pockett, et al.] the field has no causal role at all in neural functioning. As has been pointed out, the theory is mostly speculative right now and is, therefore, not fully developed. Some version of the hypothesis is still seems plausible and the above example doesn't actually falsify it.

You're that TMS does not operate by directly affecting the endogenous field of the brain; it utilizes electromagnetic induction to induce electric currents in neural tissue directly and there by affecting brain function. This in no way invalidates the EM model of consciousness since, as you said, it only directly affects the activity of neural tissue, not the endogenous field they generate.



As you've already pointed out, even with the relatively powerful fields generated by TMS machines they do no directly affect the endogenous field generate by the brain. They work by inducing activity in the tissue itself -- which requires a very high density field to have any noticeable effect. The same should hold true for background radiation generated by powerlines, and the like. By way of example, it isn't sufficient to merely have an EM field to interfere with a radio transmission; the field must have the correct frequency to interfere with said transmission.



In principle, there is no reason why it should not be possible to develop technology that would allow us to 'read' a person's thoughts. The problem is we currently have no idea how specific thoughts are encoded by the brain. So, as of now, its more than a little futile to attempt to read them even if they are somehow encoded in the endogenous field of the brain.



Not really. If anything, the examples you've brought up are easily accounted for by the theory.



You misunderstand. The hypothesis isn't asserting neural function is irrelevant to cognition, locomotion etc; it is quite clear that brain is where the action is taking place. It's core proposal of the theory is that the endogenous field of the brain is what actually carries the experience of consciousness, not that the neural processing of the brain is irrelevant. IMO, this is a perfectly plausible idea. As to whether or not the endogenous field has any causal role in neural function is still an open question in my book. Of course, as with all hypotheses, the postulate is tentative.

However, if the basic premise of the the hypothesis turns out to be valid then it would provide an solid means of conclusively determining whether or not consciousness is epiphenomenal.

Ask yourself this simple question: How could TMS, which requires sufficient stimulation to create an electric field that causes neuronal deploarization, not affect the surrounding field? How is that even theoretically possible? I thought it was self-evident that the field must be affected if the stimulus is strong enough to cuase neuronal depolarization, which is why I did not emphasize the point more.

If I rubbed a refrigerator magnet on my head it would affect that electrical field in some way; there is simply no way to avoid that fact.

 

[Dancing David]

Hey, Dave. I haven't forgotten about you. I was hopping I would have a chance to give a longer reply to you posts this evening but my other replies have taken longer than I anticipated and its about time to call it a night. As soon as I'm able I'll get back to address your points and I have some questions of my own for you

Thats cool, I have my bite stick ready. the scenery is covered in a protective layer of chicken wire.

I will say up front, no we do not know exactly how the brain makes the perception of the color red. But we do know for certain that it is an organic process learned by exposure to sensations.

And that people do not have seizures or loose consciousness in the precense of huge magnetic fields.

 

[LightningStrike]

Which comes first conciousness or thinking mind? That's the logical question.

Consciousness of course comes first and in that place neurons and brain don't exist, thank god, they are creations of the thinking mind.

"Come to me all thee that labour and are heavily laden and I will give thee rest."
Could that be the place of conciousness calling to the analytical/ problematical mind saying come lie down like a good dog in front of the fire and stop barking at your own echo.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

What are the grounds for the possibility of consciousness?

 

[dlorde]

Belz, that's exactly the point. Nothing in any current physical theories explains what they are physically, or exactly how they are produced.

Perhaps that's because they are not physical entities, they are labels for the processing of certain sensory information by a self-referential information processing system. Physical theories cover all the processing, what's left is a metaphysical abstraction for the particular processing that occurs in a particular system in response to a particular sensory input.

If there is an actual process or phenomenon that is not accounted for in a physical theory, it must either be revised in such a way that it accounts for said processes or a new theory must be formulated that is more comprehensive.

Not necessary.

Look Belz, lets put it this way. Qualia are analogous to phonemes. Conscious thoughts are analogous to sentences, paragraphs, etc. By composition, conscious thoughts are qualia and, by definition, they may be in reference to a quale, ensemble of qualia, or qualia in general.

You seem to be caught up in the reification of this metaphysical abstraction.

By that reasoning gravity and electricity were 'mystical' before humans gained a scientific understanding of them; atoms were 'mystical' until Boltzmann; the problem of black body radiation was 'mystical' until it was finally solved by early formulations of quantum mechanics. Etc, etc... Need I go on?

You forgot the aether and phlogiston...

As an aside, I've read all this thread, and extremely entertaining and educating it has been too, but for all the frustrating sparseness and opacity of many of Pixy's posts (although less so recently), I certainly haven't noticed him contradicting himself or lying to you as you claim. However, many of your own posts in response to him have misrepresented his statements and his position, making straw man targets of them, which you then attack and subsequently castigate him for denying them. These tactics are simply unnecessary and detrimental to your case. If you have a good case to argue, argue it - why pollute and dilute it this way?

I don't know whether this is accidental or deliberate, but the former is careless and the latter mean-spirited.

For my own part, I don't think your arguments stand up - the EM field theory of consciousness in particular is, as others have said, not just far-fetched, but, with the best will in the world, it's totally implausible.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Hey, Dave. I haven't forgotten about you. I was hopping I would have a chance to give a longer reply to you posts this evening but my other replies have taken longer than I anticipated and its about time to call it a night. As soon as I'm able I'll get back to address your points and I have some questions of my own for you.

Thats cool, I have my bite stick ready. the scenery is covered in a protective layer of chicken wire.

Oki. I'll try to keep my sarcasm in check as well

I will say up front, no we do not know exactly how the brain makes the perception of the color red. But we do know for certain that it is an organic process learned by exposure to sensations.

I agree with that comment except on one point. I don't think is appropriate to say that we 'learn' perceptions like red. Either our brains can readily generate them or not. Its the labels and associations of perceptions that we learn and not the perceptions themselves.

And that people do not have seizures or loose consciousness in the presence of huge magnetic fields.

That is true. Its also true that the presence of large electromagnetic fields does not necessarily negate or disrupt radio transmissions either. Its important to keep in mind that the quanta of such fields are photon [i.e. light] of varying pattens and frequencies. Take another example. Suppose one were to try to communicate data optically in some fashion. Simply sending another transmission thru the encoded beam would not disrupt it or the information it carries.

As Ichneumonwasp pointed out earlier, TMS does not work by directly manipulating the endogenous field of the brain but indirecly, by inducing a current in living brain tissue. This induced current, in turn, contributes to a change in the endogenous field of the brain and hence the conscious experience of the subject. Even then, the inducing field of the TMS must be of an extremely high density [15 orders of magnitude higher than the endogenous field, as Pixy has pointed out] to directly affect brain activity.

Which brings me to my response to your thought experiments [1 & 2]. If one were to carry out such experiments they most likely would not create any discernible effect on the consciousness of a subject. The reason for this is that, as you pointed out before, the cell membranes of neurons do not have the same physical properties of something like a conductive copper wire and does not transmit or react to electromagnetic fields or signals in the same way. The lipid bilayer that makes up most of the cell membrane is an insulator- meaning that it is not itself electrically conductive. However, while the bilayer itself is not conducive to electrical charge there are receptors embedded thru-out it that actively pump ions on either side of the membrane creating a voltage. When an appropriate signal [e.g. a neurotransmitter or other biological signal] triggers the relevant receptors embedded in the membrane and ions are temporarily allowed to pass across the voltage gradient, locally depolarizing the membrane. This sets off the coordinated propagation of the electrical signals we call action potentials. All this means is that, functionally, the cell membrane acts as a semiconductor.

The membranes of living cells differ from other conductive materials [such as metals] in that initiation and propitiation of electrical current along it's surface is biologically controlled. In order to even set an action potential in motion there must be either a highly specified biological signal, direct application of a current, or brute force EM induction as in the case of TMS.

In regards to thought experiment 3 I would have to say that, due to reasons already mentioned, the experiment probably would not work. However, the basic premise that what actually carries the qualitative experience of consciousness is [or is encoded within] the endogenous field of the brain is not invalidated by the objections raised so far. As far as whether or not the endogenous field of the brain has some direct causal role in cognitive function I'm not sure. There could possibly be some relevant interaction with specialized receptors embedded in neural membranes but, ofcourse, that would just be conjecture at this point.

I will close this response by pointing out that when it comes to biology, it seems that nature always harbors some hidden surprises. Just a little over decade or so ago it was thought that photosynthesis operated by purely classical mechanisms [tho, the high efficiency and exact details of the process were a mystery]. Now there is mounting evidence that plants utilize QM effects to achieve the extremely high energy efficiency of photosynthesis. There is still much about the biological processes of cells [including neurons] that is not yet fully understood or known. IMO, it would be wise to leave open the possibility of functions in cells not before considered.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Belz, that's exactly the point. Nothing in any current physical theories explains what they are physically, or exactly how they are produced.

Perhaps that's because they are not physical entities, they are labels for the processing of certain sensory information by a self-referential information processing system. Physical theories cover all the processing, what's left is a metaphysical abstraction for the particular processing that occurs in a particular system in response to a particular sensory input.

Off the bat, I would like to say that I find your thoughtful responses and critiques to be refreshing -- especially after all the pages combative rebuttal by some other posters

Now in regards to your above response, I would have to say that I agree with your general assessment. Thoughts, qualia, and other mental phenomena could be thought of as metaphysical abstractions of brain processes. I don't think that such a designation could be construed as being necessarily incorrect.

However, over roughly the passed year and a half, I've been mulling over this and related ontological issues. The general idea that has been coming together in my mind is that all observable entities [even atoms and 'fundamental' particles] are all just emergent processes of more fundamental constituents. Technically, one could consider our labeling of them as objects, per se, to be just metaphysical abstractions of more basic phenomena. On the other hand, I think it would be also justified to consider such entities to be as ontologically real, in their own right, as the basic process(es) that give rise to them.

One example that I like to use is that of words. Words are symbols that are used to convey concepts and meanings which are, by they nature, abstract entities of a sort. Words are words regardless of the nature of the media upon which they are conveyed [for instance, as a pattern of sound waves, a hand written text, engravings, electronic displays, etc..]. They have an objective reality that has causal relevance to actual physical events yet they themselves are not physical objects, per se, in the conventional sense.

If there is an actual process or phenomenon that is not accounted for in a physical theory, it must either be revised in such a way that it accounts for said processes or a new theory must be formulated that is more comprehensive.

Not necessary.

Granted. Its not absolutely necessary but, in the interest of advancing scientific understanding, it would be a good idea to do so. It also wouldn't hurt to put together some coherent ontological framework to comprehensively place and sort such concepts. As I mentioned in an earlier post consideration of such issues has led me to start reading up on a field called biosemiotics. The main premises of the enterprise is that one of the defining features of organisms is semiosis [i.e. the the synthesis and utilization of signs and sign systems]. Its quite clear that things like signs, signals, words and codes [abstractions tho they may be] have direct causal relevance to the actions of many physical systems -- especially living systems. Its seems to me that it maybe time to ontological bridge the apparent gap between physics and metaphysics.

You seem to be caught up in the reification of this metaphysical abstraction.

Indeed I am

As I said, this is an issue that has concerned me for quite some time. I've decided to devote a good portion of my time toward investigaton and consideration of this, and related topics

By that reasoning gravity and electricity were 'mystical' before humans gained a scientific understanding of them; atoms were 'mystical' until Boltzmann; the problem of black body radiation was 'mystical' until it was finally solved by early formulations of quantum mechanics. Etc, etc... Need I go on?

You forgot the aether and phlogiston...

Again, granted. The point is that the question of the exact nature of consciousness is still very much an open, and valid, scientific question. As I mentioned earlier terms like 'qualia' and 'memes' hold the same epistemic status that genes did during the time of Darwin and Mendel. Their existence can be inferred even if their exact mechanisms and composition have yet to be scientifically established.

As an aside, I've read all this thread, and extremely entertaining and educating it has been too, but for all the frustrating sparseness and opacity of many of Pixy's posts (although less so recently), I certainly haven't noticed him contradicting himself or lying to you as you claim.

My charges of him lying are in direct reference to his repeated claims that I have never defined what I mean by terms like 'qualia' and 'consciousnesses', despite the fact that I have repeatedly done so. I've even gone as far as to link earlier posts where I provided the definitions -- on multiple occasions. There is no way he could have been unaware of them so the only logical conclusion I can come up with is that there is deliberate dishonesty on his part.

However, many of your own posts in response to him have misrepresented his statements and his position, making straw man targets of them, which you then attack and subsequently castigate him for denying them. These tactics are simply unnecessary and detrimental to your case. If you have a good case to argue, argue it - why pollute and dilute it this way?

I admit that I do have a tendency to overreact, fly off the handle at times, or make insensitive comments [I've had close friends tell me that the filter between my brain and my mouth is faulty >_>]. I also admit that such behaviors are counterproductive and I need to work on changing those habits. However, I maintain that I have accurately represented his position as he has presented it. He defined information processing as 'awareness' and self-referential processing a 'consciousness'. These are the definitions as he presented it to me about a year ago, and they are same definitions he is employing in this thread. As you pointed out, PixyMisa has been consistent in many respects [Even so, I still maintain that there are serious logical and ontological problems with his position as hes so far presented it].

In all fairness, my reactions [justified or unjustified] were precipitated by his deliberate misrepresentations of my statements and positions. He has repeatedly claimed that I never provided a definition of 'qualia' or 'conscious' even tho I actually have done so; I have and continue to utilize the terms in a manner consistent with my stated definitions. When I proposed that the medium for what we consciousness may be a kind of EMF phenomena he chose to represent my position as being a "magical-faerie-field". Whether or not the hypothesis is valid, his persistent caricaturing of this, and other positions I've taken, is blatant straw-manning. If Pixy, or any other individual, wishes to have a civil discussion with me it they would be wise to NOT consistently behave in such a manner.

The thing is,

I don't know whether this is accidental or deliberate, but the former is careless and the latter mean-spirited.

For my own part, I don't think your arguments stand up - the EM field theory of consciousness in particular is, as others have said, not just far-fetched, but, with the best will in the world, it's totally implausible.

That's your honest opinion and I cannot, and do not, fault you for it. Your comments so far have been cogent, honest, and civil and it's been a pleasure conversing with you. However, based on reasons mentioned above, I still maintain that I find the EM model of consciousness to still hold some plausibility. If you remain personally unconvinced that is your prerogative but I will continue to consider it plausible until I see sufficient reason not to

 

[Dancing David]

Oki. I'll try to keep my sarcasm in check as well



I agree with that comment except on one point. I don't think is appropriate to say that we 'learn' perceptions like red. Either our brains can readily generate them or not. Its the labels and associations of perceptions that we learn and not the perceptions themselves.



That is true. Its also true that the presence of large electromagnetic fields does not necessarily negate or disrupt radio transmissions either. Its important to keep in mind that the quanta of such fields are photon [i.e. light] of varying pattens and frequencies. Take another example. Suppose one were to try to communicate data optically in some fashion. Simply sending another transmission thru the encoded beam would not disrupt it or the information it carries.

As Ichneumonwasp pointed out earlier, TMS does not work by directly manipulating the endogenous field of the brain but indirecly, by inducing a current in living brain tissue. This induced current, in turn, contributes to a change in the endogenous field of the brain and hence the conscious experience of the subject. Even then, the inducing field of the TMS must be of an extremely high density [15 orders of magnitude higher than the endogenous field, as Pixy has pointed out] to directly affect brain activity.

Which brings me to my response to your thought experiments [1 & 2]. If one were to carry out such experiments they most likely would not create any discernible effect on the consciousness of a subject. The reason for this is that, as you pointed out before, the cell membranes of neurons do not have the same physical properties of something like a conductive copper wire and does not transmit or react to electromagnetic fields or signals in the same way. The lipid bilayer that makes up most of the cell membrane is an insulator- meaning that it is not itself electrically conductive. However, while the bilayer itself is not conducive to electrical charge there are receptors embedded thru-out it that actively pump ions on either side of the membrane creating a voltage. When an appropriate signal [e.g. a neurotransmitter or other biological signal] triggers the relevant receptors embedded in the membrane and ions are temporarily allowed to pass across the voltage gradient, locally depolarizing the membrane. This sets off the coordinated propagation of the electrical signals we call action potentials. All this means is that, functionally, the cell membrane acts as a semiconductor.

The membranes of living cells differ from other conductive materials [such as metals] in that initiation and propitiation of electrical current along it's surface is biologically controlled. In order to even set an action potential in motion there must be either a highly specified biological signal, direct application of a current, or brute force EM induction as in the case of TMS.

In regards to thought experiment 3 I would have to say that, due to reasons already mentioned, the experiment probably would not work. However, the basic premise that what actually carries the qualitative experience of consciousness is [or is encoded within] the endogenous field of the brain is not invalidated by the objections raised so far. As far as whether or not the endogenous field of the brain has some direct causal role in cognitive function I'm not sure. There could possibly be some relevant interaction with specialized receptors embedded in neural membranes but, ofcourse, that would just be conjecture at this point.

I will close this response by pointing out that when it comes to biology, it seems that nature always harbors some hidden surprises. Just a little over decade or so ago it was thought that photosynthesis operated by purely classical mechanisms [tho, the high efficiency and exact details of the process were a mystery]. Now there is mounting evidence that plants utilize QM effects to achieve the extremely high energy efficiency of photosynthesis. There is still much about the biological processes of cells [including neurons] that is not yet fully understood or known. IMO, it would be wise to leave open the possibility of functions in cells not before considered.

I will give an extended response;

Here is the short form, if consciousness is encoded in the EM then there are some situations that are possible
1. The EM field represents the patterns of neural firing, carried through the biological organic processes of neural transmission and neurotransmission, one in cells and co-joined cells the other between cells. I think with both agree upon this
I have an important caveat however:
1.a. the organic transmission in cells and between cells has a conditioned response. This is not represented in the EM field patterns but is crucial to the 'gating' or fuzzy Boolean logic of brain patterns.

So that brings us to

2. The EM field generated by the generated by the brain also interacts with the brain and off the top of my head I think that you stated McFadden thinks it changes the depolarization potential.

3. The EM field of the brain is a byproduct of the brain and does not interact with the neural transmission in any form other than as a spurious byproduct of depolarization.

Now here is the deal:

There appears to be no evidence for 2, in fact you seem to agree to this in your post. And I do not see how frequency of pulses in EM fields is going to have any difference at all whatsoever, if EM fields cause changes in the depolarization potential, the massive and moderate EM fields will do the same thing.

So why is the 'consciousness' interacts with the EM field of the brain is it not overwhelmed by magnetic fields that are billions of times stronger than the EM field of the brain?

That is why I say, if the EM field has an effect on neural transmission, then it should be swamped by the fields generated by a transformer station, where they will be 6 -8 orders of magnitude stronger than those in the brain.


ETA: spell check