The Hard Problem of Gravity

[PixyMisa]

Oh yeah. That little problem with definitions again.

 

[Belz...]

Rly, Rly

How do "Consciousness, subjectivity, quale, etc. are terms that refer to actual empirical phenomena" if no one seems to be able to properly define the latter ?

 

[AkuManiMani]

That you could even seriously make that statement just illustrates that you don't understand what the term qualia means. A quale is just a basic element of subjective experience and such experiences are what we collectively refer to as consciousness. The term and definition are perfectly coherent.

That you could even seriously make that statement just illustrates that you don't understand what the term qualia means.

The term was invented specifically to mean whatever is left over after the physical processes are explained. In other words, it is only a coherent concept under incoherent metaphysics.

Eh? Metaphysics, by definition, is what is 'after' or 'beyond' physics. Its just so happens that qualia is beyond the current understanding of physics. This doesn't make qualia incoherent, its simply shows that its beyond the domain of applicability of current physical theories.

I am, and have been, proposing that physical theory can, in principle, be revised and extended to encompass metaphysical concepts like qualia. Its an empirical given that qualia are real phenomena; the fact that current theories do not sufficiently explain or account for them does not negate their reality.

I quite clearly recall you stating that by your definition, a simple feedback a device like a thermostat is 'aware' and devices/systems that have higher level regulating loops [i.e. reflexive programs] qualify as being 'conscious'.

The first part is correct, the second part is not accurate. Neither bears no relation to what you just claimed I said.

The two statements

All cats are mammals.
All mammals are cats.

Are NOT equivalent.

So when are reflexive systems not 'conscious' or 'aware' by your definition?

If you feel that this is inaccurate you're free to quote your exact words or shall I be forced again to dig up your past quotes myself?

Feel free to quote me. Just don't incorrectly paraphrase me.

That's pretty rich coming from an individual who has gone out of his way to repeatedly and deliberately misrepresented almost everything that I've said so far in this discussion.

I've been doing all the heavy work so far of providing supporting links for my positions AND dredging up direct quotes from this discussion [extending as far back as weeks and months prior]. What amazes me is that no matter how many times I PROVE that a particular statement has been made you still manage to deny it. That fact is, everything said in this forum discussion is a matter of public record. How many links from this thread will it take to prove that the above is an accurate representation of your argument so far? Shall I go back even further to previous threads where you make the exact same assertions and post them again for posterity? Quite frankly, I getting tired of having to pull all the weight of these discussions with you.

I've observed your posting history for quite sometime -- even in discussions where I was not a participant. Repeatedly I see a pattern of others providing argumentation while all you bring to the table are handwaving dismissals. When are you doing to realize that flat denial and assertion is not going to cut it in this discussion? Its high-time you put up or shut up.

Here's a proposition. I would like YOU to go back to each and every post in this thread where you exposit your definition of what qualifies as 'aware' and 'conscious'. Then I would like you to either repost them in quote format or simply provide them as a list of links. If you can can firmly demonstrate that I've been misrepresenting your argument thus far I will concede.

un⋅con⋅scious
  /ʌnˈkɒnʃəs/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [uhn-kon-shuhs] -adjective
1. not conscious; without awareness, sensation, or cognition.
2. temporarily devoid of consciousness.
3. not perceived at the level of awareness; occurring below the level of conscious thought: an unconscious impulse.
4. not consciously realized, planned, or done; without conscious volition or intent: an unconscious social slight.
5. not endowed with mental faculties: the unconscious stones.
–noun
6. the unconscious, Psychoanalysis. the part of the mind containing psychic material that is only rarely accessible to awareness but that has a pronounced influence on behavior.

Six definitions. You think this is somehow supposed to help your argument?

None of the listed definitions are mutually exclusive. I provided all the listed definitions of 'unconscious' to be as thorough and comprehensive as possible since you have a penchant for demanding definitions to the nth degree. I realize your profile description reads 'Persnickety Insect' but if you spent as much time actually bringing substantive arguments to the table instead of filibustering over irrelevant minutia discussions with you could actually get somewhere.

Pot. Kettle. Black.

Fail.

Pointing out blatant hypocrisy is epic win in my book

 

[AkuManiMani]

How do "Consciousness, subjectivity, quale, etc. are terms that refer to actual empirical phenomena" if no one seems to be able to properly define the latter ?

Are you conscious? Do you subjectively experience the world in a qualitative manner?

 

[AkuManiMani]

yeah but don't forget, you are thinking of the aku-pc, not the HPC as the dualists define it.

It seems like the aku-pc is more along the lines of "what is the mechanism of consciousness?"

That isn't the dualist HPC.

Oki-Doki

 

[Nick227]

yeah sure, any research papers that say that?

Any sources?

See for example...

www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.0050260

www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.0030141

With the rise of the Global Neuronal Workspace Model, so terms like "conscious access" seem to start to take over from the more loose "consciousness."

Nick

 

[Nick227]

(Please note the use of terminology assumes an appearance of reality and convention of idiom. We could just be godthought or energy/matter. Biology means the mechanical construction of creatures from 'whatever it is'.)

I think you mean 'biological', not genetic. (And there is no sex drive in humans, there are conditioned resposnses to biological states.)

And why introduce the meme language. Behaviors might suffice. Memes are higher level comminication constructs are they not?

(I don't know, which is why I ask.)

I was contrasting genetic and memetic influence, taking both as replicators. This was a bit unannounced and a little out of context so if you're not familiar with the meme scene it probably would seem a bit odd. See Blackmore, The Meme Machine for more if interested.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I'm not following this conversation closely any more, but an emotional response being automatic is precisely what James theorized, and that is where he has been most criticized. There must clearly be some sort of cognitive appraisal prior to the emotional response; and he did not provide for the sort of clear emotional responses that can occur after more nauanced social appraisals (Sartre's example of a woman in a social situation fainting as one was supposed to do in Victorian times).

I suspect things are in reality more complex. There may be different classes of emotional response, requiring differing levels of prior cognitive processing to be triggered. I believe Damasio suggests this, suggesting that some responses may be mediated solely by the amygdala, the idea being that these developed earlier. Others require the amygdala +, I think, the PFC - they developed later in our evolutionary history.

So, I would figure that these earlier responses require an absolute minimal level of cognitive processing, whereas others might require that neural representations relating to self, and even more stuff, are dragged into the scene in order to get triggered.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I think I understand how frustrating it can be to work hard on a solution to a problem only to have people who don't seem to get what you're doing tell you you're missing something

Its not my intention to downplay what you and others are doing or to be a wet blanket. Like I mentioned before, qualia have the same epistemic status that genes did a century and a half ago; not only have they not had their Watson & Crick but they are still waiting on their Mendel. It would be really cool if those most basic elements [qualia] where technically defined and discovered in our lifetimes. Such knowledge would not only greatly advance the field of AI but also revolutionize numerous other fields.

What frustrates me is that there are prominent thinkers like Dennet that go to such great lengths to rationalize away a very real problem. It just seems like they are rolling over in defeat and giving up the pursuit of a greater mystery in favor of simple puzzles already solved. I think the sooner more thinkers and researchers take the problem of qualia seriously the sooner there will be more conclusive answers to the HPC.

The problem with the HPC is that it asserts mystery where, increasingly, it appears that there might not be one. If you're Indiana Jones then, great, write long essays on the philosopher's great existential chasm between subject and object. But, the fact of the matter is, that with more and more of the easy problems of consciousness getting solved it may well be that there simply is no hard problem.

As Ramachandran says, the real issue underneath the HPC is Self. It appears that there is a self that is experiencing and at the level of the whole organism this is a thoroughly reasonable perspective. But when you get beneath this level, when you lift up the bonnet (hood) and look underneath, you don't find any little men in the brain. There is no inner agent of causation. There is no inner recipient of experience. These are notions that only make sense at a macroscopic level. This is the whole difficulty with consciousness research. What it intuitively looks like to most people is simply not how it is.

If you still crave mystery then I recommend you look at what these neuroscientist guys are up to in France, using masked and unmasked visually presented words to identify which neural circuits are active in conscious processing and which are active in unconscious processing. It's gripping stuff and they might uncover stuff which scuppers Strong AI. They also might not.

Published in 2002, well respected academic journalist Rita Carter states that few researchers are yet satisfied by the computational theory of consciousness. So I don't think you need to worry too much about the death of mystery just yet.

Nick

eta: For mystery, I've also yet to see anyone from Strong AI really take on the issue of feelings. If a computer has the behaviour of feelings, does it necessarily also feel? I don't think so.

 

[AkuManiMani]

The problem with the HPC is that it asserts mystery where, increasingly, it appears that there might not be one. If you're Indiana Jones then, great, write long essays on the philosopher's great existential chasm between subject and object. But, the fact of the matter is, that with more and more of the easy problems of consciousness getting solved it may well be that there simply is no hard problem.

I agree that what is put forward as the HPC [or as I like to call it, the EMA] is not an intractable problem. There can and has been a lot of progress. IMO, a lot of the easier problems of consciousness seem to be features specific to humans. Answering the deeper questions of consciousness [that I think are being side-stepped by some] would not only allow us to provide an objective basis for determining what entities are conscious and to what degree, but also allow us to formulate means of reproducing particular qualia synthetically.

As Ramachandran says, the real issue underneath the HPC is Self. It appears that there is a self that is experiencing and at the level of the whole organism this is a thoroughly reasonable perspective. But when you get beneath this level, when you lift up the bonnet (hood) and look underneath, you don't find any little men in the brain. There is no inner agent of causation. There is no inner recipient of experience. These are notions that only make sense at a macroscopic level. This is the whole difficulty with consciousness research. What it intuitively looks like to most people is simply not how it is.

I agree. Whatever consciousness is it most definitely does not consist of little homuculi or one magical module. The mind and consciousness are clearly a holistic phenomena involving the collective functions of entire organisms. This is why earlier I suggested that the noumenal mind [or 'self'] must be a kind of field activity. Such a conception is quite compatible with [and I think, strongly suggested by] the GWT model of consciousness.

If you still crave mystery then I recommend you look at what these neuroscientist guys are up to in France, using masked and unmasked visually presented words to identify which neural circuits are active in conscious processing and which are active in unconscious processing. It's gripping stuff and they might uncover stuff which scuppers Strong AI. They also might not.

Published in 2002, well respected academic journalist Rita Carter states that few researchers are yet satisfied by the computational theory of consciousness. So I don't think you need to worry too much about the death of mystery just yet.

Nick

eta: For mystery, I've also yet to see anyone from Strong AI really take on the issue of feelings. If a computer has the behaviour of feelings, does it necessarily also feel? I don't think so.

Once again, thank you very much for all the additional links and references

 

[blobru]

I don't agree. For me your statement "a given situation has been evaluated as demanding a certain response" implies that the subconscious mind is working out what needs to happen. I'm saying that the emotion is an autonomous response. Yours, or J-L's interpretation, for me is trying to understand the subconscious mind in the terms of the conscious mind. I don't see the point in doing this. For me the emotional responses of the subconscious are automatic, not thought out.

Nick

I'm not following this conversation closely any more, but an emotional response being automatic is precisely what James theorized, and that is where he has been most criticized. There must clearly be some sort of cognitive appraisal prior to the emotional response; and he did not provide for the sort of clear emotional responses that can occur after more nauanced social appraisals (Sartre's example of a woman in a social situation fainting as one was supposed to do in Victorian times).

Thanks for the clarification, Ich_wasp. I had misunderstood James-Lange as necessarily assuming some sort of pre/un/sub-conscious evaluation, but reading up on it again I see the emotion arises as a "visceral" response. What I'm basing the "qualia are the language of sense" proposal on is probably much closer to the Two Factor Theory of Emotion^WP.

Sorry to you and Nick for the confusion.

ETA: Or, more succinctly, James theorized that emotions precede feelings (feelings being later reflections based in emotions), but Sartre (among others) postulated that feelings can precede emotions.

I personally think a way to reconcile these viewpoints that makes sense neurologically is that they depend on parallel systems that can interact. It is not correct to view them as simple linear processes, one preceding or following the other in lock-step fashion.

I find theories of emotion also tend to assume a pristine subject having one emotion at a time, then describe it linearly, which makes the theory easier to understand, but often at the expense of capturing the complexity of emotional experience.

One thing Sartre's theory sure ain't is simple: a sort of rationalist diatribe against emotions (as threats to existential freedom). In spite of the ax-grinding though, some brilliant insights.

James' famous example is the response to a bear (with apologies to Stephen Colbert). Walking along, you happen on a bear and run away in fear long before you can actually consciously appraise the situation (this is why I gave the previous example of seeing something "flying nearby" and subconsiously assuming it could be a wasp). The fear consists in the uncoscious appraisal of danger and the body response to that appraisal -- bear, bad. In modern parlance, this is the role of the amygdala, which appraises the danger and worth of situations and communicates with the hypothalamus to begin the all-or-none fight or flight response.

This is what always trips me up with J-L. Your account, with references to "subconsciously assuming" and "unconscious appraisal" attendant on the event, makes sense; James, however, barely describes the perception of the bear stage, in his haste to get to the visceral response, then startle the reader with his conclusion, "I'm afraid because I'm running away." No wonder that seeming omission was seized on by critics.

This is to be contrasted with "feelings" which constitute more nuanced appraisals once the emotion is set in motion (and which constitute a large part of what we mean by "conscious"). ...

And I hate that ambiguity -- "feelings" may refer to the [bodily] feelings of the emotion or [conscious] feelings about the emotion! -- though I doubt my feelings'll fix it any time soon.

 

[Nick227]

I agree that what is put forward as the HPC [or as I like to call it, the EMA] is not an intractable problem. There can and has been a lot of progress. IMO, a lot of the easier problems of consciousness seem to be features specific to humans. Answering the deeper questions of consciousness [that I think are being side-stepped by some] would not only allow us to provide an objective basis for determining what entities are conscious and to what degree, but also allow us to formulate means of reproducing particular qualia synthetically.

How would you propose anyone go about answering these deeper questions?

I agree. Whatever consciousness is it most definitely does not consist of little homuculi or one magical module. The mind and consciousness are clearly a holistic phenomena involving the collective functions of entire organisms. This is why earlier I suggested that the noumenal mind [or 'self'] must be a kind of field activity. Such a conception is quite compatible with [and I think, strongly suggested by] the GWT model of consciousness.

Well, the group in France are quite wont to use some rather mystical terminology when describing the "global access" state neuronally. So, who knows?

Personally, I figure the final place the HPC will be able to hide out in is the realm of feelings. Does the computer feel? That's the question.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

I agree. Whatever consciousness is it most definitely does not consist of little homuculi or one magical module. The mind and consciousness are clearly a holistic phenomena involving the collective functions of entire organisms.

What evidence can you provide to support this claim?

This is why earlier I suggested that the noumenal mind [or 'self'] must be a kind of field activity. Such a conception is quite compatible with [and I think, strongly suggested by] the GWT model of consciousness.

If it is compatible with GWT, that's a major strike against GWT, because you still haven't addressed any of this idea's fatal flaws:

The mind doesn't behave like that.
The brain doesn't work like that.
There is no transmitter for such a field.
There is no receiver for such a field.
There is no such field.
It's physically impossible.

 

[Belz...]

Eh? Metaphysics, by definition, is what is 'after' or 'beyond' physics. Its just so happens that qualia is beyond the current understanding of physics.

Or made up, depending.

This doesn't make qualia incoherent

No, but the fact that you can have qualia about qualia about qualia about turtles certainly doesn't help the idea's credibility.

Are you conscious?

By any reasonable definition, yes.

Do you subjectively experience the world in a qualitative manner?

Based on what's been said in this thread, you've just asked me if I experiencingly experience the world in an experiencing manner.

What the hell do those terms mean, anyway ? How do you "objectively" experience ? How do you experience in a quantitative manner ?

 

[PixyMisa]

Eh? Metaphysics, by definition, is what is 'after' or 'beyond' physics.

So?

Its just so happens that qualia is beyond the current understanding of physics.

Nope.

Qualia are defined as what is left after everything observable or measurable is explained. That's a dualistic concept. It's incoherent under any monism; meaningless under solipsism. And dualism is not logically coherent.

Unless you're really talking about akualia, in which case you need to define the term precisely and stop assigning random personal meanings to technical jargon.

So when are reflexive systems not 'conscious' or 'aware' by your definition?

Depends on exactly what you mean by a reflexive system. Assuming you mean what is normally meant, this answer is when it is not an information processing system. Consciousness is self-referential information processing, not any old feedback mechanism.

That's pretty rich coming from an individual who has gone out of his way to repeatedly and deliberately misrepresented almost everything that I've said so far in this discussion.

Oh?

I've been doing all the heavy work so far of providing supporting links for my positions AND dredging up direct quotes from this discussion [extending as far back as weeks and months prior].

Your links have not supported your position. We've pointed this out to you many times.

What amazes me is that no matter how many times I PROVE that a particular statement has been made you still manage to deny it.

What statement have you proven? One example is fine.

That fact is, everything said in this forum discussion is a matter of public record.

Indeed it is. Indeed it is.

How many links from this thread will it take to prove that the above is an accurate representation of your argument so far?

If you were right, one would do. Since you're wrong, no quantity of links will suffice.

Shall I go back even further to previous threads where you make the exact same assertions and post them again for posterity?

You can if you wish. You'll still be wrong.

Quite frankly, I getting tired of having to pull all the weight of these discussions with you.

Then I advise you to try actually reading what other people write.

I've observed your posting history for quite sometime -- even in discussions where I was not a participant. Repeatedly I see a pattern of others providing argumentation while all you bring to the table are handwaving dismissals.

Wrong.

When are you doing to realize that flat denial and assertion is not going to cut it in this discussion? Its high-time you put up or shut up.

I already put up. You have completely failed to address any of the problems with your argument. At this point all I need to do is point out that you are still wrong, in the same way and for the same reasons that you were wrong to begin with.

Here's a proposition. I would like YOU to go back to each and every post in this thread where you exposit your definition of what qualifies as 'aware' and 'conscious'. Then I would like you to either repost them in quote format or simply provide them as a list of links. If you can can firmly demonstrate that I've been misrepresenting your argument thus far I will concede.

Nope.

You want to prove the point, you quote me and show that what I said is not what I said I said. How you propose to accomplish this is beyond me, but have at it.

None of the listed definitions are mutually exclusive.

So what? That is entirely beside the point.

The point is that the six different definitions are six different definitions, and you cannot change definitions mid-sentence and expect to make a meaningful statement.

And yet, you do this persistently.

I provided all the listed definitions of 'unconscious' to be as thorough and comprehensive as possible since you have a penchant for demanding definitions to the nth degree.

Right.

So you have utterly failed to grasp the point.

Six definitions for a term are of no value. Provide a single definition that tells us what you mean when you use the word "consciousness". It doesn't matter if it's your definition or you borrowed it from a dictionary, but you have to pick one and stick with it.

I realize your profile description reads 'Persnickety Insect' but if you spent as much time actually bringing substantive arguments to the table instead of filibustering over irrelevant minutia discussions with you could actually get somewhere.

I see. So the very meaning of the words you use is irrelevant to the discussion in which they are used?

Pointing out blatant hypocrisy is epic win in my book

Fail.

 

[Nick227]

Qualia are defined as what is left after everything observable or measurable is explained.

Could you cite that definition please, Pixy? I'm having a little trouble finding it in online dictionaries or Wikipedia. It seems to me that this is your interpretation of the usual definition. So please cite.

Nick

 

[Darat]

Could you cite that definition please, Pixy? I'm having a little trouble finding it in online dictionaries or Wikipedia. It seems to me that this is your interpretation of the usual definition. So please cite.

Nick

Look at the classic "Mary" thought experiment - she is meant to not know what red is even though she is also meant to know everything there is to know about red.

 

[PixyMisa]

Could you cite that definition please, Pixy? I'm having a little trouble finding it in online dictionaries or Wikipedia. It seems to me that this is your interpretation of the usual definition. So please cite.

You can't have read the Wikipedia article then. Because it's right there under "Definitions of qualia", where you'd kind of expect it to be:

Frank Jackson (1982) later defined qualia as "...certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes" (p. 273).

As Darat notes, this is the basis of Jackson's "Mary's room" argument (which is an example of the petitio principii fallacy, i.e. begging the question) - which is also in the Wikipedia article.

Dennett defines them the same way - again, in the Wikipedia article - only he points out that the concept is logically incoherent.

And it's the basis for the concept of p-zombies - which have some relevance to this thread - and which are also discussed in the Wikipedia article, and which are also a logically incoherent concept.

 

[Nick227]

Look at the classic "Mary" thought experiment - she is meant to not know what red is even though she is also meant to know everything there is to know about red.

My point is that Pixy is making claims that, AFAICT, can't be backed up. He adds extra layers of interpretation then conveniently forgets to mention this, creating the impression that what he writes is more widely agreed than is actually the case.

Qualia, for example, is found to be defined thus...

* from Wikipedia - "a term used in philosophy to describe the subjective quality of conscious experience"

His "definition" is adding extra interpretation from materialist philosophy. This he neglects to mention.

In this and previous threads he has also asserted on several occasions that all cognitive neuroscientists will back up his position. When investigated, it's found that he claims this not because there is any direct evidence that they agree to Strong AI. In fact there is evidence to the contrary which I've cited. Rather he claims it because anyone who's been involved in neuroscience has learned it within an academic institution which is philosophically grounded in materialism. Again, he's adding extra layers of interpretation to try and strengthen his case.

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

My point is that Pixy is making claims that, AFAICT, can't be backed up. He adds extra layers of interpretation then conveniently forgets to mention this, creating the impression that what he writes is more widely agreed than is actually the case.

I don't think so.

Qualia, for example, is found to be defined thus...

* from Wikipedia - "a term used in philosophy to describe the subjective quality of conscious experience"

His "definition" is adding extra interpretation from materialist philosophy. This he neglects to mention.

Next time, Nick, try reading beyond the first sentence.

In this and previous threads he has also asserted on several occasions that all cognitive neuroscientists will back up his position. When investigated, it's found that he claims this not because there is any direct evidence that they agree to Strong AI. In fact there is evidence to the contrary which I've cited.

No. The evidence you have cited does not support your claims.

Rather he claims it because anyone who's been involved in neuroscience has learned it within an academic institution which is philosophically grounded in materialism.

Neuroscience is science. What do you expect it to be grounded in? Magic elves?

Again, he's adding extra layers of interpretation to try and strengthen his case.

No.