The Hard Problem of Gravity

[westprog]

No. I could not care less about the "specialness" or not of man.

I am led to my conclusions by the facts, not by a desire for the universe to operate in a particular fashion. It is those who want to assert the "specialness" of man (for whatever desperate emotional reason, as if being special would suddenly mean all the bad things in the world cease to be bad) who are coming up with "special" things that only the "special" entities can have but can't actually say what those "special" things are or what those "special" entities are beyond asserting, "well, I'll know it when I see it!"

The reason for saying that consciousness is only exhibited and claimed by human beings is that it is, in fact, the case. That's not something that needy, desperate people have made up to validate their pathetic lives - it's actual empirical fact.

We then have the problem of deciding what consciousness is, how it works, whether it exists for other life forms, whether it exists outside of life in artificial devices, and whether it exists outside of life and the products of life altogether. Or we could just pretend we know the answers and put the question to one side.

Sorry, I call massive piles of bullflop on this.

There's a lot of bullflop calling in this field, which often serves as a substitute for analysis.

 

[cyborg]

The reason for saying that consciousness is only exhibited and claimed by human beings is that it is, in fact, the case.

And just as soon as you can explain in a coherent fashion what it is you mean when you talk about consciousness I'll consider that statement meaningful.

Otherwise talking about it as an "empirical" fact is simply riseable since there's no way in hell you can measure something you can't describe.

 

[westprog]

Closing Summary 4

It's very easy to get derailed when facing arguments that refuse to address the physical question. But that's exactly what must not happen. The endeavour when dealing with any phenomenon must ultimately be to provide a physical description of what happens. Subjective experience should not be excluded from this.

It may be that ironically, the wish for a physical description - what can be informally viewed as something that might be published as an academic dissertation in a Physics journal - leads one to be characterised as a heretic. The computational model, vague and ill-thought-out as it fundamentally is, remains the orthodoxy.

The only reason that it has achieved such a measure of success is that the physicists have nothing to say about it. The philosophers and programmers don't intrude into the physicist's realm - and hence, for the most part, the physicists simply ignore the problem. There's insufficient data - and hence the problem is not interesting to most of them.

In order to claim that this is not a difficulty for the computational approach, it's claimed that consciousness is something only applicable at a given scale - the "running" comparision. This is, like many of the arguments in this field, attractive at first, but it doesn't bear scrutiny.

When we look closely at what goes on when someone runs, we see a transfer of energy resulting in motion. It doesn't matter what scale we use - the same basic phenomenon is involved. But when we look at the components of consciousness, we don't see anything that exhibits a portion of that consciousness. We can see that certain operations are taking place, but how they produce subjective experience is still unknown.

The mystery remains.

 

[rocketdodger]

Completely wrong. Information theory is a physical theory.

This is a fact I think westprog is incapable of grasping because he really is a dualist.

For physicalists like you and I, it is a trivial fact -- everything is made of the physical, including the ideas about the physical that we use to generate mathematical formulas about the physical, formulas which themselves are nothing but more of the physical.

For dualists like westprog, this world of "physical" is inherently different from his world of "ideas." So when we say something about the behavior of the physical, instead of directly about the physical itself, he can't make the connection.

He really does think that information and computation theory is distinct from the physical world. The only explanation for such a massive brain disconnect is that he really is a dualist.

 

[rocketdodger]

When we look closely at what goes on when someone runs, we see a transfer of energy resulting in motion. It doesn't matter what scale we use - the same basic phenomenon is involved.

Lol, so you make statements that are as ignorant about kinematics as the statements you make about computation?

I hate to break it to you but when a creature runs parts of it's legs are actually stationary during each step. Other parts have a velocity much different from the net velocity of the creature.

So yes, it does matter what scale you use -- if you look at only one cell in one leg the movement will be vastly different from the movement of the creature as a whole.

 

[rocketdodger]

The reason for saying that consciousness is only exhibited and claimed by human beings is that it is, in fact, the case. That's not something that needy, desperate people have made up to validate their pathetic lives - it's actual empirical fact.

No, it isn't, and you know that because you have been presented with numerous counterexamples in this thread.

We have shown you examples of non-humans that exhibit behavior similar to humans, and we have shown you examples of non-humans that can assert they are conscious.

It has been you -- every time -- that waves it all away with your magic hand, asserting "well, those aren't real examples because it just isn't the same thing as with humans."

And of course, as cyborg points out, you don't say why.

There's a lot of bullflop calling in this field, which often serves as a substitute for analysis.

lol, as if you have presented any analytical arguments in this entire thread...

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

When we look closely at what goes on when someone runs, we see a transfer of energy resulting in motion. It doesn't matter what scale we use - the same basic phenomenon is involved. But when we look at the components of consciousness, we don't see anything that exhibits a portion of that consciousness. We can see that certain operations are taking place, but how they produce subjective experience is still unknown.

The mystery remains.

Come on, I know you're smarter than that.

If we look at the inner workings of the brain and focus on one area, sure we don't see that area as conscious since it is the whole thing functioning that is (an emergent property of a functioning brain with many interacting and intersecting parts, not just one part of a brain). But the same is true of 'running'. If we look at a small area of an organism we do not see 'running' since 'running' is defined in terms of the organism as a whole in relation to its environment.

The analogy holds. It isn't a perfect analogy, but it wasn't meant to be. It was meant as a simple to grasp example of the difference between a 'thing' and an 'action' (or activity, or motion, or interaction, or verb, or whatever word you wish to insert here). That was its only purpose, so let's not make too big a deal of it please.

 

[westprog]

Closing Summary 5

Since my main criticism of the computational theory of consciousness is that it's not a physical theory, I should probably discuss what a physical theory is, and why computation doesn't fit with it.

When I refer to a physical theory, I mean a theory in Physics. It isn't enough that it relates to the physical world - it has to be based on scientific principles. Most importantly, it has to be objective and universal.
The existence of a mathematical model does not necessarily imply a physical theory. Some mathematical models don't have universal applicability.

Computation, for example, is a rigorously defined mathematical process, which is then implemented in the real world in the form of computers. This is a matter of engineering. We can get devices to implement a model, but we should not fool ourselves into thinking that this is all that is going on.

Specifically, when we use a computer to direct certain information into our own consciousness, we should not assume that there is anything special about this information transfer. If we accept that information has a real meaning, then we have to accept that it is being transferred from everything in the universe to everything else. And yes, it is the case that the heap of random computer components thrown on the floor is transferring information just as much as the working computer. The only place where there is a difference - a fundamental difference - is in the human mind interpreting the data.

There are ways to measure, or at least estimate, how much information is being transferred around a physical system, but they have nothing to do with the computational model, and they have very little relationship to it. And this is precisely what needs to be addressed by the computational model. Why should one particular information transfer produce consciousness, and another not?

The concept of the "switch" doesn't really help. In nature, there are a vast number of processes which are "switched" on and off. In order for this to happen, there must be natural switches, whether it's a moon casting a shadow on a planet, or an atom absorbing energy and changing the state of an electron. If they don't produce consciousness - why not? This is not a rhetorical question. It's at the heart of understanding why the mind produces subjective experience.

 

[rocketdodger]

There are ways to measure, or at least estimate, how much information is being transferred around a physical system, but they have nothing to do with the computational model, and they have very little relationship to it. And this is precisely what needs to be addressed by the computational model. Why should one particular information transfer produce consciousness, and another not?

Why should one particular set of rocks produce a mountain, and another not?

Why should one particular set of water molecules produce a cloud, and another not?

Why should one particular set of particles produce an atom of gold, and another not?

 

[cyborg]

Why should one particular set of particles produce an atom of gold, and another not?

Well, that's why philosophers have been struggling with the Hard Problem of Gold for millenia.

 

[Darat]

Nominated

 

[Apathia]

Reminds me of the quips my parents used to throw at me when I asked them questions.

Why/how should a lot of biochemical processes result in self-awareness?

"To make fools like you ask questions."

Why should one particular set of rocks produce a mountain, and another not?

Why should one particular set of water molecules produce a cloud, and another not?

Why should one particular set of particles produce an atom of gold, and another not?

"There are some questions that smart people don't ask."

"Because you're a moron."

"Yup, there are dumb questions."


But that's not what's going on here.
Here we have a forbidden question.

If it's a question only "woos" are suffered and derided to ask,
then there will only be woo-woo answers.

Someone on a Christian forum asks
"How could a loving God torture people forever?"
Answer: "You are thinking with a carnal mind. Mature Christians don't ask questions like that."

Or an empty answer is parroted.
"Because God is just." (End of inquiry.)

 

[rocketdodger]

But that's not what's going on here.
Here we have a forbidden question.

The question is not forbidden. On the contrary, it is invited. It just has an extremely simple answer. And therein lies the problem -- the answer is so simple that most people refuse to accept it.

Westprog's (and others') entire argument relies on special pleading.

Why should a particular set of water molecules produce a cloud, when another not? Because of the mathematical behavior of water molecules -- period.

Why should a particular set of biochemical processes produce self-awareness, when another not?
Well, it just couldn't be due to the mathematical behavior of biochemical processes, now could it, because self-awareness is somehow special.

 

[Apathia]

Sure I'm keen on mathematical processes.
I agree with you that the process of consciouness falls right out of the nature of reality that we describe in mathmatical signs.

I'm a Naturalist. I'm not looking for Consciusness outside of natural process.
And, of course. thank you Dad and Mom, I'm not special.

But please, stop dismissing the question with a pat answer just because it's one that people with paranormal agendas ask.

I'd really love to see the mathematics of consciouness.
The details you know.
The how to.

It's like with Q-Link. The skeptic asks "Well how does it work?" and is not satisfied by a jargon answer.

Yes. In theory. In principle, the experience of consciouness ariises from all that brain activity (Though I think it envolves somewhat of the rest of the body as well.) But what's the mathematical twist that makes of it a subjective awareness?

Smart people are still asking that question and seeking pragmatic answers.

No, I don't think consciouness is some stand alone, existing of itself, "field" or whatever.
It's a "marvelous mirage" as I've said.
But I think its a good question to ask just how I'm seeing a lake in the middle of the desert.
Like you, I'm not satisfied with someone saying something like "It's because we are seeing into another world."
I want to know about heat inversion to the extent my non-technical education can grasp the point.

Sure, the desert mirage is the "mathematical nature of water molecules," but you see, that's not a very substantial answer.

I admit I pefer to think that self-awareness can be replicated in an artificial person. I'd like to see that kind of AI created before my years are up.

 

[Apathia]

I own to being reactive here.
The exchange triggered childhood "trama."

Me (age 6): Daddy, why does the moon change shape?
Dad (age 34 and soon to depart this world of suffering):
"It's just the phases of the moon (now shut up)."

Soon realizing my parents were a very poor source of answers, not to mention being clueless, I put learning to read in high gear.

 

[westprog]

But that's not what's going on here.
Here we have a forbidden question.

If it's a question only "woos" are suffered and derided to ask,
then there will only be woo-woo answers.

And we are given answers that are equivalent to a refusal to answer the question. Why, when the universe consists of vast amounts of information being transferred - indeed, when some interpretations of the universe consider that it is nothing but information - should certain types of information movement give rise to certain phenomena? And answer comes there none.

We can trace other physical phenomena from start to finish. With consciousness we cannot.

 

[cyborg]

"Why should certain types of information movement give rise to certain phenomena?"

"Why should one particular set of particles produce an atom of gold, and another not? "

Is there a Hard Problem of Gold or not or do you simply consider gold to be a phenomena you can trace from start to finish?

If so then substantiate the claim, "with consciousness we cannot," as in you'll have to explain why your argument isn't one massive smokescreen for "from ignorance doth I gain knowledge!"

 

[Belz...]

The mystery remains.

For you.

 

[PixyMisa]

And we are given answers that are equivalent to a refusal to answer the question.

You are given answers that are concise, clear, informative and insightful.

You just don't like them.

Tough.

Why, when the universe consists of vast amounts of information being transferred - indeed, when some interpretations of the universe consider that it is nothing but information - should certain types of information movement give rise to certain phenomena? And answer comes there none.

Question comes there this, yet again:

If you take a couple of million transistors, diodes, resistors and capacitors, and a few hundred miles of wire, and just dump them all on the floor, do you get a working computer?

We can trace other physical phenomena from start to finish.

Turbulence.

 

[PixyMisa]

It's very easy to get derailed when facing arguments that refuse to address the physical question.

We answered the physical question.

But that's exactly what must not happen. The endeavour when dealing with any phenomenon must ultimately be to provide a physical description of what happens. Subjective experience should not be excluded from this.

It's been answered.

It may be that ironically, the wish for a physical description - what can be informally viewed as something that might be published as an academic dissertation in a Physics journal - leads one to be characterised as a heretic. The computational model, vague and ill-thought-out as it fundamentally is, remains the orthodoxy.

The computational model is a physical answer.

The only reason that it has achieved such a measure of success is that the physicists have nothing to say about it.

Why should physicists write about the computational model of consciousness? They're physicists. They're doing physics. The physics of the brain is straightforward and already understood. The physics of computation is studied in information theory.

The philosophers and programmers don't intrude into the physicist's realm - and hence, for the most part, the physicists simply ignore the problem.

That you are ignorant of the field doesn't mean it hasn't been studied.

There's insufficient data - and hence the problem is not interesting to most of them.

Wrong. Physicists do not spend their time researching biology - biologists do that. And yet biology is a physical science.

You might as well argue that we don't know that the world isn't flat because there are hardly any dendrochronologists researching the subject.

In order to claim that this is not a difficulty for the computational approach, it's claimed that consciousness is something only applicable at a given scale - the "running" comparision. This is, like many of the arguments in this field, attractive at first, but it doesn't bear scrutiny.

It's a process. A concept you seem to find difficult to grasp.

When we look closely at what goes on when someone runs, we see a transfer of energy resulting in motion. It doesn't matter what scale we use - the same basic phenomenon is involved. But when we look at the components of consciousness, we don't see anything that exhibits a portion of that consciousness. We can see that certain operations are taking place, but how they produce subjective experience is still unknown.

Fallacy of composition.

The mystery remains.

Argument from personal incredulity.