The Hard Problem of Gravity

[westprog]

Ok, so let me get all these ducks in a row.

You assert that your consciousness is "real," even if we are living in a simulation, because you experience it as being "real."

You also assert that if there was an entity in a simulation that experienced its consciousness it would in fact not be "really" conscious because it is inhabiting a simulation.

Now, you don't find any inconsistencies between those two assertions?

Certainly there is an inconsistency between the two statements. If I'd made the second statement, I'd certainly be wrong in one or the other case.

It's the issue of whether an entity in a simulation can "experience" that is precisely in question. And if we are in a simulation ourselves, then all bets are off about everything, because we will know nothing about what the laws of nature are, or even if such things exist.

 

[westprog]

I know, I know -- it sucks when mathematics goes against your arguments. I hate when that happens!

Oh, is this yet another case when the whole of mathematics is against me?

If this is a simulation, then we have no idea what the real laws of physics are - or even if there are any laws of physics. We can be confident of mathematics, but mathematics floating free doesn't help us either. The problem with the "what if this is a simulation" argument is that it blows everything up. Speculation becomes empty.

 

[yy2bggggs]

We have a big linguistic problem because the word 'consciousness' is a noun, so it is viewed as a 'thing'. But it isn't a thing.

Well, the clearest way I can think of to summarize my objection would be to say that things aren't 'things' either.

Regardless, I think I was able to map into my nuanced views. Mostly, I grabbed the mapping from your response to westprog, though you explained it in your response to me as well. I would simply explain it differently--the significant thing is that consciousness requires a continual transformation of states.

 

[yy2bggggs]

If this is a simulation,

This is not how things "really" are--it's never going to be anything more than our own mental model trying to functionally align with the way things really are (I usually phrase this as "we're brains in a vat anyway"). There's no other conclusion you can reach from this other than, in all possibly relevant senses, to say that this is a simulation.

Does your conclusion still follow?

I'm all for blowing everything up if that's what follows. It'd be called for.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, the clearest way I can think of to summarize my objection would be to say that things aren't 'things' either.

Regardless, I think I was able to map into my nuanced views. Mostly, I grabbed the mapping from your response to westprog, though you explained it in your response to me as well. I would simply explain it differently--the significant thing is that consciousness requires a continual transformation of states.

I have no problem with that. I know I'm walking a tightrope here largely because I am leaving out the whole ontological/epistemic issue that you raise, but I'm doing so in the hopes that the message gets across.

 

[Belz...]

Ok, so let me get all these ducks in a row.

You assert that your consciousness is "real," even if we are living in a simulation, because you experience it as being "real."

You also assert that if there was an entity in a simulation that experienced its consciousness it would in fact not be "really" conscious because it is inhabiting a simulation.

Now, you don't find any inconsistencies between those two assertions?

And a simulated "running" isn't running in the simulation.

 

[Belz...]

Oh, is this yet another case when the whole of mathematics is against me?

If this is a simulation, then we have no idea what the real laws of physics are - or even if there are any laws of physics. We can be confident of mathematics, but mathematics floating free doesn't help us either. The problem with the "what if this is a simulation" argument is that it blows everything up. Speculation becomes empty.

Of course not. If this is a simulation, then we've come to know a whole lot about it.

 

[rocketdodger]

It's the issue of whether an entity in a simulation can "experience" that is precisely in question.

For you, perhaps.

Not for me, or Pixy, or Belz, or Wasp, or anyone else that understands the nature of reality.

All relationships can be simulated. The physical is nothing but relationships. If experience is a result of the physical, it can be simulated.

And if we are in a simulation ourselves, then all bets are off about everything, because we will know nothing about what the laws of nature are, or even if such things exist.

lol.

Who cares?

We inhabit the simulation, and we understand the simulated laws. Why would the "real" laws outside the simulation matter? By definition, they would be entirely out of our reach anyway.

 

[Belz...]

Which is precisely one of the strongest points against Solipsists.

 

[rocketdodger]

Certainly there is an inconsistency between the two statements. If I'd made the second statement, I'd certainly be wrong in one or the other case.

You have made the second statement, or at least many statements equivalent to it.

You have admitted that the only reason you think other humans experience is because of behavioral similaritites to yourself. In principle, all of those behaviors can be expressed by a simulated human.

So for you to say 'we don't even know if a simulated entity can experience' is somewhat misinforming on your part. What you should really say is 'I don't even know if any entity besides me can experience.'

 

[rocketdodger]

The problem with the "what if this is a simulation" argument is that it blows everything up.

I agree that it blows up all of your assertions.

It doesn't really affect mine, though.

*ponders*

Speculation becomes empty.

No, it just becomes speculation within a simulation.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I suppose the difference is that technologies like abacuses, calculators, computers, thermostats, GPS systems, etc. are artificial arrangements of matter created by intelligent agents [e.g. humans] to further augment their abilities to manipulate their environment. Its one thing for matter to compute, but quite another to make it compute in a way that is useful for the goals of an intelligent agent.

Nope.

The difference is the way the behavior of one system is statistically ordered compared to the other. We call such order in behavior "computation," among other things.

That doesn't really contradict the definition I've put forward. All you've done is phrase it in a different way and then claimed that my way of saying it is incorrect.

Although I should have asked about a puddle and a bacterium, because that is more to the point.

Okay, lets say you were to accurately simulate a puddle with a virtual bacterium in it. While statistically, the behavior of the puddle would not be as complex or ordered as that of the bacterium its dynamics are still computational expressions. Judging from the current direction of you discussion with westprog its clear that you're arguing from the same line of reasoning as me w/o even realizing it

 

[Nick227]

For you, perhaps.

Not for me, or Pixy, or Belz, or Wasp, or anyone else that understands the nature of reality.

All relationships can be simulated. The physical is nothing but relationships. If experience is a result of the physical, it can be simulated.

Personally, I find that the word "experience" clouds the issue. It's unnecessary and tends towards dualism. Consider that a human being can process visual information both consciously and unconsciously - in the light or in the dark, so to speak. The question for me is...can a computer do the same?

When we understand more about the brain, we will know.

Nick

 

[AkuManiMani]

Well, whether or not one wishes to call them 'private behaviors' they are definitely real in the sense of being actual phenomena. Our private behaviors have physical consequences such affecting external behavior responses [like motion and speaking] or our general physiology [such as stress responses and immunity]. How we perceive the world has a direct effect on how we interact with it. I think it would be wise to consider mental phenomena to be just as real as any other biological process.

Fine. It's just that when the term "qualia" is used it seems to mean more than just "private behavior" and often seems to fall into the realm of woo.

The fact that anything exists at all and that we are conscious to experience it, to me, is more astounding than any mere 'woo'. If you wish to call it 'private behavior' rather than 'qualia' thats fine with me. But I think quale conveys more of what is meant than merely saying 'private behavior'. Our experiences are real and have real physical effects on our actions and bodies. This strongly implies that what you call 'private' is actually public in some sense.

I see no reason why it would not be possible to crack the code of the brain and discover the secrets of consciousness and thought. With such knowledge it would be possible not only to create artificial consciousness, but also create direct mind-machine interfaces and hyper real virtual environments. Of course, such technologies are almost certainly a long ways off but, in principle, they should be possible.

You speak English so well I never would have thought that you weren't a native speaker

Thank you. You can thank Captain Picard for most of it!

My comment about turtles was basically boiling down to this: if we can have qualia about qualia, can we have qualia about qualia about qualia about qualia ad infinitum ? And what constitudes those ?

My guess is that our experiences are made up of specific patterns of electrochemical signals generated by the brain. What distinguishes animals like dolphins and hominids [e.g. humans] from critters like frogs and fish is that we have a higher order of conscious processing. In other words, we have more layers of qualia and qualitative processing. Unless there are physiological limits we are unaware of, it doesn't seem that there is a cap on how many layers of 'meta-qualia' an animal can evolve.

Judging from what I've real on the GWT and field models of consciousness it seems that the mind is both theater and viewer. There is plenty of research that demonstrates that neural firing across the brain and nervous system are coherent and strongly correlated with one another. The patterns that make up qualia are almost certainly encoded within the unified EM activity of the nervous system.

Indeed. But that comes back to my comment about "special" minds. We all seemed to agree that the only way we can spot consciousness is through behaviour. I have no evidence that anyone but me is "really" aware, but I accept that they are because I have evidence that their behaviour is the same. So, really, what Dodger and Pixy are saying, I think, is that if you can say the same thing about a computer, then that computer is aware by definition, because you have nothing else to go on. Otherwise we're just positing "something else" as being awareness.

What I disagree with them on is that mere reflexive processing is enough to generate consciousness by itself. As I've pointed out before, all living things are complex systems of reflexive processing loops that feed into and regulate each other. Even so, we do not always have the experience of consciousness. This clearly demonstrates that consciousness is only generated within a specific range of physiological processes. Better understanding those processes is the key to understanding consciousness.

That position doesn't really make much sense to me. It seems to imply that we're not really 'conscious' until we're taught to be.

Ever since Mercutio mentioned it, I've come to notice a number of things about myself and my childhood and children I see here and there and it makes a lot of sense, actually.

I have quite a handful of memories from when I was a toddler and even a few vague ones from late infancy.

I can remember my mother holding me and reading story books to me. I couldn't really understand what was said but i can distinctly remember her saying "Pooh bear' and "Tigger" while pointing to the characters in the illustrations. I can also remember her singing a pretty song which left a happy feeling in my chest and made me feel safe and loved. When she stopped I was frustrated because I wanted her to sing it again but didn't have a way of saying it so I would just whimper or cry. Then she would laugh softly and sing it again 'till I fell asleep.

I have this memory, and many others like it, from before I even had language to describe my experiences or the intellect to understand them. Still I experienced, thought, and felt -- I WAS conscious without knowing the word or understanding what it meant.

 

[PixyMisa]

Personally, I find that the word "experience" clouds the issue. It's unnecessary and tends towards dualism. Consider that a human being can process visual information both consciously and unconsciously - in the light or in the dark, so to speak. The question for me is...can a computer do the same?

Yes. Yes it can.

Pick any behaviour of conscious humans, and we can find it or generate it in a computer. We can't yet generate all such behaviours in one program, because such a system is simply too large and complex. But the problem is being tackled from several different directions, and we will certainly get there.

 

[rocketdodger]

That doesn't really contradict the definition I've put forward. All you've done is phrase it in a different way and then claimed that my way of saying it is incorrect.

Yeah, I apologize. It just wasn't the answer I was looking for (or one that is relevant, mind you). The problem with saying "artificial arrangements" is that you can't use it to explain life.

Okay, lets say you were to accurately simulate a puddle with a virtual bacterium in it. While statistically, the behavior of the puddle would not be as ordered as that of the bacterium its dynamics are still computational expressions.

Ah, but only from outside the simulation frame. Within the simulation, the puddle's behavior is not considered computation. It's behavior just "is."

The same applies for our frame. A real puddle is not computation, because as far as an observer in this frame can tell it's behavior isn't statisically ordered like that of a bacterium.

 

[Nick227]

Yes. Yes it can.

Pick any behaviour of conscious humans, and we can find it or generate it in a computer. We can't yet generate all such behaviours in one program, because such a system is simply too large and complex. But the problem is being tackled from several different directions, and we will certainly get there.

Yes, I believe the behaviour could be mimicked by a computer, for sure. I'm still not convinced about whether the computer sees "in the light" yet though.

It strikes me that if we accept natural selection and that unconscious processing is possible then there must have been some highly favoured evolutionary event that led to actual phenomenality. Until we know more about this I doubt anyone can say whether AI is truly analogous to human consciousness.

The other alternative is that, qualititatively, there is actually only one form of consciousness (unconsciousness doesn't exist) and that the human is actually fully conscious but our apparent experience of consciousness is acutely limited.

Nick

 

[AkuManiMani]

That doesn't really contradict the definition I've put forward. All you've done is phrase it in a different way and then claimed that my way of saying it is incorrect.

Yeah, I apologize. It just wasn't the answer I was looking for (or one that is relevant, mind you). The problem with saying "artificial arrangements" is that you can't use it to explain life.

Hmm... Perhaps 'artificial' wasn't the best term to use. I suppose the real way to distinguish life, and the products of life, it to say that they are instances of self-creating intelligence. In the case of technology, like beaver damns, chimp tools, and human inventions, they are instances of intelligent, top-down, order being imposed on matter. Technology is the external extension of intelligent agency.

Of course, this leaves open the question of what is meant by 'intelligence' and 'order'.

Okay, lets say you were to accurately simulate a puddle with a virtual bacterium in it. While statistically, the behavior of the puddle would not be as ordered as that of the bacterium its dynamics are still computational expressions.

Ah, but only from outside the simulation frame. Within the simulation, the puddle's behavior is not considered computation. It's behavior just "is."

The same applies for our frame. A real puddle is not computation, because as far as an observer in this frame can tell it's behavior isn't statisically ordered like that of a bacterium.

So what you're saying is that its relative to the observer, right? I guess thats one way to look at it and I don't think its necessarily wrong. But, on the same token, I prefer to look at things from a birds eye view. If an 'environment', simulated or otherwise, is generated via logical ops then, to me, its counts as being computational.

Like you said, for all we know the universe we live in could be considered virtual in some sense -- and I agree. This is why I don't doubt that its possible to create artificial -conscious- intelligence. The only part on which you and I really differ is on what constitutes consciousness. You seem to think [correct me if I'm wrong] that any reflexive algorithm will do, while I'm convinced that the physical media of the computation is just as, if not more, important.

edit: typos O_<

 

[Belz...]

The fact that anything exists at all and that we are conscious to experience it, to me, is more astounding than any mere 'woo'. If you wish to call it 'private behavior' rather than 'qualia' thats fine with me. But I think quale conveys more of what is meant than merely saying 'private behavior'. Our experiences are real and have real physical effects on our actions and bodies. This strongly implies that what you call 'private' is actually public in some sense.

Sure. I can agree to that. It isn't "private" in the sense that it is inaccessible.

I have quite a handful of memories from when I was a toddler and even a few vague ones from late infancy.

What years, specifically ? I have one memory from my second birthday, now obscured by remembering the memory of the memory of the memory, and a few bits of my third year. From my fourth year onwards things become suddenly sharper.

 

[PixyMisa]

I'm convinced that the physical media of the computation is just as, if not more, important.

Impossible. Church-Turing thesis.