The Hard Problem of Gravity

It's not that I can't formulate it. English isn't my first language, and sometimes it's difficult to summon the terms I need to put it into text succintly.

I certainly accept that - but if this is the basis for an entire field then surely someone defined it precisely somewhere, sometime?

(Also your English appears to be perfectly good, and you seem able to be just as abrasive as me).

In other words, interaction of a physical object with others. Again, Wiki seems to agree with you. So everything processes information. Neat, but useless in the context of this discussion, as you admitted.

I don't agree that it's useless for the discussion. It demonstrates, if we can't produce something better, that information processing is universal.

I'm sure that something better can be produced that will narrow things down somewhat. Perhaps it will even allow the thermostat in and keep the rock out.
 
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Nick said:
Thus GWT avoids some aspects of the HPC, those relating to selfhood especially. And it is not in contradiction with Strong AI, though it wouldn't to me agree with Pixy's notion of self-referencing being needed for consciousness.

Read Hofstadter.

If we're talking about narrative selfhood, then you are completely correct. This aspect of consciousness, the result of inner dialogue, is clearly the product of a self-referencing loop, though I would put the term "self" in quotes here. But narrative selfhood is merely one aspect of consciousness.

Hofstadter's "strange loop" is not consciousness itself, it is not the whole of selfhood either. It is one small but important aspect of consciousness. When Hofstadter writes "I am a strange loop," he is speaking of narrative selfhood, not consciousness.

Nick
 
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The problem is in giving a precise physical definition of "organised". The only definition in physics that I'm aware of relates to entropy - and that's again a very wide definition.

Hence why I put quotes around it. I'm aware that this is an unwieldy term, but I couldn't think of something better. For example, a digital chip's memory is "organized," each piece of data has the same structure (bits organized into words). The location of each piece of data is predictable and standard. I don't think this is an utmost requirement, but it should be copy-able by the process that is reading it. Also, there should (perhaps must, perhaps not) be a standard form of input/output. I guess that you could say that there is a transfer of information that occurs naturally, but it's not processed in a standard way that has an avenue of I/O.
 
If we're talking about narrative selfhood, then you are completely correct. This aspect of consciousness, the result of inner dialogue, is clearly the product of a self-referencing loop, though I would put the term "self" in quotes here. But narrative selfhood is merely one aspect of consciousness.
Okay, with you so far. Not saying I agree with you, though!

Hofstadter's "strange loop" is not consciousness itself, it is not the whole of selfhood either. It is one small but important aspect of consciousness. When Hofstadter writes "I am a strange loop," he is speaking of narrative selfhood, not consciousness.
No, he's not. He's talking about consciousness in general.

After all, what is consciousness?

If you are aware of the outside world, is that sufficient? An ant is aware of the world; so too a planarian, or a paramecium. Clearly aware, because they can respond appropriately to events.

No. Consciousness is the awareness of self. And that is inherently and obviously self-referential.

Everything else is baggage.
 
I certainly accept that - but if this is the basis for an entire field then surely someone defined it precisely somewhere, sometime?

(Also your English appears to be perfectly good, and you seem able to be just as abrasive as me).

My English is good, but I haven't been exposed to as many technical and everyday terms as someone who's a native English speaker.

I don't agree that it's useless for the discussion. It demonstrates, if we can't produce something better, that information processing is universal.

So is the word "thing".

It asserts the presence of qualia.

And what's qualia ? So far I'm not convinced that they exist.
 
A change in velocity, momentum, or position seems to me to be a change in behaviour, every bit as much as a change in appearance or state.

The rock changes such behaviour because of the actions of external forces - which is exactly the same as the thermocouple. The thermocouple interacts with its environment. Indeed, if it didn't, it wouldn't be much use. It is struck by air molecules, and exchanges energy with them. (Or some other medium - but the principle is the same).

If you want to define behaviour as relating entirely to changes within an object, then you exclude the thermostat. Indeed, you exclude much of what a human does as well. If you have a definition that includes the thermostat then ipso facto you include the rock.

Nope.

I can claim that when you drop a rock, it isn't actually the rock that changes, it is us and the rest of the universe that shifts. And you have no way to prove otherwise.

External properties are relative to the observer. If you want to include the position of a rock in some behavior, it must be the behavior of the rock + observer system.

With a thermocouple bending due to heat, the relevant properties change regardless of any property of any observer. The molecules within the system change position and energy relative to each other. Because of this, one can mathematically show the behavior of the thermostat to have changed without referencing any external entities.

You can't do that with a rock that merely changes position, velocity, momentum, etc.

If the rock heats up, or breaks, or otherwise has an internal state change, then the change stops being observer relative and the behavior of just the rock does indeed change.

Since there's a certain reluctance to define behaviour, here's my off-the-cuff attempt:

BEHAVIOUR - a change in the physical properties of an object due to its interaction with its environment.

And as with my definition of SWITCH, feel free to provide a better.

BEHAVIOR -- a change in the relative physical properties of a system.

It's an excellent logical definition, but if you are attempting to formulate a physical theory then you need a physical definition.

Logical definitions are a superset of physical definitions.

You can take my logical definition and make it physical in any number of ways. All you have to do is replace the variables and constants with real world entities.

I did so with a thermostat. A thermostat switches because the only time the AC is in the ON state is when the incoming power to the system and the thermostat itself are also in the ON state. And these ON states are clearly defined -- for the AC and incoming power, ON corresponds to current flowing in a given direction above a given threshold, and for the thermostat, ON corresponds to the thermocouple having bent enough to touch the contact.

I asked you to do so with a rock, to demonstrate how a rock can switch.

Have you done that yet?



Of course it is changing its state. It's movement in the thermostat which changes its state. Any physical change in an object is a change in its physical state.

Ahh, see -- you said it yourself. It's movement in the thermostat which changes its state. Not movement of the thermostat.

When snooker balls collide on a table, they end up with nothing changed but their position. That's how they exchange information. The components of a difference engine or an adding machine just change position, and they perform computation.

They change position relative to each other -- that's how they exchange information. Their position relative to an observer is irrelevant as far as the exchange is concerned.

I posted a picture. I think that's a fairly clear example of how hot rocks can switch events. And contrary to what you may have learned in school, volcanoes aren't made of papier-maché and food dye - they are made of rocks. They get hot and switch events.

Even if volcanoes switch, they are not a single rock, they are a system of multiple rocks (and other stuff), and so you cannot show a rock to switch using a volcano as an example.

Kind of like how I told you a thermocouple all by itself does not switch.
 
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Also non-verbal humans are ruled out. Clearly not good enough as a full definition.

So why don't you just define consciousness in terms of the set of behaviors exhibited by things you want to be conscious?

That would include all humans, cute furry animals, etc. Everything you want to be special.

I am serious -- why not just use a definition like that?
 
Re: the "behavior" of rocks... and whether they care or not, and whether they are switches or not...

Thank you all for illustrating my point about level of analysis. "Consciousness" is a problem of behavior (with a large concentration of that subset of behavior known as "language"). We can argue about whether a rock cares, or switches, or whatever, when it hits the ground, but I would wager that none of us were ever taught that the behavior of rocks (assuming that someone wants to call it behavior--I don't, but apparently at least one person does) was a member of that fuzzy set called conscious behavior. For most of us, lots of human behavior (but not all), lots of animal behavior (but not all), some car or computer behavior (very little), the behavior of some toys, of some weather phenomena (the tornado took aim at...), and probably more I am not thinking of, are what we learned consciousness applied to. For some people, it meaningfully applies to some very very simple behaviors (btw, same argument applies to "behavior"--some people can meaningfully use that word to apply to rocks, or thermostats, or whatever, and others do not); the behaviors may vary depending on the context of the discussion.

This is not a cop-out; this is a very messy reality. You want to find a common aspect behind all uses of "consciousness"? You won't find it in mechanism. You'll find it in use. The common factor behind X consciousness, Y consciousness, and Z consciousness is simply that we have learned to use that word in association with those behaviors. It's not magic.

Sure, studying the mechanisms behind various aspects of consciousness is very cool, but do not expect that mechanism to be what is behind other forms of consciousness. Pixy's definitions work just fine for me... in a great many, but not all, contexts. My guess is that he feels much the same about mine. It should not surprise anyone that one explanation of consciousness does not appear to fit all examples.

Along those lines, I wonder how a human raised by wolves might participate in this conversation.

Or a person born blind and deaf.

Or a person born with only half a brain who behaves within the standards of a normal human when grown up.
 
And yet you use the phrase "I'm not convinced". You not being convinced is you experiencing qualia.

I'm sorry. Computers can use the phrase "I'm not convinced", but you claim they don't experience "qualia", whatever the hell they are. So obviously experiencing qualia, assuming they exist, is not a good criterion for determining consciousness.
 
Wow. You've got me pegged just right!

Ack! Sorry, how could I forget to add you?

Erm...

Yy2bggggs: Likes to bring unconsidered points into every discussion. Also, he is the 'mazing Hero of Time that doesn't afraid of anything :D
 
Well, the fact that you USED to hold that position certainly implies that you were younger at the time.

Good point :p



So basically no amount of anything will convince you. Evidence, anecdotes, expertise, logic. All must bow to what you already KNOW is true. Now, what does that make me think of ?

Evidence, anecdotes, expertise, logic are what convinced me of my current position. Unless reality has changed it's mind I doubt that they will revert it ;)


Certainly. But then that would mean that electrons process information, as well. In fact, it would mean that everything processes information, making the term, as I said before, useless. Wikipedia seems to agree with you. So either we drop the term and find a useful one or we use the term differently.

Otherwise, rocks process information, brains process information. Since they both process information, at different levels of complexity, we could say that rocks are conscious. But I think we all agree that rocks are NOT conscious. So what's the difference ? Once we establish that, we can define consciousness in a way that we can spot what is and what isn't conscious.

Almost everyone here has agreed that behaviour is pretty much the only way to tell if something is conscious. In fact, that's pretty much true for all other terms. So what's the behaviour of a conscious entity ?

That is EXACTLY my point. The formal 'definitions' of consciousness being proposed may actually apply to conscious processes. The problem is, their categorical nets are far too broad for them to count as a sufficient explanation for properties particular to what we call conscious experience.

The only way we're ever going to come to a sufficient explanation is not by manufacturing novel entities and simply declaring them conscious, but by studying actual examples of conscious entities. As of now, there isn't sufficient data or theoretical understanding to confidently say that we can even model -- let alone reproduce -- consciousness artificially.
 
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