The Hard Problem of Gravity

[Belz...]

Oh, I have the answer to his question. The thing is, he also has the answer if he would actually take just a few seconds to seriously think about it before asking it.

I don't think we're talking about "thinking", but "feeling". Unless one is hopelessly ignorant of the history of science, it's obvious that what we "feel" is often wrong. So while it might be obvious to you, it doesn't mean it's true.

And I notice you're still not anwering him.

At this point in the discussion, I'm a bit weary of people asking me to spoon-feed the obvious only to have them complain that I never provided the answer as they just let it dribble down their chins.

Again, what is obvious to one person might not be to another, either because two people simply think differently or because the person who thinks it's obvious is simply wrong. It would help if you'd actually stop flapping your arms around and actually answer.

 

[Belz...]

It would help if you bothered trying to comprehend plain spoken English as words rather than hand gestures. Since you can't seem to grasp explicit and direct explanations I'm trying to get you to take the conceptual walk yourself to understand what is being said.

Again, I'm going to ask you:

Define the above listed words without 'circular' reference to other synonymous words. There is a stark point being made here and its clear that you're not putting two and two together. Try again, please.

Oh, no. I don't think so. I asked first, and my question is directly on topic. Can you or can you not define consciousness in a way that doesn't assume its conclusion ? I'm not talking about the dictionary, here. I'm talking about an operational definition. One we can actually use for the purposes of this discussion.

 

[cyborg]

You could use that same argument to claim that our limited introspection cannot tell us whether or not a rock or a burning candle experiences things. The problem is, that if you're going to go that route, whats to keep you from assuming that idealism is true and that the entire universe is conscious?

Nothing. But that's not my problem.

The most sensible thing to do at this stage of the game is to understand instances that we unequivocally know are conscious [i.e. our conscious selves]

Only the solophist knows he's conscious.

 

[rocketdodger]

Human beings evolved consciousness because it was useful to humans. As far as we can tell it took many millions of years to do so. So thermostats evolved consciousness exactly how?

Quite how thermostats would evolve consciousness I don't quite see. Perhaps I'm just being utterly stupid. Maybe they get it just by really really needing it.

Who is talking about consciousness?

We were talking about self versus non-self. That has nothing to do with consciousness.

Unless you are like Nick and so uneducated in the relevant topics that you think the notion of "self" is restricted to conscious beings. If so, pick up any introductory computer science text and start reading -- you might learn something.

 

[rocketdodger]

You become 'conscious' of your toe, or some other object, when you either a) consciously decide to shift your field of focus to said object or b) an overriding sensory cue grabs your attention towards it. This is all assuming, of course, that you are in a conscious state to begin with. Otherwise you do not have the capacity to turn your conscious attention toward anything.

So you are saying that in order to be "conscious" of something you must be "paying attention" to it in some way?

What about yourself -- do you think you need to be paying attention to your consciousness, on some level, in order to be conscious of your own consciousness?

This is a very serious question.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I re-read you post and felt I should put the central tenet in a less poetic way.

The thing is, a completely comatose individual cannot observe, experience, infer, or 'feel' any more than a rock can be said to. Computational processes can and do take place withing the context of conscious experience [these are what we call 'thoughts'] but outside this context there is no perception of such.

You are absolutely right in saying that a "comatose individual cannot observe, experience or infer,..." It also means that from a principal perspective there isn't a fundamental difference. You don't even have to invoke the phrase "context of conscious experience" because it does not even exist in any meaningful sense here, it is meaningless. What is absent from the comatose patient – and which will always be absent the rock – is that certain operations do not function. There is something "wrong" with the patient. The patient is unable to "ignite" certain processes that would eventually start a cascade of certain cognitions and subsequent re-cognitions.

 

[westprog]

Not in science, they don't. We're trying to establish the reality of consciousness and its replicability. We NEED to define those words.

Yes, we do. We have a big fat dictionary, and about half the words represent things that we can describe with physics, and half of them represent words that we can't describe with physics. Some of those represent words that we don't think exist, or which may not exist. Many, many others represent things that we do thing exist. And we have no solid definition for them.

There are several approaches to being unable to define "happiness", or "pain". We can use the lack of a definition as a reason to assume that they don't represent anything real, in the same sense as "pig" or "electron". This has the disadvantage that most of us do regard them as real things, and act accordingly. We can classify them in terms of the behaviour they tend to produce - but while this is a helpful way to identify the feelings, it's certainly not a definition. We can make claims about how they are produced, but if not backed by a physical theory, such claims need more justification.

My preference is to accept that we are dealing with real quantities, of some unknown nature, and to try to investigate them.

We already know. But we need to see past our illusions and delusions to get to reality. Otherwise we'd still think the sun spins around the Earth.

I'm for good and against evil myself. Hooray for knowledge! Down with ignorance!

How does one experience something "indirectly" ?

Everything in the world is experienced indirectly. We have no perfect perception of anything, except the very fact of sensation itself.

You still haven't answered the question. What do you mean by "spontaneously" ?

If you mean "without prior programming" then you are wrong. Everything you do is either deterministic or random (IF, and only IF, quantum fluctuations can actually affect us at that level), so there is no room for free will in the old sense of the word. Everything we do is pre-programmed. A computer just needs to be able to rewrite its programming using new experiences in order to simulate this, and some programs already do that.

If a program is incapable of claiming consciousness spontaneously, then it's incapable. I suspect that it may be. However, if a program isn't directly programmed to produce consciousness, but in some manner asserts it, then that would certainly be evidence - possibly the first evidence - that computational consciousness is possible.

However, to directly write a program to assert consciousness is trivial and meaningless.

So the solipsists claim. But they're wrong.

It's nothing to do with solipsism. It's obvious that we experience the external world imperfectly. That is not the same thing as claiming that there is no external world, or that everything is generated internally. I can't see any link whatsoever with an assertion that consciousness represents a problem in physics that has not been solved. The dualist accusation, while not justified, at least has something to do with the argument. Solipsism seems to be just thrown in as one of those "bad philosophical ideas" that can be used to label an opponent. What next - idealism I suppose. That usually comes up.

 

[Belz...]

This has the disadvantage that most of us do regard them as real things, and act accordingly.

And this is the weakness of your position. It's based on gut feelings, not evidence.

Everything in the world is experienced indirectly. We have no perfect perception of anything, except the very fact of sensation itself.

I think behaviourists might have a problem with that statement.

How do you experience things indirectly ? You just repeated that we do, but you haven't answered my question.

If a program is incapable of claiming consciousness spontaneously, then it's incapable. I suspect that it may be. However, if a program isn't directly programmed to produce consciousness, but in some manner asserts it, then that would certainly be evidence - possibly the first evidence - that computational consciousness is possible.

However, to directly write a program to assert consciousness is trivial and meaningless.

And AGAIN you refuse to answer my question. What do you mean by "spontanous" ?

It would be very surprising if a computer program NOT designed to be conscious would suddenly develop consciousness for no reason. That it is designed to be that way makes all the difference in the world.

It's nothing to do with solipsism. It's obvious that we experience the external world imperfectly.

That's not what I was responding to. You said that it's impossible for the experience itself to be unreal.

Solipsism seems to be just thrown in as one of those "bad philosophical ideas" that can be used to label an opponent.

There are actual solipsists.

 

[Gate2501]

No, because we don't directly experience ghosts or UFO's. We directly experience experience.

This reminds me of the visual homunculus.

Experiencing experience? Who directly experiences experiencing experience then? And who or what experiences that experience of experiencing experience?

Maybe you just got mixed up on this post(if so my apologies), but this seems incoherent.

 

[H'ethetheth]

Why would you assume any such thing?

First of all: I asked you first, but here goes.

Because it's heaps of neurons firing inside your own body, evolved to make you adapt your behaviour in complicated ways that require things like remembering stuff and creating models of the future. Why would that not feel like something?
I assume it because I then do not have to assume that there should be something inherently mysterious and unfalsifiable about my consciousness, that's why.

Why is it you require a mysterious observer; because it never never feels like anything to you when other things process information?
Alternatively, if you have a way to falsify your notion of consciousness, I'll be interested to hear that.

Now if you would be so kind not to answer my questions with questions, I might actually learn something about your view.

 

[Belz...]

This reminds me of the visual homunculus.

Experiencing experience? Who directly experiences experiencing experience then? And who or what experiences that experience of experiencing experience?

Maybe you just got mixed up on this post(if so my apologies), but this seems incoherent.

It is. It's reeking of dualistic thinking, even when the user himself is no dualist, or at least claims not to be.

It's very difficult to shed the very understandable notion that our minds are "special" and somehow "distinct" from the rest of the world. And it's this difficulty that leads to solipsism, in some cases.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

It's very difficult to shed the very understandable notion that our minds are "special" and somehow "distinct" from the rest of the world. And it's this difficulty that leads to solipsism, in some cases.

But it's a legitimate philosophical position though. Right? I wish all people were solipsists like me... wait, what...!

 

[westprog]

Who is talking about consciousness?

We were talking about self versus non-self. That has nothing to do with consciousness.

Unless you are like Nick and so uneducated in the relevant topics that you think the notion of "self" is restricted to conscious beings.

It is, actually.

If so, pick up any introductory computer science text and start reading -- you might learn something.

I'm quite familiar with computer science texts. The use of words like "self" has as much significance as the use of "male" and "female" to describe plugs. It's a convenient shorthand for the use of the programmer. Which "self" is supposed to be the real one? The object? The database? The program? The computer? The abstract algorithm?

 

[westprog]

This reminds me of the visual homunculus.

Experiencing experience? Who directly experiences experiencing experience then? And who or what experiences that experience of experiencing experience?

Maybe you just got mixed up on this post(if so my apologies), but this seems incoherent.

No, there's no recursion or endless loops. We just stop at the point of the actual experience. It is itself - no nesting. It is the fact of experience that makes "self" possible. It's the absence of experience that makes "self" inapplicable to non-conscious entities.

 

[westprog]

First of all: I asked you first, but here goes.

Because it's heaps of neurons firing inside your own body, evolved to make you adapt your behaviour in complicated ways that require things like remembering stuff and creating models of the future. Why would that not feel like something?

Because there is no physical reason that anything should "feel" anything. We can explain just about everything that happens in a human being*, on the micro and the macro scale, except this fact of "feeling".

Why would you assume that a phenomenon without any precedent or explanation should take place?

I assume it because I then do not have to assume that there should be something inherently mysterious and unfalsifiable about my consciousness, that's why.

That might be a comfort, but where's the evidence?

It's a bit disconcerting to be presented with a mysterious property of a system, but there's no point in pretending it isn't mysterious.

Why is it you require a mysterious observer; because it never never feels like anything to you when other things process information?
Alternatively, if you have a way to falsify your notion of consciousness, I'll be interested to hear that.

Of course there's no way to falsify or confirm any notion of consciousness. Try falsifying the Pixy idea that consciousness is a self-referential loop. Try confirming it. Try coming up with a series of experiments to verify it. Science is not involved in this subject. That's why all the literature on consciousness has nothing to do with physics, with the tentative exception of Penrose.

Now if you would be so kind not to answer my questions with questions, I might actually learn something about your view.

My view is very simple, stripped down to basics.

• Consciousness exists
• It is associated with the physical world
• We don't know how it works

*There are some details to be filled in, but nothing we're puzzled about.

 

[westprog]

It is. It's reeking of dualistic thinking, even when the user himself is no dualist, or at least claims not to be.

It's very difficult to shed the very understandable notion that our minds are "special" and somehow "distinct" from the rest of the world. And it's this difficulty that leads to solipsism, in some cases.

Why is it impossible to accept evidence that our minds are apparently unique?

 

[westprog]

And this is the weakness of your position. It's based on gut feelings, not evidence.



I think behaviourists might have a problem with that statement.

How do you experience things indirectly ? You just repeated that we do, but you haven't answered my question.

Can you give an example of anything in the physical world that we don't experience indirectly? We get signals to our nerves that generate electrical impulses that create brain patterns. That's indirect.

This goes back to Plato. This is pretty basic.

 

[Gate2501]

Why is it impossible to accept evidence that our minds are apparently unique?

Well, what is unique and what is not is rather subjective.

I could go as far as calling the mind/consciousness unique, simply because it is a display of such complex processes in the brain. However, you have to keep in mind that this same behavior is on display in every other human that you encounter(excluding comatose individuals etc.). So it is unique when we compare Fred to a pile of dirt, but not when we compare Fred to Sam.

Some points:

I think that Belz point, and mine, is that it is not unique as far as being outside of the realm of what is solvable or knowable.

The HPC immunizes the mind from becoming truly understandable with constructs such as P-Zombies. It is not a problem so much as it is an incoherent barrier. The hard problem was designed to be not only hard, but impossible. This is open ended dualism, the HPC attempts to make it impossible to reconcile the mind with any sort of physical monism. That is why a lot of us are saying that it is dualist in nature.

I have said it before, but I think that your whole argument with Pixy and RD, is based on your criteria for conscious behavior. You are coming from a standpoint where " It is either conscious on the level(of complexity) of human consciousness, or it is not conscious ". You are almost conflating consciousness with being human. You even said earlier in this thread that we cannot be sure that cats are conscious. Pixy and RD seem to be trying to express to you that consciousness can be separated from that complexity, and understood.

 

[PixyMisa]

No, there's no recursion or endless loops. We just stop at the point of the actual experience. It is itself - no nesting. It is the fact of experience that makes "self" possible. It's the absence of experience that makes "self" inapplicable to non-conscious entities.

Ah, so what you're saying is that it's self-referential information processing?

An intriguing idea.

 

[H'ethetheth]

Because there is no physical reason that anything should "feel" anything. We can explain just about everything that happens in a human being*, on the micro and the macro scale, except this fact of "feeling".

Why would you assume that a phenomenon without any precedent or explanation should take place?

Well, it appears to take place, I just don't see why it should be such a mystery.

That might be a comfort, but where's the evidence?

No, that's the wrong way around. I don't need evidence not to assume something unfalsifiable exists. I'm just saying that "we can explain everything that happens in a human being*, on the micro and the macro scale", and apparently being a human feels like this. I then assume that not only do other humans feel similarly, but that other information processors may also feel like something. That's all, no mystery, just an inductive hunch.

It's a bit disconcerting to be presented with a mysterious property of a system, but there's no point in pretending it isn't mysterious.

Yes there is, because you're adding unnecessary unfalsifiable hypotheses.

Of course there's no way to falsify or confirm any notion of consciousness. Try falsifying the Pixy idea that consciousness is a self-referential loop. Try confirming it.

This can be done in principle. Build a brainy robot, teach it, and see if it acts as if it's conscious. This can falsify, only in principle, I admit, Pixymisa's claim, but not yours.

My view is very simple, stripped down to basics.

• Consciousness exists
• It is associated with the physical world
• We don't know how it works

My view is also simple:

• Consciousness is associated with information processing
• Apparently, my way of processing information feels like this
• Other information processors may also feel like something

ETA: Oh and I forgot to thank you for the elaborate response, which is appreciated.