The Hard Problem of Gravity

[lupus_in_fabula]

Mr Smith is not afraid of spiders. Mrs Smith is. Different qualia from same stimulus. (Seeing a big spider). Mr Smith is scared of snakes. Same qualia from different stimulus.

Yet the context where Mr Smith sees a spider is always going to be different from Mrs Smith. Mrs might also have had bad experiences with spiders in the past having found one in her bed when she was a child. So both seeing the spider, you could say it's the same stimuli, but it will be routed in through different pathways spreading out to different parts of the brain before they reach a more general reaction to it. At what part of the process will it become problematic to talk about they're having the same stimuli?

Furthermore, Mr Smith being scared of snakes whereas Mrs Smith is scared of spiders does not mean they are scared about them in exactly the same way, although they both label it as being scared.

And how can we tell they are the same qualia? Well, we could rely on Mr and Mrs Smiths testimony ("Ooooh, I hate them snakes and spiders. They affect me the same way.") or as Mercutio would prefer, we could rely on behaviour.

Ah yes, which brings the issue back to what Mercutio called 'semantic generalization'. To which I also touched upon way back in post #193.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

The above also leads to my promised opinion about AkuManiMani's though experiment, with the help of westprog's extrapolations in regards to mine.

If we were to take away all the "content" in your experience, would you 'experience nothing', or would there be 'no experience'?

Let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that in such a case, experience/awareness would cease.

What does this tell us? Does it mean that experience is something entirely subsidiary to and dependent upon external stimulus, and hence can be disregarded as something in and of itself? I tend to think not. Things can be entirely created and dependent on other things, and yet exist in their own right.

I would suppose that even if all sensation is removed, a mind would still recycle its own memories.

But it would affect how we approach the issue in general, i.e., how we would conceptualize the point of departure and the limits or how our framework is considered 'explaining it'. So if we were to proceed with the intention of finding a physical explanation to experience in it's own right, where would we look for it, if it's entirely created and dependent on other things? How could we satisfy people who would point out that you haven't really explained IT itself.

Regarding the "mind" recycling "its own" memories? ...Well, wouldn't that also be what we are calling "experiencing"? Thus it's not empty of all content, is it? Moreover, how would we know they belong to the "mind"? Provided the context in where AkuManiMani's though experiment is applicable, where there would never have been outside stimuli (see blow): Why should we assume the experiencing is happening in the person's "mind" if she's never been exposed to matters of identity and the social constructs we have, "mind" being one of them. Certainly it's plausible that the child would not think it is it who's experiencing. Not to speak of what "memories" in this context would entail in the first place. If there's no construction of subject/object division, what does the term 'experience' mean here, would it be the same "thing" as for us who surely are capable of creating such distinctions, at least during particular times during the day?

This also brings us to Aku's own though experiment in a more general way:

Anyways, here's the thought experiment...

Suppose one took a newborn infant and rendered it blind def an paralyzed. Suppose also that you devise a way to prevent the child from receiving smell, taste and tactile information to the brain. Say you kept the unfortunate child in this condition for the rest of its life while maintaining it on life support systems. For all intents and purposes the child is cut off from the sensory 'outside' world.

With that in mind:

[1] Could the child actually be said to be conscious?

[2] Would it go thru the cycles of wakefulness and sleep?

Aside from almost certainly doing irrevocable harm to the child's development, I'd answer yes to both [1] and [2]. My guess is that, absent even external stimuli, the child could still be said to be conscious.

Perhaps we could say that the child is conscious of "internal" reactions. Although it's quite plausible that the child would not experience them as it being conscious of them. Yet if probed for behaviour it could be found that certain behaviours would entail the child is "acting" as a functional whole in some instances. It would be very difficult to assess however.

Although keeping in "mind" the plasticity and the inherent capabilities of adaptation (a newborn has more connections in the brain than adults, which it then looses by reaction to the environment and learning etc., i.e. malleability) we might even say it would be conscious of things happening in the organism that we aren't. Thus in some circumstances it would be more conscious. For us, even meditation or everyday contextual changes might also change what we become conscious of momentarily.

Hence we reach a point where we must formulate a framework for what we think the brain (or the whole organism) is and what is 'being conscious' entails. Is it ultimately satisfying to approach the organism (and the brain) as a single units, or is it more like an ecosystem where cells interact with each other independently without some of them them ever reaching a larger conscious representation, but whereas other kinds of interactions do, provided the "right" context? How could we ever pinpoint exactly where the conscious aspect is therein, or must we settle for describing the playing field where it happens, where describing the functions also means explaining IT itself?

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, maybe I'm one of those people missing the point.

You can write a computer program that avoids going into a loop.

Well, you can't guarantee this algorithmically. You can identify some cases and guess for others, but that's all. (That's what we humans do too.)

It doesn't seem like you need a second layer of programing allowing it to identify the purpose of the first layer for it to count as conscious under your definition.

That is a second layer of programming. If the program is watching what it is doing such that it doesn't get stuck in arbitrary loops, then it's already self-referential (introspective, reflective) and conscious.

 

[PixyMisa]

Let me clarify: The program has to go into a loop in order to process the data. Say that it has a hundred data values coming in, and it needs to do some statistical analysis on them.

What we then do is have the program monitor itself, so that it can say, hey, I've been looping here for a couple of minutes, and all the values coming in are zero.

If you do this by hard coding a check into each and every loop in the program, then it will become conscious gradually, by accretion, as you add more and more checks.

Or you can just use reflection to monitor what the program is doing overall and respond appropriately (or inappropriately, it doesn't matter) and the whole program becomes conscious.

 

[quixotecoyote]

That is a second layer of programming. If the program is watching what it is doing such that it doesn't get stuck in arbitrary loops, then it's already self-referential (introspective, reflective) and conscious.

Will such a program always be able to identify that the reason for avoiding certain behaviors (for want of a better word) is to avoid loops, or will it simply be able to avoid those behaviors?

 

[PixyMisa]

Will such a program always be able to identify that the reason for avoiding certain behaviors (for want of a better word) is to avoid loops, or will it simply be able to avoid those behaviors?

Well, that depends on how smart it is. I only said that it's conscious, I didn't say it wasn't stupid.

But it can inspect the behaviour of the behaviour-inspection routine, and modify its behaviour based on that. And so ad infinitum.

 

[PixyMisa]

SHRDLU, for example, was pretty smart for 1970.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I'm saying geocentrism is on par with any centrism.

On par by what criteria? You have already said, not by usefulness.

Truth. And useful for what purpose?

How can one convince you of your own existence..?

Depends on what you mean by this. I can think of at least three completely separate meanings, and I do not think this is an exhaustive list.

Okay, I've made the effort to better understand your position. For us to make any meaningful progress in this discussion it would be wise for you to do the same. As I've said before, I'm employing an ontological framework that is quite different from the ones you're familiar with. Its similar to behaviorism in some respects but in others there is a radical departure. There are no external published references to it, as far as I'm aware, because I basically formulated it on my own as I've found others to have hideous logical inconsistencies [FYI, I abhor inconsistencies an internal contradiction]. So I went thru the trouble to post some of my rationale in a rather longish post on another thread. I strongly suggest you read it if you haven't already.

I'm going to state here that the ontological basis for your position has logical flaws. The most fatal of them is that, unless one arbitrarily imposes a cut-off point, it negates the existence of all observable entities as such.

I do. I could go into detail on how, but suffice it to say that these are things that whole organisms do. No brain has ever sensed on its own, much less any mind.

I'm saying that whole organisms are singular dynamic entities and that its is more accurate and useful to think of them in terms of being behaviors of complex informational fields. Not 'magical' fields, but ones that can be quantified and understood in scientific terms. You're fighting my position tooth and nail without bothering to understanding it.

If 'qualia' do not exist then what are qualities?

Sorry, there are several definitions of qualities. I do not understand your question. Color, for example--do you consider that a quality? We could discuss color in great detail if you like. It is not a quale.

I'm saying that qualities ARE qualia just are quantities ARE quanta -- by definition. To argue that they don't exist is logically absurd.

Do you know what a field is?

Again, there are several definitions. Thus far, I have not had need of any of them.

You've great need to understand in what sense I'm using the term and why I'm employing it if you want to make any cogent critique of my position. Lupus_in_fabula has provided a great example of this. He actually makes the effort to understand my position enabling him to critique it more effectively. Again, you're going to have to make the effort to meet me halfway on this.

Scientific theories a merely conceptual models of reality. Are Newton's Laws fictions because General relativity supersedes it?

Extends, not supersedes. GR had to explain all that Newton did, and more, not deny Newton.

You misunderstand my point. I'm saying that theories are technologies, in and of themselves. They are models of reality and, being such, they are inherently incomplete. Tho Newton wasn't 'wrong', per se, Einstein's theory is more robust, explains more, and covers a larger domain of applicability. It is more useful by dint of the fact that its a closer approximation of the truth. This is what I meant by 'supersede'.

Reading on the history of scientific progress happens to be a hobby of mine. Know this: The entire theoretical framework of both Special and General Relativity was crafted from inference and introspection. Empirical corroboration did not come until years after relativity was developed and many more years passed before it was put to practical use.

Funny, then, that no philosopher came up with it, rather than a trained physicist.

Einstein was also a trained philosopher. Regardless, the nature of his background training is irrelevant to the point I was making. Empirical observation and testing is only half of the scientific process. Postulation, intuitive hunches, and logical inferences [i.e. introspection] are vital to the formation of any workable scientific theory.

The very field of science itself is a branch of applied natural philosophy. Science is a philosophical technology for acquiring truth.

Mercurial.

cute.

I are indeed a funny guy

 

[rocketdodger]

He really meant halt. He was playing with the idea (like Hofstadter and others before him) of the human Godel statement, and it crops up in various forms in some of his other books.

Why would a Godel sentence cause an algorithm to halt? If anything I would think it would cause non-halting behavior.

Note that this kind of segues into the discussion I am having with y2bigggs in this thread about "this statement is false." (which I will respond to soon -- higher quality responses take more time!)

 

[Beth]

You've spent a great many words explaining why 'mind' is not a causal agent. What you haven't done is explain what IS a causal agent. If not mind, then what? Or are they non-existant as mind and rainbows?

I'm sorry, I thought you would have gleaned that from my other posts.

Causation is in the environment, of course. Behavior is selected for by its function--its effect upon the environment.

I'm sorry, but no, I haven't yet gleaned from your posts, including this one, what it is that you consider causal. Are you saying the environment is the sole cause of behavior here? That is how I interpret what you wrote, but I'm not entirely sure that is what you meant.

In the same sense that the "cause" of the giraffe's neck length is in the environment that selected it, rather than in the willful stretching of that neck or some intelligent designer's intervention.

But, it's also reasonable to regard the willful stretching of some giraffe ancestor to nibble the top leaves of trees as contributing to the survival of that individual. Futher, continuing that willful behavior over generations is what led to the individuals with the longest necks have the greatest survival probability and thus, over generations, leading to the development of giraffes as we know them. Further, it's also reasonable to assume that some other individuals of that precusor species willfully choose to nibble on grasses rather than treetops and that behavior led different individuals to survive and reproduce different species that are not giraffes.

Hmm, I realize I'm not entirely sure what you mean by 'willful'. Do we mean the same thing by it? I think of willful behavior as the organism consciously choosing among available alternatives. Did you mean something else by the term?

The problem I have with declaring the environment the sole cause of behavior is that it does not explain why different individuals in the same environment exhibit different behaviors. Also, as a causal explanation, don't you find that environment lacks sufficiently accurate predictions. It's useful for establishing a range of potential behaviors, but it doesn't serve to identify why a particular individual organism engages in a particular behavior. If usefulness is your main criteria, how is limiting causation to environment useful?

Selection by environmental consequences, in both cases. The time scale is different, of course, and the mechanics of "how" are different, but behavior is a replicant. We can demonstrate that we repeat our behaviors, with variation, and that these behaviors are more or less effective. This is sufficient for environmental selection (in this case, known as operant conditioning) to work on behavior and to cause changes in behavior.

I don't disagree with any of this, but it seems to me that you are leaving out the fact that behavior causes changes in the environment which then change the consequences of the behavior. So why fixate on environment as the cause and change in behavior as the effect when it can easy be turned around to behavior as the cause and change in the environment as the effect.

And yes, in this view, a causal mind is the functional equivalent of creationism.

I'm sorry, but I don't really see this. It seems to me that you are equating the willful stretching of the giraffe's neck to the intervention of a designer in creating the giraffe's long neck. The two things do not seem the same to me.

 

[rocketdodger]

That fact that I am conscious is self evident. Therefore the existence of consciousness, what ever its nature, is axiomatic -- its a given.

No, it isn't.

Your knowledge of your own consciousness is dependent upon, among other things, your knowledge of self versus non-self. That makes it non-axiomatic. Unless you want to rewrite the rules of logic so that axioms can depend on each other.


P.S.In fact, Mercutio is correct, and your knowledge of your own consciousness is dependent upon a whole slew of other ideas about your natural and social environment.

Wow....rocketdodger, this post eveals that 1) you completely misunderstand my position and 2) you misunderstand what a unified theory means.

First off, I'm not proposing any new force. Electromagnetism seems like a likely enough candidate since that is the fore by which chemicals interact.

You clearly don't know what is meant by 'fundamental force'. Essentially, physicists' are searching for a unified field theory; essentially a theory in which all forces are difference expressions of the same force. As of now, physicist have theoretically unified EM, weak, and strong forces, and currently are working on trying to unify gravity.

All I'm saying is that all biological phenomenon, including onsciousness, must fall within the laws of physics and I'm speculating on ways in which they might be better understood in this light. I Wanna know the physical reason for qualitative experience. What astounds me is that while I'm proposing that there is a physicalist way of understanding these things I get accused of invoking 'magic'. Seriously, what the hell is up with all the hysteria?

No, you aren't. Or at least, if you are, you have some fundamental misunderstandings about physics and mathematics.

You see, anything in physics can be mathematically described. And if something can be mathematically described then what we know about computation theory is applicable to it. Thus, even if you are correct and consciousness is some kind of "field," it will still be the result of an equation or algorithm, which are mathematically the same thing.

 

[PixyMisa]

Why would a Godel sentence cause an algorithm to halt? If anything I would think it would cause non-halting behavior.

Well, it's science fiction:

"Basilisk" and "Medusa weapons"[13] are mythological terms used by various authors, notably David Langford, in Different Kinds of Darkness and related short stories to describe a (fictional) class of image or sensation which causes death or harm to anyone who views it. The concept of a basilisk image, as Langford describes it, that can be encoded into a picture, is an example of the literary motif of harmful sensation.

Such images not being naturally found in the real world, in science fiction they are usually generated by a computer, such as Langford's fractals (purportedly including portions of the Mandelbrot set) or else hidden in a data-storage device; the concept is also employed by Neal Stephenson.
Langford's fictional basilisk images, or BLITs,[14] are so deadly to the characters that all information about them, including the death toll when they first appear in the story, is classified; however, each of them is given a name or number, and a reasoning common to such stories is provided. From Langford's fictional "comp.basilisk" Newsgroup FAQ:[15]

"...the human mind as a formal, deterministic computational system -- a system that, as predicted by a variant of Gödel's Theorem in mathematics, can be crashed by thoughts which the mind is physically or logically incapable of thinking. The Logical Imaging Technique presents such a thought in purely visual form as a basilisk image which our optic nerves can't help but accept. The result is disastrous, like a software stealth-virus smuggled into the brain."​

​

 

[PixyMisa]

Your knowledge of your own consciousness is dependent upon, among other things, your knowledge of self versus non-self. That makes it non-axiomatic. Unless you want to rewrite the rules of logic so that axioms can depend on each other.

It's also very much dependent on how you define consciousness. The way I define it, if a system can argue that its own consciousness is self-evident, then it is.

Of course, this applies equally to toasters and tenured philosophy professors.

As we've seen, AkuManiMani rejects my definition and insists on other definitions (plural) for which this isn't true.

Thus, even if you are correct and consciousness is some kind of "field"

Which is, of course, impossible.

 

[PixyMisa]

Oh, and don't miss the comp.basilisk FAQ:

2. Can I post binary files here?

If you are capable of asking this question you MUST immediately read news.announce.newusers, where regular postings warn that binary and especially image files may emphatically not be posted to any newsgroup. Many countries impose a mandatory death penalty for such action.

 

[Mercutio]

Truth. And useful for what purpose?

ok, and how do you distinguish "truth"? If you are saying that heliocentrism and geocentrism are equally true, you have pretty much tamed that word and forced it to jump through hoops for you.

Okay, I've made the effort to better understand your position. For us to make any meaningful progress in this discussion it would be wise for you to do the same. As I've said before, I'm employing an ontological framework that is quite different from the ones you're familiar with. Its similar to behaviorism in some respects but in others there is a radical departure. There are no external published references to it, as far as I'm aware, because I basically formulated it on my own as I've found others to have hideous logical inconsistencies [FYI, I abhor inconsistencies an internal contradiction]. So I went thru the trouble to post some of my rationale in a rather longish post on another thread. I strongly suggest you read it if you haven't already.

I have read it. You axiomatically assert several things that logically (or circularly) lead to your conclusion, but which are not supportable by any evidence.

I'm going to state here that the ontological basis for your position has logical flaws. The most fatal of them is that, unless one arbitrarily imposes a cut-off point, it negates the existence of all observable entities as such.

No.

And there is no arbitrary cutoff point; I simply do not add fictional layers. The cat exists. There is no evidence for the image of the cat.

I'm saying that whole organisms are singular dynamic entities and that its is more accurate and useful to think of them in terms of being behaviors of complex informational fields. Not 'magical' fields, but ones that can be quantified and understood in scientific terms. You're fighting my position tooth and nail without bothering to understanding it.

I read it. I think I understand it, or what you are trying to say. I disagree with it.

I'm saying that qualities ARE qualia just are quantities ARE quanta -- by definition. To argue that they don't exist is logically absurd.

This does not answer my question. What are some examples of what you mean by qualities?

You've great need to understand in what sense I'm using the term and why I'm employing it if you want to make any cogent critique of my position. Lupus_in_fabula has provided a great example of this. He actually makes the effort to understand my position enabling him to critique it more effectively. Again, you're going to have to make the effort to meet me halfway on this.

An honest effort does not mean agreement with you.

You misunderstand my point. I'm saying that theories are technologies, in and of themselves. They are models of reality and, being such, they are inherently incomplete. Tho Newton wasn't 'wrong', per se, Einstein's theory is more robust, explains more, and covers a larger domain of applicability. It is more useful by dint of the fact that its a closer approximation of the truth. This is what I meant by 'supersede'.

How do you know it is a closer approximation of the truth, beyond the idea that it is more useful?

Einstein was also a trained philosopher. Regardless, the nature of his background training is irrelevant to the point I was making. Empirical observation and testing is only half of the scientific process. Postulation, intuitive hunches, and logical inferences [i.e. introspection] are vital to the formation of any workable scientific theory.

And how do we know if a hunch pans out? How do we know if it is "true"?

The very field of science itself is a branch of applied natural philosophy. Science is a philosophical technology for acquiring truth.

And when we say "it's an empirical question", what is our criterion for "truth"?

I are indeed a funny guy

 

[yy2bggggs]

(Redacted--double post)

 

[yy2bggggs]

And there is no arbitrary cutoff point; I simply do not add fictional layers. The cat exists. There is no evidence for the image of the cat.

There's an image of the cat on our retinas when we look at the cat. There's also an image throughout all of the layers of the visual cortex. As I understand the visual science behind such things, we can even make specific statements about the images stored throughout our brains, such as that the images in V1 are mapped very precisely, even to the point of containing mappings to our blind spot, or that the images processed by V5 (which primarily processes motion information) do not have color content.

So I'm curious what you mean when you say that there is no evidence for the image of the cat.

(Edit: Keep in mind I haven't been following the discussion that closely, so I may very well simply be missing something).

 

[quixotecoyote]

Well, that depends on how smart it is. I only said that it's conscious, I didn't say it wasn't stupid.

That's what I was trying to get at. Thanks.

 

[Mercutio]

There's an image of the cat on our retinas when we look at the cat.

This is the proximal stimulus I spoke of a million posts back. At this point, if you would like to call that an image I have no real problem with it; it is the projection onto the retina, via the lens, of the reflected light from the cat. The important business that happens here is the bleaching of photopigments and the transduction of light energy to nerve energy. The different cone cells are differentially sensitive to ranges of electromagnetic energy; the signals sent back to the horizontal, bipolar and ganglion cells are not at all an image. They are information, certainly, but are not an image.

There's also an image throughout all of the layers of the visual cortex.

No. There are multiple pathways of visual processing in different areas of cortex and other places. A small portion of this can be seen as spatially mapped onto cortex, but this again is not an image.

As I understand the visual science behind such things, we can even make specific statements about the images stored throughout our brains, such as that the images in V1 are mapped very precisely, even to the point of containing mappings to our blind spot, or that the images processed by V5 (which primarily processes motion information) do not have color content.

Ah, yes. I guess I should have read ahead a bit before that last comment. You already know some about this--I would caution you strongly against the statement "the images stored throughout our brains", though. The only place the whole image is together is in the distal stimulus (and, arguably, the proximal stimulus, although even there information is already changed in translating a three dimensional distal stimulus into two essentially two-dimensional proximal stimuli).

So I'm curious what you mean when you say that there is no evidence for the image of the cat.

there is plenty of evidence for visual processing. But several parallel processors do not equal a unified image.

(Edit: Keep in mind I haven't been following the discussion that closely, so I may very well simply be missing something).

 

[yy2bggggs]

Ah, yes. I guess I should have read ahead a bit before that last comment. You already know some about this--I would caution you strongly against the statement "the images stored throughout our brains", though.

Why? They are spatially mapped representations of the scene. Even the proximal image on the retina is more of a lie to children^WP when you get down to it--only a tiny fraction of the light that hits our retinas is worthy of being called an image. Specifically, that's the portion of light in the visual wavelengths (or a portion of this) which is directional--semantically, it's the portion spread across the retina that is a spatial projection of spatial elements in the scene. Semantically, that's exactly what the things in the visual cortex are (or more specifically, the parts we can refer to as the image of a cat).

The only place the whole image is together is in the distal stimulus [...] But several parallel processors do not equal a unified image.

...and this part seems to be arguing against something specific. Language like "only place where the whole image is together..." and "do not equal a unified image" imply that the thing you're claiming doesn't exist has such properties. I'm a bit confused about what that thing is--i.e., what it is exactly that you're claiming doesn't exist.

Perhaps an example or two might clarify?