The Hard Problem of Gravity

[Third Eye Open]

Think of it this way:

-the aspect of 'qualia' would be something like the color red or the emotions we might associate with red, or the significance we place on red [as in "red is the color of desire"]

-the aspect of 'quanta' would be the numerical or statistical description of the word "red", or the frequency of the wavelength of light that we experience as "red", etc.

..........

Qualia are qualities.

vs.

Quanta are quantities.

Ok.... so where is the mystery? Why is everyone always going on about how we need to 'explain qualia'?

Objects obviously have properties other than quantity, but the way we perceive them is through quanta: quata of light, quanta of molecules that we smell, quanta of nerve impulses from our fingertips.

So what you are calling 'qualia' is just our interpretation of sensory input? And 'quanta' is the input its self? I thought it was more mysterious and elusive than that. I'm probably still missing something though.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yeah, he's talking about aku-qualia. Qualia, in philosophy, are what's left over after everything that actually exists has been explained.

Which makes about as much sense as you think it does.

 

[PixyMisa]

And to AkuManiMani - qualities are quantities.

If you disagree, give me a counter-example.

 

[rocketdodger]

So this is something I find very interesting.

The typical response to the type of HPC demolition I participate in is that it defines away the problem. Which, to anybody experienced in ... well ... any number of fields ... is an entirely valid way to overcome problems. If you can redefine something such that a problem disappears (and the system stays consistent)... good job!

Yet, here we have a case of an HPC proponent seriously suggesting that a good solution to the problem is simply adding the solution as an axiom of any relevant system.

!?!?!

Adding an axiom just for consciousness!?!? Isn't that tantamount to "consciousness is magic, just accept it?"

 

[AkuManiMani]

Ok.... so where is the mystery? Why is everyone always going on about how we need to 'explain qualia'?

Objects obviously have properties other than quantity, but the way we perceive them is through quanta: quata of light, quanta of molecules that we smell, quanta of nerve impulses from our fingertips.

So what you are calling 'qualia' is just our interpretation of sensory input? And 'quanta' is the input its self? I thought it was more mysterious and elusive than that. I'm probably still missing something though.

The 'hard problem of consciousness' is like the 'hard problem of the universe'. That the universe exists is not a mystery; why there is a universe, how is there a universe, and what is the universe are the deep questions.

The 'mystery', in the case of consciousness, is trying to figure out how quanta and qualia are correlated, why there are qualitative experiences and what are such experiences.

For instance, we know that certain frequencies of EM radiation [i.e. light quanta] are experienced as the color red, but we don't know why this should be the case. From cases of synesthesia we know that it is possible for the frequency of light associated with the color red in one instance can also produce completely different subjective experiences, like smells, an emotion, or any number of other qualitative states. As of yet, we don't know what physical principles are responsible for this nor do we know why sensory input is subjectively experienced at all.

Adding an axiom just for consciousness!?!? Isn't that tantamount to "consciousness is magic, just accept it?"

Are numbers magic?

 

[tsig]

Yeah, he's talking about aku-qualia. Qualia, in philosophy, are what's left over after everything that actually exists has been explained.

Which makes about as much sense as you think it does.

Whenever I see the term qualia I know I'm about to get an earful of shaving cream.

 

[Robin]

The inability to form a precise definition of the problem is an indication of the difficulty, not of the absence of a problem. Most easy problems are easy because it's easy to formulate the question.

Oh, come on - you are saying that the hard problem of consciousness is working out what the hard problem of consciousness is.

What precise facts lead you to the conclusion that there is, in fact, a hard problem of consciousness?

 

[Robin]

The 'hard problem of consciousness' is like the 'hard problem of the universe'. That the universe exists is not a mystery; why there is a universe, how is there a universe, and what is the universe are the deep questions.

But they are not really deep questions because they are ultimately meaningless.

Suppose you have an answer to "what is the universe?", so it would be something like "the universe is a tum-te-tum". Then you just have the further question "what is a tum-te-tum?".

Supposing you have an answer to that you have "a tum-te-tum is a tum-te-tum-te-tum".

Suppose you can delve until you have an ultimate answer and can go no further - "a tum-te-tum-skip a few te tum" is a "tum-te-tum skip a few plus one te-tum".

So if you ask what is a "tum-te-tum skip a few plus one te-tum" the only answer you could have is "it is whatever it is".

In other words the answer, eventually, will just be "no reason".

And the same goes for the other questions.

The 'mystery', in the case of consciousness, is trying to figure out how quanta and qualia are correlated, why there are qualitative experiences and what are such experiences.

And the same goes for this question - if you could answer it you would only have either further questions or something that is true for no reason.

But if you think about it, we can explain the complexity of consciousness with little problem, so the final question "why is it like something?" does not need to be a complex question. In fact there might be no reason at all why.

 

[PixyMisa]

For instance, we know that certain frequencies of EM radiation [i.e. light quanta] are experienced as the color red, but we don't know why this should be the case.

You're asking the wrong questions. The answer to this sort of question is trivial, and uninteresting: It's because, if we didn't experience this as the colour red, we'd experience it as something else - which we'd still call red.

If you want to ask, what brain processes are involved in the experience of the colour red, that is an interesting question, and I'll direct you to the MIT 9.00 Introduction to Psychology lecture series presented by Prof. Jeremy Wolfe.

It's just an intro psych course, but Wolfe's area of research is visual perception, and he devotes several lectures to that.

In short, if you're asking why, you're probably barking up the wrong tree. Identify what, and then ask how.

 

[PixyMisa]

For example - and this is covered in the lectures - there's an optical illusion called the McCollough effect, whereby you can reset the colour-balance circuit in the brain such that a horizontal grid of black lines appears red, and a vertical grid appears green. And this effect can last for days.

We have the experience of seeing red because we have a whole series of layers of computer circuitry processing the signals from the optic nerve, and we call the end result of this processing, the experience of seeing red. Which can happen regardless of whether there is anything red present in our field of view; the information can be invented or misinterpreted by the brain's circuits just as easily as it can be abstracted from the photons hitting the retina.

 

[westprog]

There is nothing wrong with 'we don't know'. He wasn't saying 'I don't know', he was asserting that only living things are conscious.

So I asked what he thought it was about life that was related to consciousness.

If the answer to that is 'I don't know' also, then maybe you could consider that maybe it's nothing to do with life specifically.

It's certainly the case that only living things have exhibited consciousness. If consciousness is a physical process or attribute, then it seems likely that it can be produced by something other than living things. However, we can't claim that x is conscious just because it has something in common with y. The things it has in common may not be the relevant factors.

 

[Darat]

"living things" is purely a label we use for certain processes we see around us - it is nothing more than an "invented" distinction. We can't even agree on a black and white definition of what a "living thing" is!

 

[Darat]

...snip...

For instance, we know that certain frequencies of EM radiation [i.e. light quanta] are experienced as the color red, but we don't know why this should be the case.

...snip...

How would you account for the fact that the "experience" of red can be "generated" by quite different "frequencies of EM radiation"?

 

[westprog]

Terror? I think it would be a bit comforting to know for sure that objects can not be aware, but I can think of no reason why they should not be, if complex enough.

What does "complex" mean in a physical sense? We know what is required for an object to gain an electrical charge, or exert a magnetic field. What does it mean to say that an object becomes complex enough to exhibit consciousness? How can complexity be measured?

I suppose I just don't know enough about computers to understand what you are saying about memory. But if an object can store information about the past and use it to calculate what may happen in the future, then I would consider it aware.

That would include a sundial, say.

 

[westprog]

And when people have certain parts of their brains destroyed or removed, they know nothing about future or past states either.

Computers don't have memory unless the data is stored and interpreted as memory.

No. Computers don't have memory at all. Computer "memory" is a very big number that gets changed into another very big number.

People don't have memory unless the data is stored and interpreted as memory.

No. People do have memory. Unless of course their brains are damaged severely. What that proves I don't know. Because human minds can be damaged they must be the same as computers?

What is your point?

That human memory has nothing to do with what computers do.

Ahh, I see.

So you are saying we could, for instance, hook up another human's brain to the sensory neurons of your foot and you would be able to correctly access that individual's memories? Because, after all, a human brain just "knows" what every neural impulse means, regardless of where they come from?

I really don't know where that comes from. It doesn't seem to have anything to do with anything I've said.

I think part of the problem is calling it "thoughts." If it were called "brain state," a more accurate term, then the confusion would be less likely.

You "think"? Now there's ironic. It's almost impossible to talk about human consciousness without using the language of human consciousness. None of which applies to computers, which don't think at all.

We can also be reasonably sure that this is irrelevant. At least, those of us sufficiently versed in mathematics and computer science.



It isn't terror, it is extreme distaste.

Distaste, because if we cannot engineer consciousness -- even by accident -- there will never be a singularity and our species will live out the rest of its days stagnating as hairless monkeys.

I don't think you really understand the implications. This isn't just about "not creating robot friends," this is about not being able to improve human life.

To supplement our frail biological memory with computer assistance, we need to be able to engineer consciousness. To interface directly with our brain at any useful level, we need to be able to engineer consciousness. To save injured patients by replacing some of their natural brain functions with designed ones, we need to be able to engineer consciousness. The list goes on and on.

Frankly, I don't really care about A.I. So why have I devoted my life to it? Because until I learn how human consciousness can exist in a machine, I won't be willing to let parts of my mind become a machine. And unless I do that I won't be around to see quite a few things I want to see.

I'm sure you really want AI to be a viable route to producing consciousness. But wanting won't make it so.

 

[westprog]

In what sense does a neuron firing "understand" what it is doing?

First you should probably know what you mean by "understand".

What do you mean by "know"?

 

[PixyMisa]

What does "complex" mean in a physical sense? We know what is required for an object to gain an electrical charge, or exert a magnetic field. What does it mean to say that an object becomes complex enough to exhibit consciousness? How can complexity be measured?

This is an entire field of science by itself. Check the Wikipedia article for an overview.

Suffice it to say here that complexity is a well-defined property of physical systems and can be measured.

That would include a sundial, say.

No.

No, grasshopper. Just... no.

 

[westprog]

You can't have the qualia without the quanta. If you take away the quanta, the qualia goes away. This leads me to believe that qualitative experience is caused by quantitative experience. It is a side effect of high quantitative experience.

Perhaps it is. We still don't have a physical theory of how the one causes the other. (And Dennet and Hofstadter certainly don't).

 

[PixyMisa]

No. Computers don't have memory at all. Computer "memory" is a very big number that gets changed into another very big number.

Which is different from any other type of memory how?

No. People do have memory. Unless of course their brains are damaged severely. What that proves I don't know. Because human minds can be damaged they must be the same as computers?

Yes.

That human memory has nothing to do with what computers do.

What's the difference, then?

I'm sure you really want AI to be a viable route to producing consciousness. But wanting won't make it so.

Unfortunately for your position, AI achieved complex introspective consciousness in the 60's, found that this wasn't terribly interesting, and went on to other problems.

 

[westprog]

"living things" is purely a label we use for certain processes we see around us - it is nothing more than an "invented" distinction. We can't even agree on a black and white definition of what a "living thing" is!

That might be so, but we know that bears and dogs are living things, and that rocks and chairs aren't. The boundary conditions aren't important to this discussion. Who cares if a virus is conscious? We have bigger fish to fry.