The Hard Problem of Gravity

[AkuManiMani]

I don't think that's what he's assuming. I think he's just got so little idea what he means by the term that he shifts between definitions without even noticing.

*I* know exactly what I mean by the term and have stated what I mean by it it explicitly, consistently, and repeatedly. You're the one who is failing to grasp the explicit definition I, and many others here, have given you. You either have a real cognitive handicap or you're deliberately being obtuse.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I don't see why there's anything wrong in AI research. The expectation of producing something like a human mind is probably as unlikely as the alchemists turning lead into gold - but alchemy produced some useful side effects.

They really are the present day alchemists working hard to create homunculi. Once the other fields make their contributions, AI researchers may one day actually create a conscious entity

 

[Gate2501]

They really are the present day alchemists working hard to create homunculi. Once the other fields make their contributions, AI researchers may one day actually create a conscious entity

Don't you see that this will never be possible under a definition of consciousness that requires the presence of an immaterial aspect/phenomena?

That is why p-zombies(and the HPC) are so popular with dualists and theists.

They create an impossible definition of consciousness, that can never be reproduced outside of the human mind(or your own mind for that matter!).

 

[Third Eye Open]

Don't you see that this will never be possible under a definition of consciousness that requires the presence of an immaterial aspect/phenomena?

That is why p-zombies(and the HPC) are so popular with dualists and theists.

They create an impossible definition of consciousness, that can never be reproduced outside of the human mind(or your own mind for that matter!).

That's what I've been trying to say, but I gave up. Consciousness needs to be defined as something other than 'that thing humans do in their brains.'

 

[westprog]

That's what I've been trying to say, but I gave up. Consciousness needs to be defined as something other than 'that thing humans do in their brains.'

You can sprinkle some pixy dust and define it as what microwave ovens do. Whether you find that satisfying is up to you.

 

[Darat]

If you were to state exactly what you think the example proves, I might be better able to respond. So some scientist can use rat neural tissue to produce a Lego Mindstorms robot. So what does that prove?

You stated that "....The expectation of producing something like a human mind is probably as unlikely as the alchemists turning lead into gold..." - yet we already have done.

 

[Gate2501]

You can sprinkle some pixy dust and define it as what microwave ovens do. Whether you find that satisfying is up to you.

Or, we can say that it IS pixy dust. Which clearly is what you find satisfying.

The HPC is an impossible standard, designed with folks like you in mind.

 

[westprog]

You stated that "....The expectation of producing something like a human mind is probably as unlikely as the alchemists turning lead into gold..." - yet we already have done.

We've produced something rather less like a human than a rat is, using a rat's brain. Forgive me if I yawn.

 

[Darat]

We've produced something rather less like a human than a rat is, using a rat's brain. Forgive me if I yawn.

Amazing.

 

[PixyMisa]

Pixy and Six7s, I think that you both know that this is a semantics issue, unless Six7s believes that there is no software which can preform computations(which I would highly doubt).

That's certainly what I assumed; it would have taken Six7s perhaps a dozen words to say so. Something Westprog managed easily enough.

A computer can be defined a few different ways, latching onto one definition thereof, and calling someone out on a strict technicality based on that definition, may be a little lame.

Certainly. A computer is something that performs computations. Whether it's made out of clockwork or Lego or silicon - or bits - is largely irrelevant. We can only deal with behaviours.

The reason I pursued this is that we often see a similar claim that simulated consciousness isn't consciousness. And this is, essentially, the same claim.

Pixy isn't wrong.

I'm sure I am about something!

 

[six7s]

A computer is something that performs computations. Whether it's made out of clockwork or Lego or silicon - or bits - is largely irrelevant.

Please, do show me a computer made out of bits

Thank you in advance

 

[rocketdodger]

Software can't ever perform computation on its own. Hardware is always required. The form of the hardware is immaterial (except that it can't be immaterial).

Whether or not something can compute on its own is irrelevant to whether or not it computes period, unless you are using a definition of "compute" that explicitly says otherwise.

 

[rocketdodger]

Please, do show me a computer made out of bits

Thank you in advance

http://digg.com/gaming_news/LittleBigPlanet_used_to_create_1_600_part_calculator_video

 

[PixyMisa]

Please, do show me a computer made out of bits

Thank you in advance

There's one in your browser. There's another in your CPU.

ETA: Never mind my answer. Rocketdodger's answer is the most awesomest thing ever.

 

[Beth]

Rocks and thermometers are predictable in essentially deterministic ways.

So are transistors, and yet.

Humans and other living creatures are not.

So?

So, rocks, thermometers and transistors are not generally considered to be conscious. Living creatures are.

Since QM is stochastically predictable rather than deterministically predictable, it seems plausible enough to me that it may be involved.

If you don't understand consciousness, neurological processes, or quantum mechanics, sure.

While I don't claim to be knowledgable about such things, there are people who are and posit that QM is involved. Roger Penrose for example. While you might disagree with his suppositions, surely you are not going to claim he didn't understand QM.

I've been following this thread, but have little to contribute. However, I don't think the HPC is a way to keep humans special while being scientific.

Then you're wrong. It is deliberately and explicitly dualistic, precisely to keep consciousness in the realm of magic.

Not according to the references that AMM has posted. I have yet to see any solid evidence posted in this thread for the idea that the HPC is necessarily dualistic.

I see is as a real issue because otherwise, it is necessary to sweep consciousness under the rug claiming that perhaps we aren't actually conscious at all. Clearly, we are conscious.

How is this clear?

Definition of the term and observation of myself and others in regard to our different states of awareness. Conscious is the word we use to describe our mental state when we are aware of ourselves and what we are doing. If you claim we are not conscious, what does the word supposedly represent? Why should I doubt my own observations in the matter?

Further, I can tell when a newborn baby is conscious and when they are sleeping.

Whoops! You just switched definitions. You don't get to do that either.

No. It just doesn't fit your definition of conscious which seems to include rocks and thermometers. My usage does match up the AMM's and the general common usage of the term.

Even without the ability to speak in words, newborn babes can communicate their feelings to their mothers and fathers.

So can thermostats.

Thermostats have parents and can communicate their feelings to them from birth?

No one has taught the babe what pain and joy are, but they clearly experience such sensations without having been taught which is which.

And?

Nor does the babe have to teach the parent how to distinguish the different cries.

And?

And this was in response to Merc's point regarding that we don't actually know what other people mean by 'conscious' because we only know what the subjective state is that we label 'conscious'. We don't have to communicate with newborn babes to recognize that they are conscious and that they have experiences before we ever begin to teach them labels for those experiences. I don't find his argument convincing for that reason.

I don't see as unique to humans, I think animals are clearly conscious too.

Sure.

I don't think rocks qualify as conscious.

Sure.

I'm not sure about plants or computers, though I lean towards thinking they are not.

Why not? Well, it's pretty straightforward in the case of plants, but why not in the case of computers? I mean, you don't even know what consciousness is, so what criteria can you possibly have to make this distinction?

Computers seem too deterministic to me to consider them conscious. I'm more inclined to say that plants have consciousness than that computers do for that reason.

As for p-zombies, I think they are like square circles - a contradiction of terms that cannot actually exist. A being that simulated consciousness perfectly in all ways would have to be conscious.

You mean, like a computer?

If a computer could perfectly simulate consciousness, yes. Currently, we have no computers that can do that.

Otherwise, they would not be able to simulate it perfectly.

Actually, I think you have that backwards. It's not that you have to be conscious to simulate consciousness; it's that the simulation is the thing. Just as a virtual computer is a computer.

I agree with you here. A virtual computer is a computer and a simulation that was indistinguishable from consciousness would be conscious. But while we have virtual computers, we don't have vitual consciousness...yet.

 

[Gate2501]

The reason I pursued this is that we often see a similar claim that simulated consciousness isn't consciousness. And this is, essentially, the same claim.

I hadn't caught on to that until Westprog's post that seemed to suggest that there was "more to this".

/facepalm@self

 

[PixyMisa]

While I don't claim to be knowledgable about such things, there are people who are and posit that QM is involved. Roger Penrose for example. While you might disagree with his suppositions, surely you are not going to claim he didn't understand QM.

Well, yes, I am, given that Tegmark showed that there's a gap of 13 orders of magnitude between the timescales of neural activity and quantum coherence.

That's like saying the US GDP "about a dollar".

Not according to the references that AMM has posted. I have yet to see any solid evidence posted in this thread for the idea that the HPC is necessarily dualistic.

Read Chalmers on it. He says so himself.

Definition of the term and observation of myself and others in regard to our different states of awareness. Conscious is the word we use to describe our mental state when we are aware of ourselves and what we are doing.

Self-awareness, yes. And what is that? Awareness is information processing. Self-awareness is self-referential information processing.

If you claim we are not conscious, what does the word supposedly represent?

I don't claim that. I point out instead that computers are also conscious.

No. It just doesn't fit your definition of conscious which seems to include rocks and thermometers.

Are rocks self-referential information processing systems? How long has this been going on?

My usage does match up the AMM's and the general common usage of the term.

General common usage, including your usage and AMM's, is hopelessly inconsistent.

Thermostats have parents and can communicate their feelings to them from birth?

Yes indeedy!

And this was in response to Merc's point regarding that we don't actually know what other people mean by 'conscious' because we only know what the subjective state is that we label 'conscious'. We don't have to communicate with newborn babes to recognize that they are conscious and that they have experiences before we ever begin to teach them labels for those experiences.

Mercutio is pointing out that all you have is behaviours. Even internally, all you have is behaviours. You might only think you are conscious. Not by my definition, of course, because by my definition, if you can think you are conscious then you are consicous. But by the common, irrepressibly vague, definition, certainly.

Computers seem too deterministic to me to consider them conscious.

Are you asserting that consciousness is non-deterministic?

Are you asserting that computers aren't non-deterministic? (Because they are.) Or are you merely saying that they're insufficiently non-deterministic? In which case, where is the line, and why?

I'm more inclined to say that plants have consciousness than that computers do for that reason.

Are plants self-referential information processing systems? How long has this been going on?

If a computer could perfectly simulate consciousness, yes. Currently, we have no computers that can do that.

Actually, every computer in use today can do that, and a large proportion of them do.

If you mean perfectly simulate human consciousness, then no computer today can do that. But a moment ago you were willing to attribute consciousness to plants.

What about rat consciousness? Scientists have simulated a rat neocortical column, and are working on a simulation of the entire neocortex. What about bumblebee consciousness? Planarian consciousness?

I agree with you here. A virtual computer is a computer and a simulation that was indistinguishable from consciousness would be conscious. But while we have virtual computers, we don't have vitual consciousness...yet.

Yes we do. We do, and have had for decades.

 

[Beth]

While I don't claim to be knowledgable about such things, there are people who are and posit that QM is involved. Roger Penrose for example. While you might disagree with his suppositions, surely you are not going to claim he didn't understand QM.

Well, yes, I am, given that Tegmark showed that there's a gap of 13 orders of magnitude between the timescales of neural activity and quantum coherence.

You're certainly entitled to your opinion. As I am entitled to mine. I'll simply have to disagree here and say that while I don't know who is right, I don't know who is wrong either and remain open to the possibility.

Not according to the references that AMM has posted. I have yet to see any solid evidence posted in this thread for the idea that the HPC is necessarily dualistic.

Read Chalmers on it. He says so himself.

So? Is he the only authority on the matter? Or just the only one you agree with?

Definition of the term and observation of myself and others in regard to our different states of awareness. Conscious is the word we use to describe our mental state when we are aware of ourselves and what we are doing.

Self-awareness, yes. And what is that? Awareness is information processing. Self-awareness is self-referential information processing.

I don't agree with this definition. Certainly, self-referential information processing is a necessary component, I don't think it's sufficient. If you use that as your definition, you get consciousness being attributed to things like thermometers.

My usage does match up the AMM's and the general common usage of the term.

General common usage, including your usage and AMM's, is hopelessly inconsistent.

Maybe. But I find it a more useful and generally understood definition than yours which ends up labeling things like thermostats as being conscious.

And this was in response to Merc's point regarding that we don't actually know what other people mean by 'conscious' because we only know what the subjective state is that we label 'conscious'. We don't have to communicate with newborn babes to recognize that they are conscious and that they have experiences before we ever begin to teach them labels for those experiences.

Mercutio is pointing out that all you have is behaviours. Even internally, all you have is behaviours.

So?

Computers seem too deterministic to me to consider them conscious.

Are you asserting that consciousness is non-deterministic?

It is my opinion that non-deterministic behavior is a necessary (but probably not sufficient) aspect of the behavior we label 'consciousness'. I could be wrong, but I'm not read or observed anything that convinces me otherwise.

Are you asserting that computers aren't non-deterministic? (Because they are.) Or are you merely saying that they're insufficiently non-deterministic? In which case, where is the line, and why?

I would say that they are insufficiently non-deterministic. Where do I draw the line...hmm...the line could be as low as bacteria (in which case computers would also qualify IMO) or as high as birds. So, somewhere between birds and bacteria. How's that? It's a big fuzzy line with lots of room for argument.

I'm more inclined to say that plants have consciousness than that computers do for that reason.

Are plants self-referential information processing systems? How long has this been going on?

I imagine since they first appeared on dry land. Possibly before then. I'm not a biologist. But I don't think that having a self-referential information processing system is sufficient for consciousness. I think it also requires non-deterministic real-time autonomous decision making capability. I'm not sure if plants possess that. Consciousness may require other things as well. While I would consider both of those traits to be necessary, I'm not sure if they are sufficient.

I have a hard time expressing what else seems necessary, but I'll try. I think consciousness requires a 'self', an identity that endures over time despite drastic changes in the physical organism.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Don't you see that this will never be possible under a definition of consciousness that requires the presence of an immaterial aspect/phenomena?

The mind may not be material but it must be based on the laws of physics. If you've read some of my other post you'll know what I mean by that

That is why p-zombies(and the HPC) are so popular with dualists and theists.

I think the dualist perspective is flawed which is why I prefer to address the issue in a different way. I think the source of the controversy is flawed semantics and ontology. Once one can get around those problems I think the situation can be seen more clearly.

They create an impossible definition of consciousness, that can never be reproduced outside of the human mind(or your own mind for that matter!).

Which is why consciousness must be brought into the realm of physical theory or current physical theory must be expanded to include it. The fact that there is consciousness is beyond reasonable dispute; each and everyone of us experience it first hand every day. What must be done now is to understand the objective nature of consciousness and understand how it correlates with each subjective qualitative experience.

When we're able to understand what qualia are objectively, why each qualitative experience has their own specific quality of 'seemingness', how the relate to the laws of physics, and how to reproduce them then we will have made immense progress in solving the EMA. I don't think that can happen until we sort out a lot of the ontological issues that are causing so much confusion on the topic of consciousness.

 

[AkuManiMani]

That's what I've been trying to say, but I gave up. Consciousness needs to be defined as something other than 'that thing humans do in their brains.'

LOL!

Dude, that's what I've been saying. Solving the EMA would be doing just that