The Hard Problem of Gravity

[Third Eye Open]

Oh c'mon, you're being downright silly. You don't even need three eyes to see what I'm saying

There is no compelling reason to assume that other animals aren't conscious [i.e. aware]. I dunno why you felt the need to invoke a tautology, that I never stated or implied, or assume that consciousness must be human specific.

An elephant can know a good location to find a water hole during a drought. A frog can know that one particular sense impression [that we humans might call an 'earthworm'] is tasty to eat when feeling hungry, and that another sense impression [we humans might call it an 'ant'] tends to be very unpleasant to eat and so avoid it.

Also, simply 'being a human' is not sufficient to make one aware. An individual human may be sleep, comatose, or dead.

Ok, if we take away the human requirement, then a computer should be considered aware. My computer 'knows' that it is supposed to start the virus scan at 3AM, it acts on this information and starts the virus scan. Maybe you could even say it 'chooses' to do so. Does the fact that I know what the computer will choose to do at any given time make it less of a choice? Am I getting way ahead of myself?

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Logically, one cannot know anything unless they have awareness. Therefore awareness is the basis of all knowledge.

It seems to me that you're jumping the gun here by conceptualizing awareness into existence in it's own right. You might want to say that "one cannot know anything unless they are aware of..." There is no reason to invoke 'aware-ness' here. That concept is of your own making, and might not even be needed at all.

If you however demand it, you are close to having confused the map with the territory (or perhaps with the map of the map of the territory). Thus you might be approaching the scenario I presented in one of my earlier post, when explanations don't fit the preconceived conceptual framework you have built beyond explanatory commonality.

In a way it's like asking for money in exchange of a service, but then refusing any attempt for payment by saying: "no no no, I want money, not some pieces of metal or paper!"

 

[AkuManiMani]

It seems to me that you're jumping the gun here by conceptualizing awareness into existence in it's own right. You might want to say that "one cannot know anything unless they are aware of..." There is no reason to invoke 'aware-ness' here. That concept is of your own making, and might not even be needed at all.

When I say "awareness" I'm referring to the state of being aware. The whole issue of the HPC [which I will henceforth all the EMA] is the attempt to define just what exactly does it mean to be 'aware'. Just what exactly is this state and why should it be at all?

If you however demand it, you are close to having confused the map with the territory (or perhaps with the map of the map of the territory). Thus you might be approaching the scenario I presented in one of my earlier post, when explanations don't fit the preconceived conceptual framework you have built beyond explanatory commonality.

I'd say that 'awareness' isn't so much the map but the particular medium the map is on/in. Its my position that the state of being aware isn't just a process but should be considered a class of thing IAOI. I've said in other posts, I suspect that consciousness is a kind of field. A specific experience would be a kind of disturbance or wrinkle a field of awareness.

For instance, photons of a specific frequency would interact in a specific way with 'awareness' to produce a specific qualitative experience. The quality of the experience would depend upon the nature of the interaction involved.

In once instance the experience would be equivalent to what we humans experience as color; in other it might invoke something akin to a smell or emotion, or something completely alien to human experience. As

In short, I'm saying that there must be a physics to awareness and qualitative experience that we simply haven't developed yet.

In a way it's like asking for money in exchange of a service, but then refusing any attempt for payment by saying: "no no no, I want money, not some pieces of metal or paper!"

Ironically, that's what I'm charging some of the posters here with. They are equating representations of conscious experience with conscious experience IAOI.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Ok, if we take away the human requirement, then a computer should be considered aware. My computer 'knows' that it is supposed to start the virus scan at 3AM, it acts on this information and starts the virus scan. Maybe you could even say it 'chooses' to do so. Does the fact that I know what the computer will choose to do at any given time make it less of a choice? Am I getting way ahead of myself?

A computer doesn't know so start a scan at a particular time anymore than a wind-up clock knows to cuckoo at a certain time. Its deterministically set by a mechanical architecture designed by conscious entities to produce specific outcomes.

There is a difference between a mechanical chain of events and a conscious initiation of an event. This, among other things, leads me to assume that there must be a basic physical principle behind consciousness rather than just a specific functional architecture.

 

[Mercutio]

No you don't - that is every much just an assumption as the assumption that there are any conscious beings in the world is.

Hehe... I knew that if I kept reading instead of replying immediately, that you would have already said what I was going to.

 

[Mercutio]

With all due respect, anyone who does not know they are conscious cannot be said to know anything. Just being aware is an implicit knowledge of one's own existence.'Conscious' is just the label I put on my experience. One's own awareness is the one thing each of us can know with certainty; its the epistemological base upon which we set all our knowledge.

Oh, my... no. No. In fact, one's own awareness is known with much less certainty than one knows things about external objects.

Tell me, how is it that you learned to label your awareness? Surely each feeling did not come pre-labeled by god for your convenience; did somebody teach you that this is hunger, this is love, this is red, this is soft, this is frustrating? You did not invent your own terms; you converse with others and expect them to understand.

You learned to speak about your consciousness via people who had no access to it. Whereas you could learn "red" through public examples, you learned "awareness" from teacher who were blind to what you were actually aware of! No wonder introspection is such a flawed methodology! No wonder our descriptions of consciousness and awareness are so vastly different from the reality of consciousness and awareness, when examined experimentally!

You claim you are conscious; indeed, you claim that you are the one entity that you can guarantee is conscious. How can you possibly know you are conscious, then, when you don't even know if the people who taught you about consciousness were themselves conscious? They might have taught it all wrong! How can you know, when you yourself have said that you cannot be certain they are conscious?

 

[quarky]

Are there no degrees of consciousness?

 

[quixotecoyote]

A computer doesn't know so start a scan at a particular time anymore than a wind-up clock knows to cuckoo at a certain time. Its deterministically set by a mechanical architecture designed by conscious entities to produce specific outcomes.

There is a difference between a mechanical chain of events and a conscious initiation of an event. This, among other things, leads me to assume that there must be a basic physical principle behind consciousness rather than just a specific functional architecture.

If you want to make this argument you're going to have to demonstrate that minds you consider conscious operate in a non-deterministic manner beyond that of all other objects and entities (eta: that means no randomness or QM, as those apply to computers and cuckoo-clocks too.) Otherwise you have no basis to differentiate as you are trying to do.



Good luck.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

When I say "awareness" I'm referring to the state of being aware. The whole issue of the HPC [which I will henceforth all the EMA] is the attempt to define just what exactly does it mean to be 'aware'. Just what exactly is this state and why should it be at all?

Which means you have constructed a kind of conceptual map. And which means that HPC-EMA is demanding a whole collection of them, one on top of each other. In effect, by piling then on top of another, you don't get to the semantic endpoint, it's just a ongoing movement of syntax.

I'd say that 'awareness' isn't so much the map but the particular medium the map is on/in. Its my position that the state of being aware isn't just a process but should be considered a class of thing IAOI. A specific experience would be a kind of disturbance or wrinkle of awareness.

For first sentence, see above. The two latter sentences are assertions which you can surely make, but is there any good reason to postulate them in the first place? What is the basis for the postulation?

In short, I'm saying that there must be a physics to awareness and qualitative experience that we simply haven't developed yet.

Yes, I understand your position, but what I don't understand is the 'necessity' of it. It could also be that you're simply drowning in more conceptualizations, with no end in sight.

Ironically, that's what I'm charging some of the posters here with. They are equating representations of conscious experience with conscious experience IAOI.

Well, but translate "money" for "awareness" or "consciousness" and you understand where I'm coming from. In a way it's like the banana problem: whatever you might throw at me as an explanation, you haven't explained "banana-ness". For surely it is different form "apple-ness" even though we could agree on the formal taxonomy of both being fruits, ultimately that's just an agreed upon convention.

What seems increasingly apparent to me, is that no real truth is to be found (as in ultimate explanation). What is needed is a useful explanatory system that's internally coherent, that's all we're going to have. That seems to me where both Pixy and RD is also coming from.

 

[dv82matt]

Are there no degrees of consciousness?

I would argue that there are both degrees and kinds of consciousness. I think of consciousness not as a single thing but as a broad spectrum of cognitive behaviours.

 

[westprog]

Chalmers can be confusing he dances around the issue of the 'explanatory' gap with suggestions that 'psychophysicalism', the elevation of untestable experience to the role of core theory, is necessary. He's just substituting "experiential" for "immaterial".
http://consc.net/papers/puzzle.pdf

I believe Dennet has already been cited, but here's the most relevant section of his critique of Chalmers:



http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmers.htm

I've no particular support for Chalmers, but at least he's engaging with the problem. Dennet doesn't like the possible consequences of investigating experience, so he ignores it.

 

[westprog]

Oh, my... no. No. In fact, one's own awareness is known with much less certainty than one knows things about external objects.

Tell me, how is it that you learned to label your awareness? Surely each feeling did not come pre-labeled by god for your convenience; did somebody teach you that this is hunger, this is love, this is red, this is soft, this is frustrating? You did not invent your own terms; you converse with others and expect them to understand.

Being able to label awareness in order to communicate our internal states with other people does not imply that awareness was uncertain until labelled. The awareness comes first. The

You learned to speak about your consciousness via people who had no access to it. Whereas you could learn "red" through public examples, you learned "awareness" from teacher who were blind to what you were actually aware of! No wonder introspection is such a flawed methodology! No wonder our descriptions of consciousness and awareness are so vastly different from the reality of consciousness and awareness, when examined experimentally!

The inability to access another person's internal state does not imply that the description takes primacy over what it is describing, or that the external manifestations of the experience are more real than the experience itself.

You claim you are conscious; indeed, you claim that you are the one entity that you can guarantee is conscious. How can you possibly know you are conscious, then, when you don't even know if the people who taught you about consciousness were themselves conscious? They might have taught it all wrong! How can you know, when you yourself have said that you cannot be certain they are conscious?

Because consciousness is a lable that I assign myself, to something I know exists. I do not know if that lable is also applicable to what other people experience. It is quite possible that I am the only conscious person, and that nobody else has my experiences. It is not possible that I don't have consciousness.

 

[quixotecoyote]

I've no particular support for Chalmers, but at least he's engaging with the problem. Dennet doesn't like the possible consequences of investigating experience, so he ignores it.

I doubt you can support that (mis)interpretation.

 

[westprog]

I doubt you can support that (mis)interpretation.

My understanding is that Dennet regards qualia (or awareness, or experience, or whatever) as a confused concept, which can therefore be disregarded as useless.

IMO if "qualia" is badly defined, then it is up to the philosophers to find a way to define it. If language is inadequate to describe the sensation of awareness, then find new language. If it is impossible to define or describe qualia adequately, then accept the fact and move on from there.

Since we are using the gravitational analogy - if a layman approaches a physicist and talks about the force pushing everything together, one would hope that the response would be to try to explain how it really worked - not to claim that because gravity was such an ill-formed concept that it could be disregarded.

It may be that I'm not fully representing the subtleties of Dennet's ideas, but I'm willing to have them re-explained.

 

[quixotecoyote]

My understanding is that Dennet regards qualia (or awareness, or experience, or whatever) as a confused concept, which can therefore be disregarded as useless.

IMO if "qualia" is badly defined, then it is up to the philosophers to find a way to define it. If language is inadequate to describe the sensation of awareness, then find new language. If it is impossible to define or describe qualia adequately, then accept the fact and move on from there.

Since we are using the gravitational analogy - if a layman approaches a physicist and talks about the force pushing everything together, one would hope that the response would be to try to explain how it really worked - not to claim that because gravity was such an ill-formed concept that it could be disregarded.

It may be that I'm not fully representing the subtleties of Dennet's ideas, but I'm willing to have them re-explained.

Dennet's not saying that because experience is a confused concept that it should be ignored. He's saying that because experience is a confused concept with no referent it should be ignored.

Are you familiar with the vitalism analogy?

 

[PixyMisa]

My understanding is that Dennet regards qualia (or awareness, or experience, or whatever) as a confused concept, which can therefore be disregarded as useless.

Not confused, but incoherent.

IMO if "qualia" is badly defined, then it is up to the philosophers to find a way to define it.

Dennett didn't create the term, nor did he create its definition. Therefore it suffices for him to point out that the term is, as it's defined, meaningless.

If language is inadequate to describe the sensation of awareness, then find new language.

And if it isn't, don't?

If it is impossible to define or describe qualia adequately, then accept the fact and move on from there.

You have the problem backwards. The term qualia was defined in such a way as to be meaningless. That's why every discussion of qualia promptly runs onto the rocks.

It may be that I'm not fully representing the subtleties of Dennet's ideas, but I'm willing to have them re-explained.

There you go then.

 

[Mercutio]

Being able to label awareness in order to communicate our internal states with other people does not imply that awareness was uncertain until labelled. The awareness comes first.

The inability to access another person's internal state does not imply that the description takes primacy over what it is describing, or that the external manifestations of the experience are more real than the experience itself.

Because consciousness is a lable that I assign myself, to something I know exists. I do not know if that lable is also applicable to what other people experience. It is quite possible that I am the only conscious person, and that nobody else has my experiences. It is not possible that I don't have consciousness.

I know I have posted a link to this paper on several previous threads, but I'll be damned if I can find the right link right now, so this will have to do. Consciousness as you describe it in your last paragraph above is a trivial and useless thing, not at all what we usually think of as consciousness. It is a "something" that can't really even be labeled, as it cannot be verified as the same from one person to another.

I personally think consciousness is more than that--it is something that we see in others and in ourselves, and something that is meaningful. Of course, that something is behavior, both public and private.

I doubt you will agree with me.

 

[six7s]

VS Ramachandran:

• Qualia = sensations you are conscious of

• Self and Qualia are two sides of a Mobius Strip

Consciousness, Qualia, and Self
Dr. V.S. Ramachandran, Director of the Center for Brain and Cognition at UCSD, discusses consciousness, qualia, and self.​

Works for me

 

[Malerin]

Suffer.

Ouch!

 

[Malerin]

Most computers these days are conscious. And I'm not talking big, complex computers like mobile phones and video games, I'm talking things like microwave ovens and washing machines and car engines.

And you guys think theists have kooky beliefs?

Oh, and a video game's not a computer, Pixy