The Hard Problem of Gravity

[rocketdodger]

That's an interesting new constraint - because it has no relevance to a single rock or thermostat. Which is where this particular subthread started.

I know. It only has relevance when you say a rock switches "just like" a thermostat, because a rock does not switch "just like" a thermostat. If it did, you wouldn't have to provide the new definitions for the ON states.

If a single switch has some degree of consciousness, then clearly a rock does as well.

Absolutely. If you want to say rocks switch, then under my definition of consciousness rocks are conscious.

You seem to be entirely wedded to the conviction that consciousness is exactly what you thought it was. You start with the certain knowledge that consciousness is computational in nature, and derive everything else from that. If you start with the assumption that consciousness is physical in nature, you will end up with a quite different set of ideas.

"Computational" is a subset of "physical," so I already assume consciousness is physical in nature.

My "certain knowledge" is derived from the fact that all observable results of consciousness are computational. That means consciousness is computational. To show otherwise, all you have to do is find a single counterexample.

Of course, you can't. We have been asking you for years, and you haven't ever done so.

We seem to be gradually getting closer to a physical definition, but we are still a long way off.

Maybe you should define "physical" to begin with?

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I disagree. Most aspects of consciousness need no awareness of self for them to manifest. All of the sensory states conform to this, and feelings too. Until inner dialogue, and identification with inner dialogue, comes along there is simply no narrative self, no user illusion. Nothing happens to anybody until the thought arises that this is going on. Things simply are.

I'm not sure if it's meaningful to simply conflate self-reference with narrative self here. I would even be inclined to say that what you call narrative self includes a much looser self-referential quality than reflection or recursion at more rudimentary levels. Narrative self is more of an abstract newcomer (in evolutionary terms), on top of self-referential processes, thus it is also subject to change and construction according to activities throughout time (i.e. illation). Narrative self seems quite dependent on culture, language and robust memory systems as well. The problem-child "qualia" seems also, in turn, quite dependent on that process.

It would almost be like confusing the artist's self-portrait with the artist himself. Only in this case the artist is looking in the mirror while drawing, which seems to make it more confusing, especially since he appears to be somewhat color blind too.

 

[Mercutio]

I don't think it is logically possible for a person even to observe their own private experiences in a scientific way.

There have been multiple attempts, historically. Introspection, as practiced by James & Wundt, for example, proved flawed. Wundt's more objective measures are still used today--particularly the method of subtraction--and scientifically examine private experience. Fechner and Weber's psychophysical methods are still used today. So, it may be logically impossible, but don't tell the people who are doing it already.

Say, for example, that I observed myself to be experiencing the feeling of typing these words.

So you have the observation of the experience of the feeling of the typing. Do you have qualia of the observation of the experience of the feeling of the typing? How many turtles in total? (I am just pointing out the layers of hypothetical constructs or explanatory fictions that are presupposed in that one sentence.)

I would suppose given your views, you would take this to be reasonably good evidence of a particular experience taking place in me since the described experience conforms with what would be expected of a person typing out words on a message board.

Given my views, no. But frankly, the example and explanation are so far removed from my views that even "no" is an odd answer.

To me, this would be an incorrect conclusion because when someone makes an observation, they're already taking the discussion out of the conceptual realm of experience.

And this means...(and this assumes...)

An observation cannot be taken as evidence for an experience because it is explainable in terms of calculations made by the brain which cause the body to behave in certain ways that imply a notion we call "experience."

The brain is actually part of the body, you know that. It is not a dualistic relationship. And reductionism is not explanation. It's description, albeit at a different level. What caused the brain to cause the body...?

The report that I typed about how I was experiencing the sensation of typing can be explained as the consequence of brain activity causing my fingers to move in accordance with certain patterns. In this sense, we must leave open the possibility that consciousness is a fictitious concept invented by the methods of processing idiosyncratic to the brain.

Or a fiction that is created by our language.

It is this idea that I believe David Chalmers was trying to convey with his p-zombie, and as there is no scientific way of studying experience in light of this idea, there is no way for us to understand what experience is and what its properties are should it actually exist.

If one presupposes dualism, then perhaps there is no scientific way of studying experience. Which was kinda my point. "From some scientific views; not from all."

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

38 pages? I can't even remember what page I was on when last here. Is anything new being said or just a rehash of same-same?

 

[yy2bggggs]

38 pages? I can't even remember what page I was on when last here. Is anything new being said or just a rehash of same-same?

Somebody said something really cool and insightful in this thread. Can't quite remember which page it was on though.

 

[PixyMisa]

I disagree.

Yes, well, we know that. And you're wrong.

Most aspects of consciousness need no awareness of self for them to manifest.

Then they're baggage.

All of the sensory states conform to this, and feelings too.

So?

Is a colour-blind person not conscious?

Is a person that can't feel, say, pique, not conscious?

Until inner dialogue, and identification with inner dialogue, comes along there is simply no narrative self, no user illusion.

That's what consciousness is. The inner "dialogue" doesn't have to involve anything so complex as human language, merely symbols.

Nothing happens to anybody until the thought arises that this is going on. Things simply are.

Yeah, that's what I said. Consciousness is self-referential information processing.

Look around you and ask...without inner dialogue where is the self-reference?

Your question translates to: Without self-referential information processing, where is the self-reference?

And I respond: Wha?

It is completely possible to observe anything without any notion of self and actually this does not contradict Strong AI. It merely contradicts the notion that self is inherent in consciousness.

Yes, you can observe anything without any notion of self. If this is all you do, you are not conscious.

 

[PixyMisa]

Somebody said something really cool and insightful in this thread. Can't quite remember which page it was on though.

There were some yellow stains on page 17 that I considered rather insightful.

 

[AkuManiMani]

LOL! Well, that was a good laugh! "All that stuff that goes on in your mind when you're awake or dreaming" Is what I would call "Experience".

So if all that stuff is 'qualitative' then what the hell is quantitative?

EVERYTHING is quantitative and EVERYTHING is qualitative. Conciosuness is the state inwhich an entity subjectively experiences the qualities of quantities. Entities that have subjective experiences [which are necessarily qualitative] are concious. All the other stuff [such as how it processes those quantities, and the specific range of qualities it experiences[ are incidental.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Well, my contention is that there is nothing special in the human being to make it conscious. It's incremental, and very simple organisms have it to a much, much lesser degree. There is no hidden ingredient.

How special human consciouness is isn't the question; the goal is to define consciousness scientifically. All organisms may or may not have conscious capacities. But, juding from human expamples atleast, we know that simply being alive is not suffieicent to produce conscious experience -- humans and other animals actually have states inwhich they aren't conscious.

When we have a suffient scientific description of consciousness we should be able to propose ways to sythesize enties with little epistemological doubt as to whether or not they have conscious capacity. Once we have such knowledge it would be possible, in principle, to measure and reproduce subjective states in a reliable fashion.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

What does subjective experience mean? Do we have a good definition?

 

[AkuManiMani]

What is 'qualitative experience'? All that stuff that goes on in your mind when you're awake or dreaming.

I don't see a need to invent a new term for "perception", then.

Well, yes and no. All we actually perceive are 'qualia'. The goal is to scientifically define what the experience of qualia actually consists of. At present, we know that we perceive and that all of our perceptions are qualitative, but we do not know exatcly how they come about or how to reproduce them.

How does one observe it in others? One cannot directly do so [atleast as far as we know] but we can observe the physiological activity of humans that claim to be conscious, and compare it to instances where they are purportedly unconscious.

So qualia are useless. We observe behaviour.

Utility has nothing to do with the actuality of qualia. Finding out exactly what qualia are, objectively, will have much practical utility however. I believe that, in principle, this should be possible but we have not achieved such, yet.

 

[Mercutio]

What does subjective experience mean? Do we have a good definition?

It's private behavior, plus some quintessentially subjective something. Dunno what; I only know that it is hell and gone from mere private behavior.

 

[Mercutio]

Well, yes and no. All we actually perceive are 'qualia'. The goal is to scientifically define what the experience of qualia actually consists of. At present, we know that we perceive and that all of our perceptions are qualitative, but we do not know exatcly how the come about or how to reproduce.

Wait--all I actually perceive are qualia? I don't perceive cats, and computers, and stop signs, and water bottles and such? If I can't perceive a cat, but simply the cat qualia, how do I perceive the qualia themselves? Do I have to perceive qualia qualia?

Utility has nothing to do with the actuality of qualia. Finding out exactly what qualia are, objectively, will have much practical utility however. I believe that, in principle, this should be possible but we have not achieved such, yet.

I want a map of Florida that shows where the fountain of youth is. I believe that, in principle, this should be possible but I have not found one yet. So far, even the most detailed maps I have are obviously incomplete, since they don't show it.

 

[AkuManiMani]

What does subjective experience mean? Do we have a good definition?

We know what 'subjective experience' means. What is being sought is an objective way of defining, identifying, and reproducing it.

FYI, I don't think the Turing test is a valid way of determining consciousness. Its merely an intelligence test, not a consciousness test. All the Turing test does is highlight the epistemological problem of inferring consciousness in entities other than ourselves. The means to overcoming this problem is to find the necessary objective correlates of subjective experience, not simply inferring from contingent correlates of gross behavior.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Well, yes and no. All we actually perceive are 'qualia'. The goal is to scientifically define what the experience of qualia actually consists of. At present, we know that we perceive and that all of our perceptions are qualitative, but we do not know exatcly how the come about or how to reproduce.

Wait--all I actually perceive are qualia? I don't perceive cats, and computers, and stop signs, and water bottles and such? If I can't perceive a cat, but simply the cat qualia, how do I perceive the qualia themselves? Do I have to perceive qualia qualia?

Earlier you described a cat as an example of a 'distal stimulus'. Qualia are the conscious experience of proximal stimulation of some sort. Stimuli are not qualia until they are consciously perceived. So when you look at a cat you are experiencing qualitative elements that, together, compose the mental image impression of what we call 'cat'. 'Qualia' are subjective elements of perception of any kind. Right now, 'quale' has the same epistemological status 'gene' had about a century and a half ago. We know that they exist -- just not what they are composed of or exactly how they operate.

Utility has nothing to do with the actuality of qualia. Finding out exactly what qualia are, objectively, will have much practical utility however. I believe that, in principle, this should be possible but we have not achieved such, yet.

I want a map of Florida that shows where the fountain of youth is. I believe that, in principle, this should be possible but I have not found one yet. So far, even the most detailed maps I have are obviously incomplete, since they don't show it.

Alright, now you're being downright silly. 'Qualia' is just a term used to label a known phenomenon.

 

[Nick227]

Included in "things" are the very thinking that this is going on.

Note that you do here, explicitly, speak of different aspects of consciousness; once again I remind people that we use that word very sloppily, and to look for one explanation to cover all uses cannot be done at any level other than the behavior of the organism and the language used to describe it.

Yes, that's quite possibly true. I dare say another 100 years of research will let us know.

Other than that, you must settle for reducing one aspect of consciousness at a time. Pixy has done this. It does not fit other aspects by your analysis here; there is no requirement that it should.

Agreed. Though Pixy asserts that it does.

Without self-reference where is the inner dialogue? See, it goes both ways.

It seems to go both ways, but there are complications here. There can also be inner dialogue without identification - without the sense of it belonging to anyone. There can also be inner dialogue going on at the very borders of awareness - reactive processing becoming conscious.

And even here, both "inner dialogue" and "self-reference" are being used sloppily. Self-referencing may certainly take place without inner dialogue.

Well, there is behaviour associated with self which is not associated with inner dialogue, but it's reactive in nature.

Perhaps vice versa, too--it depends on what one means by each term.
In which aspect of consciousness? As long as we are using sloppy categorical terms, the question is sloppy.

I agree that there is a lot of sloppiness in the terminology, but I find that choice of adjective a little suspect as really the difficulties are I think inevitable. As to your question, note I was replying to Pixy's assertion that all consciousness is self-referencing by nature.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I'm not sure if it's meaningful to simply conflate self-reference with narrative self here. I would even be inclined to say that what you call narrative self includes a much looser self-referential quality than reflection or recursion at more rudimentary levels. Narrative self is more of an abstract newcomer (in evolutionary terms), on top of self-referential processes, thus it is also subject to change and construction according to activities throughout time (i.e. illation). Narrative self seems quite dependent on culture, language and robust memory systems as well. The problem-child "qualia" seems also, in turn, quite dependent on that process.

It would almost be like confusing the artist's self-portrait with the artist himself. Only in this case the artist is looking in the mirror while drawing, which seems to make it more confusing, especially since he appears to be somewhat color blind too.

Experientially, I personally find it quite valid to break consciousness up into these various aspects. There are 5 streams experienced objectively through the senses. There are feelings and there is inner dialogue. This is just how it fits together for me.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

There have been multiple attempts, historically. Introspection, as practiced by James & Wundt, for example, proved flawed. Wundt's more objective measures are still used today--particularly the method of subtraction--and scientifically examine private experience. Fechner and Weber's psychophysical methods are still used today. So, it may be logically impossible, but don't tell the people who are doing it already.

Dennett's heterophenomenology also. There may in addition be issues around self and determinism which will serve to further validate introspective analysis. Time will tell.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Yes, you can observe anything without any notion of self. If this is all you do, you are not conscious.

By your definition of "consciousness" this is of course true. However, virtually no one else on the planet afaik subscribes to it. You are effectively stating that someone who does not have inner dialogue, or identification with inner dialogue, cannot be considered conscious.

Nick

 

[AkuManiMani]

Dennett's heterophenomenology also. There may in addition be issues around self and determinism which will serve to further validate introspective analysis. Time will tell.

Nick

It is only via introspection that any of us can recognize our own consciousness [by Pixy's definition, introspection is the same as consciousness -- but I digress]. It is our capacity for introspection that allows us to create language to label, organize, and communicate our thoughts and other subjective states. The only way we can assume that others are also conscious is by inferring from our own introspective examinations. Introspection is just as empirical, and essential, as extrospection.