The hard problem of consciousness

[rocketdodger]

I have explained myself why I disagree with the prevailing theorys, or should I say materialistic interpretation of consciousness.

You have not said why you think an inference based reasoning system model falls short of explaining consciousness.

 

[JoeEllison]

You have not said why you think an inference based reasoning system model falls short of explaining consciousness.

Because it explains what YOU mean by consciousness, and not what HE means by consciousness?

 

[cyborg]

Experience is change.

The amount of analysis and the amount of change in analysis determines the quality of experience.

 

[Roboramma]

If I'm correct in my worries about the language problem, some people will still be navel-gazing about these questions when the robots are violently demanding their rights!

Well, I look at it from the other direction - not, when they are sufficiently like us, will we be able to tell that they're conscious: I think at that point it's obvious that they are.
Rather, I mean, how do we know that they aren't now? Or won't be in the near future? How about expert systems that in some ways become far more "intelligent" than us, but only in relation to very specific problems?

It's sort of the thermostat example randfan was using - does a thermostat experience something? How do we know? What leads you to your conclusion, one way or the other?

 

[Robin]

One of the biggest mysteries in science is consciousness.....Or is it?

Three pages in and the biggest mystery is "what is the hard problem of consciousness?".

Is someone able to state the problem clearly and concisely?

 

[skiba]

The problem seems to be that to treat the "HPC" as being a legitimate problem means to accept a whole lot of assumptions, some of them having to do with the words we use, and the slightly different ways that each of us define and understand those words.

The same goes for me. To say that HPC is not a legimate problem we have to make assumption. We have to assume complexity and computation can give rise to experience even though we have no proof of this. We have to assume experience/consciousness is only certain type of information process or a byproduct of it.

You have not said why you think an inference based reasoning system model falls short of explaining consciousness.

I think that touches on the cognitive function, higher reasoning, abstract thought etc, but not with consciousness/experience itself. All these cognitive functions are part of the "easy problem". All these qualities of the brain come in to consciousness after they have gone through a proces of some sort.

though I might have not fully understood what "inference based reasoning system model" is

 

[Robin]

The same goes for me. To say that HPC is not a legimate problem we have to make assumption. We have to assume complexity and computation can give rise to experience even though we have no proof of this. We have to assume experience/consciousness is only certain type of information process or a byproduct of it.

I agree that we can't assume these things - it seems entirely likely that there are some substrates capable of complexity and computation that could never, even in principle, be capable of conscious experience.

But in order for the HPC to be a legitimate problem it must be capable of being stated rigorously.

So far it has been stated as a series of imprecise questions.

 

[skiba]

does a thermostat experience something? How do we know? What leads you to your conclusion, one way or the other?

Is a rock conscious because it obeys gravity?

 

[leon_heller]

Is a rock conscious because it obeys gravity?

A thermostat reacts to a stimulus and has a choice between two actions, a rock doesn't have a choice.

Leon

 

[Jimbo07]

I agree that we can't assume these things - it seems entirely likely that there are some substrates capable of complexity and computation that could never, even in principle, be capable of conscious experience.

Actually, we can. The cool thing about science is that we can test our assumptions, and determine whether they were good assumptions in the first place. It may, for example, be only X amount of AI research until conscious machines (or sufficiently similar to be externally indistinguishable) exist. In which case, we would be validated in the assumption that a sufficient computing model is suitable to prove the physical basis of consciousness.

The question (and this is a "hard", as in physical, question): at what point in a species's attempts to create conscious machines does a failure to replicate the full appearance of consciouness constitute failure? That's a negative like SETI. When should one give up, or re-evaluate the model?

In my mind, we're not at a point worthy of giving up, nor are our assumptions invalidated. AI researchers are probably not at that point. It should also be noted that, like SETI, there have been technological spinoffs with respect to "weak" AI...

 

[skiba]

A thermostat reacts to a stimulus and has a choice between two actions, a rock doesn't have a choice.

Leon

A thermostat reacts according to the physical laws, same as the rock...same as any physical system, be it a bunch of neurons or transistors.

In the case of human brain, the question is how do you go from
neurons reacting to experience.

 

[leon_heller]

A thermostat reacts according to the physical laws, same as the rock...same as any physical system, be it a bunch of neurons or transistors.

In the case of human brain, the question is how do you go from
neurons reacting to experience.

If the thermostat was in a sealed box, and you didn't know what was inside it, how would you know that it didn't have consciousness?

That is the difference between a rock and a thermostat.

Leon

 

[Dancing David]

Three pages in and the biggest mystery is "what is the hard problem of consciousness?".

Is someone able to state the problem clearly and concisely?

Hear here! Hip hip hooray! Huuza!

 

[Dancing David]

The same goes for me. To say that HPC is not a legimate problem we have to make assumption. We have to assume complexity and computation can give rise to experience even though we have no proof of this. We have to assume experience/consciousness is only certain type of information process or a byproduct of it.

yet the neurobiology of sensation is well undertsood, the generation of perception is getting there. The understanding of verbal cognition is getting there.

There is no assumption beyond asking:

What is associated with the label of consciousness.

I think that touches on the cognitive function, higher reasoning, abstract thought etc, but not with consciousness/experience itself.

Which is where most people get into trouble, is it the vestibular sense, is it the kinesthetic sense, is it all the peripheral sense that we call 'emotion' which also contains a huge amount of cognitive framing?

So I counter, where has that which we label as consciousness occured without a biological framework?

All these cognitive functions are part of the "easy problem". All these qualities of the brain come in to consciousness after they have gone through a proces of some sort.

though I might have not fully understood what "inference based reasoning system model" is

What aspect of 'consciousness' is absent the biological process?

 

[Dancing David]

A thermostat reacts according to the physical laws, same as the rock...same as any physical system, be it a bunch of neurons or transistors.

In the case of human brain, the question is how do you go from
neurons reacting to experience.

Well that depends by that even vaguer word that you are using of 'experience', which aspect are you interested in? Sensation, perception, cognition, memory?

 

[Dancing David]

Is a rock conscious because it obeys gravity?

Not under the general defintion of behaviors that deliniate consciousness, although it is a great philosophical point of choice.

 

[westprog]

But in order for the HPC to be a legitimate problem it must be capable of being stated rigorously.

One of the reasons that it's a hard problem is that it's impossible to state it rigorously. We can't even define what we mean by consciousness in an objective fashion. The reason it's a hard problem is that we are dealing with an entirely subjective phenomenon.

 

[Belz...]

This is where I find the argument extremely strange. If I were to list the things that I am actually 100% certain exist, I would start with my own consciousness and sensations - and then stop.

Actually, I'd stop before that. I'm not certain of even those sensations and thoughts, actually.

 

[Belz...]

In other words if you were this highly complex electro-chemical computer in the classical sense you wouldn't be experiencing anything, there wouldn't be anything more than computation.

Ah, but do we actually experience anything ?

Do you believe that this would be achieved by adding more compexity?

Maybe. Maybe it's complexity... maybe it's composition... Let's wait and see.

 

[rocketdodger]

One of the reasons that it's a hard problem is that it's impossible to state it rigorously. We can't even define what we mean by consciousness in an objective fashion. The reason it's a hard problem is that we are dealing with an entirely subjective phenomenon.

Well, to me, that suggests that there might not be a problem.