The Future of Moral Science

[Tommy Jeppesen]

...
The highlighted part does not entail that morality is subjective. You presume that all objective claims are made true by observation. This just isn't so. Analytic claims (such as, "All bachelors are unmarried") are objective, but do not depend on observations. Similarly, mathematical claims[1] are objective, but do not depend on observations.

So, the fact that ethical judgments do not depend on observation is irrelevant to whether they are subjective.

...

Yes, we agree up to a certain point.

Objective:
#1 of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers
#2 expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/objective

They are not the same. For #2, that one can fall within non-objective as derived from #1 and thus outside #1. I.e. there are 2 usages of objective and "All bachelors are unmarried" that is non-objective per #1 and objective per #2.(1)
We agree so far.

Now the question becomes if you can do objective morality as per #2. So can you do morality without personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations?

Tangent: (1) All analytic sentences are as far as I can tell subjective/non-objective as per #1 because to understand an analytical sentence depends on the actual state of a brain. So ""All bachelors are unmarried" is non-objective per #1 and objective per #2.

With regards

 

[phiwum]

Yes, we agree up to a certain point.

They are not the same. For #2, that one can fall within non-objective as derived from #1 and thus outside #1. I.e. there are 2 usages of objective and "All bachelors are unmarried" that is non-objective per #1 and objective per #2.(1)
We agree so far.

We agree, I suppose, that if we use those definitions, then the conclusions that you mention above follow. Of course, I never agreed that either of those definitions are apt for our discussion. I provided a definition of "objective" which you did not criticize, so I'm not sure why we are switching definitions now.

In general, dictionary definitions are not appropriate for philosophical discussions.

Now the question becomes if you can do objective morality as per #2. So can you do morality without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations?

Added text you omitted.

That is not a question I promised to answer. It is up to you to show that it is impossible to do so.

Or, at least it would be, if that's what we thought the appropriate definition of "objective" is. I am not at all sure that it is appropriate. On the contrary,
it adds an additional layer of complexity, discussing the notion of a fact distorted by emotion and how to distinguish it from a fact which is not distorted by emotion.

But, perhaps this is what you meant when you said "Morality is subjective". You really meant "Every moral claim involves a fact or condition which is distorted by personal feelings, prejudices or interpretations." Is this what you mean? If so, I await an argument to that effect, because your previous argument didn't prove this.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

...
That is not a question I promised to answer. It is up to you to show that it is impossible to do so.
...

I don't have to do that. Let me show you how that is done. All I have to do is show you one case of subjective morality and then ask you what objective evidence you have for that being wrong.
Do you understand what I am saying? If there is just one actual case of subjective morality, then if you claim that is wrong, then you have to give evidence for it being objectively wrong.

So here it goes:
Google a combination of brain scan, morality and so on and you will find studies of what goes on in brains, when subjects do moral/ethical thinking. You will then find that people use different parts of their brains depending on what actual answer they individually give. Studies show that at least some people use feelings. So it is true that it is possible to do subjective morality and now you are on.
Me: A is morally right.
Someone: That is wrong.
Me: I like objective evidence for that or I will treat it as a case of another version of subjective morality.

With regards

 

[phiwum]

I don't have to do that. Let me show you how that is done. All I have to do is show you one case of subjective morality and then ask you what objective evidence you have for that being wrong.
Do you understand what I am saying? If there is just one actual case of subjective morality, then if you claim that is wrong, then you have to give evidence for it being objectively wrong.

So here it goes:
Google a combination of brain scan, morality and so on and you will find studies of what goes on in brains, when subjects do moral/ethical thinking. You will then find that people use different parts of their brains depending on what actual answer they individually give. Studies show that at least some people use feelings. So it is true that it is possible to do subjective morality and now you are on.
Me: A is morally right.
Someone: That is wrong.
Me: I like objective evidence for that or I will treat it as a case of another version of subjective morality.

With regards

Fascinating! Let me try.

I claim that mathematics is subjective. All I have to show is that different kinds of mathematical reasoning involves using different parts of the brain and voila!

But, no, sadly, that's not how it works. We all agree that all of our thinking involves using our brains, and so the fact that moral reasoning is reflected in brain activity is not relevant.

As well, we all agree that some moral claims reflect purely subjective biases. No realist argues that every time a person makes a moral claim, he is doing so free from emotional distortions. Rather, the realist says: regardless of one's reason for believing a certain moral judgment, the judgment itself expresses an objective claim, the sort of thing which is either true or false.

Of course, I am not arguing in favor of realism. Rather, I am evaluating your claim that subjectivism is obviously true. And I'm still waiting for a clear argument to that effect. The fact that moral reasoning involves using the brain is irrelevant, unless you have some remarkable study that objective reasoning doesn't show up in brain scans.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Fascinating! Let me try.

I claim that mathematics is subjective. All I have to show is that different kinds of mathematical reasoning involves using different parts of the brain and voila!

But, no, sadly, that's not how it works. We all agree that all of our thinking involves using our brains, and so the fact that moral reasoning is reflected in brain activity is not relevant.

As well, we all agree that some moral claims reflect purely subjective biases. No realist argues that every time a person makes a moral claim, he is doing so free from emotional distortions. Rather, the realist says: regardless of one's reason for believing a certain moral judgment, the judgment itself expresses an objective claim, the sort of thing which is either true or false.

Of course, I am not arguing in favor of realism. Rather, I am evaluating your claim that subjectivism is obviously true. And I'm still waiting for a clear argument to that effect. The fact that moral reasoning involves using the brain is irrelevant, unless you have some remarkable study that objective reasoning doesn't show up in brain scans.

Now it gets tricky. We have to go all the way back to the 3 classic laws of thought.

1. A = A
2. ~(A = ~A)
3. A OR ~A.

These are in general considered objective as per reasoning. I agree.
Now we reach the limit of my English, because I know I will misuse or get wrong some important word.
For #1 it is in short - What is, is (at a given time and in a given sense).
#2 - What is, can't both be and not be (at a given time and in a given sense).
#3: What is, is either what it is or it is something else (at a given time and in a given sense).
Now in physical terms it is at a given time and place and in a given sense.
Notice this for something to be false/wrong according to this it has take place at the same time and place whether it is so or differently. That is where my English fails me. A contradiction is a claim of something, which is in a given sense or not in a given for exactly the same time and place.
So for A to be false or not false, the law of non-contradiction must kick in, so A must at the same time and place both be A and not A.

Okay, we have ruled out objective through observation. Further we don't accept distortion by personal feelings or prejudices. What is left is without distortion by personal interpretation.
Here it gets funny. Imagine you and I witness a killing. Remember Hume and not objective through observation, so here it goes; me as the realist and you as the anti-realist. B and C are interchangeable as either right or wrong.
Me: The killing(K) was B and not C.
You: That is a personal interpretation.
Me: How do you know that?
You: Because of how cause and effect work. It wasn't caused through observation; i.e. the "was" is not in the killing.
Me: Yes, but it was without personal interpretation.
You: No, because look at K is B and not C as said by you, TJ. The "is" is caused by you. The "is" has its cause in you. So now I say K is C and not B.
Me: That is a contradiction.
You: No. They don't take place at the same time and place. So it is not a contradiction. It seems that way to you, because you reduce away time and place.
Me: That is meaningless.
You: That is a result of your personal interpretation. "K is" is no matter what follows a personal interpretation because it is a given single person, which personally assigns "B and not C" or "C and not B".

Hi phiwum
Let me sum up. For any case of the truth value of a moral claim, the truth value is assigned by personal interpretation, feelings or prejudices. It can't be any other way, unless you want to deny cause and effect.

With regards

PS - I would love for you to explain how it can be done objectively for true and false.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

... On the other hand if you get what this actually means, you also understand why all behavior is subjective. The reason you act is because of the processes in your brain "assign values" to what outcomes you prefer, but this process is never objective.

You are confusing the cause of one agent's specific behavior, based on mental states, with the observation of a set of behaviors in a population, which can provide objective data.

Secondly, even that premise, that all individual behavior is subjective, is false. Think of stimulating part of the brain and receiving a verbal response, which is just a fancy version of using electricity to move a frog's leg.

And now I will explain to you, how you use science to falsify this claim: Tell us what right and wrong looks like.

You are using the words 'right' and 'wrong,' just as other speakers might, and ostensibly associate behaviors with those terms. Just your personal, subjective opinion. Fine! So, I gather a bunch of subjects, one of them you if you like, sampling to represent the genpop, and ask them what they think is right and wrong by describing good and bad behavior. First, eliciting open responses in a large survey, then judgment of moral statements, based on the behaviors described in the first, in a following one.

For example. Or I could crack a few books for what is certainly a long history of such descriptions.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

You are confusing the cause of one agent's specific behavior, based on mental states, with the observation of a set of behaviors in a population, which can provide objective data.
...

It is not objective data, because what it is about is subjective. Data about e.g. gravity is objective. Further even if you sampled all of humanity minus yourself, it wouldn't give you any objective data to act on. It would just tell how other humans think and feel subjectively.
Objective: of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers
That you can observe how another human thinks/feels doesn't make it objective, what that person thinks/feels. Again - independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers. It is not independent of individual thought.
BTW you can't see your own thinking.

 

[phiwum]

Okay, we have ruled out objective through observation. Further we don't accept distortion by personal feelings or prejudices. What is left is without distortion by personal interpretation.

I find this argument exceedingly difficult to understand.

First, let's point out how remarkably pointless the apparent notion of subjectivity you are using is in this context. Whether a statement is subjective or not, according to this definition, depends solely on the state of mind of the person uttering the statement, and not on the meaning of the statement.

For clarity, I presume that you are using the following definition. A claim is subjective if and only if it expresses a fact as perceived with distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations.

Take the statement, "The 10,000th digit of pi is 8." I regard this as an obviously objective claim, regardless of who utters it. Now, if Joe makes this claim because he calculated appropriately, then it is "objective" according to the above definition, but if Sally makes this claim because 8 is her favorite digit, then it is "subjective". What nonsense!

A proposition is either objective or subjective, independent of the state of mind of the person making it.

Nonetheless, you pretend that you can prove that every time any person makes a statement, it is subjective in the sense above. To be sure, this claim has nothing really to do with moral propositions at all. That is, you're not claiming that there is no fact of the matter when it comes to moral claims. Rather, you are simply comitted to the bizarre idea that human beings happen to be incapable of making moral claims without distorting their perceptions due to interpretation.

Let us see, then.

Here it gets funny. Imagine you and I witness a killing. Remember Hume and not objective through observation, so here it goes; me as the realist and you as the anti-realist. B and C are interchangeable as either right or wrong.
Me: The killing(K) was B and not C.
You: That is a personal interpretation.
Me: How do you know that?
You: Because of how cause and effect work. It wasn't caused through observation; i.e. the "was" is not in the killing.
Me: Yes, but it was without personal interpretation.
You: No, because look at K is B and not C as said by you, TJ. The "is" is caused by you. The "is" has its cause in you. So now I say K is C and not B.
Me: That is a contradiction.
You: No. They don't take place at the same time and place. So it is not a contradiction. It seems that way to you, because you reduce away time and place.
Me: That is meaningless.
You: That is a result of your personal interpretation. "K is" is no matter what follows a personal interpretation because it is a given single person, which personally assigns "B and not C" or "C and not B".

Hi phiwum
Let me sum up. For any case of the truth value of a moral claim, the truth value is assigned by personal interpretation, feelings or prejudices. It can't be any other way, unless you want to deny cause and effect.

I can't follow this argument at all. Try again.

Is there any reason that we've changed from my original definition of "objective" to this silly definition given in a general purpose dictionary? The definition you are using is bizarrely inappropriate for this discussion.

 

[phiwum]

Tommy, here seems to be the problem.

You can't think of any way that a moral claim could be justified by fully established moral principles, so you think that it has to come from mere opinion. And you might be right. But the fact that you can't figure out how one might derive moral axioms and show that every rational being (say) has a duty to act accordingly is no evidence that it isn't possible.

And so, you have to show that it is literally impossible for someone to succeed in defending any possible moral theory as objectively sound. And you haven't done that. You haven't even tried that.

So, if you want to be a subjectivist, fine. I can't show you that it's wrong. But you are so far from establishing it as the obviously correct interpretation of morality that it's ludicrous for you to berate others for not seeing its superiority.

ETA: To illustrate my point, you pretended as if the realist in the dialogue had no recourse but to assert the killing was wrong. And, indeed, if dull assertion is all that he has at his disposal, we can complain that his judgment is unfounded (and perhaps that every moral claim thus far is unfounded).

But suppose instead he said this: "The reason that this killing is wrong is because we all have a moral duty to maximize happiness (or whatever). And the reason that we all have this duty is the following," and then he proceeds to give a clear, cogent argument which indeed no rational, open-minded person could deny. I can't give that argument, unfortunately, but I also can't show there is no such argument.

And as long as we cannot show without any doubt that no such argument exists, you cannot claim that moral subjectivism has made its case.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

It is not objective data, because what it is about is subjective. Data about e.g. gravity is objective. Further even if you sampled all of humanity minus yourself, it wouldn't give you any objective data to act on. It would just tell how other humans think and feel subjectively.
Objective: of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers
That you can observe how another human thinks/feels doesn't make it objective, what that person thinks/feels. Again - independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers. It is not independent of individual thought.
BTW you can't see your own thinking.

Behavior refers to the observable actions of agents. Subject to science. Inference about how some behavior may work with relation to actual mental events was first best demonstrated in bio-linguistic research on brain lesions.

The language you are using is objective behavioral data. (Not so much meanings, but certainly syntax, plus the learned skill of writing.). This board contains, in general, a wealth of objective behavioral data.

 

[Tassman]

ETA: Note that first sentence below. "You'd best do..." is, of course, synomous with "You ought", so Tassman is obfuscating, perhaps accidentally, the fact that his own sentence includes a normative component.



My, oh my. All this time and you still don't understand the basic form of the arguments we are discussing. Practical syllogisms are not "based" on ought statements -- that is, such statements do not appear in the premises. Rather, the conclusion of practical deliberation is the realization that a particular action is necessary (or advisable, or I have some reason to pursue it, depending on the nature of the argument).

Look yet again at von Wright's argument.

I want the hut to be habitable.
The hut will not be habitable unless I heat it.
So, I ought to heat the hut.
​

There are two premises. One expresses the fact that I have a desire, something that I want to make or maintain as true. The second is a belief about a causal relation that is relevant to my desire. EVERYONE AGREES THAT SCIENCE IS A GOOD MEANS TO DISCOVERING SUCH FACTS AND I SAID SO IN THE POST YOU JUST RESPONDED TO.

The conclusion expresses the realization that the causal relation in the second premise, together with the fact I have the desire in the first, practically requires that I perform the action which is necessary for my end. This is where the "ought" statement occurs.

You will note that I did not argue “ought statements” occurred in the premises, obviously they don't, but in attaining the desired goal. Quote: “IF you want to attain your specific goal then…” But perhaps I phrased it badly.

Masterful! A stunning misreading of what I said, which again, explicitly included the fact that science is a reliable means of learning relevant causal relations.

What "philosophical axiom" do you have in mind, dear sir? Please let me know. If you'll have a gander again at the hut example, you will see that neither of the premises nor the conclusion are really philosophical in nature at all.

All ‘practical syllogisms’ are a form of practical reasoning and therefore included under the umbrella of philosophy. ALL depend upon the factual accuracy of their premises in order to arrive at a true conclusion and this can only be attained by scientific methodology. This explains why virtually every argument and conclusion Aristotle made about the natural world was wrong - his arguments were valid but his premises were wrong.

Oh, and just so we can avoid going round in this stupid circle again, I invite you once more to just initial below and acknowledge that we all agree science is a good way for learning about causes and causal information is an essential and necessary part of practical reasoning. Thanks!

[ ] I understand that everyone recognizes that science is good at causal inference, and that beliefs about causality play an essential role in practical deliberation, and so no one in this thread is claiming that science has no role in practical reasoning.
​

You have it back-to-front; science is more than merely a useful adjunct of philosophy as you would have it. It is philosophy that is merely “an essential and necessary part of practical reasoning”. But whilst philosophy has an important role in ensuring self-consistency and preventing errors of false inference, it is science alone that can acquire and test the facts which underlie every single philosophical argument - including practical syllogisms such as von Wright's one quoted above. Therefore, as stated several times previously, philosophy whilst useful is nevertheless no more than an adjunct to all important science, hence my insistence on the primacy of science much to your irritation apparently.

 

[phiwum]

You will note that I did not argue “ought statements” occurred in the premises, obviously they don't, but in attaining the desired goal. Quote: “IF you want to attain your specific goal then…” But perhaps I phrased it badly.

Okay, if you meant that the statement aims at, rather than is based on, ought statements, then I misunderstood.

But, tell you what: do me the favor and express the following sentence without using normative concepts.

IF you want to attain your specific goal you’d best do what’s most likely to achieve it.​

After all, you've said that normative language is eliminable, if I understand.

All ‘practical syllogisms’ are a form of practical reasoning and therefore included under the umbrella of philosophy. ALL depend upon the factual accuracy of their premises in order to arrive at a true conclusion and this can only be attained by scientific methodology. This explains why virtually every argument and conclusion Aristotle made about the natural world was wrong - his arguments were valid but his premises were wrong.

I ask again what "untested, possibly incorrect, philosophical axiom" you have in mind here. Is it the following?

In order to attain one's goal, one must (is rationally required to) do what is necessary.​

Second, let's talk about the relation between philosophy and practical reasoning. It is no different than the relationship between philosophy and theoretical reasoning. Philosophy, for instance, has established that modus ponens is a valid argument form[1]. Similarly, philosophy investigates certain argument forms in practical reasoning and draws certain (modest) conclusions about their aptness.

The fact that philosophy studies practical arguments doesn't make such deliberations a part of philosophy. Philosophy also studies science and mathematics, but these are obviously not parts of philosophy, just as the fact that biology studies trees don't make trees a part of the discipline of biology. Rather, in the case of philosophy, we are interested in how people draw conclusions (practical or otherwise) and also -- and to a greater extent -- which methods of reasoning are reliable for drawing conclusions.

You have it back-to-front; science is more than merely a useful adjunct of philosophy as you would have it. It is philosophy that is merely “an essential and necessary part of practical reasoning”. But whilst philosophy has an important role in ensuring self-consistency and preventing errors of false inference, it is science alone that can acquire and test the facts which underlie every single philosophical argument - including practical syllogisms such as von Wright's one quoted above. Therefore, as stated several times previously, philosophy whilst useful is nevertheless no more than an adjunct to all important science, hence my insistence on the primacy of science much to your irritation apparently.

No, philosophy isn't a part of practical reasoning at all. No more than the science of biology is a part of trees. Philosophy simply aims at distinguishing good practical reasoning from bad (among its other aims).

And, again, science has an essential role to play in practical reasoning. It helps us discover how to attain our ends. But it does not tell us our ends, nor does it include the practical arguments which yield such ends.

Honestly, I don't see why you still fail to understand such basic claims. Do you think that I've contradicted any of my prior claims? If so, I apologize, but you'll have to show me how.

ETA: I invite you to initial one of the following two mutually exclusive claims, for clarity's sake. Thanks.

[ ] I understand that everyone recognizes that science is good at causal inference, and that beliefs about causality play an essential role in practical deliberation, and so no one in this thread is claiming that science has no role in practical reasoning.

[ ] I believe one or more of the following (indicated by an initial).

[ ] Some people in this discussion doubt that science is good at causal inference. These people are the following (with links):____________________
[ ] Beliefs about causality play no essential role in practical deliberation.
[ ] Some people in this thread are claiming that science has no role in practical reasoning. These people are the following (with links):________
​

[1] That is to say, this is a theorem of logic, first studied in philosophy but at home in mathematics and computer science as well these days. Similarly, practical reasoning is studied in philosophy as well as in economics and, I'm sure, other disciplines. I don't intend to claim that philosophy owns any of these topics.

 

[Tassman]

Okay, if you meant that the statement aims at, rather than is based on, ought statements, then I misunderstood.

But, tell you what: do me the favor and express the following sentence without using normative concepts.

IF you want to attain your specific goal you’d best do what’s most likely to achieve it.​

After all, you've said that normative language is eliminable, if I understand.




I ask again what "untested, possibly incorrect, philosophical axiom" you have in mind here. Is it the following?

In order to attain one's goal, one must (is rationally required to) do what is necessary.​

Second, let's talk about the relation between philosophy and practical reasoning. It is no different than the relationship between philosophy and theoretical reasoning. Philosophy, for instance, has established that modus ponens is a valid argument form[1]. Similarly, philosophy investigates certain argument forms in practical reasoning and draws certain (modest) conclusions about their aptness.

The fact that philosophy studies practical arguments doesn't make such deliberations a part of philosophy. Philosophy also studies science and mathematics, but these are obviously not parts of philosophy, just as the fact that biology studies trees don't make trees a part of the discipline of biology. Rather, in the case of philosophy, we are interested in how people draw conclusions (practical or otherwise) and also -- and to a greater extent -- which methods of reasoning are reliable for drawing conclusions.

Frankly, I'm more interested in actual, testable conclusions rather than how people arrived at them. The latter smacks of self-indulgent navel-gazing.

No, philosophy isn't a part of practical reasoning at all. No more than the science of biology is a part of trees.

Well yes it is a part of philosophy by definition: “Practical Reason, noun (philosophy, logic) 1.the faculty by which human beings determine how to act. - Oxford Pocket Dictionary.

Philosophy simply aims at distinguishing good practical reasoning from bad (among its other aims).

Are you saying that scientific methodology doesn't aim at “distinguishing good practical reasoning from bad”? Really!!! I would maintain that science is better equipped as a discipline to do just this because it has the means to test the outcomes of its reasoning. Certainly philosophy has value insofar as it asks questions that compel us to find answers; it’s just that philosophy in and of itself, is ill-equipped to answer its own questions except at a purely academic level.

And, again, science has an essential role to play in practical reasoning. It helps us discover how to attain our ends. But it does not tell us our ends, nor does it include the practical arguments which yield such ends.

Surely you're not suggesting that philosophy is the discipline best equipped to “tell us our ends”? How does it achieve this feat given that philosophy, unlike scientific methodology, is limited to existing knowledge which may well be incorrect or inaccurate and yet has no means to acquire new facts in order to test, modify or disregard any of its conclusions if needs be?

<snipped>

 

[phiwum]

Frankly, I'm more interested in actual, testable conclusions rather than how people arrived at them. The latter smacks of self-indulgent navel-gazing.

A very interesting post, and I have much to say in reply, but I apologize when I say I can't continue until we first settle a simple point.

We have covered the same ground repeatedly and I simply don't want to cover it again, so I'd like to get a perfectly clear indication on your views on the below set of questions.

I don't intend to force you to concede any point that you think is misleading. If, in any way, you think that the positions below fail to make your position clear on this one narrow matter -- if they represent a false dichotomy, or if you are concerned that I'm trying to trick you in any way -- by all means, please let me know. I just want to settle this very obvious fact, namely that all persons involved in this discussion acknowledge the crucial role that science plays in determining causal relations and that such relations are vital in practical reasoning.

So, if you could just let me know your objection to the alternatives listed below or else make your mark on the positions that express your opinions, I would much appreciate it. Until then, I'm afraid that I won't respond to your posts -- which is a shame, as I am quite interested in responding to your most recent post, I assure you.

Thanks very much for your consideration, with no sarcasm intended.

[ ] I understand that everyone recognizes that science is good at causal inference, and that beliefs about causality play an essential role in practical deliberation, and so no one in this thread is claiming that science has no role in practical reasoning.

[ ] I believe one or more of the following (indicated by an initial).

[ ] Some people in this discussion doubt that science is good at causal inference. These people are the following (with links):____________________
[ ] Beliefs about causality play no essential role in practical deliberation.
[ ] Some people in this thread are claiming that science has no role in practical reasoning. These people are the following (with links):________
​

 

[Tassman]

A very interesting post, and I have much to say in reply, but I apologize when I say I can't continue until we first settle a simple point.

We have covered the same ground repeatedly and I simply don't want to cover it again, so I'd like to get a perfectly clear indication on your views on the below set of questions.

I don't intend to force you to concede any point that you think is misleading. If, in any way, you think that the positions below fail to make your position clear on this one narrow matter -- if they represent a false dichotomy, or if you are concerned that I'm trying to trick you in any way -- by all means, please let me know. I just want to settle this very obvious fact, namely that all persons involved in this discussion acknowledge the crucial role that science plays in determining causal relations and that such relations are vital in practical reasoning.

So, if you could just let me know your objection to the alternatives listed below or else make your mark on the positions that express your opinions, I would much appreciate it. Until then, I'm afraid that I won't respond to your posts -- which is a shame, as I am quite interested in responding to your most recent post, I assure you.

Thanks very much for your consideration, with no sarcasm intended.

[ ] I understand that everyone recognizes that science is good at causal inference, and that beliefs about causality play an essential role in practical deliberation, and so no one in this thread is claiming that science has no role in practical reasoning.
[ ] I believe one or more of the following (indicated by an initial).

[ ] Some people in this discussion doubt that science is good at causal inference. These people are the following (with links):____________________
[ ] Beliefs about causality play no essential role in practical deliberation.
[ ] Some people in this thread are claiming that science has no role in practical reasoning. These people are the following (with links):________
​

Well I think that that you are understating the value of scientific theory and its role in explaining a set of related observations based upon tested hypotheses and verified multiple times. This is the process which, to a greater or lesser degree, humanity has employed to formulate it's rules of behaviour from its very earliest days.

Thus with no sarcasm intended nor, heaven forbid, even patronizing condescension I've rephrased the hilited and trust you agree with it:

I understand everyone recognizes that philosophy is good at promoting self-consistency, can guard against false inference and is an essential component of scientific methodology. I also understand that philosophy can do no more than reformulate existing knowledge because it is not equipped to uncover new factual knowledge about the natural world. Therefore philosophy can only arrive at provisional truths which, unlike the provisional truths of science, it is unable to test and modify.

Thus, whilst philosophy is useful in articulating the principles of being, knowledge and conduct it is of necessity subject to correction by science and therefore subordinate to it as a discipline. In short, philosophy is an adjunct to science and not, as sometimes claimed, the queen of all sciences wherein it supposedly deals with the foundations and presuppositions of all the disciplines, when in actuality has does not have the means to do so.

 

[epepke]

Descriptive morality doesn't tell us anything except what people already think is moral. So it cannot possibly add anything to an ethical discussion. It's literally impossible. If I say to the world's greatest expert on descriptive morality "I think murder is immoral, is that the correct thing to think?" all they can say is "You think murder is immoral". We already knew that! This is just stone soup.

Descriptive morality could conceivably tell us how morality works. It couldn't from a single instance ("I think that fellating Jusin Bieber is immoral"), but when looking at patterns, perhaps some correlations might emerge. George Lakoff has done some interesting work about the moral systems of conservatives and liberals. It has some scientific value, as it can be used to predict reactions to new issues. Also (which I only recently found out by looking at some of his earlier stuff), it can be used to predict effects of raising children, especially combines with other science about how various child-raising strategies affect people.

You could say that this would not be an ethical discussion. However, it can tell use something other than what people already think is moral. And it has a place in something that the term "moral science" could mean.

Of course, there isn't much evidence from this thread that anybody but me cares. Still, there is evidence that a lot of people seem to think that the kinds of things I'm interested in should be ruled out of consideration. There is also the converse assumption that, by stating such things, I am trying to wipe the other things that are being said out of existence.

That is interesting to me, and I wonder if it could inform an understanding of morality, perhaps indirectly, as the dynamics of social status.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

Just came across a great read on this topic. From the text:

All this brings us to a theory of how the moral sense can be universal and variable at the same time. The five moral spheres are universal, a legacy of evolution. But how they are ranked in importance, and which is brought in to moralize which area of social life — sex, government, commerce, religion, diet and so on — depends on the culture. Many of the flabbergasting practices in faraway places become more intelligible when you recognize that the same moralizing impulse that Western elites channel toward violations of harm and fairness (our moral obsessions) is channeled elsewhere to violations in the other spheres. Think of the Japanese fear of nonconformity (community), the holy ablutions and dietary restrictions of Hindus and Orthodox Jews (purity), the outrage at insulting the Prophet among Muslims (authority). In the West, we believe that in business and government, fairness should trump community and try to root out nepotism and cronyism. In other parts of the world this is incomprehensible — what heartless creep would favor a perfect stranger over his own brother?

Innate foundation, shaped by culture. Works for me.

 

[phiwum]

Well I think that that you are understating the value of scientific theory and its role in explaining a set of related observations based upon tested hypotheses and verified multiple times. This is the process which, to a greater or lesser degree, humanity has employed to formulate it's rules of behaviour from its very earliest days.

Thus with no sarcasm intended nor, heaven forbid, even patronizing condescension I've rephrased the hilited and trust you agree with it:

I understand everyone recognizes that philosophy is good at promoting self-consistency, can guard against false inference and is an essential component of scientific methodology. I also understand that philosophy can do no more than reformulate existing knowledge because it is not equipped to uncover new factual knowledge about the natural world. Therefore philosophy can only arrive at provisional truths which, unlike the provisional truths of science, it is unable to test and modify.

Thus, whilst philosophy is useful in articulating the principles of being, knowledge and conduct it is of necessity subject to correction by science and therefore subordinate to it as a discipline. In short, philosophy is an adjunct to science and not, as sometimes claimed, the queen of all sciences wherein it supposedly deals with the foundations and presuppositions of all the disciplines, when in actuality has does not have the means to do so.

I don't think I understand your objection. And I cannot believe that you think the two paragraphs above are anything like a rephrasing of what I wrote.

Perhaps you don't understand the point of my insistence that we settle this issue. It is simply this: over and over again, you point out that we need science in order to know what actions are likely to be useful in attaining our goals, and then you make some silly remark that philosophy not being able to do the same, as if this was a point of contention.

But we all know that science is very good at discovering causal relations and that these are important for practical reasoning. And I get exhausted at seeing you pretend over and over that this is a controversy.

Now, maybe you think that science can do even more than the below statement says. That's fine. The statement does not say this is the only role for science. It says that everyone recognizes at least this role.

At this point, I suppose you've said enough to conclude that you agreed with the highlighted statement, just so long as we recognize it as placing no limits on the role of science in practical reasoning. Therefore, you will not repeat the same tired facts that philosophy doesn't discover causal relations, science does, and this is part of the data necessary for making reliable practical inferences.

So, let's move on.

 

[phiwum]

Frankly, I'm more interested in actual, testable conclusions rather than how people arrived at them. The latter smacks of self-indulgent navel-gazing.

I don't believe that practical reasoning generates what are normally understood as testable conclusions. When we deliberate, we decide what to do. Once we've carried through on our decision, we can look back and see whether it turned out as we expected, whether the outcome was largely positive, whether it seems likely that an alternative would have been better, but none of this is testing our practical conclusion in the scientific sense.

Well yes it is a part of philosophy by definition: “Practical Reason, noun (philosophy, logic) 1.the faculty by which human beings determine how to act. - Oxford Pocket Dictionary.

I think you'll see in the following exchange that you've confused yourself.

It is philosophy that is merely “an essential and necessary part of practical reasoning”.

No, philosophy isn't a part of practical reasoning at all.

Well yes [practical reasoning] is a part of philosophy by definition.

We were discussing whether philosophy is part of practical reasoning, and you just switched to the claim that practical reasoning is part of philosophy.

Are you saying that scientific methodology doesn't aim at “distinguishing good practical reasoning from bad”? Really!!!

Yes, that's right, by and large. Science is a method for generating theoretical results, that is, data and theory about the world around us. I don't see much in the way of evaluating practical arguments in a scientific setting. What do you have in mind?

I would maintain that science is better equipped as a discipline to do just this because it has the means to test the outcomes of its reasoning. Certainly philosophy has value insofar as it asks questions that compel us to find answers; it’s just that philosophy in and of itself, is ill-equipped to answer its own questions except at a purely academic level.

Tell you what. Show me a scientific study about the validity of various practical deliberations, or how to best arrive at a conclusion about what ought to be done, and I'll have a better idea what you have in mind. Or tell me which discipline you think applies the scientific method in order to evaluate practical syllogisms or something similar and point me to some reference discussing these experiments.

Because, I have to say, I've no idea what you are talking about.

Surely you're not suggesting that philosophy is the discipline best equipped to “tell us our ends”? How does it achieve this feat given that philosophy, unlike scientific methodology, is limited to existing knowledge which may well be incorrect or inaccurate and yet has no means to acquire new facts in order to test, modify or disregard any of its conclusions if needs be?

<snipped>

No, I'm not saying philosophy tells us our ends. This peculiar fascination with a bizarre battle between philosophy and science is all your own.

I'm saying that the ends which play a role in practical deliberations are known to us. That prior to practical deliberation, we have some goal to be achieved. This goal isn't given by science or philosophy or any other academic discipline. It's just a fact that there are certain ends we've chosen to pursue, and we know this fact.

Prior to typing your post, you realized that you wanted to respond to my argument. Did you determine this fact using the scientific method? Did you have a brain scan so that a trained researcher could tell you what you want to do? If so, you lead a fascinating life. For myself, I tend to know my consciously pursued ends.

 

[angrysoba]

Just came across a great read on this topic. From the text:



Innate foundation, shaped by culture. Works for me.

Yeah, I've read that before. It's certainly interesting but again this is an exploration of descriptive morality.

From what I understand, people such as Haidt, Hauser and others (maybe including de Waal) have some interesting research on how people make moral decisions, often with some evolutionary explanation. This is all very interesting, but it falls short of the stronger claims that science can determine morality.

What I find a bit curious about Sam Harris's book is that he seems well aware of some of the pitfalls of these explanations. For example he spells out that his science of morality is explicitly not that of an evolutionary account. (some of his followers seem to have skipped these suras or assume they are not to be taken literally).