The Brereton Report

I feel sick.
I will never wear my service medals again as I am in the process of parcelling them up and sending them back to the Australian department of Veterans affairs.

I have no words. The stories I have heard so far are appalling and apparently this is just the tip of the iceberg.
 
No, it's not. But whenever people who are in a position of power with insufficient oversight are caught abusing that power, people say "oh but it was just a few bad apples" in an attempt to excuse those in authority who ought to have known about and prevented the abuse. It happened for Abu Ghraib and it happened for some of the BLM circumstances. I am hoping it doesn't happen here too.

It also requires the complicit approval of the entire institution or organisation for these types of behaviours to become embedded. As humans we tend to give loyalty to our organisation/institution, many of these institutions indeed encourage a “loyalty at all cost” attitude, which creates a “us” and “them” attitude and means we will defend “us” even if only by turning a “blind eye” to what is happening. Protecting the organisation as much as individuals.

We need to create organisations and institutions that understand this tendency and hardwire in safety mechanisms, procedures etc. that stops the “one bad apple” corrupting the entire barrel.
 
It also requires the complicit approval of the entire institution or organisation for these types of behaviours to become embedded. As humans we tend to give loyalty to our organisation/institution, many of these institutions indeed encourage a “loyalty at all cost” attitude, which creates a “us” and “them” attitude and means we will defend “us” even if only by turning a “blind eye” to what is happening. Protecting the organisation as much as individuals.


I don't think that "as humans we tend to give loyalty to our organisation/institution," but it is very easy for the institutions to encourage that attitude. Very few institutions encourage rebelliousness. Armies certainly don't. I agree with Matthew Ellard's father on this: "if you train elite soldiers to be killing machines that's what they become."

We need to create organisations and institutions that understand this tendency and hardwire in safety mechanisms, procedures etc. that stops the “one bad apple” corrupting the entire barrel.


Safety mechanisms against the idea that the enemy needs to be killed?! Or is your point that 'the enemy only needs to be killed when we say so'? I.e. that soldiers should obey and follow orders.
But that already seems to be the ground rule of the army, doesn't it?
 
No, this will not happen. Not this time. The behaviour of the SAS is beyond belief and can’t be swept under the carpet.
If may not be swept under the carpet but it will take years before anybody is prosecuted. The federal police will have to re-interview all of the witnesses (since most of the Brereton report is confidential) and the the DPP will have to decide if a prosecution is likely to result in a conviction and then the minister of defence will have to make the final decision.
 
I don't think that "as humans we tend to give loyalty to our organisation/institution," but it is very easy for the institutions to encourage that attitude. Very few institutions encourage rebelliousness. Armies certainly don't. I agree with Matthew Ellard's father on this: "if you train elite soldiers to be killing machines that's what they become."




Safety mechanisms against the idea that the enemy needs to be killed?! Or is your point that 'the enemy only needs to be killed when we say so'? I.e. that soldiers should obey and follow orders.
But that already seems to be the ground rule of the army, doesn't it?

If the training of the army is such that what they produce are killing machines, then that is a fault of the institute.
But the fact that the soldiers in question hid their crimes by placing weapons on the corpses, shows that they knew that what they did was wrong.
Throw the book at them as hard as is possible.

And also look into the organisation, which made it possible for them to commit these crimes. Did they hide it so much that nobody at the time knew? In that case it is indeed only a 'bad apple' case. Were there people who knew or suspected at the time, but was no action taken? In that case there is also a serious issue within the unit and does this need a reorganisation as well.

During my little stint in the Army in the 90's, we got a lot of very serious lectures about what was expected from us as soldiers, what we could do and when we had to disobey orders.
And for me this was even while not being send abroad. Those soldiers got some extra instructions in this department.

Rules of Engagments is always paramount. These tell when you can use violence and how much you can use of it. Or even if you can use violence at all!
 
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It also requires the complicit approval of the entire institution or organisation for these types of behaviours to become embedded. As humans we tend to give loyalty to our organisation/institution, many of these institutions indeed encourage a “loyalty at all cost” attitude, which creates a “us” and “them” attitude and means we will defend “us” even if only by turning a “blind eye” to what is happening. Protecting the organisation as much as individuals.

We need to create organisations and institutions that understand this tendency and hardwire in safety mechanisms, procedures etc. that stops the “one bad apple” corrupting the entire barrel.

I agree with this.
 
There are many similarities with what became known as the Somalia_affairWP in Canada.

The Somalia affair was a 1993 military scandal. It peaked with the beating to death of a Somali teenager at the hands of two Canadian soldiers participating in humanitarian efforts in Somalia. The act was documented by photos, and brought to light internal problems in the Canadian Airborne Regiment

Many, many of the issues and causes were similar.

One of the outcomes was the disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment , government inquiries, courts trials, one or two convictions and substantial changes in procedure and training. The story is long and complicated but the Wikipedia article does a good job of wading through the whole sorry mess. For those truly interested it is worth a read and to eventually compare to the resolution in Australia.
 
It might well be "a few bad apples", but that in no way excuses it or explain why it was allowed and/or ignored by the seniors.

I figure there's two major components to this:

One is, results. If the teams are getting results, management is going to be reluctant to inquire too closely into how, and into what other "extracurricular" activities the team might be involved in. If the team needs to do a bit of hazing in order to maintain unit cohesion and combat effectiveness, it's probably for the best if we don't ask for details. As long as the results keep coming in.

The other is, death by inches. Once management has adopted a "don't ask, don't tell" policy in order to keep getting results, it becomes progressively harder for them to find out about excesses and nip real problems in the bud. Pretty soon you've got a charismatic unit commander with a cult of personality and an amazing record of bringing in results. Now you can't really afford to rein him in, because (a) unit morale will go to pieces and results will stop coming in, and (b) who knows what excesses will come to light and be laid on your desk, once you start asking those kinds of questions.
 
I figure there's two major components to this:

One is, results. If the teams are getting results, management is going to be reluctant to inquire too closely into how, and into what other "extracurricular" activities the team might be involved in. If the team needs to do a bit of hazing in order to maintain unit cohesion and combat effectiveness, it's probably for the best if we don't ask for details. As long as the results keep coming in.

The other is, death by inches. Once management has adopted a "don't ask, don't tell" policy in order to keep getting results, it becomes progressively harder for them to find out about excesses and nip real problems in the bud. Pretty soon you've got a charismatic unit commander with a cult of personality and an amazing record of bringing in results. Now you can't really afford to rein him in, because (a) unit morale will go to pieces and results will stop coming in, and (b) who knows what excesses will come to light and be laid on your desk, once you start asking those kinds of questions.

And that's how things like the crash of the B52 bomber Czar-52 happens, where for too long the excesses of the pilot 'Bud' Holland were tolerated, insteead of acted upon.
Or the Far right issues there were in the German Special Forces, earlier this year. Issues serious enough that it was thought better to just disband the unit.
Or for more present examples, the issue a lot of the US police departments have.

Kudoos for the Germans, by the way, to have the courage to take the final step in just disbanding the entire unit. No better way to signal to the rest of the forces, that things like this simply will not be tolerated. Bit late, that's true, but decisive nonetheless.
 
I don't think that "as humans we tend to give loyalty to our organisation/institution," but it is very easy for the institutions to encourage that attitude.

I strongly disagree, it crops up wherever humans create institutions throughout history, that’s enough evidence for me.

Very few institutions encourage rebelliousness.

Which is of course one of my points.

...snip... I agree with Matthew Ellard's father on this: "if you train elite soldiers to be killing machines that's what they become."

Obviously untrue, they are only killers in certain circumstances.

Safety mechanisms against the idea that the enemy needs to be killed?
Or is your point that 'the enemy only needs to be killed when we say so'? I.e. that soldiers should obey and follow orders.
But that already seems to be the ground rule of the army, doesn't it?

My post was obviously about organisations and institutions in general not specifically an army. How each one can be structured to help minimise the effect of “bad apples” will vary.

In specific to this instance “ that soldiers should obey and follow orders.
But that already seems to be the ground rule of the army, doesn't it?”

Didn’t seem to be the case with these criminals. Or are you saying their rules of engagement allowed for this type of action?
 
What nonsense. 23 events involving 19 individuals (ie SAS soldiers) caused 39 deaths. Have a look at the redacted report posted earlier.

My mistake - I was confusing the perpetrators with the victim numbers.

It seems that you and psion are saying the fix is in. You are wrong. The consequences on Australian military leadership and training will be epochal.

I hope you're right, but I do indeed expect a brownwash. It's gone too far for a whitewash, but it's going to come down to the fundamental question of "Does Australia want to have armed forces or not?"

I'm betting the answer to that is a resounding yes, and part of sending grunts to fight wars is an admission that they will rape and murder. It's part of our evolution to act that way, and we have for all of human history and beyond. There are no woke warriors, so it becomes a choice of accepting these things will happen or deciding wars are a stupid and anachronistic response and put down the guns.

I don't think you'll go as far as America decorating the perpetrators, and I expect it will end up like UK - PTSD, sending boys to do the dirty work, increase the number of psychologists in the army and they do 3-5 years for manslaughter.

There are many similarities with what became known as the Somalia_affairWP in Canada.

The full report contains a mass of coalition examples, starting with NZ. Fascinating reading if you have a strong stomach.
 
I'll take Buffy's thoughts on the subject:



She first explains how she came to write the song.
 
If the training of the army is such that what they produce are killing machines, then that is a fault of the institute.
But the fact that the soldiers in question hid their crimes by placing weapons on the corpses, shows that they knew that what they did was wrong.
Throw the book at them as hard as is possible.

If you train elite soldiers to become "killing machines" that does not prevent them from undertaking activities to hide their illegal kills. It's a bit like serial killers being either organised or disorganised. The organised ones still hide their crimes so they can remain killers.

In military psychology, soldiers are drilled with "over-learning" so they undertake those specific activities without hesitation. That does not prevent them thinking slowly about other events which they haven't been trained about. I imagine that's why the soldier who lovingly kisses his daughter for an hour, can kill an Afghani controlled prisoner without hesitation.

However, you are right. This is an institutional and cultural fault of the elite ADF.

It could also be argued senior field commanders are asking juniors to kill controlled prisoners so they are all criminals together and won't dob each other in.
 
My instinct upon hearing about this is that the SAS (Special Air Services Regiment, for those who don't know) should be disbanded, if not the whole Army.
The 2nd Squadron SAS has already been struck from the order of battle, and a new squadron will be created with a new name.
 
The military lawyer who leaked the classified documents to the media that led to this report is currently undergoing prosecution. People have now started calling for those charges to be dropped. I agree. Whistleblowing this situation is grounds for praise, not criminal charges.
 
My position is that a real hero would do the time.
Note that it's other people intervening on behalf of the whistleblower asking for the charges to be blocked. Does he become less of a hero if other people make a convincing argument that he shouldn't be charged or tried?

At the moment I don't know a lot of things in order to judge him. Such as whether the "official channels" for this whistle blowing are/were compromised.
 

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