From my understanding, ironically, the UK forces have been forced to adapt to US tactics, out of necessity, because the insurgency in Iraq are far more brutal and extreme than the IRA ever where.
Actually I'm not sure of that. The US forces made crucial mistakes in the invasion and first weeks of the occupation. Without the British expertise, they quite simply totally screwed up the crucial first weeks of the occupation. Those first weeks are when the major part of the population decide if they like you or not.
By the time the US had learned how to occupy a hostile country, it was too late, and everything was falling apart.
The Lieutenant commanding the platoon featured in
Kill Generation has also written a book
One Bullet Away, and within days of arriving in Baghdad and beginning the occupation - when Iraqis were still greeting them with smiles and flags - he had already predicted the outcome perfectly, based not on what the civilians were doing, but what the Americans were doing.
An excellent example:
Prior to the invasion, the Iraqi government issued literally millions of firearms to civilians. When the Americans occupied they immediately called for these weapons to be handed in. Those friendly to the coalition did so. Those with nasty intentions refused, instantly giving them an advantage over their fellow citizens. What ensued was uncontrollable looting, murders, and so forth - against the pro-coalition Iraqis. The Americans couldn't protect them because the war strategy didn't allow for it, and the demands from Washington prevented it. It doesn't take long for a citizenry to turn against their protectors if those protectors simultaneously take away the citizenry's own ability to defend itself, and also fail to offer protection.
Lt Fick recounts how in the first weeks in Baghdad, they would move into a neighbourhood, remain there just long enough to establish a relationship with the locals, and then they'd be moved some place new. And this continued over and over. Every few days they moved.
Command wouldn't let them go out on patrols when there was chaos in the streets. Quite aside from the fact that they are required under the Geneva Conventions and Hague Conventions to provide security to the civilian population, it was a totally flawed move because it doomed them to failure. When they did go out, it'd be for a specific objective or mission, which might include popping into several villages to say hello before moving on. But there was no flexability.
At one village, the soldiers were told by the civilians that there was unexploded ordnance in someone's backyard. Against orders, Fick stayed at the village and disposed of it. The entire village gathered to watch, and instantly they saw Fick's platoon as a bunch of heroes. He was told off for doing it, and within days they had been moved again, so the villagers had a new American unit to deal with.
Having read some detailed accounts now, having seen the media reports, having a bit of a grasp of warfare, I am now convinced, had the US government given the military commanders the number of troops they requested, and had the military focused in those first crucial weeks on establishing law and order and embedding military units into neighbourhoods, Iraq would be a peaceful stable nation today.
That, of course, is what the British did in Basra. And it worked well. But it cannot be maintained unless it's happening all over the country. The failure of US forces in Baghdad and elsewhere undermined the success of the British troops in Basra. And the rest, as they say, is history.
-Gumboot