Here are a few highlights from the oral argument.
Walter Dellinger, representing the District of Columbia, began with one of his principal arguments, that the debate about the Second Amendment centered
exclusively around military usage, and not self-defense, hunting or other usage of arms:
MR. DELLINGER: In the debates over the Second Amendment, every person who used the phrase "bear arms" used it to refer to the use of arms in connection with militia service and when Madison introduced the amendment in the first Congress, he exactly equated the phrase "bearing arms" with, quote, "rendering military service."
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And even if the language of keeping and bearing arms were ambiguous, the amendment's first clause confirms that the right is militia-related.
Chief Justice Roberts asked the first question of the day:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: If you're right, Mr. Dellinger, it's certainly an odd way in the Second Amendment to phrase the operative provision. If it is limited to State militias, why would they say "the right of the people"? In other words, why wouldn't they say "state militias have the right to keep arms"?
Dellinger responded that the Framers viewed the people as the militia. A better response might have been to say, "Yes, indeed it is odd! And this odd phrasing comes about as a result of trying to find a wording upon which most could agree. As set forth in our brief and the briefs of others, there were several proposals about wording, and each wording proposal had its advocates. But whatever compromises in wording were reached,
all of the participants in the congressional debates agreed that that they were talking about arms in a military context." Eventually, Dellinger did make part of this point, saying "what you don't see in the debates over the Second Amendment are references to, in those debates, the use of weapons for personal purposes."
Even if the Second Amendment's wording came about as the result of compromise, the Chief Justice is making a very important point: the best indicator of the intent and meaning of a constitutional provision is what the provision itself says, not necessarily what individual drafters may have wished. The issue then came to the fore: what function did the Amendment's reference to "militia" have? Did it have any real effect at all? The Court would return to this question several times during the oral argument.
Justice Scalia left no doubt as to where he stood.
JUSTICE SCALIA: But why isn't it perfectly plausible, indeed reasonable, to assume that since the framers knew that the way militias were destroyed by tyrants in the past was not by passing a law against militias, but by taking away the people's weapons -- that was the way militias were destroyed. The two clauses go together beautifully: Since we need a militia, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
Lest there be any doubt as to whether he was still on the fence, Justice Scalia would later go on to explicitly help the advocate who was arguing that the restrictions were unconstitutional, by apparently prompting him how to answer another justice's questions:
JUSTCE BREYER: But does that make it unreasonable for a city with a very high crime rate, assuming that the objective is what the military people say, to keep us ready for the draft, if necessary, is it unreasonable for a city with that high crime rate to say no handguns here?
JUSTICE SCALIA: You want to say yes.
JUSTICE BREYER: Now, why?
JUSTICE SCALIA: That's your answer.
JUSTICE BREYER: Well, you want to say yes, that's correct, but I want to hear what the reasoning is because there is a big crime problem. I'm simply getting you to focus on that.
MR. GURA: The answer is yes, as Justice Scalia noted….
Even though there is almost no indication that the congressional debate even considered issues like hunting, shooting Indians and the like, Justice Scalia thought he saw a pretty good authority for support of his view:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Blackstone thought it was important. Blackstone thought it was important. He thought the right of self-defense was inherent, and the framers were devoted to Blackstone.
William Blackstone is one of the titans in the history of law, and his commentaries are an impressive feat of work. In the Ten Commandments cases, mention was made that the image of Moses appears in the Supreme Court's courtroom. Another whose image is enshrined there is Blackstone. But Mr. Dellinger was ready for this:
MR. DELLINGER: When Blackstone speaks of the personal guarantee, he describes it as one of the use of weapons, a common law right. And if we're constitutionalizing the Blackstonian common law right, he speaks of a right that is subject to due restrictions and applies to, quote "such weapons, such as are allowed by law." So Blackstone builds in the kind of reasonableness of the regulation that the District of Columbia has.
Going into the argument, the conventional wisdom was that Justice Kennedy would be the deciding vote in the case. Early in the argument, Justice Kennedy tipped his hand:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: And in my view [the Second Amendment] supplemented [Congressional power of militias] by saying there's a general right to bear arms quite without reference to the militia either way.
Mr. Dellinger responded that if that were the case, then it would seem that the result would be absurd:
MR. DELLINGER: But that right, this right of personal liberty, the Blackstonian right, is an unregulated right to whatever arm, wherever kept, however you want to store it, and for the purposes an individual decides, that is a libertarian ideal. It's not the text of the Second Amendment, which is expressly about the security of the State; it's about well-regulated militias, not unregulated individual license….
This is similar to turning Chief Justice Roberts's point around: if the Framers' goal was to have unregulated individual license they certainly had an odd way of expressing it.
The focus of the argument jumped about, from historical context to potential consequences of a constitutional ruling, to whether the firearms restrictions at issue in this case were reasonable.
One of Mr. Dellinger's allies was (get ready for a surprise) the Bush Administration. (Vice President Cheney lent his name to a Friend of the Court brief that argued against the District of Columbia.) Solicitor General Paul Clement rose to argue in favor of the District of Columbia. Sort of. Upon hearing the arguments, Mr. Dellinger might have been saying to himself that with friends like these, he wouldn't need enemies. General Clement actually came out of the chute apparently undermining arguments made by his "ally":
GENERAL CLEMENT: The Second Amendment to the Constitution, as its text indicates, guarantees an individual right that does not depend on eligibility for or service in the militia.
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And, obviously, the term "keep" is a word that I think is something of an embarrassment for an effort to try to imbue every term in the operative text with an exclusively military connotation because that is not one that really has an exclusive military connotation. As Justice Scalia pointed out, "keep" was precisely the word that authorities used in statutes designed specifically to disarm individuals.
General Clements's position is that certain types of weapons are not "arms" at all, and get no constitutional protection:
GENERAL CLEMENT: (W)e would take the position that the kind of plastic guns or guns that are specifically designed to evade metal detectors that are prohibited by Federal law are not "arms" within the meaning of the Second Amendment and are not protected at all.
However, certain other weapons
would be "arms":
GENERAL CLEMENT: I think to make the same argument about machine guns would be a much more difficult argument, to say the least, given that they are the standard-issue weapon for today's armed forces and the State-organized militia.
Justice Kennedy, as he had done with Mr. Dellinger, expressed the view that the Framers
must have had "foremost" in their minds a concern about individual self-protection, whether it be from wild animals, savage Indians, roaming brigands (or other dangers that they simply forgot to mention during the debate), and so the concern behind the amendment was that guns not be taken away from people who needed them for their own defense. General Clement responded:
GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, Justice Kennedy, we would analyze it this way, which is we would say that probably the thing that was foremost in the framers' minds was a concern that the militia not be disarmed such that it would be maintained as a viable option to the standing army.
General Clement then returned to undercutting the arguments of the District of Columbia. With friends like these….
Justice Stevens took the opportunity to expand upon a point he brought up earlier. States addressed arms rights at about the same time, and most states determined that rights in arms were for common defense, not for individual protection. In addition, during the congressional debates, something odd happened. Someone actually proposed making the Second Amendment an explicitly individual right.
JUSTICE STEVENS: There was also a proposal to make it clear there was an individual right, which was also rejected.
GENERAL CLEMENT: I'm sorry, Justice Stevens. Which aspect of that did you have in mind?
JUSTICE STEVENS: The Pennsylvania proposal [which included the words, "for the defence of themselves and the state"].
GENERAL CLEMENT: Oh, but I don't think that ever made it to the floor of the House or the Senate that I'm aware of.
Justice Souter explored the issue of hunting:
JUSTICE SOUTER: Somebody going out to -- in the eighteenth century, someone going out to hunt a deer would have thought of themselves as bearing arms? I mean, is that the way they talk?
GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, I will grant you this, that "bear arms" in its unmodified form is most naturally understood to have a military context. But I think the burden of the argument on the other side is to make it have an exclusively military context.
Curious: General Clement refers to his ally as "the other side." With friends like these….
His time expired, General Clement was given a little extra time (as Mr. Dellinger was). Although there was some discussion about whether being armed was a pre-existing right, Justice Alito asked about consequences of a particular constitutional holding, basically asking the Solicitor General why he was ostensibly on the same side as the District of Columbia:
JUSTICE ALITO: If the amendment is intended at least, in part to protect the right to self-defense in the home, how could the District code provision survive under any standard of review …?
There was more to Justice Alito's question, but Justice Scalia interrupted, and General Clement basically gave no response. But Justice Ginsburg wanted an answer, and she also wanted to know about consequences:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: There is a lot of talk about standards and stop words like strict scrutiny. Does it make a practical difference whether we take your standard or the strict scrutiny that was in the D.C. Circuit's opinion? And specifically there is a whole panoply of Federal laws restricting gun possession. Would any of them be jeopardized under your standard? And the same question with the District scrutiny, does it make any difference?
GENERAL CLEMENT: In our view it makes a world of difference, Justice Ginsburg, because we certainly take the position, as we have since consistently since 2001, that the Federal firearm statutes can be defended as constitutional, and that would be consistent with this kind of intermediate scrutiny standard that we propose. If you apply strict scrutiny, I think that the result would be quite different, unfortunately.
So apparently the Bush administration is trying to have the best of both worlds: it doesn't want federal firearms laws suddenly invalidated, but it wants the Second Amendment to protect an individual right. The Bush administration's proposed solution is to apply a different level of scrutiny to firearms rights than would ordinarily be applied to other individual constitutional rights. The Chief Justice, surprisingly, was hot for the idea:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, these various phrases under the different standards that are proposed, "compelling interest," "significant interest," "narrowly tailored," none of them appear in the Constitution; and I wonder why in this case we have to articulate an all-encompassing standard….
I'm not sure why we have to articulate some very intricate standard. I mean, these standards that apply in the First Amendment just kind of developed over the years as sort of baggage that the First Amendment picked up.
It isn't often that jurisprudence and precedent are referred to as "baggage." Even more interesting is hearing a supposedly conservative justice musing about being activist, setting an entirely new framework for analysis, just for the Second Amendment.
Alan Gura argued the case for Heller. He showed signs of being a bit nervous.
JUSTICE SCALIA: Talk a little slower; I'm not following you.
Mr. Gura basically began with the argument that the restriction in this particular case was not reasonable. Since reasonableness was the topic, Justice Breyer brought up a sore point:
JUSTICE BREYER: Now, focus on the handgun ban. As I read these 80 briefs -- and they were very good, I mean really good and informative on both sides -- and I'm trying to boil down the statistics where there is disagreement, and roughly what I get -- and don't quarrel with this too much; it's very rough -- that 80,000 to 100,000 people every year in the United States are either killed or wounded in gun-related homicides or crimes or accidents or suicides, but suicide is more questionable. That's why I say 80,000 to 100,000.
In the District, I guess the number is somewhere around 200 to 300 dead; and maybe, if it's similar, 1,500 to 2,000 people wounded. All right.
Now, in light of that, why isn't a ban on handguns, while allowing the use of rifles and muskets, a reasonable or a proportionate response on behalf of the District of Columbia?
Mr. Gura responded:
MR. GURA: Because, Your Honor, for the same reason it was offered by numerous military officers at the highest levels of the U.S. military in all branches of service writing in two briefs, they agree with us that the handgun ban serves to weaken America's military preparedness. Because when people have handguns --handguns are military arms, they are not just civilian arms -- they are better prepared and able to use them. And, certainly, when they join the military forces, they are issued handguns.
So this number of dead and wounded civilians is, I suppose, a small price to pay. The military officers' brief, by the way, includes some, shall we say, questionable assertions. Mr. Gura would have been better off not mentioning it.
But Mr. Gura had other troubles. His arguments were sometimes incoherent, and, as previously mentioned, he had to take prompting from Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia even criticized of Mr. Gura's arguments as "unrealistic," and expanded the argument for him:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Which shows that maybe you're being unrealistic in thinking that the second clause is not broader than the first. It's not at all uncommon for a legislative provision or a constitutional provision to go further than is necessary for the principal purpose involved.
The principal purpose here is the militia, but the -- but the second clause goes beyond the militia and says the right of the people to keep and bear arms.
Now, you may say the kind of arms is colored by the militia. But it speaks of the right of the people. So why not acknowledge that it's -- it's broader than the first clause?
Mr. Gura took the hint:
MR. GURA: Well, we do acknowledge that, Your Honor.
Later, Mr. Gura got muddled again, and Justice Kennedy came to his aid. Turning to cite Blackstone, Mr. Gura got muddled again, as Justice Breyer pointed out that Blackstone referred to a right to keep and bear arms "under law," implying that some governmental restrictions were permissible. When asked what governmental restrictions would be permissible, Mr. Gura gave an answer that seemed to take Justice Kennedy by surprise:
MR. GURA: Well, my response is that the government can ban arms that are not appropriate for civilian use. There is no question of that.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: That are not appropriate to –
MR. GURA: That are not appropriate to civilian use.
Mr. Gura gave, as his first example of a weapon not suitable for civilians, a machine gun. While this is arguably good tactics (Mr. Gura not wanting to sound like he wants everyone to own a machine gun), it undercuts somewhat arguments—in his favor!—that the Solicitor General had made. In addition, Mr. Gura's argument, if adopted, would welcome government regulation—even outright banning—of most weapons. With friends like these….
Justice Stevens returned to a previous theme, namely, that self-defense was not a consideration except in two states, where it was so stated in uncertain terms. Justice Stevens grilled Mr. Gura about the history of arms rights, and pointing out inconsistencies in Mr. Gura's position. This grilling (which apparently was fairly intense) went on for several minutes. Mr. Gura seemed to be so off-balance that he needed someone else to finish his sentences for him:
MR. GURA: I think the common law of England is a guide, and it's always a useful guide because that's where the -- where we -- where we look to, to interpret –
JUSTICE SCALIA: It's useful for such purposes as what "keep and bear arms" means and things of that sort.
MR. GURA: It certainly is, Your Honor. And it's also useful to see how –
JUSTICE SCALIA: They certainly didn't want to preserve the kind of militia that America had, which was a militia separate from the state, separate from the government, which enabled the revolt against the British.
MR. GURA: That's correct, Your Honor.
A few minutes later, Justice Ginsburg brought up another practical point:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: If [the right to keep and bear arms is] a fundamental right, what about licensing? … Assuming you're right on the first question, that you couldn't flatly ban handguns, what about a requirement that you obtain a license to carry -- to have a handgun?
MR. GURA: Justice Ginsburg, that would depend on the licensing law itself. We don't have a problem with the concept of licensing so long as … the licensing law is not enforced in an arbitrary and capricious manner, so long as there are some hopefully objective standards….
He also said testing and background checks were okay. Some gun rights advocates must have messed their pants upon hearing that. With friends like these….
Justice Stevens picked up the point:
JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask this question? Are you, in effect, reading the amendment to say that the right shall not be unreasonably infringed instead of shall not be infringed?
MR. GURA: There is that inherent aspect to every right in the Constitution.
Justice Scalia couldn't believe his ears. Once again, he had to come to Mr. Gura's rescue:
JUSTICE SCALIA: You wouldn't put it that way. You would just say it is not being infringed if reasonable limitations are placed upon it.
MR. GURA: That's another way to look at it, Your Honor.
Mr. Dellinger got a brief rebuttal.
MR. DELLINGER: Mr. Chief Justice, I want to address first why this law is reasonable and should be sustained, and why the judgment below has to be reversed, however, whatever position you take on the theories of the amendment. And in defending the eminent reasonableness and careful balance of this law, I need to start with the trigger law, about which Justice Alito asked.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, before you start with it, how many minutes does it take to remove a trigger lock and load a gun?
For the next several minutes, the hypothetical situations came fast and heavy. You hear an intruder in your house. You need to act fast. You don't want to have to turn on a light and get your reading glasses to dial in the combination on the damned trigger lock. You want to sneak out of bed and blow the bad guy's head off without any delay (and never mind the "burglar" might really be your kid.) Now, is that trigger lock restriction reasonable?
Mr. Dellinger said he could undo a trigger lock in three seconds.
Most of the rest of the argument was directed to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the restrictions. But before the argument ended, Justice Kennedy asked whether it would be permissible to limit the number of guns a gun-owner might have. Mr. Dellinger seemed to say that the number of guns wasn't really the issue, it was whether the guns were portable and concealable.
MR. DELLINGER: I know, Justice Kennedy, that you would be concerned about a national government which sets a single standard for rural and urban areas, for East and West, North and South. Here you have legislation that is adopted by a group of citizens in the District, operating under the authority of Congress, but it is local legislation.
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And when you ask about the statistics, what is critical here is not to apply the kind of categorical standard the court below did or a kind of strict scrutiny that would strike this law down. This is an area, unlike areas where government regulation is presumptively illegitimate, this text contemplates regulation of inherently dangerous weapons. And where the battle -- the great battle over methodology, to which Justice Breyer replied, in these briefs --indicates that this is the kind of right -- where you have disputes among experts, it's a kind of right where even if you recognize it, deference needs to be given to the legislative resolution rather than have courts try to decide how best to resolve the statistical and methodological debates.
Mr. Dellinger ended his argument with this plea that the Courts not substitute their judgment for that of legislative bodies… a traditionally "conservative" position.
With that, the oral argument concluded.