Which is why I specified the infliction of pain, not generalised nonspecific suffering.
Thanks, that clarifies that. I didn't realize you meant specifically physical pain.
So it *is* the corporal aspect of it, yes? That's where you draw the line? No punishment that causes physical pain?
Look at the definitions I posted. Punishment is included in the definition. It's exactly the same, ie. morally repugnant.
Thanks, I missed that. I apologize.
To be clear, your position is that inflicting physical suffering as a form of punishment is immoral, and that inflicting mental or emotional suffering as a form of punishment is moral. Do I have it correct now?
ETA: I remember now. I noted the "for punishment" clause at the time, but also noted the "excruciating" modifier. At the time, I inquired about the excruciating part.
My view is that inflicting excruciating suffering of any sort - physical, mental, or emotional - all counts torture, and all counts as immoral*. My view is that it's possible to inflict excruciating suffering on someone without laying a finger on them. My view is that it's also possible to inflict corporal punishment on someone without inflicting excruciating levels of suffering. I assume you agree that excruciating amounts of mental or emotional suffering, as punishment, would be immoral.