Ten myths on WWI - debunked

[gumboot]

Prior to WW1 when did the British use conscription?

Firstly, in Medieval England, military service was compulsory for everyone except serfs. This followed a tradition going back thousands of years in virtually all cultures making war compulsory for males.

When the Monarchy was overthrown, the New Model Army was recruited by impressment, a form of compulsory military service. This was discontinued with the Restoration, but revived briefly from 1778 to 1780.

The Royal Navy, however, was manned primarily through impressment, and continued to do so until about 1815. Naval impressment remained legal in the UK until the early 1900s.

Through the Napoleonic Wars and wars of the latter 19th Century the UK was somewhat unusual in not having a conscripted army (unlike virtually all other European powers), but this can be explained by their focus on a powerful navy.

 

[jimbob]

Here's a link to a discussion on the QI forum on this very subject. There's some interesting stuff in there.

http://old.qi.com/talk/viewtopic.ph...&start=0&sid=85ee21ed3f31a9dbe2b6438a3ef55aa8

Thanks, that is why I was so tentative about the statement.

 

[Damien Evans]

I finally learned something from a "top 10 myths" kind of post! It's been a while. #6 is something I've believed for a long time. I always thought they were just Australians and New Zealanders, hence the holiday of all holidays Down Under. When I was younger, I even pictured them foolishly riding kangaroos and emus into battle, and that's the reason they lost. They should have used ostriches! I feel embarrassed to admit this since my family lived pretty close to Gallipoli at the time.

Not, it's mostly because it was our first major campaign of the war, and (excluding the latter stages of the Boer War) our first as semi-independent dominions rather than colonies.

 

[zooterkin]

4. The upper class got off lightly. The death rate was 12% of soldiers, 17% of officers. Eton lost more than 1,000 former pupils - 20% of those who served.

The Germans apparently aimed for the officers, who were betrayed by their tailors. Captured Germans revealed that they were able to pick out (and pick off) the British officers during an advance by looking for their 'thin legs', as the officers wore better cut trousers (often riding breeches) than the men.

 

[rjh01]

The Germans apparently aimed for the officers, who were betrayed by their tailors. Captured Germans revealed that they were able to pick out (and pick off) the British officers during an advance by looking for their 'thin legs', as the officers wore better cut trousers (often riding breeches) than the men.

I read once that the Viet Kong snipers shot at anyone who looked different. So I guess that applies to just about any war. Lesson, in war make sure everyone looks the same.

 

[catsmate]

I read once that the Viet Kong snipers shot at anyone who looked different. So I guess that applies to just about any war. Lesson, in war make sure everyone looks the same.

Yep. Hence the modern trend of discrete rank insignia and even officers carrying rifles; don't stand out.

 

[angrysoba]

I read once that the Viet Kong snipers shot at anyone who looked different. So I guess that applies to just about any war. Lesson, in war make sure everyone looks the same.

That way the Commies win anyway.

 

[iamcanjim]

People often attribute the mobile warfare in WW2 as being an effect of the tank and aircraft. I would say it was also an effect of better artillery. In WW2, artillery was fearfully accurate and effective. A fixed trench, which could somewhat survive being shelled in early WWI would have been quickly demolished in WW2.

 

[McHrozni]

People often attribute the mobile warfare in WW2 as being an effect of the tank and aircraft. I would say it was also an effect of better artillery. In WW2, artillery was fearfully accurate and effective. A fixed trench, which could somewhat survive being shelled in early WWI would have been quickly demolished in WW2.

Yes, although by late WW1, this effect was already visible.

Another major issue - trucks and logistics in general allowed deep penetrations by huge armies. This was a constant problem suffered by all sides in WW1.

McHrozni

 

[Border Reiver]

Yep. Hence the modern trend of discrete rank insignia and even officers carrying rifles; don't stand out.

It's not unique to WWI, the Boers also did it to British officers in the 1898-1902 spat.

 

[Damien Evans]

Yes, although by late WW1, this effect was already visible.

Another major issue - trucks and logistics in general allowed deep penetrations by huge armies. This was a constant problem suffered by all sides in WW1.

McHrozni

There was another thing that made holding a defensive trench very hard for the Germans in 1918: Peaceful Penetration.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_Penetration

 

[catsmate]

People often attribute the mobile warfare in WW2 as being an effect of the tank and aircraft. I would say it was also an effect of better artillery. In WW2, artillery was fearfully accurate and effective. A fixed trench, which could somewhat survive being shelled in early WWI would have been quickly demolished in WW2.

Yes, although by late WW1, this effect was already visible.

Another major issue - trucks and logistics in general allowed deep penetrations by huge armies. This was a constant problem suffered by all sides in WW1.

McHrozni

Exactly. Logistics improved, better (more capacious, more mobile and reliable and more plentiful) transport allows you to move and supply that extra artillery. Deprive your enemy of that mobility (destroying trucks, trains, barges, fuel supplies, manufacturing et cetera) and you starve them of the ability to wage war. And literally.

It's not unique to WWI, the Boers also did it to British officers in the 1898-1902 spat.

Yes indeed, encouraged the adoption of camouflage and almost doomed the Lee-Enfield and the .303 round.

 

[Andy_Ross]

German mobility in the Blitkreig was also provided by using aircraft as artillery.

One of the problems with mobile warfare is getting ahead of your artillery.
Britain motorised it's artillery well before the war (See Moving-Guns-Mechanisation-Artillery-1854-1939
But even then the 6" guns were called the 'Divisional Road Block'
French artillery took an age to move and prepare.
Even motorised artillery has to be towed in to position. dug in, ranged etc.
Self Propelling Guns was an answer as the war went on but even this takes time to deploy and come in to action and has a long supply 'tail'

Tactical Bombers working in close co-operation with ground units was the German answer to the problem. It keeps up with the advance and jumps over difficult terrain, traffic jams and bad roads.

 

[Andy_Ross]

and almost doomed the Lee-Enfield and the .303 round.

I don't understand this?

 

[Border Reiver]

I don't understand this?

At the time of the Boer War, the Lee-Enfield had a ten round magazine, and a cut-off device to turn the weapon into a singleshot rifle with an emergency magazine and no capacity for fast-loading. The cut off was only to be disengaged when so ordered to keep rates of fire lower. Also the .303 round was not loaded to produce as flat a trajectory as the Boer weapons which made for lower long range capability.

The Boers were typically armed with the '93 Mauser rifle, which sported a much flatter trajectory, and a fast loading ability when stripper clips were employed, this allowed for higher rates of fire, and when combined with the Boer's standard tactics of hit and run made for a much better fit of weapons to tactics.

So, the Brits (and the Canadians and Aussies that showed up) were stuck with rifles that were less efficient than their opponents, and initially employed tactics that were not suited at all to facing an extremely mobile guerrilla force. The war lead to a number of changes to the Lee-Enfield design and the .303 cartridge, which resulted in the No.3 design that saw such wide use in WWI and II, and to British tactics. It also lead us Canadians to reject the Lee-Enfield in favour of the Ross rifle, due to Sam Hughes, his Boer War experience, and his feeling that "if he was in charge, things would be different." (But that's a whole nother thread)

The British, wi

 

[Giz]

People often attribute the mobile warfare in WW2 as being an effect of the tank and aircraft. I would say it was also an effect of better artillery. In WW2, artillery was fearfully accurate and effective. A fixed trench, which could somewhat survive being shelled in early WWI would have been quickly demolished in WW2.

Also an effect of improved command and control. Prior to ww1, general's had often had vision and "voice command" (I.e. by staff rider) over an entire battlefield. By ww2, there were efficient man portable radios. During ww1 battles the generals (especially attacking ones) would suffer terribly from fog of war, making it very difficult to commit reserves to exploit any opportunities.

 

[catsmate]

I don't understand this?

What Border Reiver said.
Basically after the Boer War the UK planned to scrap the LE/.303 combination in favour of a Mauser action firing a high velocity 7mm round. This became the Pattern 11 and then Pattern 13 rifle, and the .276 Enfield cartridge (7x60mm) with about 4kJ of energy at the muzzle. This was tested and found to have a number of problems that delayed mass production. Then WW1 started and switching wasn't an option.

The P13 became the P14, in .303, manufactured in the USA by various companies for UK use, and in 7.62x54mmR for Russian use.
Later the P14 was manufactured in .30-06 (7.62x63mm) for the US Army (as the M1917 Enfield) where it was the most common US Army rifle used in WW1, about four times as many being produced as the "standard issued" M1903 Springfield. It was gradually replaced by the Springfield but thousands were still issued during WW2.

 

[gumboot]

I think one of the classic misconceptions is that there was this sort of static approach to warfare prior to WWI, and that with WW2 mobile warfare was developed. This is really quite wrong. WWI began as a highly mobile war, and it ended as a highly mobile war too. Warfare prior to WWI had been highly mobile, for hundreds of years.

It was really only 1915 and 1916 that were very static, and that was an anomaly in the history of warfare. And the reason for it really was simply that the modernisation of armies hadn't been matched with the modernisation of their logistical capabilities, as others have referenced. As a result, military maneuver was effectively limited to the major rail lines, which in Northern France and Belgium primarily ran North-South. The entire frontline of the Western Front was basically dictated by the railways because the two armies were forced to adhere to that path as they repeatedly tried to outflank each other during the period of maneuver warfare known as the "race to the sea".

 

[gumboot]

People often attribute the mobile warfare in WW2 as being an effect of the tank and aircraft. I would say it was also an effect of better artillery. In WW2, artillery was fearfully accurate and effective. A fixed trench, which could somewhat survive being shelled in early WWI would have been quickly demolished in WW2.

Actually I think it's the other way around. Far more shelling was done in WWI, and with bigger shells, than in WW2, and many fortifications were strong enough to withstand direct hits intact.

The issue is rather that there's no point investing an enormous amount of resources in static defense if the front lines are constantly fluctuating.

Artillery in WW2 wasn't really much more accurate than in WWI, but rather what changed was that soldiers had portable radios which meant they could call in artillery directly onto targets, instead of having to pre-plan everything in advance.

Aircraft, in WW2, where much like the equivalent of artillery in WWI - their effectiveness was hindered by their inability to respond directly to what was happening on the ground, relying instead on gathering intelligence and pre-planned fixed piece attacks.

Ultimately, all through military history, more direct command and control has made an enormous difference. The Centurion who could immediately exploit a breach in the Greek Phalanx, the infantry officer who can radio in artillery on an enemy gun emplacement, and the modern infantryman who can laser designate an enemy tank for a fighter loitering overhead. These are all effectively the same improvement - giving the soldiers in the thick of it the authority and technology to immediately exploit an advantage and bring force to bear to turn a minor breach into a complete victory.

 

[gumboot]

Another major issue - trucks and logistics in general allowed deep penetrations by huge armies. This was a constant problem suffered by all sides in WW1.

There were numerous times during WWI that successful British advances had to be halted because the artillery literally ran out of shells.