Teleportation

[MageLite]

We all know the basic idea behinds teleportation on shows like Star Trek is that you break down the person to be transported into their component molecules and re-assemble them at the desired location. But I see a problem in this: As somebody mentioned in one of the R&P threads, 'you' are not the atoms that compose you, which are replaced constantly; you are the pattern that they make. And if you are composed of individual atoms, what holds this pattern? What keeps the consciousness intact? If a consciousness is broken down, is it merely replaced with a new one at the intended destination? Is the original person killed, and replaced by a clone with the same memories?
I see a similar problem with the oft-used idea of 'uploading' minds, in a future where humans can interface their brains with computers, and transferring them to new bodies. If a consciousness is broken down into data to be transferred, is it necessarily the same mind that is re-assembled?

Food for thought

 

[athon]

We all know the basic idea behinds teleportation on shows like Star Trek is that you break down the person to be transported into their component molecules and re-assemble them at the desired location. But I see a problem in this: As somebody mentioned in one of the R&P threads, 'you' are not the atoms that compose you, which are replaced constantly; you are the pattern that they make. And if you are composed of individual atoms, what holds this pattern? What keeps the consciousness intact? If a consciousness is broken down, is it merely replaced with a new one at the intended destination? Is the original person killed, and replaced by a clone with the same memories?
I see a similar problem with the oft-used idea of 'uploading' minds, in a future where humans can interface their brains with computers, and transferring them to new bodies. If a consciousness is broken down into data to be transferred, is it necessarily the same mind that is re-assembled?

Food for thought

There's a few threads somewhere in the archives on this topic. It comes up every now and then.

Essentially you're proposing a dualist concept of mind. If we're not the result of the arrangement of atoms into a pattern of cells, and the subsquent cellular reactions which provide our memories are not based on cellular and atomic arrangements...then what are we? What is 'the mind', then, and what are the rules which govern it? Cartesian dualism pretty much went out a long time ago.

If we show up with memories intact...then what's to say that figure is not the same individual? If I recall from past threads, the word 'same' becomes a game of semantics. For all purposes, it is the same individual with the same memories.

Athon

 

[Just thinking]

If we show up with memories intact...then what's to say that figure is not the same individual? If I recall from past threads, the word 'same' becomes a game of semantics. For all purposes, it is the same individual with the same memories.

How is this different from a form of reincarnation?

 

[MageLite]

If we show up with memories intact...then what's to say that figure is not the same individual? If I recall from past threads, the word 'same' becomes a game of semantics. For all purposes, it is the same individual with the same memories.

Athon

But what if you used the data from the hypothetical teleporter to create a second person, same memories, different atoms but same person in all other regards? What if instead of transporting matter, you merely made the exact same person as far as other people's sense are concerned, but with different atoms? Will you enter the teleporter, die and a replacement created, but not 'you'?

I'm not proposing a dualist philosophy here, more saying, 'what's the point of teleportation if you can't survive it?'

 

[rocketdodger]

You can get around these problems, MageLite, by enforcing some sort of a continuity between the mind pre-transfer, the mind in-transfer, and the mind post-transfer.

This implies that either the device must be able to act as a substrate for your consciousness en-route, or else simply transfers only parts of your mind at a time and offers a connexion between the two during the process.

So, at the most basic level, it would happen something like this:

1) A neuron N is teleported from location A to B.
2) Any incoming impulses to that neuron at A are detected and identical impulses are transferred to it at B.
3) Any response the neuron gives is detected and transferred from B to all other neurons it was connected to at A.

You could optionally do the same stuff to a "simulated" neuron en-route to the destination.

As long as the parts teleported are small enough AND all communication between them is bridged and continued, the person at A will be the same one at B.

 

[Jimbo07]

But what if you used the data from the hypothetical teleporter to create a second person, same memories, different atoms but same person in all other regards? What if instead of transporting matter, you merely made the exact same person as far as other people's sense are concerned, but with different atoms? Will you enter the teleporter, die and a replacement created, but not 'you'?

What was that movie? Or was it an Outer Limits episode? Where the people being transported didn't know that a copy was being made and the copy was killed at the departure end, but one wasn't...

 

[MageLite]

As long as the parts teleported are small enough AND all communication between them is bridged and continued, the person at A will be the same one at B.

That works, but it probably wouldn't make for good TV with half a person standing there on the transporter pad waiting for the rest to come

 

[athon]

How is this different from a form of reincarnation?

Well...it depends. If it is a religious form of reincarnation, then there is a different system to it. If it's only a comparison with reincarnation, where death is not required...then moving somebody into an identical arrangement of atoms might be similar to reincarnation.

I don't understand your point.

Athon

 

[Just thinking]

But what if you used the data from the hypothetical teleporter to create a second person, same memories, different atoms but same person in all other regards? What if instead of transporting matter, you merely made the exact same person as far as other people's sense are concerned, but with different atoms? Will you enter the teleporter, die and a replacement created, but not 'you'?

I'm not proposing a dualist philosophy here, more saying, 'what's the point of teleportation if you can't survive it?'

Hence the point of my earlier question. If it is you (meaning you have a continued sense of existence from disintegrator to re-integrator), then you have agreed to a form of reincarnation. There should be no difference if the time interval between acts of teleportation are microseconds or centuries.

 

[Furious Coder]

The film version of The Prestige covers this same case (although the book is slightly different). Spoiling the movie here (if you haven't seen it, don't read!):

One magician creates a trick where he "teleports" himself to a very distant part of the theater, appearing to vanish from stage and reappear behind a curtain. Of course, the vanish is just him falling through a trapdoor, and a duplicate is created at a distance, but both instances of "him" are still alive, so the trapdoor one falls into a water torture trick box which locks shut and drowns him.

This leads to the dilemma, is he transported and the duplicate created in his place, or is the original drowned? Which is the "real" magician? The seemingly paradoxical answer is that both are the real person, as both are identical in every aspect with the exception of position in space. David Bowie, performing as a very odd Tesla, answers a question earlier in the movie as to which teleported hat is the "real" hat thusly: "They are all your hat."

*end movie spoilers here*

As to the metaphysical/scientific question, what would happen, and what would the experience be like? I'm not sure this one is answerable. If we assume that the "original person" is disintegrated and an exact copy is created at another location, with no "continuity of consiousness", the copy would be absolutely convinced that it was the original person, and no amount of scientific testing could conclude otherwise. Only if the original was not destroyed as part of the teleportation, if every molecule was left intact yet duplicated exactly at a remote location, well, then you'd have two people claiming they were the "real and original" person, but by examination of the mechanism of action of the device (that the "Sending Station" merely scans without disturbing and the "Arrival Station" merely constructs molecules in a pattern sent to it), we could see that the newly created person was not the original.

It's all speculative unless we understand the mechanism of action of the effect, but if we simply black-box a teleporter, and are unable to examine how it works, then I'd assert that we could never know if a teleported person was the actual transported consiousness or just an exact copy, nor whether the original person was dead or alive.

 

[Just thinking]

... It's all speculative unless we understand the mechanism of action of the effect, but if we simply black-box a teleporter, and are unable to examine how it works, then I'd assert that we could never know if a teleported person was the actual transported consiousness or just an exact copy, nor whether the original person was dead or alive.

Yes ... it's exactly like finding out if there's life after death by having yourself killed --- only you can know for sure. As for the transporter, only the person going through knows for sure if he continues to exist, even though everyone else (and every possible test for ID) would conclude it's the same person.

 

[athon]

But what if you used the data from the hypothetical teleporter to create a second person, same memories, different atoms but same person in all other regards? What if instead of transporting matter, you merely made the exact same person as far as other people's sense are concerned, but with different atoms? Will you enter the teleporter, die and a replacement created, but not 'you'?

I was waiting for this one.

So, you've replicated the individual. That person would have the same memories and think 'I am me' just as the other would. As time progressed, each incarnation would experience slightly different observations, and possess divergent memories. They could not be considered to be the same person now.

I'm not proposing a dualist philosophy here, more saying, 'what's the point of teleportation if you can't survive it?'

Who says you can't survive it? If you've replicated the atomic arrangement perfectly, then they're the same person for all purposes. If something hasn't been replicated, then it is dualist as it exists outside the arrange of the forces and atoms.

Athon

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Some idealists (e.g., Interesting Ian) believe that if you did this, the target (copied) person would be a corpse, because there would be no "soul" to inhabit the copy. That sounds more dualistic to me, but I can never tell the two metaphysics apart anyway.

~~ Paul

 

[rocketdodger]

Who says you can't survive it? If you've replicated the atomic arrangement perfectly, then they're the same person for all purposes. If something hasn't been replicated, then it is dualist as it exists outside the arrange of the forces and atoms.

Athon

The consciousness has the same content, but it is not the same consciousness.

Or not... hmmm... I need to think about this more...

 

[Furious Coder]

As for the transporter, only the person going through knows for sure if he continues to exist, even though everyone else (and every possible test for ID) would conclude it's the same person.

I would argue that even the person going through would not know for sure. If the sending action "killed" the original person, they would not be around to know it didn't work. The person at the arrival station would feel and believe that they were the very same person, and for all outward (and even inward) appearances would be that same person, but there would be no way of testing this hypothesis.

Consider Sleep. We don't "die" when we fall asleep, and the person who wakes up the next morning is not simply convinced that they are the same. We know that we are the same person from day to day even though there is an interruption in consiousness. However, there is a continuity of physical matter and electrochemical brain function. If a person fell asleep, and then fell into a deep coma or went brain dead, they would never know, as there would be no consiousness to make that realization. Now if we destroy the person in a coma, then recreate them distantly and take them out of a coma, the original person never knew they died, but the recreated person believes they're the original, and they've been moved and just woke up.

Again, I assert that without examining the method of action of the transporter, there's no way any participant could know that they were really the same person, if such a claim were made. If it was explicitly stated that there was a duplicate created and the original was destroyed, I only know one person who would willingly use such a device, and I highly question his understanding of the topic. (He's claimed he would have no problem if his clone slept with his girlfriend, because it would be him. I tried to convince him otherwise, but failed.)

 

[Just thinking]

I was waiting for this one.

So, you've replicated the individual. That person would have the same memories and think 'I am me' just as the other would. As time progressed, each incarnation would experience slightly different observations, and possess divergent memories. They could not be considered to be the same person now.

Then you die, if transported in the Star Trek style.

If there is no continued sense of existence into a duplicated you while you still exist (duplicated meaning a copy while the original was only scanned), then there should be no continued sense of existence into a duplicate if you are disintegrated as in Star Trek.

 

[athon]

Some idealists (e.g., Interesting Ian) believe that if you did this, the target (copied) person would be a corpse, because there would be no "soul" to inhabit the copy. That sounds more dualistic to me, but I can never tell the two metaphysics apart anyway.

~~ Paul

Idealists are monists, though. Dualism proposes the need for a distinct metaphysical system, Idealism simply says what happens in our heads is reality, and what happens 'out there' is different and not real.

Athon

(ETA: Oops, I just reread what you said, and see you weren't claiming idealism to be dualistic. Yeah, metaphysics all blurs into a soup of confusion in the end. Problem with all speculation being equal until it can be tested empirically, I guess...)

 

[Just thinking]

I would argue that even the person going through would not know for sure. If the sending action "killed" the original person, they would not be around to know it didn't work. The person at the arrival station would feel and believe that they were the very same person, and for all outward (and even inward) appearances would be that same person, but there would be no way of testing this hypothesis.

True enough ... there is no way for someone that is killed to know anything, but that doesn't automatically make the person who claims to be the one transported the reincarnate of the deceased. For what if a dozen copies come out where only one went in? Each one comes out as the person who went in, but then each differs from that moment on. Are any the one that went in after 5 seconds past? Consider that each one of us differs from any given moment and you'll begin to see why I have problems with this. Just because a group of atoms and electromagnetic pulses match another doesn't make them the same atoms and pulses. Each has its own distinct set of world-lines.

Consider Sleep. We don't "die" when we fall asleep, and the person who wakes up the next morning is not simply convinced that they are the same. We know that we are the same person from day to day even though there is an interruption in consciousness.

One is not unconscious during sleep.

However, there is a continuity of physical matter and electrochemical brain function. If a person fell asleep, and then fell into a deep coma or went brain dead, they would never know, as there would be no consciousness to make that realization.

Brain dead is not the same as being in a coma. You can come out of a coma --- not once after you're brain dead.

Now if we destroy the person in a coma, then recreate them distantly and take them out of a coma, the original person never knew they died, but the recreated person believes they're the original, and they've been moved and just woke up.

This doesn't actually argue the point. The re-created person may have the same memories, but not the same physical past.

Again, I assert that without examining the method of action of the transporter, there's no way any participant could know that they were really the same person, if such a claim were made. If it was explicitly stated that there was a duplicate created and the original was destroyed, I only know one person who would willingly use such a device, and I highly question his understanding of the topic. (He's claimed he would have no problem if his clone slept with his girlfriend, because it would be him. I tried to convince him otherwise, but failed.)

Too bad.

 

[Furious Coder]

Just because a group of atoms and electromagnetic pulses match another doesn't make them the same atoms and pulses. Each has its own distinct set of world-lines.

I agree. I'm postulating that consiousness, and the concept of self, is an emergent property of the physical layout and electrochemical reactions that take place inside our brains.

I think I understand all the points you've made, and I appreciate your corrections on my misunderstanding of sleep. However, I'm uncertain as to the argument you're making regarding reincarnation. Could you clarifiy that for me? Thanks.

 

[TacoSnake]

What was that movie? Or was it an Outer Limits episode? Where the people being transported didn't know that a copy was being made and the copy was killed at the departure end, but one wasn't...

It was an Outer Limits episode called "Think Like a Dinosaur". I can't post links yet, so you will have to Google the title for more info.