That's a completely different question. We can't know everything. But we can explain everything.
The principle of consistency says that the same explanation for a given process applies everywhere in the Universe. You don't, by any means, need to know everything to fully understand everything in principle.
As with your argument on consciousness, this is confusing parameters with functions.
I don't believe I've provided an argument on consciousness. I only tried to explain BDZ's position on it. That perspective isn't really a confusion of parameter with function except within a given definition of what consciousness is. Change the definition and you change the parameter/function relationship. He is simply using a different definition. I think there is some utility in that approach. In fact, behaviorists view things in much the same way. The separation between 'person' and 'environment' is not concrete when we discuss such interactions. We create strict boundaries so that we can discuss them, but we shouldn't reify those boundaries if this impairs understanding of behavior within a system.
We -- you and I -- are not really saying different things. I think the only difference between us is that you have more confidence in our ability to explain the world than I have. I have full confidence that we can explain consciousness, and it also pisses me off when folks come in and try to say that such explanations are theoretically impossible. That's why I tried to stay out of this conversation.
This is true. I understand that some mathematicians really can visualise four dimensional space. I certainly can't.
No, not at all. I can't visualize four dimensional space, but I solve problems in more than four dimensions every day. (I'm a computer programmer.)
Then you, more than most, should be able to appreciate that there may be vistas that we cannot reach, working in an area that is hard to conceptualize. Again, there is nothing woo here. We would simply be ignorant of these aspects of reality (if they exist -- and we could only speculate and not argue that they do). There is no way to offer proof of such things, only speculate on them. Is this consequential? Well, obviously not. Really, such speculation is a waste of time, but it might also be true.
The Mary problem is based on a lie.
Well, of course it is -- that is why it isn't really a problem. But it is the case that Mary's internal sensation of seeing 'red' is new information. The lie is in the original proposition that she can know everything about seeing red without actually having that experience. Bait and switch seems to be a favorite in philosophy of mind.
There are experiences that we are simply not capable of. We can think about them, we can conjecture, but we can't get to them. There are simply things that we cannot know.
No, that only means the description is incomplete. That's the lie I just mentioned in the Mary problem.
Yes, then we agree on that.
Subjective experience is a physical process, and there is nothing in principle to limit our understanding of that process.
We are talking about different things here. There is nothing woo about the Mary problem. We can understand what is happening in a subjective experince, but we cannot share that experience -- even if we create conditions to mimic the same internal 'hormonal' environment that constitutes part of what we call 'feelings' (in part, because we are not the same substrate as the person having the experience, so interaction issues would dictate a difference). We can understand those process to the level of Mary understanding 'seeing red' while still in her white and black room (leaving aside the obvious neurological reality that she could never see color in the first place given that weird scenario). We can describe an amazing number of things. But we cannot know everything. I think you probably agree with this.
That's just silly. We had no reason to think about hydrogen atoms or positrons before we knew they were there either. Then we discovered them, and thought about them, and understood them.
Yes, and there may be strangenesses that we cannot conceptualize in our limitations. Agin, they would be inconsequential because we couldn't know them, but they might be there. They would simply have no impact on us whatsoever. And, yes, I know this is pure speculation.
It's a nice turn of phrase, and it illuminates the weirdness - relative to our everyday experience - of twentieth-century physics. But it's not an argument.
Of course it's not an argument. It isn't meant as one. It is a caution about our limitations.
What Godel's Theorem says is that any sufficiently powerful (and arithmetic is sufficiently powerful) formal system contains propositions that cannot be shown to be either true or false using the axioms of that system.
But science is a system for generating explanations of the Universe, and the Universe isn't a formal system. So exactly how, or even if, Godel's Theorem is a limitation on science is not at all clear.
Yes, but a full explanation of the universe would amount to a formal system -- the axioms being the underlying physical constants that determine what is out there.
I'm afraid I do not share you confidence in our abilities to arrive at final explanations. There is much that we can explain. Consciousness is going to be one of those things -- I am almost certain of that -- since it arises from the workings of matter/energy, which is theoretically explainable at the level we see in our daily lives.