Stupid teleportation topic.

[Z]

Oh look - Hypocritic Ian has returned, yet again.

Ian, you can just never get enough of JREF, can you?

Anyway, toddjh, I still cannot wrap my head around this idea that two seperate beings should be considered the same person (singular). We don't do this with identical twins (though, granted, even 'identical' twins aren't perfectly identical), so why would we do this with duplicates?

Further, there is the simple, materialistic fact that you (the first person, singular, continuous and dynamic instance of you that exists and is reading this right now) will never, ever, EVER be the duplicate. There is just no way that creating a copy will ever transfer your subjective awareness by magic! This is easily demonstrated in the red room/blue room thought experiment.

Let's face it - there's no way you would know (aside from observing the duplicate) if they bothered to duplicate you or not! For all you know, the 'teletransporter' is nothing more than an implausible excuse to execute you - and you'd never know any better, because at no point during or after duplication would you have any subjective awareness from the duplicate's POV. I find it hard to believe that you'd be willing to lay down and die on the promise that 'another instance of you' supposedly exists somewhere else! After all - you will never experience what he is experiencing - never benefit as he benefits. Instead, you will be terminated.

Worse still - maybe they'll just keep you and use you for vivisections, torturous experiments, etc... after all, 'you' are alive, well, healthy and wealthy somewhere on Mars, aren't 'you'? So you don't really matter any more - we'll just keep you for 'medical research'. You're not a person anymore, pal... sorry, but you agreed to this, and we can't have two 'yous' running around loose, now can we?

 

[Bri]

I agree to all this, but at the moment of duplication they are both the same, except from spacetime location. I can only assume you must assume some sort of dualism.

Actually, I don't assume dualism at all. Do you really think two people at two locations can share the same consciousness? It would actually be impossible for two people to be at two different locations and have the exact same configuration of their brains, if for no other reason than because they're seeing two different things out of two different sets of eyes. Therefore, it would be impossible for the original and the duplicate to not have two separate consciousnesses. Sure, both of the consciousnesses branch from the same configuration, but immediately upon branching they diverge. At no point are the two exactly the same.

Let's put it another way. Let's say that you are kidnapped and put in a blue room that unknown to you is actually a duplicator. An exact copy is made of you that is assembled in a red room. Would you ever see red? Would you ever know you had been duplicated? Of course not! The two people are never exactly the same, and never share the same consciousness. They diverge as soon as the duplication occurs.

-Bri

 

[toddjh]

Anyway, toddjh, I still cannot wrap my head around this idea that two seperate beings should be considered the same person (singular). We don't do this with identical twins (though, granted, even 'identical' twins aren't perfectly identical), so why would we do this with duplicates?

Identical twins are only identical in a genetic sense, which has very little to do with the way the brain develops over time. They are so dissimilar in terms of personality and memories that this example has nothing at all to do with the teleportation debate.

Further, there is the simple, materialistic fact that you (the first person, singular, continuous and dynamic instance of you that exists and is reading this right now) will never, ever, EVER be the duplicate.

This is a contradiction. Under materialism, the "singular, continuous and dynamic instance of you" is an emergent property of the hardware, nothing more. Duplicate the hardware, and you recreate the consciousness.

Your use of the word "singular" shows the source of our disagreement. To you, a person is unique. He is defined by the subjective awareness he experiences, and you believe this awareness is somehow "assigned" a body and inhabits it. You believe that the subjective experience created by one brain would be distinguishable from the subjective experience created by a separate but identical brain. I can't agree with this, because it rejects materialism -- it assumes that some aspect of awareness is independent of the hardware.

To me, a person is a machine. A computer program, running on the hardware of his brain. The subjective awareness we experience is simply the output of that computer program. Copy the program to a new, identical computer, and the output will remain the same. One subjective awareness is as good as the other. To me, identity is not singular. If we had a teleporter, we could create many instances.

There's nothing inconsistent with your position per se; in fact, an awful lot of people agree with you. It's simply not compatible with materialism. You'll have to decide for yourself whether that bothers you.

There is just no way that creating a copy will ever transfer your subjective awareness by magic!

"Transfering subjective awareness" makes no sense if you believe that awareness is created by the brain. What you're describing here is a soul, which I don't believe in. Since the rest of your examples rely on this phenomenon, I can't really address them.

Jeremy

 

[Bri]

You believe that the subjective experience created by one brain would be distinguishable from the subjective experience created by a separate but identical brain. I can't agree with this, because it rejects materialism -- it assumes that some aspect of awareness is independent of the hardware.

So if two people have a different experience, how can they have identical brains? How is it possible, even for a moment, for a person standing in a blue room to have an identical brain as the person in a red room? It is clear that they are different people with different brains. This "divergence" you speak of doesn't happen gradually as you'd like to think. In the case of a copy appearing instantly in a different physical location than the original, there is an immediate divergence. At no time are they the same person.

-Bri

 

[toddjh]

In the case of a copy appearing instantly in a different physical location than the original, there is an immediate divergence. At no time are they the same person.

I've said this so many times before, I really don't understand why it hasn't stuck. The issue isn't whether there is any divergence at all, the issue is whether that divergence results in the loss of information. Or, to use zaayrdragon's terminology, the issue is whether there is a termination of a stream of "subjective awareness," without an equivalent awareness being recreated on some other substrate.

Jeremy

 

[Roboramma]

So if two people have a different experience, how can they have identical brains? How is it possible, even for a moment, for a person standing in a blue room to have an identical brain as the person in a red room? It is clear that they are different people with different brains. This "divergence" you speak of doesn't happen gradually as you'd like to think. In the case of a copy appearing instantly in a different physical location than the original, there is an immediate divergence. At no time are they the same person.

-Bri

You don't see anything until light hits your retina. The divergence takes time because physical effects take time to occur. You brain can't be altered by being in a blue room until the light from the room hits your retina, and your eye sends a signal to your brian to tell you about it.

 

[Z]

I've said this so many times before, I really don't understand why it hasn't stuck. The issue isn't whether there is any divergence at all, the issue is whether that divergence results in the loss of information. Or, to use zaayrdragon's terminology, the issue is whether there is a termination of a stream of "subjective awareness," without an equivalent awareness being recreated on some other substrate.

Jeremy

Todd, you're so wrong I'm not sure where to start.

The subjective individual awareness isn't about soul or any other immaterial thing; it's about the fact that each person IS a unique instance of identity, no matter how similar they may be physically. Just as each computer program is a unique instance of software, no matter how many identical copies of the program is running. If I have two identical vases, they are still two separate vases, not the same vase. If I have two identical computers running the exact same program, they are still two separate programs running, not the same program. And if each program is hard-wired to protect its own existence - as we are - then it doesn't matter to the program HOW many copies are running, it will try to protect its own existence.

This is part of the human experience - the attempt to protect one's own existence. It can, of course, be overridden by race instincts, protection of family, higher ideals, etc.... and allowing a clone to replace us would definitely require overriding the basic human instinct for self-protection.

Todd, answer the question about the red room/blue room example. If both original and duplicate are allowed to live, and you were walked into a room that was blue, and that was secretly a duplicator, would THIS INSTANCE OF YOUR IDENTITY see the red room? This is the only self you can ever be - a continuous and ever-changing creature which has an instinct for self-preservation, comprised entirely of matter and energy, possessing self-awareness and consciousness... all locked into the dynamic matter and energy configuration that you are. Heck, if the duplicator makes six copies, one in each of six different colored rooms, would you see any - ANY - other color? Nope. Yes, someone exactly like you would see one - that someone would not be you.

I'm not arguing that they wouldn't falsely believe that they were you - after all, they've had all of your memories falsely implanted into them.

Let's look at it another way: suppose, for a moment, that for whatever reason, memory remained elusive, possibly stored in some manner that the duplicator cannot read (can't imagine how this would be the case, but let's pretend). So would you then argue that there is one you with all your memories, and one you with amnesia? Or would there be you and someone else? Or, let's suppose the memories don't 'stick' in the duplicate, and a week later, the person loses his memories of being you - is he still you, with amnesia induced by the teletransporter, or would be be someone else?

IMHO, in order for this thing to work, it has to work in all conceivable instances. In other words, if the duplicate is you, it has to be you in every conceivable situation - including if the original survives. And there's the catch - the survival of the original demonstrates, clearly, that you are never the duplicate - because your conscious awareness never includes the POV of the duplicate. You have no idea what's going on up there.

I thought of an interesting question last night. Let's say that duplication is a common situation for Mars work, and volunteers on Earth allow a clone to be made for working on Mars. The Company pays them, takes care of them, etc - so you're under no obligation to your clone. Then, the political situation on Mars goes sour, and a revolution begins; and your clone dies in a suicide bombing. Should the government come and arrest you? First, are you and your clone identical, legally? Do both share responsibility for one's actions? Second, should you be arrested because of your POTENTIAL for terrorism? If it's been demonstrated that, in the same situation, you would become a terrorist, should the government arrest you then? Would this bring about the idea of thought-crimes? A far more interesting line of thought, IMO, than the whole tele-trans thing. In fact, I find that the teletrans situation is pretty much settled, to my mind, and quite satisfactorily. After all, our primitive survival instinct never included a 'secondary instance check' - we weren't programmed to make sure that a duplicate of us survived before we got ourselves killed. Added to that the fact that human technology is never 100% infallible, and I can see no positive reason to take the teletrans.

The funny thing is, back when I was a hard-core religious person, I thought nothing at all of such an idea. We used to use these concepts in RPG games. The concept of 'soul' was simply shrugged off; we just assumed the soul could instantly travel to the new body. And I am a dualist, btw - not a heavily religious one, but a dualist nevertheless. Now, if there is a soul, I personally think it will eventually prove to be a physical/material thing as well, and therefore subject to duplication; but a duplicate soul is STILL not the same soul; two of any given thing are not the SAME thing.

Todd, do you have two of any identical thing? Two identical forks, two identical doorknobs, anything? And are they the SAME thing? Or are they two identical things, but still separate and unique? After all, if you bend one spoon, do all the spoons that are identical to it bend as well? Now, what if that one spoon could feel pain? What if that one spoon was self-aware? Do you think it would care that seven other identical spoons are just fine, right about then?

I can just imagine what it's like around your house. You're drinking from an expensive crystal goblet, and you toss it to the ground, shattering it; but, hey, you still have it - there's three more of it right there, so it's fine. Right?

 

[Bri]

You don't see anything until light hits your retina. The divergence takes time because physical effects take time to occur. You brain can't be altered by being in a blue room until the light from the room hits your retina, and your eye sends a signal to your brian to tell you about it.

OK, but let's say the duplicate is created standing on a hot plate, or that somehow we could get a signal to the duplicate's brain immediately upon assembly, so you really think the original would experience the same thing? They are two separate people with two separate consciousnesses. Even if they were exactly alike and they never diverged, they would still be two different consciousnesses since they have the potential to diverge at any moment.

If we duplicated a lamp in the same manner, we would have two identical lamps. Are you claiming that they are the same lamp until someone turns one of them on (thus changing its state) and then all of a sudden they become two different lamps? Should it be illegal to sell them separately until one is turned on, or would you have to notify the buyer that they are only buying part of the lamp?

-Bri

 

[Bri]

I've said this so many times before, I really don't understand why it hasn't stuck. The issue isn't whether there is any divergence at all, the issue is whether that divergence results in the loss of information. Or, to use zaayrdragon's terminology, the issue is whether there is a termination of a stream of "subjective awareness," without an equivalent awareness being recreated on some other substrate.

Let's say that when we duplicate the original, the duplicate appears in an identical sealed room as the original. In fact the room itself is an exact duplicate of the original's room. According to you, they are the same room on the inside, although perhaps different rooms on the outside (which seems to be a paradox itself). Anyway, after duplication, there is no divergence between the original person and the duplicate person. Are you saying that it wouldn't be a crime to kill one of the people after an hour as long as they haven't diverged? Given that the two exist in different locations, they would diverge the moment they walk outside of their rooms, right? Doesn't the loss of potential information count as loss of information? Would you volunteer to be shot in the head if you were the original since there would be no loss of information to the world?

It still seems to me as though there are simply two identical consciousnesses now, not one, and that killing one of them would be murder. To define them as the same being seems like a useless definition to me.

-Bri

 

[Roboramma]

OK, but let's say the duplicate is created standing on a hot plate, or that somehow we could get a signal to the duplicate's brain immediately upon assembly, so you really think the original would experience the same thing?

If he's standing on a hot plate it still takes time for the heat to go from the plate into his body. If you send a signal to his brain immediately upon assembly (I assume this to mean at the same time as assembly, since if it happens after assembly then it's no different than any other divergence), then the duplicate hasn't been created identically to the original. You've just basically said, "well, if we make the duplicate a little different then it'll be different, right?" of course it will. But if you don't, then it will take time for the two to become different. Or in the terminology of this thread, to diverge.

They are two separate people with two separate consciousnesses. Even if they were exactly alike and they never diverged, they would still be two different consciousnesses since they have the potential to diverge at any moment.

Why does potential matter?

If we duplicated a lamp in the same manner, we would have two identical lamps. Are you claiming that they are the same lamp until someone turns one of them on (thus changing its state) and then all of a sudden they become two different lamps? Should it be illegal to sell them separately until one is turned on, or would you have to notify the buyer that they are only buying part of the lamp?

I see your point, but I don't think anyone is saying that there is only one person after duplication. They're saying that they are identical, and that there is no way to say which one is "you".

Personally I think the problem is with the concept of self. I'm really not sure what it means, and that's why I can't come to any conclusions as to this dillema.

For instance, if my brain were replaced one neuron at a time by techonology that did the same job as those neurons (perfectly), after the process would I still be me? I think so.

What if the process were instantanious? That's more analogous to this duplication and destruction question. As to that, I don't have an answer.

 

[Bri]

If he's standing on a hot plate it still takes time for the heat to go from the plate into his body. If you send a signal to his brain immediately upon assembly (I assume this to mean at the same time as assembly, since if it happens after assembly then it's no different than any other divergence), then the duplicate hasn't been created identically to the original.

I think that's my point. The duplicate is never created identially to the original since it's in a different location. The new location may be a different temperature, different color, etc. If they are exactly the same, they would diverge VERY quickly. If time occurs in discrete units, the duplicate would diverge at the very next instance after duplication.

Why does potential matter?

Potential always matters. For example, if you were to record someone's state to a computer and kill them (rather than duplicating them) and then restore them to a duplicate an hour later, you have changed their future. Therefore, doing this without the person's consent would be a crime, even if the original and the duplicate are the same person. Of course, I don't think they are the same person (they are simply identical people except that they now have different futures) and I believe the crime would actually be murder since you have killed the original (the information no longer exists, although there is a copy of the state of that information that does exist in a computer, and a duplicate of that information that exists in an identical person).

I see your point, but I don't think anyone is saying that there is only one person after duplication.

Actually, toddjh was saying that given a choice between keeping the original alive and killing the original the moment the duplicate is made, the latter would be better. I believe he likened it to destroying one copy of "Romeo and Juliet," and said that since they are copies of the same person it would be OK to kill one of them.

They're saying that they are identical, and that there is no way to say which one is "you".

Again, I disagree. It is possible that the duplication process doesn't even touch the original. There is no reason to assume that the duplicate is the original, even if they're exactly alike. If you make several copies of a document in a copy machine (let's assume they are exact copies) can you not tell which is the original since only one of them will still be sitting on the glass where you left it? The copies are off to the side where the copies come out. Sure, they are identical, but only one is the original.

Personally I think the problem is with the concept of self. I'm really not sure what it means, and that's why I can't come to any conclusions as to this dillema.

This I can agree with, that is may simply have to do with a definition. But I would argue that a definition of "self" is pretty useless if it can't allow two copies of a person to identify themself rather than pointing to the other and saying "that one might be me -- I just can't tell!

For instance, if my brain were replaced one neuron at a time by techonology that did the same job as those neurons (perfectly), after the process would I still be me? I think so.

I see your point, but I'm not so sure. Your new brain might think it's you, but it's not you if your brain is replaced by a mechanical brain. There is a question about when you cease to be you if your brain is gradually replaced by mechanical parts, but I think that's another issue.

What if the process were instantanious? That's more analogous to this duplication and destruction question. As to that, I don't have an answer.

I agree, this is closer to the issue at hand. Assuming that your identity is stored in the brain (presumably as the state of the brain), if your brain were removed and placed in a new (indentical) body, that body that contains your brain would be you wouldn't it? If your old body were then implanted with a new mechanical brain, even one that is programmed to believe it is you, would it be you? Would you and the robot look at each other and be confused about the meaning of "self?" Would you feel that the robot should be allowed to have sex with your wife since it's as much you as you are?

Let's say that your original brain wasn't implanted in another body, but instead allowed to die, you would be dead and a robot that is identical to you would be left in your place. I don't think that robot would be you, although it might think it's you. Killing your original brain would be murder, in my opinion. Killing the robot would also be murder since it has consciosness.

-Bri

 

[DanishDynamite]

Aside from the fact that teleporters are apparently not possible, I still like the philosphical discussion.

So, where is it exactly that the "I wouldn't use a transporter if my life depended on it!" people object?

Is it that the atoms are not the exact same atoms? OK, suppose you stepped into the teleporter, got scanned, and your atoms were then collected. The info necessary to recreate you was then transmitted to Mars and the atoms were sent by Slo-Freight. Once your atoms arrived at the reprocessing center, your very own atoms would be used to reassemble you.

In what way would you then not be yourself?

Or suppose you were cryogenically frozen. Your atoms would have no activity in this state or at least your consciousness would have no activity. You would then be shipped to Mars. Where you were Thawed.

Would you then still be yourself? If so, in what way would this method of transport differ from the previous?

 

[Bri]

Aside from the fact that teleporters are apparently not possible, I still like the philosphical discussion.

So, where is it exactly that the "I wouldn't use a transporter if my life depended on it!" people object?

My objection is mostly that there is a choice between either dying or else having a duplicate of yourself running about who thinks they're you and might be pissed if they don't get to sleep with your wife. Neither possibility seems especially attractive to me.

Is it that the atoms are not the exact same atoms? OK, suppose you stepped into the teleporter, got scanned, and your atoms were then collected. The info necessary to recreate you was then transmitted to Mars and the atoms were sent by Slo-Freight. Once your atoms arrived at the reprocessing center, your very own atoms would be used to reassemble you.

In what way would you then not be yourself?

Taking your body apart atom by atom (the "Star Trek" scenario) would undoubtedly kill you, so it's really no different than the scenario previously discussed, except that your atoms are recycled. I still don't think the resulting person is actually you, just someone who thinks they're you.

Or suppose you were cryogenically frozen. Your atoms would have no activity in this state or at least your consciousness would have no activity. You would then be shipped to Mars. Where you were Thawed.

Would you then still be yourself? If so, in what way would this method of transport differ from the previous?

I thought about this (the "Alien" scenario), and the major downside (death) that we saw with the other methods does seem to be avoided. One possible downside would be that you'd have to sleep for a very long time to get to Mars, but at least you'd be the same person with the same brain when you got there and there wouldn't be another one of you running about. Of course, everyone dear to you would be dead by the time you got there unless they were also frozen for the same period of time.

-Bri

 

[Roboramma]

One possible downside would be that you'd have to sleep for a very long time to get to Mars, but at least you'd be the same person with the same brain when you got there and there wouldn't be another one of you running about. Of course, everyone dear to you would be dead by the time you got there unless they were also frozen for the same period of time.
-Bri

[nickpick] Can't we get to mars in something like six months? [/nitpick]

 

[Z]

Not in a Yugo...

 

[Jyera]

Aside from the fact that teleporters are apparently not possible, I still like the philosphical discussion.

So, where is it exactly that the "I wouldn't use a transporter if my life depended on it!" people object?

Is it that the atoms are not the exact same atoms? OK, suppose you stepped into the teleporter, got scanned, and your atoms were then collected. The info necessary to recreate you was then transmitted to Mars and the atoms were sent by Slo-Freight. Once your atoms arrived at the reprocessing center, your very own atoms would be used to reassemble you.

In what way would you then not be yourself?

Or suppose you were cryogenically frozen. Your atoms would have no activity in this state or at least your consciousness would have no activity. You would then be shipped to Mars. Where you were Thawed.

Would you then still be yourself? If so, in what way would this method of transport differ from the previous?

Assume it is safe perfect, I wouldn't mind either of the above.
Assuming atoms are just simply atoms and are all the same. I wouldn't mind using a different atom to make me. As long as is the exact me.

In fact, If they make the new me a little younger and stronger I wouldn't even mind.

The only thing that is a no-no to meddle with, is my mind, memory and identity. Identity not just interms of self awareness. But also interms of how well my family and friends will recognise me.

Ultimately what I would object to ... is that it is not Branded and not clinically tested with real humans to be safe.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Taking your body apart atom by atom (the "Star Trek" scenario) would undoubtedly kill you, so it's really no different than the scenario previously discussed, except that your atoms are recycled. I still don't think the resulting person is actually you, just someone who thinks they're you.

So once you actually die, then it is absolutely impossible for you to be alive ever again? Wow! What about every morning when you wake up? Are you the same person as the night before?

 

[Z]

So once you actually die, then it is absolutely impossible for you to be alive ever again? Wow! What about every morning when you wake up? Are you the same person as the night before?

Yes, Hypocrite, you are. Of course, for you to understand this, you would have to (1) understand the difference between sleep and death; (2) recognize that brain processes do not cease when you sleep; (3) accept a definition of 'person' and 'same' that allows for the continuous and dynamic nature of an organism's natural existence; and (4) stop being an idiot.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Yes, Hypocrite, you are. Of course, for you to understand this, you would have to (1) understand the difference between sleep and death; (2) recognize that brain processes do not cease when you sleep; (3) accept a definition of 'person' and 'same' that allows for the continuous and dynamic nature of an organism's natural existence; and (4) stop being an idiot.

I can with complete confidence state that it's you that's being the idiot. Under materialism, or any metaphysic which holds that consciousness is a product of the brain, then a particular unique physical configuration must fix a unique consciousness. The ultimate entities of physical reality i.e electrons and quarks are all absolutely identical. Thus if they are arranged in a particular manner they must give rise to a unique individual. The same physical configuration can not give rise to an arbitrary large number of differing individuals!

What you're saying is that I amount to more than a particular arrangement of such ultimate physical entities. That is a point blank denial of materialism my friend.

 

[hammegk]

... a particular unique physical configuration must fix a unique consciousness.

Now all that needs to be decided is if the wavefunctions of 'all individual entities -- which is a problem in itself' need be teleported, or is it the wavefunction of the 'individual entities' combined (very very short wavelength) that is teleported.