Stupid teleportation topic.

[Bri]

How is that impossible? Everyone does that all the time.

If two people look exactly alike, can you tell them apart at a single moment in time? No, you'd have to observe them over time to tell any differences aside from location.

Small but important correction: Two instances of the same person.

OH, well that makes all the difference! So they're not the same person even if they are exactly alike, they are two instances of the same person! Then let me rephrase my question...if you were one of those instances, would you mind being shot in the head? After all, there's another "instance" just like you so it wouldn't make any difference, right?

As we've already discussed, having two instances of you would be quite a bother to your wife and friends who might be confused. Since it's not murder if we kill one of the instances, and in fact it's better to kill one than to allow your loved ones to be bothered by the presence of two instances, if one of those instances is YOU, would you volunteer to be the one shot in the head to alleviate the confusion?

Where's the mystery? They have different experiences, so they change.

OK, let's say that two people are exactly alike (by your definition, they are "instances" of the same person). Let's say they are both standing in identical rooms, so we know that they will not diverge. But we know that in exactly one minute, someone is going to run into one of the rooms and yell "boo" causing them to diverge. Is it OK to shoot one of them in the head before the minute is up? Would it be OK if that one was YOU?

They are two instances of the same person. At an entirely arbitrary point, we may decide to regard them as two different people.

At what point would it no longer be OK to shoot one of them in the above scenario? At what point after divergence do they become two different people, when we should consider it murder to kill one? We know that before that moment, it is in fact GOOD to kill them (to avoid confusion of loved ones), but after that moment in time it would be very BAD (in fact murder). What is this magical amount of time? Is it a minute? Is it a second? Again, if you were one of those "instances" would it be OK for you to be shot in the head in one minute, but not OK in one minute and one second?

What does that mean?

If you mean, do they share each other's subjective or objective experiences, then no, that's absurd.

Of course they must share each other's subjective and objective experiences if they're exactly the same! But let's use the duplicate room again. Do you think that the two "instances" would identify themselves as "instances" of the same person even if they learned of one another's existance, or would each identify as an individual person? If you asked them what they consider "self" would they say that they exist in two locations, or would they identify their own body as "self" and the other one as another individual?

Any useful definition of "self" involves the person uniquely identifying himself as "self." I would guess that a person who is an "instance" of another person would feel as individual as a twin does, and would be able to easily identify himself as "self" apart from the other "instance" even if they are exactly alike. So the definition of "self" you're using seems a lot less useful than zaayr's definition to me. If one who considers himself to be an individual cannot even use the term "self" to uniquely describe himself, then of what use is the term exactly?

If there is evidence of the discontinuity, yes. If not, then the copy has no way of telling.

Having teleported from one location to another is evidence, except perhaps in the above example with identical rooms. In that example, the person wouldn't know that they're not the original until they walked outside of the room. But that doesn't make the copy the original (the fact that you had to define a new term "instance" to take care of this is evidence of that). There are clearly two individuals, so they might be identical but they are not both the original, and therefore not the same person. They have the capacity to diverge, and therefore are individual "selves" by any meaningful definition of the word. Very few people would consider it OK to murder one of them since, hey, there's another one exactly the same in the other room, so what's the difference? The difference is that as soon as they leave their identical rooms, they will no longer be identical.

You can find yourself in a different location without being copied. That alone is insufficient, as I have pointed out repeatedly.

I don't recall saying that location alone was sufficient. I said that perhaps both the body AND location are sufficient.

Or not. It could be the copy, while the original has been whisked off somewhere else.

But that would of course make them divergent, so they are no longer instances of the same person, but now two different people. In fact, at no time does your definition of "instances of the same person" hold except in the identical rooms scenario since otherwise being at two different locations would cause them to be divergent.

The only way to tell is perpetual surveillance.

Which we are constantly doing with ourselves. That's why "self" can only pertain to who you identify yourself to be, and has nothing to do with how others identify you. If someone else cannot distinguish one twin from another who looks exactly the same on the outside, does that mean that they're actually the same person? If there are two "instances" of the same person (in two identical rooms) who are aware of each other's existance, not only would they not identify themselves as the same person as the other, but others would not identify them as being the same person either. Do you really think nobody would care if you decided to shoot one of them in the head since after all, you're really just destroying a copy of "Romeo and Juliet" and not the play itself? Your definition just seems to not be very useful to me.

Well, no. He won't realise anything at all. He's dead.

Which brings us back to your definition of death. What is it? If it's just another state of the body, then the death of one instance is itself a divergence. You cannot resolve the murder problem by causing a divergence since two divergent beings are individuals.

Only because that is your definition of "death". For other definitions of death, this simply doesn't apply. By all immediate evidence, both objective and subjective, the person still exists. The only distinction is a discontinuity the the space-time vector of the body in question.

So, it would be OK to be shot in the head as long as everyone else didn't know the difference. That seems to be the gist of what you're saying. So you'd volunteer to be the one shot, right?

Similarly, if we sent you off on a deep space mission with your family and friends knowing that you would be going too far to return during your lifetime. After the tearful good-bye's, it would be OK with you if we then decide to blow up your ship as you left Earth's atmosphere rather than sending you on your mission as planned. After all, nobody would know the difference, right? To everyone else you're still alive.

What facts? All I see is a definition.

As I've pointed out:

1. Everyone who uses the teleporter (as defined) will be entirely satisfied that it works as promised. There is not only no evidence of any other outcome, there is no possible evidence of any other outcome. You have defined an undetectible problem into existence arbitrarily.

2. Teleporters are impossible.

OK, so using your definition, and given that your copy and your wife would be entirely satisfied that it worked, would you or would you not use the teleporter? If so, would you or would you not want to be killed in the process?

-Bri

 

[Bri]

And my answer still stands: We do that all the time.

Without viewing them over time? Really?

If two people look the same, their voices may be different.

You can only distinguish their voices by listening over time.

If their voices are also the same, their choice of words may be different.

You can only understand choice of words by listening over time.

If their choice of words is also the same, their thoughts may be different.

Only by listening over time.

If their thoughts are also the same - then who are you to say they are different people?

Of course their thoughts are different. But you cannot know that without observing them over time.

If you have two people, and you give them an exhaustive series of tests, and in every test their response is identical, you have no grounds to identify them as different people. You can only identify them as two instances of the same person. That's the operational definition of personal identity. You can only distinguish between identities based on properties or processes you can actually measure.

Again, all based on assumptions of observation over time.

Basically, it comes down to this: If you can't tell the difference, you have no basis to say there is a difference.

If both stand right in front of you at the same time, you would be forced to identify them as instances of the same person? And you'd also be justified shooting one of them, right? After all, no loss to the world if you can't tell them apart without observing them over time. In fact, shooting one of them would be the best option since it would alleviate any further confusion. Again, if one of them was YOU, would you volunteer to be shot in the head since there would be no loss to the world? Come on, you can do better than that!

-Bri

 

[PixyMisa]

If two people look exactly alike, can you tell them apart at a single moment in time? No, you'd have to observe them over time to tell any differences aside from location.

Exactly my point.

OH, well that makes all the difference! So they're not the same person even if they are exactly alike, they are two instances of the same person!

Yes.

Then let me rephrase my question...if you were one of those instances, would you mind being shot in the head? After all, there's another "instance" just like you so it wouldn't make any difference, right?

How can you possibly come to that conclusion? You had two living beings, and you just shot one in the head. That they were not distinguishable by tests does not change the fact that you just killed one of them (or attempted to do so).

What's more, by the very act of shooting one of the instances, you have caused them to diverge sharply into two distinct personalities.

As we've already discussed, having two instances of you would be quite a bother to your wife and friends who might be confused.

Yes. So?

Since it's not murder if we kill one of the instances, and in fact it's better to kill one than to allow your loved ones to be bothered by the presence of two instances, if one of those instances is YOU, would you volunteer to be the one shot in the head to alleviate the confusion?

Whether it is murder or not depends on your definition of murder. If a duplicator is possible, we would need additional terms, one to cover the deliberate killing of an instance of a person, and another to cover the deliberate killing of all instances of a person. And degrees of murder, to cover varying degrees of difference between instances.

OK, let's say that two people are exactly alike (by your definition, they are "instances" of the same person). Let's say they are both standing in identical rooms, so we know that they will not diverge. But we know that in exactly one minute, someone is going to run into one of the rooms and yell "boo" causing them to diverge. Is it OK to shoot one of them in the head before the minute is up? Would it be OK if that one was YOU?

No. Why would this be acceptable?

At what point would it no longer be OK to shoot one of them in the above scenario?

It is never acceptable to do so.

At what point after divergence do they become two different people, when we should consider it murder to kill one?

That point is, as I have noted, entirely arbitrary. And we have redefined murder in any case.

We know that before that moment, it is in fact GOOD to kill them (to avoid confusion of loved ones)

Confusion is worse than death to you?

but after that moment in time it would be very BAD (in fact murder). What is this magical amount of time? Is it a minute? Is it a second? Again, if you were one of those "instances" would it be OK for you to be shot in the head in one minute, but not OK in one minute and one second?

I never suggested it was acceptable at all. I'm not sure how you developed this delusion.

Of course they must share each other's subjective and objective experiences if they're exactly the same!

Nonsense. They have two, entirely independent sets of subjective and objective experiences. It's just that they are identical.

But let's use the duplicate room again. Do you think that the two "instances" would identify themselves as "instances" of the same person even if they learned of one another's existance, or would each identify as an individual person?

That depends on the person.

If you asked them what they consider "self" would they say that they exist in two locations, or would they identify their own body as "self" and the other one as another individual?

I'm not sure what you're getting at here. There is no magical connection between the two instances; they have no more communication than two people who were born of different mothers.

Any useful definition of "self" involves the person uniquely identifying himself as "self."

No. Such a definition is definitively not useful, because it is subjective and cannot be used to communicate anything.

I would guess that a person who is an "instance" of another person would feel as individual as a twin does, and would be able to easily identify himself as "self" apart from the other "instance" even if they are exactly alike. So the definition of "self" you're using seems a lot less useful than zaayr's definition to me. If one who considers himself to be an individual cannot even use the term "self" to uniquely describe himself, then of what use is the term exactly?

The point is, my definition is testable, and Zaayr's is not. Subjective experience is not relevant to either case.

Having teleported from one location to another is evidence, except perhaps in the above example with identical rooms. In that example, the person wouldn't know that they're not the original until they walked outside of the room. But that doesn't make the copy the original (the fact that you had to define a new term "instance" to take care of this is evidence of that). There are clearly two individuals, so they might be identical but they are not both the original, and therefore not the same person. They have the capacity to diverge, and therefore are individual "selves" by any meaningful definition of the word. Very few people would consider it OK to murder one of them since, hey, there's another one exactly the same in the other room, so what's the difference? The difference is that as soon as they leave their identical rooms, they will no longer be identical.

Yes, that's what I said. (Apart from the murder nonsense.)

The point is, you cannot tell which one is the original.

I don't recall saying that location alone was sufficient. I said that perhaps both the body AND location are sufficient.

My counter-example included the body AND location, so no.

But that would of course make them divergent, so they are no longer instances of the same person, but now two different people. In fact, at no time does your definition of "instances of the same person" hold except in the identical rooms scenario since otherwise being at two different locations would cause them to be divergent.

The distinction between "two different people" and two "instances of the same person" is purely arbitrary.

Which we are constantly doing with ourselves.

No we aren't. We are not continuously aware; even more so in a thought experiment permitting teleporters and duplicators.

If there are two "instances" of the same person (in two identical rooms) who are aware of each other's existance, not only would they not identify themselves as the same person as the other, but others would not identify them as being the same person either. Do you really think nobody would care if you decided to shoot one of them in the head since after all, you're really just destroying a copy of "Romeo and Juliet" and not the play itself? Your definition just seems to not be very useful to me.

Destroying a copy of "Romeo and Juliet" is an act of destruction in itself, so why do you imagine that destroying an instance of a person would not be objectionable?

Which brings us back to your definition of death. What is it? If it's just another state of the body, then the death of one instance is itself a divergence.

Of course.

You cannot resolve the murder problem by causing a divergence since two divergent beings are individuals.

The existence of duplicates redefines murder.

So, it would be OK to be shot in the head as long as everyone else didn't know the difference.

No.

That seems to be the gist of what you're saying.

Not even remotely. In fact, I fail to see how you made that particular leap of illogic.

So you'd volunteer to be the one shot, right?

Thanks, but I'll pass. You?

Similarly, if we sent you off on a deep space mission with your family and friends knowing that you would be going too far to return during your lifetime. After the tearful good-bye's, it would be OK with you if we then decide to blow up your ship as you left Earth's atmosphere rather than sending you on your mission as planned. After all, nobody would know the difference, right? To everyone else you're still alive.

You killed the me on the spaceship. Why would you think that to be acceptable?

OK, so using your definition, and given that your copy and your wife would be entirely satisfied that it worked, would you or would you not use the teleporter? If so, would you or would you not want to be killed in the process?

How does being killed come into it?

 

[PixyMisa]

Without viewing them over time?

Again, all based on assumptions of observation over time.

Well, duh.

If both stand right in front of you at the same time, you would be forced to identify them as instances of the same person?

Correct.

And you'd also be justified shooting one of them, right?

Could you please tell me how you came up with this insane idea?

After all, no loss to the world if you can't tell them apart without observing them over time.

That is utterly ludicrous.

They will diverge with time and differing experience. You plan to destroy the potential of one of them for no reason.

In fact, shooting one of them would be the best option since it would alleviate any further confusion.

Okay, not for no reason, just for a really stupid reason.

Again, if one of them was YOU, would you volunteer to be shot in the head since there would be no loss to the world?

Since there quite obviously would be a loss to the world - not to mention the loss to me - your assertion is absurd.

Come on, you can do better than that!

And indeed I have, from the beginning of the discussion, but you do not appear to have been paying attention.

 

[Bri]

How can you possibly come to that conclusion? You had two living beings, and you just shot one in the head. That they were not distinguishable by tests does not change the fact that you just killed one of them (or attempted to do so).

What's more, by the very act of shooting one of the instances, you have caused them to diverge sharply into two distinct personalities.

toddjh claimed that killing one of two instances of the same person would not be murder because they are both the same person. In fact, he implied that it wouldn't be a crime at all, likening it to destroying one of two copies of a Shakespeare play. He even said that it would be better to kill the original person during the teleportation process rather than leaving him alive, in order to alleviate any confusion over which was the "real" person. That's the argument I think zaayr and others were having problems with. Since you seemed to be joining the argument against zaayr, I had incorrectly assumed you were agreeing with toddjh.

If you weren't agreeing with him, then I apologize and perhaps we are in agreement on the most important issue. You can define "self" however you want as long as you agree that the above scenario is murder. That said, I must still disagree on your definition of "self."

Whether it is murder or not depends on your definition of murder. If a duplicator is possible, we would need additional terms, one to cover the deliberate killing of an instance of a person, and another to cover the deliberate killing of all instances of a person. And degrees of murder, to cover varying degrees of difference between instances.

I was never talking about killing both of the instances, only one (specifically, the original). The question of why killing only one would be less of a crime than killing both notwithstanding, if it's a crime to kill one instance, then indeed you must agree that it's better to let them both live.

Whether you consider this copy and the original to be the same person at the moment of "teleportation" is really irrelevant since they will immediately diverge anyway. So the only question is whether the idea of "teleportation" is desirable if you don't actually teleport at all, but remain in the same location and simply create a copy of yourself at the other location. Keep in mind that this copy thinks he is you, and will want to have sex with your wife nightly.

-Bri

 

[Z]

By being very careful and quiet about it.

What, you allow teleporters but not an electric truck with soft suspension?

Actually, what I allow is instant duplication devices... show me an electric truck with soft suspension that can carry an entire room to Mars.



And now that I know where you're coming from - programming - I see part of the problem: in programming, there IS no such thing as 'self'. When you start dealing with self-aware programs, we'll talk.

 

[Asm]

Yes, no, yes, no...?, yes! I hadn't even given this a thought before and now you guys have made me change my mind back and forth with every good argument.

I think I have finally settled. If not, tell me where I'm wrong zaayrdragon.

At the moment of teleportation the self-awareness is simply split in two, or duplicated, and two equally valid self-awarenesses continue in two different directions. You simply don't "end up in one of them".

Or you could make a thousand copies, even destroy the original, and they would all be valid. MY continous experience wouldn't continue in one single copy, but in all of them. All the separate self-awarenesses will feel as if they have lived my whole life.

The only hard part for me now is to imagine several equally valid self-awarenesses, being a single awareness myself. But why not?

(God did of course know about this dilemma and made sure to put the "no cloning theorem" into his laws of quantum mechanics.)

Asm

 

[Bri]

At the moment of teleportation the self-awareness is simply split in two, or duplicated, and two equally valid self-awarenesses continue in two different directions. You simply don't "end up in one of them".

Sure you do. You end up in the same one you were in before the duplicate was made. In fact, the duplication process wouldn't necessarily involve anything but "scanning" the original. If you make a copy of a drawing in a copy machine, is the original drawing somehow replaced by two completely new drawings, or do you still have the original plus an extra duplicate? If you are duplicated, why would you stop being you? You are still the same you that you were before the copy. It just happens that after the copy there's another person who is just like you and thinks they have the same past as you, but they actually don't have the same past since their atoms didn't exist in that configuration before the copy was made.

So, yes, the self-awareness of the duplicate may be as "valid" as the original, but no, they are not the original! If you are copied, you and your duplicate are two different people, and will diverge immediately since the two occupy different physical spaces and therefore have different input from the world.

-Bri

 

[GeO1977]

look in the mirror, look at your left eye, then at you'r nose, and then at your right eye.. what did see ? .. i tell you: 0 , 0 and what's between 0 , 0 is 1 brain.. so we can use that 1 brain so many people want to see $ , $ (a snake that doesnt get through the needle) (money locks you up)
Know for teleportation, i teleport with my brain, i visualize myself worlds of how it would be much better.. and more peacefully, but some idiots are doing such idiot work, while there is much more work to be doing then we are doing right know) (clean up operation in the desert, dig rivers from the sea through whole Africa.. I teleport myself to that world, so one day i hope people understand that does people need water to... pfew..
hahaha

 

[Z]

look in the mirror, look at your left eye, then at you'r nose, and then at your right eye.. what did see ? .. i tell you: 0 , 0 and what's between 0 , 0 is 1 brain.. so we can use that 1 brain so many people want to see $ , $ (a snake that doesnt get through the needle) (money locks you up)
Know for teleportation, i teleport with my brain, i visualize myself worlds of how it would be much better.. and more peacefully, but some idiots are doing such idiot work, while there is much more work to be doing then we are doing right know) (clean up operation in the desert, dig rivers from the sea through whole Africa.. I teleport myself to that world, so one day i hope people understand that does people need water to... pfew..
hahaha

Oh, you're looking for Kumar. He's one database over, babbling about God and salt.

Bri - thank you, you put it quite properly, of course.

 

[Asm]

Sure you do. You end up in the same one you were in before the duplicate was made.

Yes, but you also end up in the duplicate.

In fact, the duplication process wouldn't necessarily involve anything but "scanning" the original. If you make a copy of a drawing in a copy machine, is the original drawing somehow replaced by two completely new drawings, or do you still have the original plus an extra duplicate? If you are duplicated, why would you stop being you? You are still the same you that you were before the copy. It just happens that after the copy there's another person who is just like you and thinks they have the same past as you, but they actually don't have the same past since their atoms didn't exist in that configuration before the copy was made.

If you pause time at the exact moment of duplication, there is, as people have already pointed out, no way to tell the difference between the original and the duplicate. As long as the configuration is the same, I simply fail to understand why their past should have any effect whatsoever.

So, yes, the self-awareness of the duplicate may be as "valid" as the original, but no, they are not the original! If you are copied, you and your duplicate are two different people, and will diverge immediately since the two occupy different physical spaces and therefore have different input from the world.

I agree to all this, but at the moment of duplication they are both the same, except from spacetime location. I can only assume you must assume some sort of dualism.

In the thread "Consciousness: what do we know", zaayrdragon says:

If so, I'll be willing to reconsider the view that consciousness arises from matter - from things physical, to make H-P happy - but if not, then I'd say that the most reasonable thing is to compare what we know.

So apparently he doesn't. Then how does the location in space interrupt the self-awareness? The change in sensory input is not very dramatic IMO compared to, let's say, being drugged down and then wake up midair falling, without a parachute, tied to a bomb.

Or what if I was instantly cut and pasted in the exact same spot, would I be "dead" then? What is this floating thing that would cease to exist? Does self-awareness depend on being completely continous? Then what if the whole process took only one Planck time or no time at all?

Asm

 

[Z]

Yes, but you also end up in the duplicate.

No, you don't. A person who is exactly like you does; but not you - not the continuous, dynamic point of view. For example, let's say the original is in a red room, and the duplicate in a blue one; what would the current instance of your identity see at that future point when it was duplicated? Red? Blue? Purple, perhaps?? And that's all you are - an instance of your identity, continuous and dynamic through your existential history. Any duplicate of your identity becomes a separate instance of your identity, which is automatically not you.

Then how does the location in space interrupt the self-awareness?

That's not what we're discussing here - we're discussing the fact that the thing that you are is a set of active matter, continuously changing and re-arranging yet retaining some of the same material each moment, having a self-awareness from your own point-of-origin (birth), occasionally suppressed by sleep or other forms of unconsciousness, but never disrupted (unless, perhaps, you were momentarily brain-dead at some point in your past - and then, I wonder how much of 'you' really continued from back then). And no matter how many duplicates of you are generated, not one of those duplicates is you - they are all someone else. They are all duplicates of you, sure - all just like you - but not one of them shares your subjective set of experiences.

Really, that's what lies at the core of this argument - not souls, not dualism, but the difference between a personal, subjective definition of 'self' and an objective definition of 'identity'.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Does that mean that your consciousness should be regarded as being continually created and destroyed, and that there really is no 'you'?

Yes necessarily so if you believe consciousness is a product of the brain. I've argued about this so many times. I'll just paste it in once again for those who may have missed it.

I originally thought that such duplication thought experiments established that materialism, and indeed any materialist based metaphysic such as property dualism, must be incorrect. However, I now acknowledge I was wrong. Why? Because I was implicitly presupposing the notion of an enduring self. In other words I was begging the question. Anyway, here is what I formerly thought of as the proof against materialism.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[original so-called "proof"]
I think I have demonstrated that should materialism be true then we need to concur that with a star trek teletransporter device, where the original person gets destroyed and a perfect duplicate gets created somewhere else, that the duplicate would be you in the absolute fullest sense of the word.

Now if we imagine a case where the original person is not destroyed and simply get duplicated, we will then have 2 streams of consciousnesses. Let's imagine that someone offers me £10,000,000 if I agree to be duplicated with the duplicate being killed after about an hour after duplication. And let's for the sake of argumentation ignore the ethical implications. Now this might seem like a good deal to me. After all, how could I lose out? A duplicate is created, lives for an hour, and then is destroyed. So after the duplicate is destroyed is exactly the same as before the duplicate was created, except I'm £10,000,000 richer!

So ok, I agree to it. Now let's suppose that the copying will take place in a room with a TV set. The copying will take place sometime whilst I am watching my favourite film of all time Groundhog Day, although precisely when duplication will take place is not specified. It could take place anytime during the duration of the film. Imagine also that the duplicate will suddenly appear in an absolute identical room with the same film playing which is also precisely synchronized to the other film.

It should be obvious that nothing untoward will happen at the precise moment of duplication. If I am the original obviously nothing will happen. I will be watching the film and will notice absolutely nothing at the precise moment of duplication. If I am the duplicate, again I will note nothing untoward. At the precise moment of duplication I will suddenly appear in the duplicate room, sitting exactly in the same relative position and posture, the film will be continuous with the film being shown in the other room, and my memories will be continuous with the original Ian just prior to duplication.

So ok, I'm sitting there watching the film, and I most probably will be thinking to myself "hmmmm, I wonder if I have been duplicated yet or not?". Because I have no way of knowing. Moreover, even if I have been duplicated, I have absolutely no way of telling whether I am the original or the duplicate. But now the end of the film arrives. I know that duplication must have taken place, but there is absolutely nothing about the character of my experiences which could enable me to determine whether I am the original or the duplicate. My consciousness has been continuous. I might feel therefore that I must be the original Ian. But of course the duplicate will be thinking exactly the same thoughts. Bearing this in mind I cannot ascribe anymore probability than I am the original than the duplicate, and the same reasoning will be gone through by the other Ian. So I will conclude that there is a 50/50 chance I am the original.

Then the door to the room opens, and the person standing there says "I regret to inform you that you are the duplicate Ian, and therefore must be immediately executed".

So we reach our paradox. I had concluded that I was just being given £10,000,000 to watch my favourite film of all time. There should have been no danger to myself at all. But yet there is. But this is clearly absurd! After all, how could it meaningfully differ from the situation where the same situation pertains yet no duplication takes place? Then, since no duplicate is created, there is absolute 100% certainty that I am the original Ian.

It might be pointed out that at least the other Ian gets the £10,000,000. But this doesn't interest me anymore than anyone else I like who receives £10,000,000.
[/original so-called "proof"]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



So how does the materialist escape the paradox? He has to relinquish the notion of an enduring self! Consider the precise moment after duplication. Which is the rightful heir to the original Ian? The answer is neither of them! Under materialism "I" am effectively dying every infinitesimal fraction of a second only to be replaced by a differing "I". Thus after duplication the duplicate should not rationally mind dying at all since he is continually effectively dying! And of course the same goes for the original Ian. As long as one of the Ians' remains alive then that is absolutely great because then I will be £10,000,000 better off

 

[Interesting Ian]

Been discussed before in a very memorable thread, the title of which I've now inadvertently forgotten (wouldn't make any difference if I remembered as it was irretrievably lost in one of the purges).

I do remember that the thread ran at least 10 pages and that the crowning moment was when Win (a non-materialist, BTW) finally convinced BillyJoe (a materialist, yet ardently against using the teleporter) that he could use the teleporter without loss of self. Man, those were good times....

Win's argument ran along the lines of comparing a person cryogenically suspended, physically transported to its end destination and thawed, to a person stepping into a transporter and momentarily being recreated at the destination. Yes, a lot of discussion had preceeded this.

I'm not sure I want to be engaged once again in this discussion. Suffice it to say that I would have no qualms using the teleporter.

It was called "staying alive". The title coming from this quiz
http://www.philosophersnet.com/games/identity.htm

 

[Interesting Ian]

*Fights, but gets drawn in nevertheless*

You couldn't and it wouldn't matter. Both would be you.

Yes indeed.

 

[Interesting Ian]

You hit the nail on its head, LMG. That was exactly the title of the thread:

"Staying alive".

Ooops, I should read this thread first!

 

[toddjh]

So, tell me how you define death.

I would imagine that receiving a lethal injection would qualify as being killed, regardless of whether a clone of you exists elsewhere or not.

I've said it dozens of times now: death, to me, is the destruction of the information which constitutes my memories and personalities -- in short, my identity.

I understand what you're saying, but they would have different personalities and different memories if they exist in two different locations.

No, if they're physically identical, they will have identical personalities and memories up until the point they begin to diverge. The only alternative is to say that these things are not determined by the structure of the brain...in which case, again, it's unlikely we'll agree.

Jeremy

 

[toddjh]

GitM!

"Knowing that [my soul] would be transferred to a new [body]...

Yep, there it is. He's imagining a soul transfer.

No, souls have nothing to do with it. What is being transferred is the information -- physical states of atoms, nothing more. Nothing supernatural involved.

In fact, it's non-reductionists (presumably like yourself) whose position demands the existence of a soul. I believe a person is entirely defined by the physical configuration of his body. An identical body means an identical person, since its identical brain would give rise to an identical consciousness with identical memories and personality. To say that these two identities are different despite no possible way to tell them apart means invoking some ineffable quality to explain the distinction.

If the original wasn't destroyed in the teleportation process, then there would indeed be two "mes," at least for a few microseconds until they diverged to a significant degree. Even after that, they would both continue to be "largely me." I don't have a problem with this philosophically, just ethically and legally.

Jeremy

 

[toddjh]

It's called a thought experiment. They're well-known in science and philosophy.

Yes, but often ludicrous thought experiments are proposed in order to show extreme consequences of a position -- consequences that have no bearing on reality because they would only happen in completely unrealistic circumstances.

For example, suppose you said you thought rape was wrong in any circumstances. I could propose a "thought experiment" which states that a mad scientist has threatened to destroy the entire planet unless you rape an innocent woman, and then say, "Clearly Beerina's position is wrong, because it could result in the end of the human race!" If you come back and say okay, in those extreme circumstances rape would be justifiable, I can say, "See? Beerina thinks rape is a-okay after all. Watch out, ladies!" It's a rhetorical trick that I'd prefer to avoid here, which is why I called attention to the absurdity of the thought experiment even as I answered it.

The point is that, although two brains are identical, so what? There are two people experiencing. You kill one of them, they're dead. So what that an identical copy of you exists? You die. End of story...for you...and no mincing of words is gonna change that.

Well, you seem quite dead set on your position, so it would be a waste of time to argue with you. Suffice it to say I don't find your position convincing because I don't see a reason to regard two physically identical bodies as two separate identities, and you haven't provided a convincing one yet.

Yet the greatest remaining problem to physics is how do we get there from here. How do we get to the subjective perceptual experience from atoms and energy "out there"?

Indeed. It's a fascinating question. However, I remain confident that the explanation will be a naturalistic one; the evidence is quite compelling that the brain is responsible for creating the phenomenon of consciousness, and no rational alternatives have been proposed. I don't think this gap in our knowledge has any bearing on my position.

The bad part about murder isn't so much that your loved ones are grieving, but rather that your existence is ended.

Which is why I said it might not be murder. But it would still be wrong to inflict that kind of loss on loved ones. And it might still be murder, depending on what type of "parallel universes" we're talking about...usually we only speak of information in terms of one universe. It's not entirely clear if the concept of "information" is even meaningful across multiple universes which can't possibly have any contact with each other, which is why I wanted you to define that more clearly first.

In any case, if you are pulling the "information is lost" card out of the bag, then loved ones grieving has nothing to do with it.

Agreed. I never said otherwise; I simply said it would be wrong for other, mostly unrelated reasons.

Indeed, this entire argument is invalid, since in physics, "information loss" includes spacial position and momentum. It's not the crass notion of total knowledge about a particular set of atoms right over there in the corner that can be moved around anywhere.

Atoms have no hair. The position and momentum of a person's body have no effect on the way the brain functions, so that's irrelevant here. Now, the relative position and momentum of atoms within the body makes a difference, of course, but I thought our hypothetical teleporter made sure that was preserved already. Otherwise it's not much of a teleporter.

In a single-universe scenario, the person could be teleported somewhere successfully (say, to another planet), but a supernova occurs while this happens. The person made it OK, but the sender's panels all read failure -- he is dead!

The family grieves, yet no information was lost and the person is still alive.

Should the sender re-assemble the person from the local atoms? Sure!

Guess the original copy is killed in this scenario after all, because he's now back alive.

Like I've said, I have no philosophical problem with the idea of multiple copies of a person running around at the same time. They wouldn't remain the same person for long, as their experiences led them all in different directions.

No, I simply think that scenario should be avoid for ethical and legal reasons. It would be highly confusing and inconvenient to have multiple people of ambiguous legal status running around.

If a second copy were created by mistake and allowed to diverge and develop into a separate person, well, that would be a legal conundrum on par with babies switched at birth, or something like that. It would be regrettable, but we'd work around it. The point is that we should try to avoid that scenario whenever possible -- for practical, not philosophical, reasons.

Jeremy

 

[Interesting Ian]

Addendum:

The problem seems to be that some people feel there is a unique YOU which apparently transcends any relation to the physical YOU. As if YOU exist in some way apart from any machinery which generates YOU. As if you have a soul.

That's absolutely right.

You dont. Or rather, there is no reason to suspect you do.

As you know I don't agree with you here, but that's unimportant. The people who think they cease to exist when using a teleporter are substance dualists. Certainly not materialists.