Merged State Department admits there was no protest at Benghazi consulate

[Checkmite]

Wow, you've now blamed the victim. Your attempts to defend the Obama administration at all costs have crossed the line into desperation.

Are you saying that's not a fair question to ask? Is it not a fact that there was enough security at Tripoli that they could afford to deploy some of it to Benghazi during the attack?

 

[tyr_13]

Yes. So why wasn't the ambassador's security team strengthened?

By the FAST team you're talking about? Because they didn't know which threat was going to be carried out in the region so they didn't know to go to that specific one.

Wow, you've now blamed the victim. Your attempts to defend the Obama administration at all costs have crossed the line into desperation.

The ambassador wasn't part of the Obama administration?

 

[Checkmite]

What about these other questions I asked, which you edited out when you quoted my post to complain about "blaming the victim"?

You're continuing to make presumptions about the nature of diplomatic security. Are consulate offices typically protected? Are ambassadors typically protected by a phalanx of troops in these situations, no matter where they go?

These are pertinent questions, after all. Before you go blaming anyone for deliberately neglecting the security needs of the diplomatic mission in Libya, there's two things you need to prove: whether enhanced security would even have the qualities you claim - personal protection for the ambassador at all times, equal protection for all outlying offices as at the Embassy, and so forth; and whether the diplomatic security situation in Libya is abnormal, i.e. do you have examples of these security measures being employed in other situations? Can you point to another consulate office in another country where a similar security situation existed and say, "Look at all the troops and resources they put into protecting this consulate; why could they not do the same in Benghazi?" It's not enough to say, "they had this team, it could've been deployed". They could have deployed an entire battalion of Marines. Would they have? Have the Marine FAST teams (or whichever you choose, etc) ever been deployed to a consulate in such a fashion and along such a timeline as the one you insist should've happened at the Benghazi consulate office?

 

[A'isha]

Perhaps a fair question would be to ask, why did the ambassador decide to leave the security of Tripoli with (allegedly) only a single bodyguard, and travel to an area that in his own diary he called alarmingly dangerous?

According to the initial State Department briefing on September 12,

With regard to Chris’s trip to Benghazi, as you know, he made regular and frequent trips to Benghazi so that he could check up on developments in the east. You know that he had been our representative – the Secretary’s representative and the President’s, to the Transitional National Council before the fall of Qadhafi and had spent a lot of time in Benghazi and built deep contacts there. So this was one of his regular visits that he made periodically.

With regard to the security arrangements, I think you will understand that we never talk in detail about how our security is arranged. And we particularly don’t talk about security arrangements for – personal security arrangements for senior level personnel.

What I can tell you is that security in Benghazi included a local guard force outside of the compound on which we rely, which is similar to the way we are postured all over the world. We had a physical perimeter barrier, obviously. And then we had a robust American security presence inside the compound, including a strong component of regional security officers. But I’m not going to go any further than that on the specifics.

There were about 25-30 personnel total in Benghazi (not counting the local Libyan guards or the reinforcements that arrived later from Tripoli). According to Ambassador Stevens' own Benghazi Weekly Report sent on 9-11-12, "The Ambassador will open American Space Benghazi, a public platform for cultural and educational outreach by US Mission Libya", which would include a small library and a computer lab. The Report also noted that the Ambassador met with the Benghazi Local Council.

(As a side note, when asked about the "Innocence of Muslims" video during that briefing (by the Fox News reporter, no less), the response was:

With regard to whether there is any connection between this internet activity and this extremist attack in Benghazi, frankly, we just don’t know. We’re not going to know until we have a chance to investigate. And I’m sorry that it is frustrating for you that so many of our answers are “We don’t know,” but they are truthful in that.

When asked by the Foreign Policy reporter about "protests", the response was:

With regard to the protests – I assume you’re not talking about protests in Cairo, are you? You’re talking about protests in Benghazi?...Okay. We frankly don’t have a full picture of what may have been going on outside of the compound walls before the firing began. So I really just don’t have any specifics on that at the moment. I apologize.

In the State Department's October 9 briefing, it's noted that Ambassador Stevens had arrived in Benghazi on September 10, and the evening of the attack had had a series of meetings that day, the last one with a Turkish diplomat. There are five Diplomatic Security special agents providing internal security, and four members of the February 17th Brigade (deputized by the Libyan government as the host government security force) providing external security. There is also a "rapid reaction force" at the CIA annex about a mile away (which, when the first attack happened, sent 6 American personnel and 16 more members of the February 17th Brigade to assist the 9 security personnel at the consulate).

At this briefing, it's also specifically noted, "Because of the – this was a post and not a – and we – this post held no classified documents. They had computer communications with Washington, but the material would arrive on the screen and you would read it on the screen, and then that was it. There was no classified paper, so there was no paper to burn."

And even though this was the same briefing that was so famously and widely quoted as having State Department personnel say "That was not our conclusion" when questioned about whether there was a protest over the video outside the consulate that preceded the attack (which was what prompted Cylinder to start this particular thread), those very same State Department personnel also say at this briefing, "As in terms of the – of any kind of security threat, the – both ODNI spokesman and the DNI have been correctly quoted as saying that there was no actionable intelligence of any planned or imminent attack."

Yes. So why wasn't the ambassador's security team strengthened?

At that same October 9th briefing, a Bloomberg reporter prompted the following exchange:

QUESTION: Hi. Did the Ambassador – before the attack, did the Ambassador request that security be increased in Benghazi? And if so, did anything ever come of it?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL NUMBER TWO: The – when the Ambassador traveled to Benghazi, he traveled with two additional security agents over and above the complement of three who were assigned to post. So there were five agents with him there rather than the two who are normally assigned there – the three who are normally assigned. So they were up two.

MODERATOR: Okay. Thank you. Next question, please.

OPERATOR: The next question comes from the line of Jo Biddle with AFP. Please go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. The two people who died in the compound – in the annex, excuse me – were they part of the five security agents you’ve mentioned, or were they separate to that? And how many people did you have to evacuate that night from the annex?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL NUMBER TWO: Because – since unfortunately we couldn’t fit everything on one compound, we had two – the principle compound and the annex. We had – therefore, had our security professionals divided between the two compounds.

And, at the end of the briefing, that issue was raised again:

OPERATOR: Certainly. Our next question is from the line of Chuck Todd, NBC News. Please go ahead.

QUESTION: Can you at least explain the process by which if a request for more security comes in, how that’s – how you go about determining resources, so in the instance of the reports that more security was requested by the folks in Libya, can you sort of walk through how that process works?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL NUMBER TWO: Certainly. The – this is sort of an iterative process, a discussion between the field and Washington, back and forth; the field identifying what their needs are, Washington working very, very closely with them. We always attempt to mitigate our risk. We cannot eliminate them. Sometimes the post – any post in the world might come in and say, “We need A, B, and C,” there would be a dialogue, and instead of sending them A, B, and C, we would send them B, C, and D because in this discussion process, we go to functionality, and when we determine the functionality that gets us the maximum – a maximum possible security, then we – that is what we deliver to the post.

MODERATOR: Okay. Thank you. I feel like I just ignored Shaun. I know you dropped off. If you’re still on, you get last chance here, buddy.

OPERATOR: And our last question does come from Shaun Waterman, Washington Times.

QUESTION: Hello?

MODERATOR: Yes, Shaun. Go ahead, buddy.

QUESTION: Oh, hey. Okay. Thanks, man. So could – I mean, just in view of what you are now saying about the attack and the intensity of it and the numbers of people involved, what – can you say what kind of security presence might have been needed to repel an attack like that? I mean, what – I mean, if the criticism is there wasn’t enough security, how much would you have needed to protect the compound from this attack?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL NUMBER TWO: It is difficult to answer hypothetical questions, but let me just put it this way. The lethality and the number of armed people is unprecedented. There had been no attacks like that anywhere in Libya – Tripoli, Benghazi, or elsewhere – in the time that we had been there. And so it is unprecedented. In fact, it would be very, very hard to find a precedent for an attack like that in recent diplomatic history.

In addition, the Benghazi Report linked above notes that the Benghazi Local Council is specifically noted as "assert[ing] that the security situation was improving and told the Ambassador that the USG should 'pressure' American companies to invest in Benghazi.", and that a "state of maximum alert" that had been imposed on Benghazi on August 29th (for fears that ex-regime supporters would strike on the September 1st anniversary of Qadhafi's rise to power) had been ended on September 2nd.

The Report does note that several local militias were threatening to stop carrying out their security duties in Benghazi if Mahmoud Jibril were named Prime Minister of Libya, but also describes only violence and conflicts between various Libyan factions, and does not highlight any threat to the US Mission or other Western forces (indeed, the theme of "encouraging increased American business investment in Benghazi" is hit on repeatedly in the memo).

It doesn't mention any worries about the US Mission's own security situation, nor does it make any request for increased protection or personnel.

 

[Checkmite]

...

That's a lot of interesting information!

According to this, Ambassador Stevens did have a lot of protection at the Benghazi consulate; he did have a personal escort which was significantly more than just "one person"; further, this personal bodyguard had been nearly doubled in response to the Ambassador's concerns about security. In addition, he had the other security personnel in the consulate. So this wasn't a case, as is being portrayed, of "not having any security"; it's a case of having significant security which was merely overwhelmed by the size and force of the attack. The folks at the CIA annex didn't merely hear the consulate attack in the distance and take it upon themselves to try and help their American brethren down the road, but were as a matter of fact stationed where they were expressly for the purpose of responding and providing such support in case of such a security incident.

 

[Newtons Bit]

By the FAST team you're talking about? Because they didn't know which threat was going to be carried out in the region so they didn't know to go to that specific one.

Not just FAST, I used them as an example, but by any security team. The State Department routinely uses contractors. As far as I can tell, two of the four people that died were contractors.

The ambassador wasn't part of the Obama administration?

Ambassador's are part of the US Foreign Service, while it's quasi political at the level of Ambassador, they don't get changed out wholesale when a new President comes in. I think it would be analogous to the United States Attorneys. Recall how big of a deal it was when the Bush administration dismissed 7 USA's.

 

[Newtons Bit]

...

So, the Ambassador had 5 members on his security team:

Ubben, who was with the Ambassador,
Doherty, at the CIA annex,
Woods, at the CIA annex,
Two others, unknown location​

According to Ubben, he was with the Ambassador and Smith and no one else. Where were the other two?

 

[A'isha]

So, the Ambassador had 5 members on his security team:

Ubben, who was with the Ambassador,
Doherty, at the CIA annex,
Woods, at the CIA annex,
Two others, unknown location​

According to Ubben, he was with the Ambassador and Smith and no one else. Where were the other two?

This is described in detail in the October 9th briefing. There were five Diplomatic Security agents at the compound itself. At the time the first attack happened, four of those agents were in what was labeled "Building C", which contained the bedrooms and the "safe haven". The fifth agent was in the Tactical Operations Center. This is all at the consulate compound itself, separate from the reaction force at the annex a mile away. Guarding the perimeter of the compound were four members of the February 17th Brigade.

When the first attack occurred, a request for reinforcements was sent almost immediately to the main embassy in Tripoli. One of the four agents (carrying an M4 rifle and a sidearm) in Building C went and got the Ambassador and Sean Smith, and went with them into the safe haven. The other four agents (three in Building C and the one in the TOC) armed themselves with M4s, body armor, and helmets. The agent in the TOC stays there throughout the whole attack, while the other three are at various times in Building B, Building C, and attempting to secure the perimeter.

At the same time, the rapid reaction force from the annex sent aid to the consulate compound, consisting of six additional Diplomatic Security agents and 16 more members of the February 17th Brigade.

By this time, Building C had been set on fire, and smoke was a serious problem. During the efforts to escape the smoke, the agent with the Ambassador and Smith loses track of them both, and suffering rather severely from smoke inhalation. Members of both the original 5-person consulate compound security team and the 6-person quick reaction team attempt to re-enter the burning building to locate the Ambassador and Smith, but while they are able to locate Smith (who had died), they can't find Stevens. At that point, all 11 Diplomatic Security members decide to withdraw to the annex with all the consulate personnel and Smith's body.

At the annex, they are joined at the annex by an additional team of reinforcements from Tripoli that have arrived at the Benghazi airport (which the news reports I can find say consisted of 8 people), and they stay holed up there until near dawn, when a mortar attack kills Woods and Doherty, and the decision to return to the Benghazi airport to evacuate all personnel is made (with a stopover at the Benghazi hospital to pick up Stevens' body, since looters had taken the still-alive but unconscious Ambassador there, where doctors were unfortunately not able to resuscitate him).

I haven't yet been able to find out whether Woods and Doherty were part of the group at the annex, or part of the reinforcements that arrived from Tripoli. This Reuters article said that one of the two Americans killed was part of the Tripoli team, but does not specify which it was, while this CBS article said both of them were part of the Tripoli team, but also identifies them as "US Marines" and says their cause of death was gunshot wounds.

 

[A'isha]

Ambassador's are part of the US Foreign Service, while it's quasi political at the level of Ambassador, they don't get changed out wholesale when a new President comes in. I think it would be analogous to the United States Attorneys. Recall how big of a deal it was when the Bush administration dismissed 7 USA's.

Stevens wasn't named as ambassador to Libya until April 2012, when was nominated by President Obama to succeed the previous (Bush-appointed) ambassador to Libya, Gene Cretz (Obama moved Cretz to the position of ambassador to Ghana). Before that, Stevens was the Obama-appointed Special Representative to Libya's National Transitional Council.

He wasn't a holdover in either position from the previous administration.

 

[Newtons Bit]

..

QUESTION: Thank you very much. The two people who died in the compound – in the annex, excuse me – were they part of the five security agents you’ve mentioned, or were they separate to that? And how many people did you have to evacuate that night from the annex?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL NUMBER TWO: Because – since unfortunately we couldn’t fit everything on one compound, we had two – the principle compound and the annex. We had – therefore, had our security professionals divided between the two compounds.

There's some conflicting statements in that briefing. It sounds like Woods and Doherty were part of the five, but at the CIA annex during the attack. I'm not sure who the four security agents at the consulate were. Maybe there were two permanently posted there, I don't know.

 

[Newtons Bit]

Stevens wasn't named as ambassador to Libya until April 2012, when was nominated by President Obama to succeed the previous (Bush-appointed) ambassador to Libya, Gene Cretz (Obama moved Cretz to the position of ambassador to Ghana). Before that, Stevens was the Obama-appointed Special Representative to Libya's National Transitional Council.

He wasn't a holdover in either position from the previous administration.

Stevens has been a long time member of the Foreign Service. But by your rational, Justice Kagan is a member of the Obama Administration.

 

[A'isha]

There's some conflicting statements in that briefing.

No there aren't. The briefing is very clear about how many members were stationed where (five at the compound, and at least six at the annex, though there may have been more that did not go to the compound and remained at the annex when the first attack started), and describes in very specific detail the locations of the five security agents who were at the consulate compound during the first attack.

[EDIT: The part you quoted doesn't conflict with the earlier detailed description of the locations and actions of the five agents at the compound, it just doesn't answer the specific question asked.]

It sounds like Woods and Doherty were part of the five, but at the CIA annex during the attack.

At the time Woods and Doherty were killed (during the second attack, the one on the annex, not the first attack, the one on the consulate compound), all personnel were at the annex - the original five-member consulate team, the six-member rapid reaction team originally based at the annex, and the 8-member reinforcement team from Tripoli. That's why it's hard to figure out which team they belonged to, since they were all at a single location by that point.

 

[A'isha]

Stevens has been a long time member of the Foreign Service. But by your rational, Justice Kagan is a member of the Obama Administration.

Foreign Service is part of the Executive Branch. Kagan is currently a member of the Judicial Branch, separate from Executive. You could say she used to be a member of the Obama Administration when she was Solicitor General, but she hasn't been since taking her position on the Supreme Court.

Stevens was ambassador to Libya specifically because Obama wanted him as ambassador to Libya, not because he was already there and simply wasn't replaced when Obama became president.

 

[Newtons Bit]

Foreign Service is part of the Executive Branch. Kagan is currently a member of the Judicial Branch, separate from Executive. You could say she used to be a member of the Obama Administration when she was Solicitor General, but she hasn't been since taking her position on the Supreme Court.

And the specious arguments continue...

Obama Administration != the entire Executive Branch.

 

[Checkmite]

So, the Ambassador had 5 members on his security team:

Ubben, who was with the Ambassador,
Doherty, at the CIA annex,
Woods, at the CIA annex,
Two others, unknown location​

According to Ubben, he was with the Ambassador and Smith and no one else. Where were the other two?

According to ANTPogo's post there were 9 security personnel at the consulate (not counting the locals' security force), and 25-30 total between the consulate and the annex.

 

[Checkmite]

And the specious arguments continue...

Obama Administration != the entire Executive Branch.

It was when the Egyptian ambassador's unilateral statement about the internet video was declared official Obama Administration policy by Romney...

 

[A'isha]

According to ANTPogo's post there were 9 security personnel at the consulate (not counting the locals' security force), and 25-30 total between the consulate and the annex.

To be fair, the "9" number at the consulate did include the locals. There were five security personnel at the consulate compound, not counting the locals' security force.

And I'm not sure of the 25-30 number is all personnel, or just security personnel. I'm pretty sure there were more security guys than just the 11 described, though, since I doubt that they would leave the annex with no security people at all when they sent the six additional members to help the five already at the consulate compound. They undoubtedly left some behind to protect the annex, meaning that the total number of diplomatic security personnel in Benghazi (not counting locals or the reinforcements from Tripoli) was almost surely higher than 11.

 

[A'isha]

New Detailed Account of Benghazi Attack Notes CIA’s Quick Response

 

[Skeptical Greg]

This actually makes sense:

David Petraeus Tells Lawmakers He Believed Libya Attack Was Terrorism
( But an informed White House spun the story differently to mislead the terrorists .. )

The recently resigned spy chief explained that references to terrorist groups suspected of carrying out the violence were removed from the public explanation of what caused the attack so as not to alert them that U.S. intelligence was on their trail,

But I suspect it may be an effort by Petraeus to snuggle up to the Administration ...

 

[Skeptic Ginger]

I honestly can't believe there is a substantial number of Americans buying into this contrived CT. John McCain has really put his foot in it and will have a hard time cleaning that shoe.