Apparently Ohio was the first state whose ratification put the amendment (I don't remember the number) authorizing income tax over the 3/4 of the states needed for ratification, and some sovcits and tax resisters claim that, because Ohio wasn't really a state, that amendment is void. Unfortunately, there were more states that ratified after Ohio, so, even if it were true that Ohio didn't count, it was still ratified. I don't remember the exact argument that they use to claim that Ohio isn't really a state, but I remember that it is, as with most sovcit nonsense, epically stupid.
From Daniel B. Evans's outstanding, if slightly dated,
Tax Protester FAQ:
When Ohio was preparing for the 150th anniversary of its statehood, researchers discovered that they couldn’t establish the exact date that Ohio became a state, and that there was some confusion on the issue. For example, the Senate Manual (S. Doc. 5, 82d Cong., p. 570) gave the date as March 3, 1803, while the Congressional Biographical Directory (H. Doc. 607, 81st Cong., p. 76, note 9) gave the date as November 29, 1802. Further research showed that Ohio was unique because Congress declared that Ohio would become a state upon fulfilling certain conditions but had never formally declared that the conditions had been met. In admitting other states, Congress either declared that the state would be admitted as of a certain date, or passed an enabling act and then later declared that the state was admitted. In the case of Ohio, Congress passed an enabling act but never formally declared that the conditions of the enabling act had been met, either due to an oversight or due to a belief that a formal declaration was not intended and not needed.
In a 1953 report to Congress, the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress stated that the lack of a formal resolution “may be considered unessential.” (1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2126, 2128.) However, Ohio asked for a formal declaration, sending a new petition for statehood to Washington by horseback (yes, in 1953), and Congress complied (with a certain number of snide jokes), passing a joint resolution that declared Ohio to be one of the United States of America as of March 1, 1803. P.L. 82-204, 67 Stat. 407. The Senate Report to the resolution states that the purpose was “to make formal, legal declaration of the de facto situation with respect to the admission of Ohio as a State of the United States.” Senate Report No. 720, 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2124.
So the fact of the matter was that Ohio was accepted as a state of the United States sometime in 1802 or 1803 and Congress declared the admission to be as of a certain date in 1803, but the declaration was not made until 1953.
The argument that Ohio was not a state until 1953 was rejected in Knoblauch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 749 F2d 200, 201-202 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 474 U.S. 830 (1986), and in Bowman v. Government of the United States, 920 F.Supp. 623, 625 n. 4 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d 88 AFTR2d Par. 2001-5537, No. 00-1689 (3rd Cir. 10/4/2001).
As for the additional states, the argument is that due to minor defects in the text of the amendment, or recordkeeping errors, the ratification bills passed by most of the ratifying states' legislatures are invalid. From
United States v. Thomas:
Thomas insists that because the states did not approve exactly the same text, the amendment did not go into effect. Secretary Knox considered this argument. The Solicitor of the Department of State drew up a list of the errors in the instruments and--taking into account both the triviality of the deviations and the treatment of earlier amendments that had experienced more substantial problems--advised the Secretary that he was authorized to declare the amendment adopted. The Secretary did so.
Although Thomas urges us to take the view of several state courts that only agreement on the literal text may make a legal document effective, the Supreme Court follows the "enrolled bill rule." If a legislative document is authenticated in regular form by the appropriate officials, the court treats that document as properly adopted. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294 (1892). The principle is equally applicable to constitutional amendments. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 42 S. Ct. 217, 66 L. Ed. 505 (1922), which treats as conclusive the declaration of the Secretary of State that the nineteenth amendment had been adopted. In United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457, 462-63 & n. 6 (7th Cir. 1986), we relied on Leser, as well as on the inconsequential nature of the objections in the face of the 73-year acceptance of the effectiveness of the sixteenth amendment, to reject a claim similar to Thomas's. See also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972, 83 L. Ed. 1385 (1939) (questions about ratification of amendments may be nonjusticiable). Secretary Knox declared that enough states had ratified the sixteenth amendment. The Secretary's decision is not transparently defective. We need not decide when, if ever, such a decision may be reviewed in order to know that Secretary Knox's decision is now beyond review.
